Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

AMIYA JUVAIS DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:25-cv-563-GSL-AZ

)

ANDREW SMITH et al., )

)

Defendants. )

FINDINGS, REPORT, AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C)

This matter is before the Court on State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed

by Defendants Gary S. Germann and the State of Indiana (“the State Defendants”)

on January 20, 2026. DE 10. Pro se Plaintiff Amiya Juvais Davis filed three

responses, which were stricken, and then filed a single amended response. DE 13, 20,

23, 49; see DE 43. The State Defendants filed a reply. DE 61. The presiding District

Court Judge referred the motion to dismiss to me for a Report and Recommendation.

DE 31.

This Report constitutes the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). For the following reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS that District Court Judge Gretchen S. Lund GRANT the State

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Background

The Complaint alleges the following: On September 27, 2024, Plaintiff was at

a gas station when a white woman accused Plaintiff of intimidating her, which

Plaintiff believes was racially motivated. DE 1 ¶¶ 89-90. Defendant Andrew Smith,

a police officer with the Portage Police Department, followed Plaintiff home. Id.

¶¶ 26, 96. An additional 10 police officers descended on Plaintiff’s home and searched

through her personal belongings, but they did not arrest her at that time. Id. ¶¶ 98,

100, 103. At Defendant Smith’s instigation, about a week later on October 5, 2024,

Plaintiff was arrested for intimidation based on the earlier gas station incident. Id.

¶¶ 107-08.

Between September 27 and October 14, Defendant Smith appeared at or near

Plaintiff’s home multiple times for no reason, and Plaintiff believed he was surveilling

her. Id. ¶¶ 111-13. Plaintiff felt unsafe in her own home. Id. ¶ 114. Then on October

14, Plaintiff drove home to find Defendant Smith waiting for her. Id. ¶¶ 118, 125-36.

Defendant Smith had not been dispatched there, had not observed any traffic

violation, and did not have a warrant, but when Plaintiff arrived home, Defendant

Smith immediately activated his emergency lights and approached Plaintiff’s car. Id.

¶¶ 126-37.

Plaintiff was afraid and requested they go to the nearby police station or call

Defendant Smith’s supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 142, 144. Smith refused and threatened to

break her car windows and flatten her tires. Id. ¶¶ 149-50, 156-57. He then pulled

out his firearm and pointed it at Plaintiff, ordering her out of her car. Id. ¶¶ 160-62.

Terrified, Plaintiff unlocked her door, and Defendant Smith immediately grabbed

her. Id. ¶¶ 166, 173, 175. He pushed her against the car with enough force to lacerate

her lip. DE 1-1 at 3. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital for treatment and was then

arrested. Id., DE 1 ¶ 3.

Defendant Smith arrested Plaintiff on five charges: (1) possession of

marijuana; (2) operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility; (3) dealer

plate violations; (4) failing to display license or permit; and (5) failure to provide

vehicle registration certificate. DE 1-1 at 4. The charges were false. Id. at 4-5.

Following the arrest, Defendant Germann, a Porter County prosecutor, filed

formal criminal charges against Plaintiff, relied on Defendant Smith’s false police

report, failed to verify facts or conduct any independent investigation, prolonged the

prosecution despite knowing that Plaintiff was innocent, and withheld exculpatory

evidence. DE 1 ¶ 4. He continued the prosecution for more than a year before all

charges were dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.

Plaintiff’s Complaint brings § 1983 and Indiana state law claims for false

arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, assault, battery,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Smith, a second officer on the

scene, the City of Portage, the Portage Police Department, the State of Indiana, and

Prosecutor Germann.1 DE 1 at 5-6. Plaintiff is suing the officers and Defendant

Germann in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 5. She also purports

to bring Monell claims against the City of Portage, the Portage Police Department,

1 Although the Complaint also names the Porter County Prosecutor’s Office and Porter

County, Indiana, as defendants, Plaintiff confirmed at a hearing on May 7, 2026 that she was

not proceeding against them. DE 60 at 1, 3.

and the State of Indiana. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive relief, and

attorney’s fees and costs. Id. ¶ 8.

Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a pleading for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint will

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if it contains allegations that “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Schaumburg,

930 F.3d 812, 821 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). The complaint’s factual

allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, the plaintiffs must allege “only

enough facts” to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Id. at 570. The Court must “accept all well-pleaded allegations of fact as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Alarm Detection Sys., 930 F.3d

at 821.

Pro se complaints are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[p]ro se plaintiffs’ allegations must still

plausibly establish the elements of each cause of action.” Davis v. Target Metal

Blanking, 2026 WL 1998802, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2026).

