Opinion

Trapani

Court: District Court, N.D. New York
Filed: Sep 11, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DAMIAN R. TRAPANI,

Plaintiff, 1:25-CV-01479

V. (GTS/PJE)

ST. PETER’S HOSPITAL OF THE CITY OF

ALBANY, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Damian R. Trapani

9 Avenue C

Geneva, New York 14456

_| Plaintiff pro se

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

Plaintiff pro se Damian R. Trapani’ purported to commence this action on

October 22, 2025, with the filing of a complaint. See Dkt. No. 1. As plaintiff did not pay

the filing fee or apply for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the Court

administratively closed the case. On December 1, 2026, plaintiff filed an application for

"| leave to proceed IFP and the Court reopened the case. See Dkt. Nos. 4, 5. On

January 5, 2026, plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration in support of his IFP

application. See Dkt. No. 6. The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff's submissions and

Plaintiff has commenced other actions in this District: (1) 1:10-CV-1353 (TJM/RFT), Trapani v. Carney,

et al.; (2) 8:23-CV-01433 (LEK/DJS), Trapani v. Sypniewski, et al.; (3) 9:18-CV-805 (CFH), Trapani v.

Dagostino, et al.; (4) 9:21-CV-681 (LEK/ML), Trapani v. Annucci, et al.; 9:14-CV-556 (TJM/TWD), Trapani

v. Bonafede, et al.; (5) 9:14-CV-683 (GTS/CFH), Trapani v. Cuomo, et al.; (6) 1:25-CV-1846 (LEK/DJS),

Trapani v. Spniewski, et al.

concludes he is financially qualified for leave to proceed IFP. See Dkt. Nos. 4, 6.

Accordingly, plaintiffs IFP application is granted.?

ll. Legal Standards

28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal

(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Thus, it is a court’s responsibility to determine that a plaintiff

may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed further with his

action.” Praileau v. Fischer, 930 F. Supp. 2d 383, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).

Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his

submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they

suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Second Circuit stated,

our cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se

submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se

litigant’s allegations, or arguments that the submissions

themselves do not suggest, that we should not excuse

frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro

se status does not exempt a party from compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . .

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks, citations, and footnote omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,

537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Although detailed allegations are not required at the

pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants

2 Plaintiff is advised that IFP status does not apply to any other costs or expenses associated with this

action, including, but not limited to, copying fees.

with notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which these claims are

based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

Further, “pro se pleadings still must comply with . . . the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.”* Kastner v. Tri State Eye, No. 19-CV-10668 (CM), 2019 WL 6841952, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019) (quoting Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994));4 see also

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading shall contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” “a short and plain statement of

the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ... and ...a demand for the relief sought. . . .”).

complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too a heavy

burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no

meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v.

Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). As the Second Circuit has held, “[w]hen a

complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has

the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861

m|F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However, “[d]ismissal . . . is usually

reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” /d. (citations

omitted).

3 Hereafter, “Fed. R. Civ. P.”

4 All unpublished cases cited in this Report-Recommendation and Order, unless otherwise noted, have

been provided to plaintiff. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Under Rule 8, a complaint shall contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’; and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.”

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, a “court must

accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable

"| inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Dallio v. Hebert, 678 F. Supp. 2d 35, 54 (N.D.N.Y.

2009) (quoting Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

_,|inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /qbal, 556 U.S. at

678. The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to

permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an

adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.”

Burrell v. DOCCS, 655 F. Supp. 3d 112, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Powell v. Marine

Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Spinner Consulting LLC v.

m| Stone Point Cap. LLC, 623 B.R. 671, 675 (D. Conn. 2020) (noting that while “detailed

allegations are not required . .. , conclusory assertions are insufficient), aff'd, 843 F.

App’x 411 (2d Cir. 2021). A complaint that fails to comply with these pleading

requirements “presents far too a heavy burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a

comprehensive defense[,] and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the

sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).

Ill. Complaint

Plaintiff provides that on July 30, 2024, he was transported to St. Peter’s Hospital

Emergency Room in Albany, New York, “after ingesting crack cocaine.” Compl. at 3.

Plaintiff was “lucid” and “request[ed] activated charcoal and close observation.” /d.

Plaintiff contends that hospital staff “negligently and maliciously denied or ignored”

plaintiff's request, informing him “that the hospital no longer administered activated

charcoal for narcotics ingestion.” /d. Plaintiff was “placed in a crowded emergency

department waiting area, publicly exposing his sensitive medical condition to other

patients.” /d. Plaintiff contended that he eventually “began to experience drug-induced

delirium, heart palpitations, and sharp chest pain” for which he “repeatedly sought help

from nurses and security, but was met with open hostility and rudeness.” /d. At some

point, plaintiff “fell from his wheelchair and later from a bed in a hallway, screaming that

he was having a heart attack.” /d. “Despite clear emergency, hospital staff continued to

delay treatment, prioritizing unnecessary X-rays over life saving intervention.” /d.

