Noem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JUAN DIEGO LOPEZ MACIAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-484-J

)

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Juan Diego Lopez Macias, a noncitizen1 and Mexican national proceeding

, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging her detention by U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). United

States District Judge Bernard M. Jones II referred this matter to the undersigned

magistrate judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Respondents filed a

Response and a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, followed by Petitoner’s response to the

motion and Respondents’ reply. (ECF Nos. 9-12). Petitioner also filed a Motion to Expedite

Consideration. (ECF No. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned

recommends the Petition be DENIED as moot because Petitioner is currently subject to

mandatory detention.

1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to

the statutory term ‘alien.’” , 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(3)).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PETITIONER’S CLAIM

Petitioner entered the United States on or about November 6, 2022. (ECF No. 1:3).

On February 28, 2026, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody and while detained in this

jurisdiction, he filed a habeas petition, challenging his detention. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner

is currently detained at the Prairieland Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas.2 In the

Petition, Mr. Lopez-Macias argued that he was improperly being detained under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2) which required mandatory detention and no right to a bond hearing.

ECF No. 1:7-12. As relief, Petitioner asked the Court to immediately release him from

custody, or order a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1:13). On June 10, 2026, an Immigration

Judge granted Petitioner voluntary departure.3 Neither Petitioner nor the Department of

Homeland Security filed an appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). “[T]he primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers

jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear . . . challenges to the lawfulness of

immigration-related detention.” , 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001);

, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Challenges to immigration

2 https://locator.ice/gov/odls/#/results (last visited Aug. 13, 2026).

3 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Aug. 13, 2026).

detention are properly brought directly through habeas.”). “Mootness is a threshold issue

because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to

federal court jurisdiction.” , 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th

Cir. 1996). “Because mootness is a matter of jurisdiction, a court may raise the issue

.”

III. LAW REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLAIMS RELATED TO

PETITIONER’S DETENTION

Prior to the entry of a removal order, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226 govern the

detention of aliens. An alien detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to a bond hearing at

which he can argue to an immigration judge that he should be released while he awaits

removal proceedings because he is not a danger to others or at risk for non-appearance.

, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (“Federal regulations provide that

aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.”) (citing

8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).

“After the pre-removal period concludes, the statutory authority to detain an alien

shifts to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.” , 43 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1188 (D. Colo. 2014).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A), a non-citizen is subject to a 90-day removal period,

where detention is mandatory. at 1189 (“[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the

Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days

. . . . During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)). This shift from the “pre-removal” period under § 1225 and § 1226 to

the “removal” period under § 1231(a) is triggered by the latest of three events:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final;

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order;

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process),

the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). A removal order typically becomes administratively final “upon

the earlier of”: “a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such

order” or “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of

such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). However,

“the decision of the Immigration Judge” may also “become[] final upon waiver of appeal.”

8 C.F.R. § 1003.39; , , No. 3:26-cv-63-

CAB-AHG, 2026 WL 184206, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (“Petitioner was ordered

removed on September 30, 2025, and because he waived his right to appeal, his order

of removal became administratively final the same day.”) (citation omitted).

Here, the Immigration Judge granted Petitioner voluntary departure on June 25,

2026. . Thus, Petitioner’s pre-removal-order period ended 30 days later, July

27, 2026, when the order became administratively final. . As a result, Petitioner

is presently subject to § 1231(a)(2)(A), which mandates detention without bond for 90

days.

IV. DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and

‘controversies.’” , 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2). “In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a [petitioner] must

demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or personal stake, in the

outcome of the action.” , 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This means “an actual controversy must be extant at

all stages of review.” , 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). “If an

intervening circumstance deprives the [petitioner] of a personal stake in the outcome of

the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be

dismissed as moot.” , 569 U.S. at 72 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any

effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”

1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that while this matter was pending,

an Immigration Judge granted Petitioner voluntary departure and the order became

administratively final 30 days later. That development materially alters the statutory basis

for Petitioner’s detention. Prior to finality of the order, Petitioner’s detention was governed

by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Once the order granting voluntary departure became administratively

final, however, his detention became governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 during the removal

period. ; , No. 1:26-cv-00663-KWR-JMR, 2026 WL

1602614, at *2 (D.N.M. June 4, 2026) (holding that “Petitioner is mandatorily detained

pursuant to § 1231” once the time for an appeal had expired following an Immigration

Judge’s grant of voluntary departure to the petitioner).

Because Petitioner is no longer detained pursuant to § 1226, the Court can no

longer grant the relief requested in the Petition. First, Petitioner’s request for a bond

hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is moot. Likewise, Petitioner’s request for release is not

presently cognizable because her detention during the statutory removal period is now

governed by § 1231(a), which authorizes mandatory detention. Because the Court cannot

now order the § 1226 bond hearing requested in the Petition and because Petitioner’s

detention is presently governed by a different statutory framework, no live controversy

remains regarding the claims asserted in the Petition. Accordingly, the Court should

dismiss the Petition as moot.4

V. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS

the habeas Petition as moot.5

The parties may object to this Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any objection must be filed not later than August

20, 2026. The parties are further advised that failure to make timely objection to this

Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and

legal issues contained herein. , 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).

4 If the Court adopts this recommendation, it should terminate ECF Nos. 9 and 13—Respondents’

motion to Dismiss and Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite—as moot.

5 Nothing in this Report and Recommendation prevents Petitioner from realleging any claim if he

remains detained into the post-removal period in violation of the law.

VI. STATUS OF REFERRAL

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates the referral

to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.

ENTERED on August 13, 2026.

SHON T. ERWIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE