Whitehead

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

DAVID LOUIS WHITEHEAD CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-1236

VERSUS JUDGE VAN HOOK

MARTIN LEMELLE ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

David Louis Whitehead (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, has a history of filing

frivolous complaints and vexatiously filling the record with multiple meritless motions.

He has been sanctioned by this court and the Fifth Circuit, and since 2012 the clerk of court

has been ordered to decline any civil complaint submitted by Plaintiff unless it was first

presented to a district judge and the judge specifically authorized in writing that the

complaint could be filed. Plaintiff commenced this civil action in state court. The

defendants removed it based on federal question jurisdiction, so Plaintiff now has a case in

this court despite the limitation on him filing new civil actions.

Plaintiff’s state court petition asserted breach of contract and other claims related to

the termination of his employment as a professor at Grambling State University. The case

has been in federal court less than a year, but there are already 155 docket entries for what

should be a run-of-the-mill employment case. The court has already ruled on several

motions, but there are currently pending more than 20 motions, most of which were filed

by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was warned early in these proceedings that “if he continues to file frivolous,

repetitive, or otherwise meritless motions in this case then this civil action may be subject

to summary dismissal as a sanction for such abusive litigation.” Doc. 33. Plaintiff has

nonetheless continued to file such motions. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended

that this civil action be dismissed with prejudice as a sanction for vexatious and abusive

litigation.

Litigation History

Plaintiff’s filings in this court began in Whitehead v. Fedex, 10-cv-1120. Plaintiff

alleged in that suit, which was removed from a Bossier Parish state court, that he was

assaulted by a FedEx employee while he was a customer at a FedEx store in the District of

Columbia. He alleged that FedEx destroyed the store’s tape of the incident and conspired

with its attorneys to deny Plaintiff information about the tape. Judge Foote dismissed the

case based on improper venue. Whitehead v. FedEx Office Inc., 2010 WL 4103707 (W.D.

La. 2010).

Judge Foote “recognize[d] that Plaintiff has a history of filing frivolous complaints

and is in fact enjoined from filing suit in a court of proper venue.” She cited a number of

published decisions as evidence:

See Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2009 WL 1491402 (E.D. Va.

May 26, 2009) (enjoining Plaintiff from filing any new civil actions in the

Eastern District of Virginia without first seeking and obtaining leave of

court); Whitehead v. Viacom, 233 F.Supp.2d 715 (D.Md.2002) (finding

Plaintiff “is clearly a vexatious litigant” with “blatant disregard for this court

and the judicial system as a whole”); Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,

145 F.Supp.2d 3 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordering Plaintiff seek leave of Court before

any filing of his be accepted by the Clerk of Court after finding he “has no

regard for our judicial system or the drain on its resources caused by his

actions”); Whitehead v. Wickham, 2005 WL 2874975 (D.C. Super., Sept. 6,

2005) (enjoining Plaintiff from filing any new cases without leave of court

after recognizing his “long history of filing vexation, harassing, and

duplicative lawsuits in the District and throughout the country.”). Plaintiff

is cautioned that sanctions may ensue if he files further frivolous pleadings

in this action.

Plaintiff’s complaints in those earlier cases typically alleged that movie studios or

publishers stole his ideas for use in films or publications, or that public officials were

engaged in wide ranging conspiracies directed at him. He sought bizarre relief such as an

injunction against the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor1, and he filed almost 100 motions

in one case.2 One judge wrote that Plaintiff’s self-proclaimed purpose for bringing multiple

copyright lawsuits was to extract nuisance settlements and that Plaintiff intended to

continue a barrage of motions and force the defendants to incur substantial legal fees until

litigation became so expensive that they would pay him to go away. Whitehead v.

Paramount Pictures, 145 F.Supp.2d at 5.

After Judge Foote dismissed Whitehead v. Fedex, Plaintiff filed a barrage of

requests to reopen, reconsider, and the like. He requested recusal lists for the district’s

judges and, after his request was denied, made repeated renewals of the request to the point

that he was barred from filing any pleading relating to the court’s recusal list. Plaintiff

continued to plague the court with frivolous filings even seven years after his case was

closed. Judge Foote sanctioned him $100.00 and directed the clerk of court to not accept

1 Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 366 Fed. Appx. 457 (4th Cir. 2010).