Discussion

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 16, 2025. DE 1. After the present

motion to dismiss was fully briefed and referred to me for a Report and

Recommendation, Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint, which removes

the State of Indiana as a defendant but retains Defendant Germann. DE 66. As the

Court will explain in a separate order, the allegations in Plaintiff’s proposed amended

complaint are futile as to Defendant Germann. Rather than allow Plaintiff to file the

amended complaint and moot the present motion to dismiss, which would force the

parties to do another round of motion to dismiss briefing, the Court will first

recommend a ruling on the present motion to dismiss, and then in a separate order

rule on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

In the present motion to dismiss, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim against them because the State of Indiana and Defendant

Germann acting in his official capacity are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. DE

10 at 1, DE 11 at 6. They also argue the State of Indiana is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity and Defendant Germann is entitled to absolute prosecutorial

immunity on both the § 1983 claims and state law tort claims. DE 10 at 1, DE 11 at

5-10. They further argue that the Monell claim fails against them because they are

not a municipality. DE 11 at 10-11.

In her response, Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit

against states, and she does not address the Monell argument or the argument that

the State Defendants are not “persons” under § 1983. DE 49 at 7. Plaintiff argues

that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against Defendant Germann in his

individual capacity, nor does it bar injunctive relief against state officials in their

official capacity under the Ex parte Young doctrine. DE 49 at 7. Plaintiff also argues

that Defendant Germann is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because

he acted as an investigator, not a prosecutor. DE 49 at 6.

The Court will address the claims against the State of Indiana and Defendant

Germann in turn.

I. Claims against the State of Indiana

The first basis to dismiss the federal claims against the State of Indiana is

Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.

XI. In other words, the Eleventh Amendment “bar[s] litigation in federal court by

private entities against a state.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n,

183 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999). However, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not

apply “if Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity from suit through an

unequivocal expression of its intent to do so and pursuant to a valid exercise of its

power,” or if the state itself has “waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit

in federal court.” Id. at 563.

Those exceptions to sovereign immunity do not apply here because “Congress

did not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Woods

v. New Albany Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 3398938, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1979)). And Indiana has not waived sovereign

immunity and consented to suit in federal court. Thus, the federal claims against the

State of Indiana should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t

of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 531-33, 535 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that dismissal on

Eleventh Amendment grounds is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

Further, the § 1983 claims must be dismissed because the State of Indiana is

not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Section 1983 states, “Every person who,

under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law . . . .” (emphasis added). It is well-established that a

state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and cannot be held liable under that

statute. See, e.g., Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Thus, all § 1983 claims against

the State of Indiana, including the Monell claim, must be dismissed. See Will,

491 U.S. at 70.

Finally, the state law claims against Indiana must be dismissed because the

Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of state law claims in federal court

against the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98,

117 (1984) (stating that “a State may not be sued without its consent” in federal

court); see also Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2016). “[A] state

may consent to suit against it in federal court,” but its consent must be “unequivocally

expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99. Plaintiff seeks to bring tort

claims against the State of Indiana, but the Indiana Tort Claims Act expressly states

that Indiana does not waive Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and does not

consent to suit in federal court. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(f); see also Zwilling v.

Indiana, 2016 WL 1627707, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 2016) (explaining that Indiana

Tort Claims Act’s consent to suit in state courts does not waive Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity in federal courts). Since Indiana has not consented to suit in

federal court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against

the State of Indiana.

II. Claims against Defendant Germann

The claims against Defendant Germann in his official capacity must be

dismissed for the same reasons as for the State of Indiana. “[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a

suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State

itself.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citation omitted). Thus, “lawsuits brought against

employees in their official capacity . . . may also be barred by sovereign immunity.”

Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 (2017); see also Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d

966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to state

officials acting in their official capacities”).

“Whether a particular official is the legal equivalent of the State itself is a

question of that State’s law . . . .” Garcia, 24 F.3d at 969. Indiana prosecutors “are

state officials, as the State provides salaries to prosecutors and provides them with

legal representation when they are sued.” Woods v. New Albany Police Dep’t, 2010

WL 3398938, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Ind. Code §§ 33-39-6-5(d), 33-23-

13-3). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 suits against Indiana prosecutors

in their official capacity for damages. See Woods, 2010 WL 3398938, at *4 (dismissing

§ 1983 claims for money damages brought against Indiana prosecutors in their official

capacity).

The State Defendants do not argue that Defendant Germann is entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity, but they do argue that the State of Indiana is. Since

the claims against Defendant Germann in his official capacity are really brought

against the State of Indiana, Defendant Germann in his official capacity is likewise

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiff argues she can bring claims against Defendant Germann in his official

capacity for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). DE 49 at 7.

In theory, that is true. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 183 F.3d at 563. But Plaintiff has

not met the standard to bring those claims. The court in Woods v. New Albany Police

Department explained the standard well:

[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar a claim against a

state official acting in his official capacity when injunctive

relief rather than monetary damages are sought. See Kroll

v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 908 (7th Cir.

1991). Declaratory relief is likewise not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,

757, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) . . . . However,

injunctive relief for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment

is limited to prospective relief. Parents for Quality Educ. v.

Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1475, 1481

(N.D. Ind. 1987). Additionally, declaratory or injunctive

relief is not available when its only purpose is to “establish

liability for past infringement of [plaintiff’s] rights so as to

entitle [plaintiff] to damages.” Ill. Dunesland Pres. Soc’y v.