“[A]n unnamed female security guard, Defendant Jane Doe, who was formerly or

is currently a Correction Officer with the Schenectady County Sheriff Department,”

approached plaintiff in the hallway, stating “with open hostility,” “you think we don’t know

m|who you are. We remember you from jail.” Compl. at 3. Plaintiff contends that Jane

Doe’s statement “was a direct reference” to plaintiff's twenty-five year history “of

challenging social injustices imposed against prisoners and detainees” as a “prolific

litigant and advocate, fighting for law library materials, recreational reading materials,

and proper living conditions at the Schenectady County Correctional Facility,” resulting

in three successful civil lawsuits against Schenectady County and the State of New

York, winning two appeals, and “circumvent[ing] convictions on several felony cases,

including felony assault charges brought against him by correction staff employed by

the Schenectady County Sherriff Department at the Schenectady County Correctional

facility.” /d. at 3-4. Plaintiff contends that Jane Doe’s statement was “a deliberate,

conspiratorial act of retaliation for his protected First Amendment rights.” /d. at 4.

While plaintiff was “in a state of drug-induced delirium,” a nurse physically

assaulted him. Compl. at 4. “When [plaintiff] regained consciousness he was being

held down by multiple nurses and security personnel, who surrounded him with

clenched fists and open hostility.” /d. “Defendants then forcibly injected Plaintiff with a

sedative against his will, without informed consent, while he was restrained.” /d.

Plaintiff contends that “Defendant Police Officers, were present and actively

_,| participating in the physical restraint.” /d. The police officers “conspired with the private

defendants to restrain Plaintiff and deny his requests to press charges against the

hospital staff.” /d.

After receiving the sedative, “Plaintiff was taken to an empty room, handcuffed,

and strapped to a bed, where a doctor eventually administered activated charcoal. The

doctor’s reluctance suggested he was acting under duress and not out of professional

m| care.” Compl. at 4.

Plaintiff provides that he wishes to bring claims pursuant to (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act for failure to provide “appropriate

medical screening and stabilizing treatment” resulting in “severe personal injuries, and

(3) Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act for discriminating against him for his

disability of substance use disorder by “deny[ing] him full and equal enjoyment of the

goods, services, facilities, and privileges of the hospital on the basis of his perceived or

actual disability” insofar as “[t]he denial of activated charcoal, the hostile and rude

treatment by staff, and the subsequent unlawful restraint and sedation.” Compl. at 7.

Plaintiff argues that the Police defendants “subjected Plaintiff to an unreasonable

“| seizure and the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” /d. at 4. He contends that the police defendants “actively conspired”

with the St. Peter's defendants “to restrain Plaintiff and deny his rights to press charge

against the hospital staff.” /d.

He also seeks to bring the following state law claims pursuant to this Court's

supplemental jurisdiction: (1) Assault and Battery, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional

_,| Distress, (3) Medical Malpractice & Negligence, (4) Invasion of Privacy in violation of

New York State Mental Hygiene Law 33.13, (5) “Negligent Hiring, Retention, and

Supervision,” and (6) “Respondeat Superior.” Compl. at 8. Within his complaint,

plaintiff also requests this Court issue sanctions against the St. Peter’s defendants for

their alleged failure to “preserve and retain requested relevant hospital video and

surveillance footage.” /d.

tri Plaintiff? contends that St. Peter’s Hospital; St. Peter’s Health Partners;

Jane/John Does #1-15; Sean Keane, Manager of Security at St. Peter’s Hospital;

Dennise Allen, Security Guard at St. Peter’s Hospital; Erica Brant, Security Guard at St.

Peter’s Hospital (collectively, St. Peter’s defendants, where appropriate) conspired with

5 Plaintiff contends that he brings his complaint “by and through his counsel”; however, plaintiff has

appeared in this action pro se.

the City of Albany, City of Albany Police Department, Doe Police Commander, City of

Albany Police Department; Doe City of Albany Police Sergeant; and Does #3-6,° City of

Albany Police Officers to deny him care in retaliation for plaintiff's “extensive history as a

pro-se litigant and advocate for prisoner and detainee rights.” Compl. at 1-2.

Plaintiff contends that the municipal defendants are liable “because the

unconstitutional acts of their officers were committed pursuant to “a custom or policy of

the municipality” which “includes, but is not limited to, a failure to properly train and

supervise police officers in their interactions with private hospitals and individuals

experiencing medical emergencies, as well as a policy of deliberate indifference to the

rights of detainees and individuals known to challenge the government.” Compl. at 5.

Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in compensatory damages; punitive damages of

_,| $4,000,000 “against all Defendants for their malicious, willful, and wanton conduct{,]”

unspecified “Damages for the deprivation of his civil rights,” “Reimbursement for all

significant medical expenses and other financial losses,” and costs and fees. Compl. at

IV. Analysis

A. 1983 Claims pursuant to Monell

1. State Actor: Conspiracy or Joint Action

As plaintiff implicitly acknowledges, the St. Peter’s defendants are not state

actors, however, he contends they “engag[ed] in a willful and concerted joint action, with

the City of Albany Police Department to unlawfully restrain, sedate, and imprison

Plaintiff[,]” officers “active[ly] participat[ed] in the physical restraint” and “actively

6 Plaintiff refers to the unidentified police defendants as “Michael Moes # 1-6. For ease of reference, the

undersigned refers to these parties as Does.

conspired” with the St. Peter’s defendants to restrain plaintiff and prevent him from filing

charges against the St. Peter's defendants, which was “integral to the deprivation of

Plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Compl. at 4, 5. Plaintiff interchangeably uses the terms

“joint action” and “conspiracy” throughout his complaint; however, these two claims are

not identical. Out of special solicitude to the pro se plaintiff, the undersigned will assess

“| whether he has sufficiently alleged either conspiracy or joint action.

To plead joint action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must “allege facts

demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to

commit an unconstitutional act.” Betts, 751 F.3d at 84 (quoting Spear v.

Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992)). “Put differently, a

private actor acts under color of state law when the private actor ‘is a willful

participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” /bid. (quoting

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).

To allege a Section 1983 conspiracy against a private party, a plaintiff “must

allege (1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act

in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in

furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Ciambriello v. County of

Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002). Under both theories of

liability, “[a] merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in

concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against

the private entity.” /d. at 324-25; see Rice v. City of New York, 275 F. Supp.

3d 395, 403-06 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

Sadigh v. Quyyum, No. 23-CV-2937 (RPK) (RML), 2025 WL 745993, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 7, 2025) (spacing added). Although there can be no conspiracy claim if there is no

demonstration of a constitutional violation, the undersigned addresses this claim first

because if plaintiff has not demonstrated either, none of his section 1983 claims can

proceed.

It is well settled that “[c]onclusory, vague, or general allegations of a conspiracy

to deprive a person of constitutional rights do not state a claim for relief under section

1983.” Velleca v. Pangburn, No. 9:20-CV-0887 (BKS/DJS), 2022 WL 2392543, at *5

(N.D.N.Y. June 2, 2022) (citing O'Neil v. Bebee, No. 5:09-CV-1133 (GTS/DEP), 2010

WL 502948, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2010)) (internal quotations omitted), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2390243 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022); see also, e.g.,

Hawthorne v. City of Albany, No. 1:17-CV-0716 (GTS/TWD), 2017 WL 3822112, at *7

(N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (“Wholly conclusory claims of conspiracy are properly

"| dismissed sua sponte on initial review.”) (citing Johnson v. Goord, 12 F. App’x. 22, 23

(2d Cir. 2000) (summary order) (additional citation omitted)), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Hawthorne v. Ruecker, 2017 WL 4351520

(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017). Here, plaintiff did not show meeting of minds to commit an

unconstitutional act as needed in order to plead a claim for conspiracy under section

1983. See Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing a § 1983 conspiracy

_,|Claim where the complaint lacked specific factual allegations demonstrating an

agreement between defendants); see also Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346,

364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing conspiracy claim as “too general and conclusory to

sufficiently plead the meeting of the minds requirement.”).

Thus, a complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private party

and the state actor “share[d] some common goal to violate the plaintiff's

rights” and “that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to

commit an unconstitutional act.” Betts, 751 F.3d at 84-85 (quoting Spear,

tri 954 F.2d at 68) (internal quotations omitted).

Arbeeny v. Cuomo, No. 22-CV-02336 (LDH) (LB), 2025 WL 71729, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

10, 2025), aff'd, No. 24-2856, 2025 WL 3079217 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), cert. denied sub

nom. Arbeeny v. Cuomo, 224 L. Ed. 2d 499 (Apr. 20, 2026).

2. First Amendment Retaliation

The undersigned next assesses whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged joint

action and First Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff contends that, due to his history of

filing lawsuits and speaking out against conditions at the Schenectady County

Correctional Facility, he was restrained, administered a sedative against his will, and

beaten by a nurse. See Compl. at 27. He contends that police officers were present

"| and actively participated in restraining him.

However, plaintiff fails to show that anyone other than the Jane Doe security

guard was aware of plaintiff's litigation history. Nothing suggests that the Doe Nurse or

officers who assisted in restraining him were aware of his history of protected speech

relating to the Schenectady County Correctional Facility or that they restrained, beat

him, or issued a nonconsensual sedative because of the protected speech.

“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant's individual liability in a

suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant's personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720

F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). Thus, “a Section 1983 plaintiff must ‘allege a tangible

connection between the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.” Bass v.

Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986)) (other citation omitted). Accordingly,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the security officer acted jointly with state actors

to retaliate against plaintiff in violation of his First Amendment rights and this claim must

fail. Out of special solicitude to plaintiff pro se, it is recommended that this claim be

dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

3. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection

Plaintiff contends that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing a “first come, first served” “policy of serving

patients in order of arrival. He contends that they “appllied] a de facto first-come-first-

served policy in a discriminatory manner.” Compl. at 5-6. He contends “[t]he evidence

suggests that this selective enforcement was not based on clinical triage but was an

intentional, malicious delay of care, initiated after Defendants recognized Plaintiff as a

controversial and prolific litigator, thus constituting a breach of the fundamental trust

inherent in emergency medical services.” /d. at 6. Plaintiff contends that the hospital

defendants delayed him care due to his First Amendment exercise which “reflects a

deliberate policy or custom to treat individuals perceived as challenging to the system,

or those with perceived stigmatized conditions like substance use disorder, with marked

_,| hostility and a substandard level of care not applied to the general public.” /d. Plaintiff

contends that this conduct amounts to state action because the City of Albany police

officers participated in restraining plaintiff and refused to allow plaintiff to press criminal

charges against the “hospital staff.” “This concerted action transomed the hospital’s

internal, discriminatory policy into a state-sanctioned deprivation of civil rights, violating

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by treating Plaintiff as a

Class of one’ who was singled out for punitive, adverse treatment absent any rational

basis for doing so, other than to retaliate for his past advocacy.” Id. at 6.

Plaintiff contends that the hospital’s treatment of him, “contrasted with the

immediate or prioritized care typically afforded to other patients presenting with life-

threatening symptoms” suggests that the hospital applied its policy of the order in which

to treat patients in a discriminatory manner. Yet, this generalized allegation does not

explain how he was treated differently from similarly-situated patients, nor does plaintiff

allege that he was treated differently based on a protected characteristic.

