Opinion

Tufano

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Aug 12, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK TUFANO CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-542

Plaintiff,

v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)

ROMAN STEPHEN NELSON, et

al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

Frank Tufano, is a “YouTuber” who promotes the “Carnivore

Diet.” In several previously filed lawsuits in this Court, all of which

have been dismissed, Tufano alleged that Paul Saladino, M.D. has

maliciously copied and used Tufano’s life work and discredited him. See

Tufano v. Saladino, et al., No. 3:25-CV-262, 2025 WL 5100589, (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:25-

00262, 2025 WL 5100590 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2025) (“Tufano I”); Tufano

v. Saladino, No. 3:25-CV-1400, 2026 WL 796584, (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3,

2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-CV-1400, 2026 WL

793305 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2026) (“Tufano II”); Tufano v. Saladino, No.

4:25-CV-1960, 2025 WL 4102909, (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 4:25-CV-01960, 2026 WL 288410 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 3, 2026) (“Tufano III”). In these previous matters, Tufano has

also alleged that several others conspired with and aided Saladino in

stealing Tufano’s work and discrediting him.1 Tufano apparently made

the same or similar accusations against Saladino in other forums as

well. On November 7, 2020, Saladino brought suit against Tufano in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,

Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346, and won a default

judgment enjoining Tufano from, inter alia, “making public statements

referencing that [Saladino] copied, plagiarized, stole or otherwise

improperly used [Tufano’s] or any other third party’s work” on January

30, 2025. See Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at *1. In his previous actions

against Saladino in this Court, Tufano also alleged that Jeffrey Davis,

Esq., who represented Tufano in the SDNY case and David D. Lin, Esq.,

1 Included in the list of alleged co-conspirators are “the Illuminati,” the

Freemasons, White Plains Lodge #473, Jeffrey Davis, Esq., and David

D. Lin, Esq. Tufano added the Honorable Karoline Mehalchick as a

defendant in Civil Number 4:25-CV-1960 because she dismissed Tufano

who represented Saladino in the SDNY case, conspired together and

with others to fraudulently obtain the judgment against Tufano in that

case.2

In this, his fourth case along the same lines, Tufano now alleges

that two of the federal judges involved in the Southern District of New

York case, District Judge Nelson S. Roman and Chief Magistrate Judge

Judith C. McCarthy (the “Judicial Defendants”) acted outside of their

judicial capacity and conspired with the other Defendants to obtain a

fraudulent judgment against him. (Doc. 1-1). He asserts that the

Judicial Defendants are “members of Freemasonry, a secret society with

religious beliefs that, to Frank Tufano’s understanding, require them to

strongly oppose any outsider.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Because Frank Tufano

does not belong to Freemasonry, he asserts the Defendants acted to

harm him. (Id.). Plaintiff also names White Plains Lodge #473 as a

defendant because “all decisions were placed in the hands of an

individual judge who may or may not have attended meetings at a

2 Tufano alleged that these lawyers, and all lawyers, are members of the

Freemasons and other secret societies who take loyalty oaths and

Tufano belongs to no such groups.

Masonic Lodge to discuss case decisions in secrecy.”3 (Doc. 1-1, p. 10).

These very claims were the subject of Tufano I, II, and III.

Currently pending are Motions to Dismiss filed by the Judicial

Defendants and the White Plains Lodge. Because Judges Nelson S.

Roman and Judith C. McCarthy are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity and because no cognizable claim has been pled against White

Plains Lodge #473, it will be recommended that the Motions to Dismiss

filed by these Defendants be granted. Additionally, the Court notes

that the claims raised herein against White Plains Lodge #473,

Saladino, Davis and Lin have been addressed on their merits and

dismissed with prejudice in Tufano II, it will therefore be recommended

that the issue of claim preclusion be raised sua sponte, and that the

claims against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

3 In addition to the Judicial Defendants and White Plains Lodge,

Plaintiff again names Jeffrey Davis, Davil Lin and Paul Saladino as

defendants. Davis, Lin and Saladino have not filed a responsive

pleading to the Complaint and service appears to be an issue.

II. Procedural Background

The Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the

Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on February 6, 2026.