2 Whitehead, 2009 WL 1491402 at *3.

any new filings from Plaintiff until the sanction was paid. Plaintiff continued his efforts in

the Fifth Circuit, where he moved to recuse Judge Edith Jones and asked to bypass the Fifth

Circuit and directly petition the Supreme Court. All of his requests were denied, and he

eventually voluntarily dismissed his appeal.

While the Whitehead v. Fedex proceedings were ongoing, Plaintiff filed Whitehead

v. White & Case, LLP, 12-cv-0399. The 145-page complaint named as defendants

approximately 35 judges, a number of attorneys and law firms, the District of Columbia

Federal Judicial Nomination Committee, the District of Columbia, the Democratic

National Committee, and delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton. Other defendants included

Apple Computer, Inc., Microsoft, Inc., officials at Howard and Georgetown universities,

Harvard University, City Group, Bank of America, and other financial institutions.

Another large group of defendants were from the entertainment industry and included Tom

Cruise, Columbia Pictures, Inc., Walt Disney Company, Home Box Office, Mike Myers,

Black Entertainment Television, Sean Combs, Tyler Perry, Mel Gibson, and USA Today

opinion columnist Dewayne Wickham.

The judges were generally accused of massive, malicious misconduct, usually

relating to rulings in prior actions that were dismissed around the country. Plaintiff did not

name Judge Foote as a defendant, but he alleged that she was a material witness regarding

fraud in his FedEx case. Part of the alleged wrongdoing in Plaintiff’s past litigation was

attributed to a conspiracy between “unnamed defendant” President Clinton and Hollywood

celebrities such as Tom Cruise and David Geffen. The lengthy allegations about the

alleged judicial wrongdoing were simply incapable of meaningful summary. Suffice it to

say that they were bordering on unintelligible, and any rational person who read the

complaint would immediately come to the conclusion that the writer was either mentally

ill or, as suggested in a prior suit, intentionally drafting a complaint that was as vexatious

and burdensome as possible in an effort to extract a financial settlement.

Plaintiff alleged that “Unnamed President George W. Bush” retaliated against him

for writing his college paper on the Persian Gulf War. Plaintiff also claimed to have penned

a play, “The Big Bad Wolf v. Ms. Little Red Riding Hood - The Mike Tyson Story,” which

somehow led to retaliation by President Bush, who appointed judges and other government

officials who rejected Plaintiff’s many judicial and administrative complaints. Plaintiff

alleged that his play was the basis for the majority of Tyler Perry’s successful films, and

the “same plot was used for James Cameron’s film ‘Titanic’ characters, with Jack, Rose,

Cal, and Rose’s Mother, for Mike Tyson, Robin, and her mother.”

Plaintiff alleged in paragraph after paragraph that various officials at universities,

corporations, and government agencies had various conflicts of interest based on stock

holdings, personal relationships, campaign contributions, or the like, all of which somehow

violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Many of the allegations went back several years, beyond

any possibly applicable statute of limitations. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Howard

University retaliated against him in 1990—22 years prior to the suit—because Plaintiff ran

against Jessie Jackson for District of Columbia shadow senator. Plaintiff added that the

paper he wrote about the Persian Gulf War, while enrolled at Howard, was accessible by

Time Warner’s Dick Parsons and led to the film Wag the Dog, produced by Time Warner

subsidiary New Line Cinema. Defendant law firm White & Case was alleged to represent

Time Warner, and the judge who granted summary judgment for Howard University in a

lawsuit based on the above-alleged retaliation was said to be “connected to” White & Case.

This was just one of the several conclusory assertions of such conspiracies and conflicts of

interest that were found throughout the lengthy complaint.