Insofar as plaintiff invokes a class of one theory of discrimination, plaintiff does

not demonstrate state action. Even if he alleges that officers participated in restraining

him and declined to allow plaintiff to bring criminal charges against hospital staff, he

“| does not show how participating in restraining plaintiff is part of a joint action to

enforce a policy of delaying treatment to him. Even if the officers engaged in joint action

to restrain plaintiff and to prevent him from bringing charges against the hospital

workers who restrained him, there is no connection to the policy he alleges — to decline

to administer him treatment as quickly as his medical condition necessitated because of

his status either as a litigator or person with substance use disorder. As plaintiff has not

demonstrated state action, his Fourteenth Amendment claim must fail.

4. Fourth Amendment: Unreasonable Seizure and Excessive Force

a. Restraint

Plaintiff contends that he was unreasonably seized and subjected to excessive

force,, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, insofar as he was restrained and

administered a sedative without consent. See Compl. at 4-5.The Supreme Court of the

mi| United States has made clear that a seizure occurs when “the officer, by means of

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). Although plaintiff has arguably sufficiently

alleged joint action between the police officers and hospital staff, he has not provided

sufficient facts surrounding defendants’ restraint to allow the undersigned to assess

whether the force was excessive or objectively unreasonable. As noted, plaintiff alleges

that he was experiencing drug-induced delirium. Plaintiff has not provided facts for the

undersigned to address whether he was complying, acting aggressively, threatening, or

if he was submissive and calm. Thus, it is recommended that his Fourth Amendment

claim, as it relates to his being restrained, be dismissed without prejudice and with leave

to amend.

b Beating

Plaintiff contends that a Jane Doe “physically assaulted” him. Compl. at 4 J 27.

However, plaintiff does not allege joint action here. Although plaintiff contends that

police refused to allow plaintiff to press charges, he fails to connect the refusal with any

joint action or conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. See id. As

noted, mere conclusory allegations of a conspiracy or concerted action with a

government officer, as plaintiff has pled here, do not suffice. Here, it appears he seeks

this Court to infer that, because officers did not allow plaintiff to press charges, it must

be presumed that they conspired with the Jane Doe nurse who assaulted him.

Arguably, it might support a claim for failure to intervene, but plaintiff fails to provide how

it supports a claim that the municipal defendants conspired to violate his Fourth

Amendment rights.

tri Accordingly, insofar as he contends that he was physically assaulted in violation

of the Fourth Amendment and that there existed joint action or conspiracy with state

actors, such claim fails. Accordingly, it is recommended that this claim be dismissed.

Out of special solicitude to plaintiff pro se, it is recommended he be afforded leave to

amend.

5. Defendants Named Only in Caption

Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate personal involvement of the Doe City of Albany

Police Commander; Doe City of Albany Police Department Police Sergeant; Manager of

Security, Sean Keane; or Security Guards Erica Brandt and Dennise Allen. He names

these defendants in the caption but does not identify them anywhere else in the

complaint. Similarly, he names a variety of Doe individuals, yet, other than identifying

“| the Doe security officer who made a comment about his former incarceration and the

Doe nurse who assaulted him,’ plaintiff does not explain how the other Doe defendants

were involved in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. The undersigned can

surmise that the Doe Officers 3-6 were the ones allegedly involved in restraining him,

but it is not possible to guess as to the John/Jane Does 1-15.

Claims “cannot be maintained against parties who are named only in the caption

not discussed in the complaint.” Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 9:06-CV-0889 (LEK/DRH),

2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (citation omitted) (“A complaint cannot

be maintained against a defendant who is listed in the caption, but against whom no

facts are alleged in the body of the complaint.”). Accordingly, it is recommended that

any claims against Brandt, Allen, Keane, Doe City of Albany Police Commander, Doe

City of Albany Police Sergeant, and John/Jane Does ##1-15 be dismissed without

Prejudice and with opportunity to amend.

6. Monell

Even if plaintiff had sufficiently established joint action or conspiracy, he may only

proceed against the municipality pursuant to Monell. There are several deficiencies

Plaintiff does not assign a number to these Doe defendants. It is recommended, upon amendment,

plaintiff refer to security officer who spoke with him as Doe Officer #__ and the nurse who allegedly

assaulted him as Doe Nurse #__ or a similar kind of identification.

with the complaint in this regard. First, the police department is a municipal entity and is

not legally distinct from the municipality. See Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F.

Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing Section 1983 claim brought against the

police department because it did not have a legal identity distinct from the municipality).

Thus, the City of Albany Police Department is not the proper defendant; rather, the City

"| of Albany is. Accordingly, it is recommended that the City of Albany Police Department

be dismissed from this action.

Similarly, insofar as plaintiff names the Doe City of Albany Police Commissioner,

to the extent he names the officer in his or her official capacity, “official capacity claims

against these defendants are, in effect, claims against the municipality that employs

them.” Sangaré v. City of Albany, No. 1:24-CV-555 (DNH/PJE), 2026 WL 1964895, at

_,|*13 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-555

(DNH/PJE), 2026 WL 1963720 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2026). “Where, as here, the plaintiff

has also named the municipality as a defendant, courts generally dismiss official-

capacity claims as redundant or duplicative.” /d. (citing, inter alia, Hulett v. City of

Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462, 498-99 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)). Accordingly, to the extent

plaintiff seeks to sue Doe Police Commander, City of Albany Police Department and

mi| Doe Police Sergeant, City of Albany Police Department in their official capacities, such

claims be dismissed as duplicative of any claims against the municipality. See id.