(Doc. 1-1). The Judicial Defendants, Roman Stephen Nelson and Judith

C. McCarthy, filed a Notice of Removal on March 4, 2026. (Doc. 1). On

March 11, 2026, the Judicial Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and

a supporting brief on March 25, 2026. (Docs. 3 and 4). Plaintiff filed an

opposing brief on March 31, 2026. (Doc. 5). On June 16, 2026, White

Plains Lodge filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting brief.

(Docs. 11 and 12). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on June 29, 2026.

(Doc. 14). Both motions are ripe for disposition.

III. Factual Background

As noted above, in a trilogy of previously filed cases, Plaintiff

alleged, inter alia, that the judgment obtained against him in the

Southern District of New York in Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No.

7:20-CV-9346 was fraudulently obtained. In those three cases, Plaintiff

alleged that the lawyers involved in the SDNY case, Davis and Lin,

conspired with others consistent with their membership in secret

societies. Here, Plaintiff reasserts his claims against the lawyers

(although those claims have been thrice dismissed) and adds two SDNY

judges as well as a Lodge where the judges and others may have met.

The instant Complaint contains a detailed recitation of the oath

purportedly taken by members of the Freemasons, but only conclusory

allegations against the moving Defendants. With regard to the Judicial

Defendants, Plaintiff alleges:

Judicial officials have acted outside their judicial

capacity and have violated Frank Tufanos civil rights[.]

All defendants are members of Freemasonry, a secret

society with religious beliefs that, to Frank Tufano's

understanding, require them to strongly oppose any

outsider.

Because Frank Tufano chooses not to believe in

Freemasonry, he is being discriminated against for his

personal and religious beliefs. These defendant

individuals acted as Religious Freemasons to

intentionally harm Frank Tufano for not belonging to

Freemasonry himself.

These defendant individuals achieved a fraudulent

judgment against Frank Tufano, in a lawsuit that should

be considered a hate campaign against Frank Tufano, by

conspiring together as freemasons to violate his civil

rights.

(Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-5).

The Complaint then described, in detail, various oaths

purportedly taken by Freemasons. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Plaintiff asserts

that the Defendants “conspired together to commit fraud against Frank

Tufano filing perjured documents and submitting fraudulent financial

statements to find Frank Tufano ‘guilty’ of civil statutes he did not

commit. Judicial officials knowingly acknowledged perjured service

documents to enter a default against Frank Tufano, resulting in no

trial, and a fraudulent judgement against Frank Tufano.” (Id. at p. 8).

Plaintiff avers that “judicial officials knew that all of the documents and

actions committed by Paul Saladino and his attorney were fraudulent,

however refused to acknowledge this fraud to harm Frank Tufano by

finding him guilty of crimes he did not commit.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts

that the Judicial Defendants ignored the malpractice and legal fraud

committed against him.” (Id. at p. 9). He avers that the Defendants

“involved in ‘Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.7 :2020cv09346’

conspired against Frank Tufano oppressing him of his First and

Seventh Amendment Rights.” (Id.). The only reference, although

tangential, to Defendant White Plains Lodge is that: “The members of

this case had no intention of giving Frank Tufano a fair trial as it is

irrelevant to their sworn oaths to defend their fellow freemason

members, all decisions were placed in the hands of an individual judge

who may or may not have attended meetings at a Masonic Lodge to

discuss case decisions in secrecy.” (Id. at p. 10).

IV. Discussion

The claims raised in the instant Complaint mirror those raised in

Tufano I, II, and III, only here, the Judicial Defendants are added.

After setting forth the applicable legal standards, each claim will be

addressed seriatim after which judicial immunity and claim preclusion

will be discussed.

A. Standard Applicable in Deciding a 12(b)(6) Motion

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means

that a complaint may be dismissed if it does not present sufficient facts

to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss

may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”

Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

The court must accept both the plaintiff’s allegations and any

reasonable inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Monroe v. Beard, 536

F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, it need not accept “‘unsupported

conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.

2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and supporting

them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those

statements the presumption of truth. McNeilly v. City of Pittsburgh, 40

F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)).