Plaintiff alleged that Mike Myers and other entertainment industry defendants stole

his script called “A New World” and used it to create the Austin Powers films. Plaintiff

made a similar allegation in one of his affidavits that Tom Cruise and other entertainment

industry officials infringed on a book he wrote called “Brains, Sex & Racism in the CIA

and the Escape” to create the Mission Impossible films.

The undersigned reviewed the complaint in Whitehead v. White & Case and

determined that it warranted swift dismissal to avoid any further waste of the court’s time

or the incurring of attorney fees by the many defendants. The allegations were deemed

patently frivolous and vexatious. It was noted that Plaintiff had not been deterred by earlier

warnings by Judge Foote and other judges against frivolous filings, and he had an

incredible track record of filing similar, frivolous actions around the country. It was

recommended that the clerk of court be ordered to decline to file any civil complaint

submitted by Plaintiff unless the complaint was first presented to a district judge of this

court and the judge had specifically authorized in writing that the complaint may be filed.

Judge Haik adopted that recommendation and entered judgment in May 2012.

Judge Haik’s judgment was entry number 45 on the docket in 12-cv-0399. Plaintiff

then began filing various requests to reconsider, request congressional records, compel

testimony of a judge, obtain recusal lists, and the like. There were 151 docket entries by

the time it ended with the Fifth Circuit imposing sanctions of $200.00. Along the way,

things got so bad that Judge Haik ordered the clerk to not accept any future filings of any

kind from Plaintiff without prior judicial approval.

Plaintiff argued in the Fifth Circuit that several judges of that court were disqualified

to handle his petition, asked that they order Justice Scalia to issue a statement, and again

demanded district court recusal lists. The Fifth Circuit noted that Plaintiff had “inundated

this court with multiple motions and filings that are largely incomprehensible or fanciful”

and that he had filed more than 20 motions despite warnings of sanctions. The court did

ultimately impose a $200 sanction and prohibited Plaintiff from filing any new appeals or

actions in the Fifth Circuit pertaining to 12-cv-0399 until the sanction was paid.

Plaintiff returned in Whitehead v. Netflix, 17-cv-0225, when he filed a motion for

leave to file an antitrust and fraud case against several defendants based on an allegation

that an attorney submitted a 30-film proposal that was declined by entertainment industry

defendants. Judge Drell reviewed Plaintiff’s litigation history and ordered the complaint

stricken. He noted that the complaint appeared to be a duplicate of prior frivolous suits

filed in this court and across the country. Multiple additional filings followed, along with

another trip to the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court denied a request to compel the

Department of Justice to seize copyrighted works, unseal an alleged federal investigation

involving over 100 judges relating to the massive theft of Plaintiff’s copyrights, denied

recusal requests, and rejected other similar demands. That case alone required almost four

years of judicial attention.

Plaintiff also filed Whitehead v. Parish of Caddo, 17-cv-0306. Plaintiff alleged in

that case that Caddo Parish would not provide him a copy of video footage of an accident

that occurred at a library when Plaintiff walked into an object and allegedly strained his

neck. Judge Drell denied Plaintiff permission to file the complaint.

Plaintiff next filed Whitehead v. Buttigieg, 22-cv-0385, a case which began in the

Southern District of New York and alleged that the Department of Transportation violated

the First Amendment, the ADA, and a host of other state and federal laws by disagreeing

with an opinion that Plaintiff expressed about the Dred Scott case. The case was transferred

to this district, after which Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.

Plaintiff returned in Whitehead v. Grand Canyon University, 24-cv-0423. He

asserted claims of race and age discrimination, retaliation, conspiracy, cyber theft, and

other claims against Grand Canyon University and an individual who resides in Arizona.

The complaint appears to be based on actions allegedly taken while Plaintiff was enrolled

in an online class. Judge Doughty reviewed the matter, including Plaintiff’s history of

sanctions, and dismissed the action for lack of the required advance permission. Plaintiff

was also ordered to pay a sanction of $500 for failure to abide by orders of the court. The

clerk of court was directed not to accept any new suits from Plaintiff until the sanction was

paid in full. Judge Doughty also ordered that the clerk of court “shall accept no further

filings of any kind from David Louis Whitehead unless the filings have first been presented

to the Chief Judge of this Court and the Chief Judge has specifically authorized in writing

that they may be filed.” Thus, the preauthorization requirement was extended from new

civil actions to filings of any kind.