Because the police officer defendants are municipal agents, not state actors,

plaintiff must demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a

municipal policy, custom, persistent or widespread practice, or failure to train or

supervise. “The elements of a Monell claim are (1) a municipal policy or custom that

(2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020); Lucente v. Cnty. of

Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020). Monell “extends liability to a municipal

organization where that organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it

has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation.” Segal v. City of New

York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). “[A] successful Monell claim based on a failure

to train theory must show that ‘the need to act [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy of

current practices so likely to result in a deprivation of federal rights.” Tirado v. City of

New York, 19-CV-10377 (LAK)(SN), 2021 WL 11646299, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,

2021 (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 50 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007)). However,

“conclusory allegations that a municipality failed to train and supervise its employees

_,| are insufficient to state a Monell claim absent supporting factual allegations.” Hodge v.

City of Mount Vernon, No. 25-cv-2736, 2026 WL 637092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,

2026).

Plaintiff alleges that the City of Albany Police Department committed various

violations of his constitutional rights “pursuant to a policy or custom of the municipality”

and “said custom or policy includes, but is not limited to” a failure to properly train or

m| Supervise police officers in their interactions with private hospitals and individuals

experiencing medical emergencies, as well as a policy of deliberate indifference to the

rights of detainees and individuals known to challenge the government.” Compl. at 4-5.

Plaintiff also contends that the municipality had a “policy of deliberate indifference to the

rights of detainees and individuals known to challenge the government.” /d. at 5. He

further alleges a failure to train or supervise officers that led to the violation of his

constitutional rights. See id.

As to plaintiff's failure to train or supervise argument, “mere allegations of a

municipal custom, a practice of tolerating official misconduct, or inadequate training

and/or supervision are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a custom

unless supported by factual details.” Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 1:13-CV-4178,

2015 WL 1379652, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015); see, e.g., Wilson v. Cnty. of

Onondaga, No. 5:20-CV-1489 (DNH/TWD), 2022 WL 3141764, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21,

2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2965584 (N.D.N.Y. July 27,

2022). “The municipality may only be liable under the failure to train theory ‘when

[municipal] policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission

_,|in their training program causes [municipal] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional

rights . . . [but] the policymakers choose to retain that program.” Forrest v. Cnty. of

Greene, 676 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Buari v. City of N.Y., 530 F.

Supp. 3d356, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (additional citation omitted)). “While there is no

bright-line test for how many civil rights complaints must occur to adequately put a

municipality on requisite notice, recurring complaints can suffice.” /d. (citing Buari, 530

m|F. Supp. 3d at 399). Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a practice “so consistent and

wide spread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of

which supervising policy-maker must have been aware.” Taylor v. Henson, No. 25-CV-

4867 (JGLC), 2026 WL 915455, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2026) (quoting Brandon v. City

of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 161, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).

Here, plaintiff has failed to allege that Doe Police Commissioner or Doe Police

Sergeant were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations or that they

are policymakers. However, even if he had alleged they are policymakers, a

policymaker is not “deliberately indifferent just because a few subordinates caused a

particular kind of constitutional harm.” Crawley v. City of Syracuse, 496 F. Supp. 3d

718, 730 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). “Rather, deliberate indifference on a failure to supervise or a

failure to discipline claim requires a consistent failure to meaningfully investigate

complaints or a consistent failure to discipline those involved in actual constitutional

violations.” /d. Plaintiff has not made such claims. Accordingly, it is recommended that

his claim that the municipal defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to a

failure to train or supervise also be dismissed for failure to properly plead such claim

_,| under Monell.

Next, plaintiffs claim that the municipality has a policy of “deliberate indifference

to the rights of detainees® and individuals known to challenge the government” is too

conclusory, even considering his pro se status and the early stage of this litigation.

Compl. at 5.

To properly plead a de facto policy or custom through a widespread

practice, a plaintiff must “show that the policymaker was aware of a

tri subordinate’s unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to ignore

them, effectively ratifying the actions” based on governmental reports

documenting constitutional deficiency that are “sufficiently connected to the

specific facts of the case” or complaints in other cases that contain similar

allegations that involve factually similar misconduct, contemporaneous with

the misconduct at issue, and result in an adjudication of liability. Buari v.

City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

It is not sufficient to merely plead that the isolated incidents of the present

case imply the existence of a de facto policy. See Bird v. County of

8 Even if the municipality had such a policy, the undersigned fails to see its relevance because plaintiff

was not a detainee at the time relevant to this complaint.

Westchester, No. 20-CV-10076, 2022 WL 2263794, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June

23, 2022) *77 (“[A] single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it

involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show

a municipal policy.”) (quoting DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir.

1998)).

Forrest v. Cnty. of Greene, 676 F. Supp. 3d 69, 76-77 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (spacing added).