When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court

should conduct a two-part analysis: 1) separate the factual and legal

elements of a claim; and 2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the

complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim

for relief.” Id. (internal citation removed). The court may consider facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated

into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007). This analysis requires the court to look at the claims

on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial experience and

common sense.” McNeilly, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 650. The court will not be

reaching legal conclusions, but instead will merely determine “whether

the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the

allegations.” Id. (citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.

2000)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

i. Fraud

Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for the tort of Fraud. In support,

he alleges the Defendants: “conspired together to commit fraud against

Frank Tufano filing perjured documents and submitting fraudulent

financial statements to find Frank Tufano ‘guilty’ of civil statutes he did

not commit. Judicial officials knowingly acknowledged perjured service

documents to enter a default against Frank Tufano, resulting in no

trial, and a fraudulent judgement against Frank Tufano.” (Id. at p. 8).

As explained in Tufano II:

In Pennsylvania, “[f]raud is actionable in tort.” V-Tech

Servs., Inc. v. St., 72 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa. Super. 2013). “The

elements of fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, are

(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the

transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of

its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false;

(4) with intent of misleading another into relying on it;

(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6)

the resulting injury was proximately caused by the

reliance.” Miller v. Daly, No. 14 EDA 2025, 2025 WL

3765442, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2025) (quoting

Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1072 (Pa.

Super. 2003)). “The essence of fraud is a

misrepresentation fraudulently uttered with the intent to

induce the action undertaken in reliance upon it, to the

damage of its victim.” Id. “Additionally, under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there is a heightened

pleading standard for fraud, as required by Rule 9(b),

which provides that ‘a party must state with particularity

the circumstances constituting fraud.’” DCD Nucar Alni

LLC v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., No. 5:25-CV-4327,

2025 WL 3516667, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)) (emphasis in the original).

“Consequently, it is necessary to plead or allege the date,

time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject

precision or some measure of substantiation into a fraud

allegation and must allege who made a

misrepresentation to whom and the general content of

the misrepresentation. The purpose of the heightened

standard is to provide a defendant with notice of the

precise misconduct with which he or she is charged and

to prevent false or unsubstantiated charges.” Id. (cleaned

up).

Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 4. Here, as in Tufano II, Plaintiff has

failed to allege a viable cause of action under Pennsylvania law for the

tort of fraud. His allegations of fraud are conclusory. Beyond broad

and sweeping allegations, Plaintiff has not made any particular

allegations to support his claim. He has not alleged that any of the

Defendants knowingly made a false statement to him, intending that he

rely on it, that he relied on it and was therefore damaged. See Tufano

II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 4. The Court need not accept “unsupported

conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.

2013) (quotation omitted). Because the Complaint fails to plead the

necessary elements of the tort of fraud and simply makes a bare-boned

legal conclusion, it has not stated a cognizable claim for fraud.

ii. Tortious Interference

Plaintiff asserts a claim for tortious interference alleging that the

Defendants’ actions “caused Frank Tufano to lose his business, be

removed from his childhood home, and permanently damage his

physical and mental health.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 8). Plaintiff continues that

“[a]ctions which were filed to address this in the previous case were

ignored by the corrupt judicial officials Nelson Stephen Roman and

Judith C. Mc[C]arthy.” (Id.). This claim fails for the same reasons that

Plaintiff’s similar claim for Tortious Interference failed in Tufano II:

To the extent that a claim for Tortious Interference is

brought, it must fail because the essential elements of the

tort are not alleged. “A claim for tortious interference

with a business relationship requires the plaintiff to

plead the following elements: ‘(1) a prospective

contractual relationship; (2) the purpose or intent to

harm the plaintiff by preventing the relation from

occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on

the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of

actual damage resulting from the defendant's conduct.’ ”

Smart Commc'ns Holding, Inc. v. Glob. Tel-Link Corp.,

No. 1:21-CV-01708, 2024 WL 2158676, at *4 (M.D. Pa.

May 13, 2024)(quoting Brokerage Concepts v. United

States Healthcare, 140 F.3d 494, 529–30 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants

intended, without justification, to interfere with a

contractual or potential contractual relationship.

Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 5. Because Plaintiff has not even

alleged the existence of a business relationship or prospective

contractual relationship that was interfered with, but rather asserts

general allegations of damages not remotely related to an existing or

prospective business relationship, a cognizable claim has not been

stated.

iii. Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff next alleges that “judicial officials knew that all of the

documents and actions committed by Paul Saladino and his attorney

were fraudulent, however refused to acknowledge this fraud to harm

Frank Tufano by finding him guilty of crimes he did not commit.” (Doc.

1-1, p. 8). “‘The tort of intentional non-disclosure has the same elements

as intentional misrepresentation except in the case of intentional non-

disclosure, the party intentionally conceals a material fact rather than

making an affirmative misrepresentation.’” Tufano II, 2026 WL

796584, at *6 (quoting Bortz v. Noon, 556 Pa. 489, 499, 729 A.2d 555,

560 (1999) (cleaned up)). Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim fails

for the reasons similar to those outlined above in connection with

Plaintiff's claim of intentional misrepresentation (fraud). Plaintiff does

not allege that any of the named Defendants withheld material

information that was “material to the transaction at hand; (3) made

falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is

true or false; (4) with intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5)

justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting

injury was proximately caused by the reliance.” Miller v. Daly, supra at

*4. Accordingly, this claim is subject to dismissal.

iv. Civil Conspiracy

As in Tufano I, II, and III, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants

conspired to obtain an illegal judgment against him. But as in Tufano

I, II, and III, the instant Complaint makes only speculative and

conclusory allegations. Indeed, the Plaintiff asserts that he “believes

that Defendant parties conspired with court officials to have an

agreement to conduct a lawful act accomplished through unlawful

means.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 8, ¶ 18) (emphasis added). As previously stated in

Plaintiff’s prior cases:

To the extent Tufano is asserting a state law claim of civil

conspiracy, under Pennsylvania law, he must allege “(1)

a combination of two or more persons acting with a

common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful

act by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose; (2) an

overt act done in pursuance of the common purpose; and

(3) actual legal damage.” Tegg Corp. v. Beckstrom Elec.

Co., 650 F. Supp. 2d 413,426 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing

Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987–88

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).

Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 t * 7; Tufano I, 2025 WL 5100589. Plaintiff

again has made only vague and conclusory allegations which do not

support a claim of civil conspiracy.

v. Plaintiff's Claim Under 18 U.S.C. § 241

Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants involved in his SDNY case

“conspired against Frank Tufano oppressing him of his First and

Seventh Amendment Right.” This claim too was addressed in Tufano I,

II and III. In Tufano II and III, the undersigned quoted Judge Bloom,

who issued the Report and Recommendation in Tufano I, as follows:

As we explained in a prior case Tufano brought

before this court, “criminal statutes, such as [18

U.S.C.] § 241, do not provide for a private right of

action.” Tufano v. Frankie’s Free Range Meat

Conspirators, Civ. No. 3:24-CV-846, 2024 WL

5318269, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2024) (citing

Walthour v. Herron, 2010 WL 1877704, at *3

(E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (collecting cases and

concluding that § 241 does not provide a private

right of action)). Accordingly, Tufano’s claim for

criminal conspiracy fail as a matter of law.

2025 WL 4102909, at *4 and 2026 WL 796584, at *7 (quoting Tufano v.

Saladino, et al., No. 3:25-CV-262, 2025 WL 5100589, *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb.

28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:25-00262,

2025 WL 5100590 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2025). Because, as explained to

Plaintiff now for the fifth time, a federal criminal statute does not

provide the basis to form a private cause of action. Accordingly, this

claim is frivolous and fails to state a cognizable claim.

C. Judicial Immunity

As fully described above, the Complaint contains no concrete

allegations against the Judicial Defendants. The Complaint speculates,

in equivocal terms, that the Judicial Defendants may belong to secret

societies and may have taken oaths which would require them to make

decisions against Tufano. However, the actions complained of deal with

the adjudication of “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.7 :2020cv09346.”

(See Doc. 1-1, p. 9, ¶ 23). Although the Complaint makes a bald

assertion that the Judicial Defendants “acted outside their judicial

capacity and have violated Frank Tufanos civil rights,” (doc. 1-1. p. 4),

the Complaint makes no allegations against either Judge Nelson or

Judge McCarthy to support that conclusion.