This Civil Action

Plaintiff filed this civil action in state court against Grambling State University and

its president, Mr. Martin Lemelle. Plaintiff alleged that the university terminated his

employment after the school year that ended in May 2024. Plaintiff alleged that the

university did not have any grounds to terminate his employment, but Mr. Lemelle

retaliated because Plaintiff had filed a bar complaint against Lemelle’s uncle, William

Hughey. The complaint invoked state law claims such as breach of contract and unjust

enrichment, but it also specifically cited 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and other federal

statutes. The defendants removed the case based on federal question jurisdiction.

Plaintiff first filed motions in an effort to have the case remanded to state court. The

court entered an order (Doc. 8) that explained exactly how Plaintiff could achieve that goal

by filing an amended complaint that deleted all federal claims and references to federal

law. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 24), but he invoked the same federal

statutes as well as RICO and the First Amendment. Plaintiff also filed a request for entry

of default, a RICO statement, a motion for recusal, a motion for emergency unsealing of

grand jury findings, and the like.

The court entered an order (Doc. 33) that addressed some of the motions and noted

that this case had found its way to federal court only because it escaped the ban on new

filings by arriving here as a removed case. The court stated that the previous ban did not

directly affect this case, but given Plaintiff’s lengthy history of frivolous lawsuits and

motions he was “cautioned that if he continues to file frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise

meritless motions in this case then this civil action may be subject to summary dismissal

as a sanction for such abusive litigation.”

Plaintiff did not heed that warning. Several motions, including a request for default

judgment, were filed and denied. Then, beginning April 15, 2026, which was less than

four months before this writing, Plaintiff submitted the following 40 or so filings (typos

and misspellings in the original):

Doc. 76: Motion to Modify the Court’s Order Relating to Document 72,

Associated with Documents 53, 53(1), (2) and (3) and Defendant’s

Response

Doc. 77: Amended Motion to Modify the Court’s Order Requesting

Consolidation of Document Number 72 (Second Amended Complaint

(B) with Document Number 75 (Exhibits) and Others Related Records,

If Necessary

[The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on untimeliness, lack of

individual liability under certain statutes, and failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted.]

Doc. 85: Plaintiff’s Motion to be Allowed to Respond to Defendant’s 12 B (B)

Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Filing an Answer to the

(Second Amended Complaint (B) with Document Number 75

(Exhibits), Request to File Summary Judgment Should Defendants File

an Answer, or in the Alternative Allow Parties to Conduct a Rule 26 (f)

Discovery Conference

Doc. 87: Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Prov. 12 B (6)

Doc. 88: Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal of Judicial Panel due to Appearance or

Actual Conflicts of Interest Relating to Magistrate Judge’s Historical

“Apple” Financial Interest Tied to William Hughey, Xlibris, Amazon,

Google, Lemelle, Grambling State University, and Judge’s Prior Office

Referral to the FBI for an Investigation Concerning Plaintiff’s Civil

Action Cases, Including In Re: David Louis Whitehead v. White &

Case LLP, et al. 12cv399, Associated with Judge Richard Haik and

Magistrate Hornsby, with the Latter Jurist Presiding on this Case.

Doc. 90: Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for an Extension of Time of Respond to

Defendfant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Prov. 12 B (6)

Doc. 91: Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendfant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to Fed. R. Prov. 12 B (6), Six Days with no Service of Paper Copy

[The court issued an order (Doc. 94) denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal (Doc. 88).]