City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.808 824, n.8 (1985) (“The fact that a municipal

‘policy’ might lead to ‘police misconduct’ is hardly sufficient to satisfy Monell’s

requirement that the particular policy be the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional

violation. There must at least be an affirmative link between [for example] the training

inadequacies alleged, and the particular constitutional violation at issue.”) (emphasis in

original)); see also Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Absent a

showing of a causal link between an official policy or custom and the plaintiffs’ injury,

_,| Monell prohibits a finding of liability against the [c]ity.”). Indeed, “conclusory allegations

which merely recite the elements for stating a Monell claim are insufficient to state a

claim for municipal liability[.]” Blount v. Cnty. of Onondaga, No. 5:20-CV-0937

(GTS/TWD), 2021 WL 3863386, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021) (citing Nielsen v. City of

Rochester, 58 F. Supp. 3d 268, 277 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)) (additional citation omitted)),

report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3861045 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2021).

tri Plaintiff appears to seek to hold the Police Commander and Sergeant liable for

the alleged acts of the police officers due to their supervisory positions. Yet, plaintiff

has not alleged the City of Albany Police Commander's or Police Sergeant's

involvement in any of the conduct alleged therein nor has he alleged that they are

policymakers who had final decision-making authority with respect to the issues in

question. See, e.g., Rissetto v. County of Clinton, No. 15-CV-720, 2016 WL 4530473,

at *27 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016) (dismissing a claim against the sheriff because

complaint did not assert that he “acted as a policymaker for the [relevant] purposes’).

“When alleging policymakers caused the violation, ‘the critical inquiry is not whether an

official generally has final policymaking authority; rather, the court must specifically

determine whether the government official is a final policymaker with respect to the

particular conduct challenged in the lawsuit.” Rinaldi v. Sylvester, No. 24-CV-272

(KMK), 2025 WL 2682691, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025) (quoting Taranto v. Putnam

County, No. 21-CV-2455, 2023 WL 6318280, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023)).

Accordingly, it is recommended that all claims against the Doe City of Albany

Police Commander and Police Sergeant in their individual capacities be dismissed

without prejudice and leave to amend.

B. Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff appears to seek to bring a Title Ill ADA claims against the St. Peter's

defendants for disability discrimination. See Compl. Plaintiff contends that he was

denied medical care because of his disability of substance use disorder. He contends

that he was denied being administered activated charcoal, was made to wait to receive

medical care despite experiencing a medical emergency and was met with rudeness

m| and hostility from hospital staff.

Title Ill of the ADA provides that “[nJo individual shall be discriminated

against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or

leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. §

12182(a). Hospitals are considered “public accommodations” for the

purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (defining “public

® Plaintiff does not specify whether this claim is sought to be brought only against the St. Peter's

defendants; however, even if plaintiff sought to raise these claims against the Police defendants, such

claim would fail.

accommodation” to include “a ... hospital’). However, Plaintiff seeks only

monetary damages, and the only available remedy under Title ||| of the ADA

is injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).

Vale v. Northwell Health, No. 17-CV-7111 (PKC)(LB), 2018 WL 1115345, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018). Here, even assuming for purposes of this review that plaintiff

is a qualified individual under the ADA, as plaintiff has sought only monetary relief in

connection with this claim, his claim must fail. See Compl. at 9-10; Frazier v. South

Shore Univ. Hosp., et al., No. 26-CV-4450 (AMD) (LGD), 2026 WL 2333673, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2026) (dismissing Title II] ADA claim which sought only monetary

relief).

C. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”)

Plaintiff provides that St. Peter’s Hospital, which he contends is a “participating

hospital under Medicare,” violated the EMTALA by failing to provide “appropriate

medical screening and stabilizing treatment” to plaintiff presenting with an “‘emergency

medical condition’ (crack cocaine ingestion).’”” Compl. at 7. Plaintiff contends that the

violation “was compounded by their conspiratorial conduct, which constituted a

deliberate denial of care to a person in dire need.” /d. Plaintiff, elsewhere in the

complaint, contends that St. Peter’s uses a first-come, first-served approach in the

m| hospital, referring to prioritizing x-rays, suggesting that the hospital was treating less-

urgent, but earlier-arrived patients over him. See id. at 3.

“EMTALA’s requirement that individuals seeking emergency care receive an

‘appropriate medical screening examination’ obligates hospitals to ‘apply uniform

screening procedures to all individuals coming to the emergency room.” Jones v. Beth

Israel Hosp., No. 1:17-CV-3445-GHW, 2018 WL 1779344, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,

2018) (first quoting Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

825 (1994), then citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 879; next citing Holcomb v. Monahan, 30

F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that EMTALA's screening provision “requires a

hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they

would provide any other patient’)). “Courts have interpreted ‘appropriate medical

screening’ as a requirement that hospitals must “provide uniform or even-handed

screening examinations for emergency conditions, consistent with their own policies and

based on the hospital’s capabilities and the medical circumstances and symptoms

presented.” Lawrence v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, No. 3:25-CV-01022 (SVN),

2026 WL 2140448, at *5 (D. Conn. July 23, 2026) (quoting Macamaux v. Day Kimball

Hosp., No. 3:09-CV-164 (JCH), 2011 WL 4352007, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 16, 2011)).

_,| The statute defines “emergency medical condition” as “a medical condition manifesting

itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the

absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in ...

placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy; serious impairment to bodily

functions; or . . . [s]erious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.” 42 U.S.C. §

1395dd(e)(1).

The EMTALA requires “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the

medical condition,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A), and forbids the patient's

release unless his condition has “been stabilized,” id. § 1395dd(c)(1). The

statute defines “emergency medical condition” as “a medical condition

manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe

pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could

reasonably be expected to result in . . . [inter alia] placing the health of the

individual . . . in serious jeopardy[.]” /d. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i).

Jones, 2018 WL 1779344, at *8. “A patient with an emergency medical condition is

‘stabilized’ when ‘no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable

medical probability, to result from or occur during’ the patient's release from the

hospital.” /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B)).