“It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper

administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the

authority vested in him or her, shall be free to act upon his or her own

convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences.” Crisdon v

City of Camden, No. CV 26-482, 2026 WL 2225494, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3,

2026) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting Bradley

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)). “Accordingly, judges are

‘absolutely immune’ from suits arising out of acts performed in their

judicial capacity, even where those acts are alleged to have been

erroneous, malicious, or in excess of authority.” Id. (quoting Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354 (1978).

“Both judges of general and limited jurisdiction, including

magisterial district judges, are entitled to judicial immunity.”

McClinton v. Colon, No. 3:25CV1482, 2025 WL 2618774, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 10, 2025) (citing Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir.

2000) (emphasis added). “Generally, where a court has some subject

matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient justification for immunity

purposes.” Id. (cleaned up). The Court must “engage in a two-part

inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions

not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not

immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768.

Because Defendants Judge Nelson S. Roman and Judge Judith C.

McCarthy “enjoy[] absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in

[their] judicial capacity, we must decide whether the Complaint set

forth allegations that, taken as true, establish that the application of an

exception to the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is above the

speculative level.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 114 (3d Cir.

2014) (cleaned up). The actions complained of on the part the Judicial

Defendants involve the adjudication of Saladino’s case against Tufano

in the Southern District of New York in Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ.

No. 7:20-CV-9346. “A judge is immune from all liability for actions

taken in his or her judicial capacity, even those alleged to have been

done maliciously or corruptly, unless such action is taken in the absence

of all jurisdiction.” Reid v. Munley, No. 25-3028, 2026 WL 1972180, at

*1 (3d Cir. July 8, 2026). Here both judges sit in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York. Their actions in

adjudicating Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346 clearly

fall within the scope of their judicial duties and they acted within their

proper jurisdiction. Accordingly, they are absolutely immune from the

claims brought in this suit.

D. Claim Preclusion

1. Claim Preclusion Can be Raised Sua Sponte

“Though res judicata is an affirmative defense, it is appropriate

for a court to raise the issue sua sponte if the court is on notice that it

has decided the issue previously. Curbison v. United States, No. 25-

2893, 2026 WL 788901, at *1, n. 2 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (citing

Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)). See also Garcia v.

Dauphin Cnty. for Childen & Youth, No. 1:25-CV-00693, 2026 WL

453116, at *5, n. 2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2026), report and recommendation

adopted, 2026 WL 450397 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026) (“The Third Circuit

has advised that in certain circumstances, sua sponte consideration of

claim preclusion is appropriate.”); 47th & 7th LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

No. CV 25-1930, 2025 WL 1400410 (D.N.J. May 14, 2025) (dismissing

complaint with prejudice based on claim preclusion raised sua sponte);

Guerrero v. United States, No. 1:23-CV-01490, 2023 WL 8456122, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2023) (“courts may raise the issue of claim preclusion

sua sponte”) (citing King v. East Lampeter Twp., 69 F. App’x 94, 95–96

(3d Cir. 2003); Cook v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-00331, 2019 WL

3233154, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2019), aff'd, 846 F. App'x 161 (3d Cir.

2021) (same). Accordingly, “if a court is on notice that it has previously

decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua

sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully

consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based

solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice

defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary

judicial waste.” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (cleaned

up).

2. The Claims Raised Here Were Previously Adjudicated

Tufano I, II and III raise nearly identical claims as those

presented here. Tufano I, 3:25-CV-262, named Paul Saladino, M.D.,

Jeffery Davis, Esq., White Plains Lodge #473, and The Illuminati as

defendants. In that case, Tufano alleged that Saladino stole his life’s

work and that Saladino, Davis and the Illuminati conspired against him

to obtain the judgment in “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.

7:2020cv09346.” He alleged that White Plains Lodge #473 was the

likely place of the secret meetings. Tufano I was dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim by Order dated April 29, 2025, and

Plaintiff was given leave to file an Amended Complaint. (3:25-CV-262,

Doc. 7). On June 11, 2025, the case was dismissed without prejudice

because Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. (Id. Doc. 9).

