Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ERIC HAMILTON, No. 2:25-cv-2575 AC PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER and FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

14 CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL,

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

15 OFFICE, and SACRAMENTO POLICE

DEPARTMENT,

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Defendants.

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19 Plaintiff, a Sacramento County inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaint dated

20 September 1, 2025 and docketed on September 8, 2025. ECF No. 1. The case is referred to the

21 undersigned by operation of E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(17). Before the court is a motion

22 to dismiss filed by defendant California Highway Patrol. ECF No. 5. For the reasons stated

23 below, the undersigned recommends that the motion be granted. The court further finds that the

24 complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as

25 to unserved defendants.

26 I. Background

27 A. Complaint

28 The complaint, ECF No. 1, consists of a handwritten narrative that does not specify

1 individual causes of action. The named defendants are the California Highway Patrol,

2 Sacramento Sheriff, and Sacramento Police Department. Id. at 1.

3 Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on October 18, 2021, by unidentified CHP officers

4 who relied on falsified information provided by the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.

5 The allegedly fabricated evidence included a two-week old criminal complaint whose dates were

6 “manipulated” to make it appear that plaintiff was presently armed with stolen guns. During the

7 incident leading to his arrest, plaintiff was surveilled by drones and subjected to unspecified acts

8 of racism. Plaintiff, who has suffered from mental illness for much of his life, attempted to flee

9 and ran into a concrete wall, knocking himself unconscious. When he came to, he was being

10 viciously attacked by a police dog. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that use of the dog on an

11 unconscious suspect constitutes an excessive of force. Id. at 3.

12 The court construes the complaint as a putative civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

13 B. Procedural History

14 The complaint has not been screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. IFP status was not

15 granted until February 11, 2026, ECF No. 17, after plaintiff was repeatedly ordered to submit a

16 properly supported application, ECF Nos. 3, 7, 9. Despite the fact that the complaint has not been

17 screened and ordered served, the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) appeared and filed the

18 instant motion to dismiss. ECF No. 5.

19 The undersigned granted plaintiff two extensions of time to respond to the motion. ECF

20 Nos. 11, 16. He eventually filed various medical records, ECF No. 19, along with a statement

21 explaining that he suffers from a severe mental health disorder which should excuse any

22 untimeliness, ECF No. 20. CHP filed a notice asserting that plaintiff has never responded to the

23 motion to dismiss. ECF No. 21.

24 II. The Motion to Dismiss

25 A. Overview

26 CHP moves for dismissal on grounds that plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and that it is

27 not subject to suit under § 1983. ECF No. 5. In the interests of justice, the undersigned construes

28 plaintiff’s filings at ECF No. 19 and 20 as a statement that he opposes dismissal. The court will

1 also consider plaintiff’s assertions about his mental health in relation to the timeliness of the

2 petition.

3 B. Legal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

4 “The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal

5 sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

6 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

7 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901

8 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

9 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more

10 than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

11 allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of

13 facts that “merely creates a suspicion” that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of

14 action. Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-35

15 (3d ed. 2004)). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

16 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

17 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

18 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

19 for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

20 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court “must accept as true all of the

21 factual allegations contained in the complaint,” construe those allegations in the light most

22 favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Erickson v. Pardus,

23 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954,

24 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th

25 Cir. 2010). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of

26 factual allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See

27 Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State

28 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001).

1 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave to

2 amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

3 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave

4 to amend may be denied when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent

5 with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.

6 Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly

7 denied ... if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d

8 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).

9 C. The California Highway Patrol Cannot Be Sued Under Section 1983

10 States and their departments are not subject to suit under Section 1983, both because they

11 are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute and because they enjoy Eleventh Amendment

12 immunity from such suit. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)

13 (holding as a matter of statutory construction that a state is not a “person” who can be sued, and

14 noting that sovereign immunity also applies); see also Pittman v. Oregon, Employment Dept., 509

15 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the CHP is not a proper defendant and must be

16 dismissed.

17 D. The Complaint is Untimely

18 CHP argues that the complaint is time-barred. Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s

19 statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Butler v. Nat’l Comm. Renaissance of

20 California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). This statute of limitations is two years in

21 California. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 335.1). A claim under §1983 claim accrues, for the

22 purposes of the starting of the running of the limitations period, when the plaintiff “knows or has

23 reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021,

24 1025 (9th Cir. 2015).

25 Plaintiff’s complaint concerns an arrest and injury that occurred on October 18, 2021,

26 almost four years before this action was filed. All actions of law enforcement officers which are

27 alleged as a basis for liability occurred on or before that date. ECF No. 1. Accordingly, the

28 complaint is time-barred on its face.