Plaintiff provides that when he arrived at St. Peter's Hospital, he requested

activated charcoal and was told that the hospital did not issue charcoal anymore for

narcotics use. See Compl. at 3. He also contends that while he was waiting for care,

fell out of his hospital bed and a wheelchair and screamed that he was having a

heart attack. See id. He provides that he was eventually issued activated charcoal

before he was released. Thus, he fails to state a claim for failure to stabilize. See id. at

Addressing his allegations of a failure to properly screen, he contends that he

suffered serious injuries because of the alleged failure to properly screen under the

_,. EMTALA. Although he refers to waiting in the waiting room, he also provides that he

initially asked for activated charcoal and was told the hospital does not provide it, was

placed on a hospital bed, all suggesting that he was subject to triage and eventually

brought into the emergency room while awaiting treatment. At some point, a screening

must have occurred because he was provided with medical treatment. However, some

courts have held that an unjustified delay in attending to a patient can amount to

m| effective denial of a screening examination. See, e.g., Byrne v. Cleveland Clinic, 684

F.Supp. 2d 641 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

Further, plaintiff has not contended that the alleged delay in screening was due

to his inability to pay. “An appropriate screening is properly determined not by

reference to particular outcome but instead by reference to a hospital's standard

screening procedures and it is for a plaintiff to show that, in screening him/her the

hospital failed to follow the screening policy or standard of care which it regularly follows

for other patients presenting substantially similar conditions.” Rosado-Gonzalez v.

Alejandro Otero Lopez Hosp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 48, 56 (D.P.R. 2011).

Plaintiff suggests that he was not screened because the medical providers at St.

Peter's Hospital were “prioritizing unnecessary x-rays over life-saving intervention[,]”

pursuing a first-come, first served approach to seeing patients. See Compl. at 3. Even

assuming this is true, he does not set forth any allegation that St. Peter’s Hospital

deviated from its own screening procedures, as the EMTALA requires. See Compl. at

6-7; Brenord v. Cath. Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 179, 190

(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Even assuming that screening procedures at St. Mary’s Hospital

should have been in accordance with these state law provisions, the fact that they might

have been does not demonstrate that St. Mary’s deviated from its own screening

procedures, a showing which is essential to an EMTALA claim. Also, even if plaintiffs

could demonstrate that St. Mary’s Hospital did have written policies that complied with

these state laws, it is not at all clear that such policies would constitute part of the

hospital’s ‘standard screening procedures’ if they were uniformly ignored by hospital

staff.”). Indeed, “[t]he appropriateness of the screening examination is determined by

| reference to how the hospital treats other patients who are perceived to have the same

medical condition .... EMTALA is implicated only when individuals who are perceived

to have the same medical condition receive disparate treatment.” Brenord v. Cath.

Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 179, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)

(quoting Fisher, 989 F.Supp. at 449)

Although he references experiencing drug-induced psychosis, which he appears

to attribute to the failure to issue activated charcoal at an earlier time, and contends that

he was experiencing palpitations and screamed to nurses that he was having a heart

attack, he does not contend that he actually experienced a heart attack. Plaintiff

contends that he suffered serious injury from the delay in receiving medical care but

“| does not define his injury. See generally Compl.

To the extent plaintiff names any defendant beyond St. Peter’s Hospital"? in his

EMTALA claim, such claims must be dismissed as the “if any individual’ language has

been interpreted through a plain reading of the statute to extend protection to all

individuals who present at participating hospitals.” Ballachino v. Anders, 811 F. Supp.

121, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (first citing Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933

_,| F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C.Cir.1991)); then citing Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc.,

917 F.2d 266, 269-70 (6th Cir.1990) (additional citation omitted). “Equally persuasive is

the opinion that the Act's enforcement provision, codified at § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), is

explicitly limited to actions against the participating hospital so that there is no private

right of action against individual physicians under EMTALA.” /d. (citing Gatewood, 933

F.2d at 1040).

tri Accordingly, it is recommended that plaintiffs EMTALA claim against St. Peter's

Hospital be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Out of special solicitude to the pro se

plaintiff, it is recommended he be afforded leave to amend as against St. Peter’s

Hospital. To the extent plaintiff may have intended to bring this claim against any other

defendant, such claim be dismissed without opportunity to amend.

10 See Compl. at If] 49-50, referring to “Defendants” collectively.

D. State Law Claims

District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims that are so

related to federal claims over which they exercise original jurisdiction that they form part

of the same case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a) (2000). Although the undersigned does not recommend that any federal claim

proceed as pled, because the undersigned recommends allowing plaintiff to amend, the

undersigned reaches review of plaintiffs state claims with judicial efficiency in mind."

1. Municipal Defendants

Plaintiff does not specify against whom he seeks to bring most of his state law

claims, largely referring to defendants collectively. He seeks to bring claims for

negligence and medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault

battery, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13, negligent hiring and retention, and

“respondeat superior.” Compl. at 8.

The Court has the discretion to address plaintiff's state law claims through its

supplemental jurisdiction. To the extent plaintiff brings these claims against the County

defendants, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate compliance with filing a notice of claim.

Under New York law, a notice of claim is a condition precedent to bringing a tort claim

m| against a municipality and any of its officers, agents, or employees. See N.Y. Gen. Mun.

Law §§ 50-e(1), 50-i(1); C.S.A. Contracting Corp. v. New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., 5

N.Y.3d 189, 192 (2005); see also Fincher v. Cnty. of Westchester, 979 F. Supp. 989,

11 The undersigned would only recommend exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims if a valid federal claim is permitted to proceed. See generally See Klein & Co. Futures v. Bd. of

Trade of City of New York, 464 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It is well settled that where, as here, the

federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation, courts should generally decline to exercise

pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims”). The undersigned reviews plaintiff's state law

claims for thoroughness.