Tufano II followed. Tufano II named Paul Saladino, M.D., Jeffrey

Davis, Esq., David Lin, Esq., White Plains Lodge #473 and The

Illuminati as defendants. Tufano II raised the identical claims raised

here, viz., Fraud, Tortious Interference, Fraudulent Concealment, Civil

Conspiracy and 18 U.S.C. § 241. (25-1400, Doc. 1). The factual

allegations in Tufano II and the instant case are similar in that

Plaintiff alleged there, as he does here, that the Defendants are secret

society members who conspired against him to fraudulently obtain a

judgment against him in the SDNY case. While Judge Nelson is not

named as a Defendant in Tufano II, Plaintiff alleged there, as he does

here, “Judge Roman Stephen Nelson ignored the blatant legal

malpractice being committed against Frank Tufano by both his own

lawyer and Paul Saladino's counsel.” (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 52). Plaintiff also

made the same allegations against White Plains Lodge # 473 as being

the place “where conversations pertaining this case likely occurred.”

(Id. at p. 6, ¶ 34). The gravamen of the instant Complaint was raised in

Tufano II. There, Plaintiff alleged:

Associates of the case "Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.

:2020cv09346," agreed in secrecy to plan all decisions

against Frank Tufano in favor of Paul Saladino, MD.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Paul Saladino and Frank Tufano's

own attorney, likely met in secret meetings, held to their

Freemason, Illuminati, or Secret Society Oaths, loyalty to

a greater cause than the court to collude against Frank

Tufano and strip him of his right to fair judicial process.

(25-CV-1400, Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 45). As relief, Plaintiff also sought a stay in

the SDNY case. All of the claims raised in Tufano II – including the

identical claims raised here – were addressed on the merits and

dismissed with prejudice by Order dated March 20, 2026. (Id. Doc. 9).

Tufano III, 4:25-CV-1960, was filed while Tufano II was still

pending. In Tufano III, Plaintiff again sued Paul Saladino, M.D.,

Jeffery Davis, Esq., David Lin. Esq., White Plains Lodge #473 and The

Illuminati and added Judge Mehalchick and Union Lodge #291 as

defendants. Plaintiff again claimed, inter alia, that Saladino stole

Tufano’s life work and that the Defendants conspired against him in the

SDNY case. Tufano alleged there, as he does here, that “Judge Roman

Stephen Nelson ignored the blatant legal malpractice being committed

against Frank Tufano by both is lawyer and Paul Saladino’s counsel.”

(25-CV-1960, Doc.1, p. 11, ¶ 60). He also sought a stay of the SDNY

civil case, “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No. 7:2020cv09346.” Judge

Mehalchick, was sued because she dismissed Tufano I. Because Judge

Mehalchick is a resident of Pennsylvania, complete diversity

jurisdiction did not exist, and therefore Tufano III was dismissed

without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. (Id., Doc. 7).

3. Claim Preclusion Applies

Claim preclusion, also referred to as res judicata, protects

defendants from the risk of “repetitious suits involving the same cause

of action once a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final

judgment on the merits.” Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir.

2021) (quoting United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307,

315 (2011) (internal citations omitted)). But in addition to protecting

the interests of defendants, claim preclusion also promotes public

interest and conserves scares judicial resources. See B & B Hardware,

Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 147 (2015) (“The idea is

straightforward: Once a court has decided an issue, it is forever settled

as between the parties thereby protecting against the expense and

vexation attending multiple lawsuits conserving judicial resources, and

fostering reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of

inconsistent verdicts.”) (cleaned up).

The prior judgment's preclusive effect extends not only to the

claims that the plaintiff brought in the first action, but also to any

claims the plaintiff could have asserted in the previous lawsuit. See In

re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). This is because a party

may not split a cause of action into separate grounds of recovery and

raise the separate grounds in successive lawsuits; a party must raise in

a single lawsuit all the grounds of recovery arising from a single

transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together.

Mars, Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki–Kaisha, 58 F.3d 616, 619–620

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2)

(1984) and Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Claim preclusion consists of three elements: (1) a final judgment

on the merits in a prior suit; (2) a subsequent suit based on the same

cause of action; and (3) involvement of the same parties or their privies

in both suits. Ndungu v. Att'y Gen., 126 F.4th 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2025).