Ill. Dept. of Natural Res., 584 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2009).

Declaratory or injunctive relief is only proper if there is a

continuing violation of a federal law. Green v. Mansour,

474 U.S. 64, 73, 106 S. Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985).

Woods v. New Albany Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 3398938, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2010).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a continuing violation of federal law or

seek prospective relief. Thus, the prospective relief exception to Eleventh Amendment

immunity does not apply, and all § 1983 claims against Defendant Germann in his

official capacity should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity.

As for the federal claims against Defendant Germann in his individual

capacity, Defendants argue Germann is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Plaintiff responds that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not apply because

Defendant Germann acted as an investigator when he failed to verify facts in the

police report, check on the status of Plaintiff’s driver’s license and insurance, obtain

lab results, and review body camera footage.

The Court finds that Defendant Germann in his individual capacity is entitled

to absolute prosecutorial immunity on all federal claims. “In determining whether

actions taken by government officials enjoy absolute immunity or qualified immunity,

the Supreme Court applies a ‘functional approach . . . which looks to the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Jones v.

Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). Prosecutors are “absolutely immune in civil suits for

damages under section 1983 for activities intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Jones, 998 F.3d at 787 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). In other words, “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune for

actions they undertake in their capacities as prosecutors, even including malicious

prosecution unsupported by probable cause.” Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 612

(7th Cir. 2017); see also Smith v. Power, 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]bsolute

immunity shields prosecutors even if they act maliciously, unreasonably, without

probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.”) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). “In contrast, prosecutors acting in the role of administrator or

investigator are entitled only to qualified immunity.” Jones, 998 F.3d at 787.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Germann failed to investigate and withheld

exculpatory evidence while knowing Plaintiff was innocent. These allegations fall

squarely within the prosecutorial function. The failure to investigate during a

prosecution is not investigation. See Everling v. Ragains, 2015 WL 1319707, at *4

(S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2015) (“[I]nadequate investigation is not an actionable claim.”);

Nielsen v. Lees, 2023 WL 346052, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 2023) (“The claim that [a]

prosecutor failed to investigate is not of constitutional dimension.”) (citations

omitted); cf. Srivastava v. Newman, 12 F. App’x 369, 370-72 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming

dismissal of inadequate investigation claim due to prosecutorial immunity). Further,

Brady violations “breach a defendant’s trial rights and are, thus, inherently

prosecutorial in nature.” Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff

has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendant Germann acted as an investigator

rather than a prosecutor. Thus, Defendant Germann is entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity on the federal claims for damages brought against him in his

individual capacity.

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief does not save her individual-capacity

suit against Germann either. The Complaint does not indicate any basis for

prospective relief, as the prosecution was dismissed in 2025 and there are no factual

allegations indicating continuing violations or imminent harm to Plaintiff. Thus,

Plaintiff lacks standing to seek an injunction. See Garcia, 24 F.3d at 969; see also City

of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983).

The state law claims against Defendant Germann, which are based on the

same factual allegations as the federal claims, also fail. “Prosecutorial immunity

under Indiana law is even broader than under federal law.” Everling v. Ragains,

2015 WL 1319707, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2015). “When Indiana prosecutors act

‘reasonably within the general scope of authority granted’ to them, they receive

absolute immunity.” Id. (quoting Foster v. Pearcy, 387 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ind. 1979));

see also Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Indiana law is more

generous to the prosecutor, because it has rejected the Supreme Court’s distinction

between prosecutorial and administrative or investigative functions for purposes of

immunity, as long as the prosecutor is acting within the scope of his or her

authority.”). A prosecutor’s scope of authority includes initiating court proceedings.

Woods v. New Albany Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 3398938, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2010).

Since prosecutorial immunity under Indiana law is broader than federal law,

and since the allegations that Defendant Germann filed criminal charges, failed to

investigate, withheld evidence, and continued the prosecution for more than a year

all fall within the scope of authority granted to prosecutors, Defendant Germann is

entitled to prosecutorial immunity under Indiana law.

To sum up: all claims against the State of Indiana should be dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; furthermore, all

§ 1983 claims against the State of Indiana could also be dismissed because Indiana

is not a “person” that can be sued under § 1983. All claims against Defendant

Germann in his official capacity should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, because those claims are really against

the State of Indiana; and all claims against Defendant Germann in his individual

capacity should be dismissed due to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court RECOMMENDS that District Court

Judge Gretchen S. Lund GRANT the Defendants Gary S. Germann and the State of

Indiana’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 10].

This Report and Recommendation is submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties shall have fourteen (14)

days after being served with a copy of this Recommendation to file written objections

thereto with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file a timely objection will result in waiver

of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the

Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); United States v. Cox,

54 F.4th 502, 513 (7th Cir. 2022); Davis v. Kayira, 938 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2019).

So ORDERED this 13th day of August, 2026.

/s/ Abizer Zanzi

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ABIZER ZANZI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: Plaintiff Amiya Juvais Davis (U.S. Mail)