Doc. 96: Motion for Reconsideration on Recusal

Doc. 98: Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Consolidation of his Second Amended

Complaint (B) DKT. 72 to be Attached with his Exhibits DKT. No. 53,

which became DKT. No. 75 Based on Clerk’s Office Error and Parties

Consent

Doc. 101: Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Rick Gallot,

Grambling State University, Martin Lemelle, Board of Trustees and

Louisiana U/L System’s Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Based on the Following Discussion,

Complaint, Affidavit, and Exhibit Attachment of Records

Doc. 102: Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

to Strike

Doc. 103: Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Serve Lemmy Akoma

and David Kaul of Grambling State University

[The court granted Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to serve and gave Plaintiff until

July 17, 2026 to serve defendants Akoma and Kaul. Doc. 105.]

Doc. 106: Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply Memorandum to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

FRCP 12 (B) (6) #83 Citing Misrepresentation and/or Fraud for Failure

to Disclose Consent Agreement Pertaining to Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint DKT. 72 and Exhibit DKT. 75, & Sanctions

Doc. 108: Plaintiff’s Motion to Attach Consent Statement to His Motion to Strike

Defendant’s Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12 (B) (6) #83…

Doc. 109: Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify His Amended Motion to Consolidate His

Second Amended Complaint (B) DKT. No. 72 with His Exhibits DKT.

No. 75.

Doc. 110: Motion for Extraordinary Leave to Amend Third Amended Complaint

Pursuant to Rule 15 (A), 15 A (2) and Rules 16 (Good Cause) and 16

(B)

Doc. 111: Emergency Motion to Replace Page Numbers 2 Through 11 of the

Third Amended Complaint as a Correction

Doc. 113: Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply

Doc. 114: Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

to Strike Defendant’s Reply Memorandum No. 104, with Separate

Motion to Strike

Doc. 115: Plaintiff’s Amended Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition

to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply Memorandum No.

104, with Separate Motion to Strike

Doc. 117: Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Allow DKT. No. 75 (Exhibits) be

Attached to Second Amended Complaint (B) Document Number 72

Consented by the Parties and Request an Immediate Ruling

Doc. 118: Motion for Default Judgment (Rule 55 - Default Judgment) Against

Defendants Grambling State University, Rick Gallot, Martin Lemelle,

Louisiana State University System, Board of Trustees Failure to File an

Answer to Amended Complaints

Doc. 120: Plaintiff’s Second Amended Motion to Consolidate his Amended

Complaint DKT. No. 72 with his Exhibits DKT. No. 75

Doc. 121: Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate his Various Motions to Strike

Defendants Pleadings and Request for Sanctions for Defendants’

Misrepresentation

Doc. 123: Motion to Disqualify the Office of Attorney General of Louisiana in the

Above Captioned Case Based on Legal Conflicts of Interest or

Appearance of a Conflict of Interest Associated with Grambling State

University, Martin Lemelle, William Hughey and Amazon Contracts

Tied to University Louisiana System and Defendant Rick Gallot and

Others

Doc. 125: Plaintiff’s Motion for Adversary Misconduct – Undue Influence

Pursuant to Rule 60 b (3) Involving Defendant’s Activities in

Shreveport, Louisiana Attempting to Influence the Court in Their

Favor, Requesting the Court to Enter Undue Influence Order Striking

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a Sanction

Doc. 127: Plaintiff’s Motion for Added Time to Serve Defendants Akoma and

Kaul, Requesting 7 Days from July 17, 2026, to Allow Process Server

to Serve Adverse Parties

Doc. 128: Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply Memorandum

Doc. 129: Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Adversary Misconduct – Undue

Influence Pursuant to Rule 60 b (3) Involving Defendant’s Activities in

Shreveport, Louisiana Attempting to Influence the Court in Their

Favor, Requesting the Court to Enter Undue Influence Order Striking

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a Sanction

Doc. 131: Plaintiff’s Second Amended Motion for Adversary Misconduct –

Undue Influence Pursuant to Rule 60 b (3) Involving Defendant’s

Activities in Shreveport, Louisiana Attempting to Influence the Court

in Their Favor, Requesting the Court to Enter Undue Influence Order

Striking Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a Sanction

Doc. 136: Motion for Temporary Retraining Order Requesting Backpay and

Reinstatement Concerning Unlawful Termination of Employee with

Disability and Retaliation in Violation of Louisiana Whistle Blower Act

Doc. 137: Motion for Injunctive Relief Requesting Backpay and Reinstatement

[Plaintiff filed proof of service on defendants Akoma and Kaul. Doc. 133.]