1 Plaintiff has provided the court with documentation of his diagnoses of bipolar disorder,

2 depression, paranoia, and anxiety. ECF Nos. 19, 20 at 1-2. He explains that these conditions

3 prevented him from understanding time constraints and legal procedures, and he asks for leniency

4 regarding his late filing. ECF No. 20 at 2. The court lacks the authority to waive timeliness rules

5 out of sympathy for plaintiff’s situation. Although the result may be harsh, it is required by the

6 statute of limitations, which exists to provide finality to litigation and prevent stale lawsuits. As

7 the California Supreme Court has explained:

8 [A] statute of limitations. . . operates conclusively across-the-board.

It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not

9 have merit and also those that do. That it may bar meritorious causes

of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the price of the orderly and

10 timely processing of litigation — a price that may be high, but one

that must nevertheless be paid.

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12 Norgart v. Upjohn, 21 Cal. 4th 383, 410 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

13 For the reasons explained above, CHP’s motion to dismiss should be granted.

14 E. Leave to Amend Would Be Futile

15 Courts should grant leave to amend unless it is clear that such leave would be futile. See

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031; Carrico, 656 F.3d at 1008. Although plaintiff

17 might theoretically be able to substitute individual CHP officers for the state entity defendant by

18 amendment,1 all claims arising from the 2021 arrest would remain time-barred.

19 In light of plaintiff’s proffer of mental health information, the undersigned has considered

20 sua sponte whether the complaint might be amended to include allegations to support equitable

21 tolling. California tolling rules apply here. Butler, 766 F.3d at 1198 (statute of limitations and

22 related tolling rules are borrowed from those of the forum state). To trigger equitable tolling in

23 California, a plaintiff must show (1) “timely notice” of the claim to the defendant; (2) “lack of

24 prejudice” to the defendant; and (3) “reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the

25 plaintiff.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 102 (2008); see also

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27 1 Individual state law enforcement officers may be sued in their individual capacities under §

1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (establishing liability for persons who violate constitutional rights

28 under color of state law).

1 Butler, 766 F.3d at 1204. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff could satisfy any of

2 these criteria, let alone all of them. Indeed, given the extent of the untimeliness, defendants

3 would be prejudiced by the delay even if plaintiff had given timely notice of the claim(s). This

4 would defeat tolling even on a plausible factual basis, which is not present here.

5 California Civil Procedure Code § 352(a) specifically provides for tolling where, at the

6 time the cause accrued, the claimant lacked the legal capacity to make decisions. Mental illness

7 is not the same thing as legal incapacity, however, and nothing in the records plaintiff has

8 provided suggests that he had been found legal incompetent prior to October 18, 2021, when the

9 claim accrued (or at any time thereafter). For all these reasons, the undersigned concludes that

10 the untimeliness of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Accordingly, leave to

11 amend should be denied as futile.

12 III. The Complaint Should Be Summarily Dismissed as to Non-Moving Defendants

13 The above statute of limitations analysis applies equally to all defendants, named and

14 unnamed. Neither the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department nor the Sacramento Police

15 Department has been served or appeared. It is nonetheless apparent that the complaint does not

16 state a claim against them and is not suitable for service.

17 The court notes that the complaint names local law enforcement entities, rather than

18 individual officers, as defendants. Civil rights claims under § 1983 must be brought against the

19 individual officers who violated a plaintiff’s rights. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

20 Cir. 1978). Municipalities and law enforcement agencies are not liable for the actions of their

21 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[t]here is no respondeat

22 superior liability under section 1983”). Municipal entities can be liable only when their policies

23 caused the alleged constitutional violations. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900

24 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, plaintiff’s putative claims against the Sacramento County Sheriff’s

25 Department and the Sacramento Police Department must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

26 1915(e)(2)(B).

27 For all the reasons explained above as to the CHP, amendment as to other defendants

28 would be futile. Even if plaintiff pleaded facts regarding the actions of individual officers, or

1 attempted to assert a Monell claim2 based on some municipal policy, the claims would be time-

2 barred. The untimeliness of the complaint is not a defect that can be cured by amendment.

3 IV. Pro Se Plaintiff’s Summary

4 The magistrate judge is recommending that your case be dismissed because you filed it

5 too long after the 2021 arrest that is the basis of your complaint. The two-year statute of

6 limitations cannot be waived due to your mental illness. The district judge will make the final

7 decision. You may submit written objections to these Findings and Recommendations, following

8 the directions below.

9 V. Conclusion

10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall randomly

11 assign a district judge to this case.

12 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:

13 a. The California Highway Patrol’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED;

14 b. The complaint be dismissed as to all other defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

15 1915(e)(2)(B); and

16 c. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.

17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

18 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days

19 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

20 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a

21 document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

22 Recommendations.” Due to exigencies of the court’s calendar, requests for extension of time

23 are strongly disfavored. Objections need only identify the portion of the Findings and

24 Recommendation to which objection is made. Any response to the objections shall be filed

25 with the court and served on all parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local

26 Rule 304(d). Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

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28 2 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

1 | District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

2 | 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

3 | DATED: August 19, 2026 ~

ALLISON CLAIRE

5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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