Here, all of the elements for claim preclusion to apply are met. In

Tufano II the same claims raised here were addressed on their merits

and they were dismissed with prejudice. The claims raised in Tufano II

are identical to those presented here. Paul Saladini, Jeffrey Davis,

David D. Lin and White Plains Lodge #473 were also defendants in

Tufano II. In Tufano II, the Plaintiff alleged that Saladino, Davis and

Lin conspired with each other and court officials to obtain a fraudulent

judgment against him in the Southern District of New York in the case

of Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346. Tufano II alleged

that the conspirators—secret society members acting in according with

secret society beliefs—likely met at White Plains Lodge #473. The

claims and Defendants in Tufano II are identical to those raised here.

The only difference here is that the Plaintiff named the judges involved

in the SDNY case as defendants, whereas in Tufano II allegations

against Judge Nelson were made but he was not a party to that action.

Plaintiff may not avoid the preclusive effect of Tufano II by bringing the

exact claim against Saladino, Davis, Lin and the Lodge by simply

naming other members of the alleged conspiracy that was the subject of

Tufano II.

Accordingly, the claims against Defendants Saladino, Davis, Lin

and White Plains Lodge #473 should also be dismissed with prejudice.

E. Leave to Amend

The Third Circuit has voiced a strong preference for allowing the

filing of an amended complaint in cases where the original complaint is

subject to dismissal. In Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 153 (3d Cir.

2025), the Court instructed:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs

courts to grant motions for leave to amend “when

justice so requires.” So leave to amend should be

liberally given unless amendment would be

inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,

400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And

because courts have a special obligation to be

“more forgiving of pro se litigants,” Garrett v.

Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this

Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro

se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the

court rules upon defendants' motions to dismiss,”

Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir.

1990) (collecting cases).

Leave to amend in this case, however, would be futile for numerous

reasons. The Judicial Defendants, as subjects to absolute immunity

and amendment, would not alter that conclusion. Similarly, because

the Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause of action based on a criminal statute

that does not provide for a private remedy, amendment would not alter

that outcome. Moreover, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Saladino,

Davis, Line and White Plains Lodge have already been adjudicated on

the merits and dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may not assert

them yet again. Accordingly, it is recommended that leave to amend

not be granted.

V. Conclusion

Frank Tufano believes that Paul Saladino stole Tufano’s life’s

work and conspired against him along with fellow members of secret

societies. He maintains that part of the conspiracy against him was the

obtaining of a fraudulent judgment in the Southern District of New

York. Plaintiff has now brought the identical claim in this Court four

times. However, these claims have previously decided and the latest

attempt to recharacterize the same claims must fail. As previously

explained to Plaintiff, if he is dissatisfied with outcome of his case in the

Southern District of New York, his remedy is in that Court of in the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Attempts to revive the claims

here are futile.

VI. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:

1) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Judith C. McCarthy

and Roman Stephen Nelson (Doc. 3) be GRANTED and the

claims against them dismissed with prejudice;

2) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant White Plains Lodge

#473 be GRANTED and claims against it be dismissed with

prejudice;

3) The claims against Defendant Saladino, Davis and Lin be

DISMISSED with prejudice based on claim preclusion;

4) Leave to amend not be granted, and;

5) The Clerk of Court directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: August 12, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella

Leo A. Latella

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK TUFANO CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-542

Plaintiff,

v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)

ROMAN STEPHEN NELSON, et

al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered

the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 12, 2026.

Any party may obtain a review of the Report and

Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s

proposed findings, recommendations or report

addressing a motion or matter described in 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a

recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner

case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and

serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,

written objections which shall specifically identify

the portions of the proposed findings,

recommendations or report to which objection is

made and the basis for such objections. The

briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2

shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made and may accept, reject,

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.

The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing

only in his or her discretion or where required by

law, and may consider the record developed

before the magistrate judge, making his or her

own determination on the basis of that record.

The judge may also receive further evidence,

recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions.

Dated: August 12, 2026 s/ Leo A. Latella

LEO A. LATELLA

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.