Doc. 138: Plaintiff’s Amended Execution of Service on Defendants Lemmy

Akoma and David Kaul Conducted by process Service in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, Service Performed on or about July 16, 2026, Filed with the

Court on July 17, 2026. See Attached Records.

Doc. 139: Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff Motion to Disqualify the Office of the Attorney General of

Louisiana (RD #123)

Doc. 141: Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Adversary Conduct

[Defendants Kaul and Akoma filed a Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages in their

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 142.]

Doc. 144: Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants Request for Leave to File

Memorandum to Motion to Dismiss

Doc. 145: Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant’s

Third Motion to Dismiss in Reference to Defendants Akoma and Kaul

Et Al

[The court granted Kaul and Akoma’s motion for leave to file excess pages (Doc. 146),

and Kaul and Akoma filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 147).]

Doc. 150: Plaintiff’s Amended Objection to Defendant’s Motion to File a

Memorandum Motion to Dismiss and Request for Judgment

Doc. 151: Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants Motion to File a Memorandum

Motion to Dismiss and Deny Defendant’s Request for Judgment Due to

Undue Influence, Fraud, Misconduct and Conflicts of Interest,

Requesting Sanctions Denying Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Doc. 153: Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Judgment in Reference to

Defendants Akoma and Kaul Et Al

Doc. 154: Plaintiff’s Affidavit Supporting his Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint and Disqualification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 28

U.S.C. Section B (4) (Apple and Comcast) and Financial Interest-

Dealings with Department of Education (Student Loan)3

3 This filing included a copy of the undersigned’s financial disclosures. Plaintiff points to

a student loan with the Department of Education and ownership of Apple stock. He

contends that recusal is required because the DOE and Apple have a relationship with

Grambling or other persons who Plaintiff has targeted in this case or others.

Analysis

A district court has inherent authority to dismiss a civil action with prejudice if a

litigant has acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process. Ben E. Keith Co. v.

Dining All., Inc., 80 F.4th 695, 702 (5th Cir. 2023). Such a sanction does not require a

showing that the opposing litigant was prejudiced because the court invokes its inherent

power to vindicate its own interest, not the interest of the opposing litigant. Id. at 701. In

addition to finding that the litigant acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process,

the court must find that lesser sanctions would not serve the best interest of justice. Id. at

702.

The facts set forth above are more than sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff has

acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process. He has filed multiple motions

that can be attributed only to bad faith or some form of lack of self-control. Multiple judges

of this court and the Fifth Circuit have warned Plaintiff about such filings, they have

sanctioned Plaintiff for such filings, and this court specifically warned Plaintiff in this case

that he risked dismissal of this civil action if he continued to file frivolous, repetitive, or

otherwise meritless motions. He has nonetheless continued to do so, and there is zero

chance that any sanction other than dismissal would end this madness.

Every filing by Plaintiff requires the time and attention of multiple persons. The

judges, the clerk of court employees, and other court staff have already spent numerous

hours in connection with Plaintiff’s several filings in this case. This should be a fairly

straightforward employment case that would not stand out from any of the several others

before the court. But Plaintiff’s lengthy, repetitive, and confusing filings make it by far

the most ridiculously complicated such case. His submissions have consumed far too many

resources of the court, not to mention the time required of the defense attorneys who are

also government employees who have important and meritorious cases to address.

Plaintiff’s filings have consumed far more than his share of the resources of the court and

the community, and he has delayed justice for citizens who have legitimate business before

the court. A sanction of dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted in this civil action

is well warranted and is the only way to bring an end to this proceeding without further

waste and abuse of judicial resources.

Accordingly,

It is recommended that all of Plaintiff’s claims asserted in this civil action against

all named defendants be dismissed with prejudice as a sanction based on the inherent power

of the court.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an

extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the

District Judge at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar

that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See

Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 12th day of August,

2026.

Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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