1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). “A notice of claim must be filed within ninety days after the claim

arises.” Acevedo v. City of New York, No. 1:24-CV-558-GHW, 2026 WL 1661344, at

“12 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2026) (quoting Rose v. Cnty. of Nassau, 904 F. Supp. 2d 244,

248 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). “‘In addition, the plaintiff must plead in his complaint that: (1) he

has served the notice of claim; (2) at least thirty days have elapsed since the notice was

and before the complaint was filed; and (3) in that time the defendant has

neglected to or refused to adjust or satisfy the claim.” /d. (quoting Rose, 904 F. Supp 2d

at 248. “Notice of claim requirements are construed strictly by New York state courts,

and failure to abide by their terms mandates dismissal of the action for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction.” /d. (quoting Tulino v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-7106, 2016 WL

2967847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 201) (additional citation omitted)).

Plaintiff provides that, on unspecified dates, he filed “motions for leave to file a

late notice of claim and leave to file a late claim against the municipal defendants.”

Compl. at 9. He provides that on October 14, 2015,'? the Clerk of the Albany County

Supreme Court advised him “that his motion and supporting documents were being

returned,” including “his application for an order to show cause for alternate service and

his accompanying application for a waiver/reduced filing fee. The stated reason for the

m| return was the Plaintiff's failure to include a request for an index number.” /d. Plaintiff

contends that the requirement that plaintiff include an index number “was improper

particularly given his pro se status and the fact that he was financially unable to pay the

associated fee, as evidenced by his application for a waiver/reduced filing fee. The

12 The undersigned assumes this is a scrivener’s error and plaintiff intended to say October 14, 2025.

See Compl. at 9.

plaintiff believes he should not have been required to request an index number under

those circumstances.” /d.

Plaintiff has, therefore, demonstrated that he did not file a notice of claim upon

the County, and insofar as he sought permission to file a late notice of claim sometime

in 2025, he does not demonstrate that the permission was granted in state court.

Indeed, he appears to indicate that his papers were returned.’ Accordingly, this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.

2. St. Peter’s Defendants

a. Assault and Battery

Plaintiff contends that defendants’ “forcible physical restraint” and use of a

sedative without his consent “constitute an unlawful and unprivileged touching of

_| Plaintiff.” Compl. at 8. Assault and battery claims under New York law have a one-

year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3); see, e.g., Burns v. City of Utica,

2 F. Supp. 3d 283, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). Accordingly, plaintiffs assault and battery

claim is time barred. ‘4

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff contends that “Defendants’ extreme and outrageous conduct, including

m| the retaliatory denial of care, the forced sedation, and the conspiratorial actions, were

beyond all possible bounds of decency and caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress.”

Compl at 8. This is a one-year statute of limitations. The events occurred on July 30,

13 To the extent plaintiff argues that the state court should have not required him to request an index

number or should have allowed him to serve a late notice of claim, that matter is not properly before this

Court. See Acevedo, 2026 WL 1661344, at *13 (quoting, inter alia, Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of

Wesley Hills, 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“However, district courts within this Circuit ‘have

routinely found that they lack jurisdiction to even consider . . .’ an application to extend the notice of claim

‘¢Nothingyin his complaint suggests that equitable tolling would apply.

2024, and plaintiff commenced his action on October 22, 2025, more than one year

later. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed as time barred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §

215(3).'°

c. Medical Malpractice & Negligence

i. Lack of Informed Consent

Plaintiff contends that the St. Peter’s Hospital and staff “were negligent and

committed malpractice by failing to follow established medical standards of care,

including the failure to obtain informed consent for the administration of a sedative.”

Compl. at 8. Here, beyond administering a sedative without informed consent, plaintiff

fails to set forth any claims underlying his medical malpractice allegations. Liberally

read and applying special solicitude, although plaintiff contends that defendants

committed medical malpractice, the only wrongful act plaintiff identifies is that

unidentified medical providers administered a sedative without informed consent. Such

a claim sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice. See Berndston v.

United States, No. 3:15-CV-1879 (AWT), 2017 WL 830390, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 1,

2017), abrogated on other grounds by Corley v. United States, 11 F.4th 79 (2d Cir.

2021).

tri To establish a cause of action to recover damages based on lack of

informed consent, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the person providing the

professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to

inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the

treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner

would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably

prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the

treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the lack of

informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury.’

15 Nothing in his complaint suggests that equitable tolling would apply.

Gilmore v. Mihail, 174 A.D.3d 686, 688, 105 N.Y.S.3d 504, 507 (2019) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, plaintiff does not allege that he had the capacity to consent at the time the

sedative was administered. Indeed, he provides that he was experiencing a drug-

induced delirium. If a patient is combative, poses an immediate danger to themselves

"| or others, and/or is under the influence of mind-altering drugs, a medical provider may

not be able to obtain informed consent. See generally N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §

22.09.

Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim is also flawed because he does not specify

what injury he suffered as a result of being provided a sedative without informed

consent nor does he allege that the lack of informed consent was the proximate cause

Of any injury. See McQueen v. United States, No. 9:19-CV-998 (TJM/CFH), 2021 WL

3849457, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No.

9:19-CV-998 (TJM/CFH), 2021 WL 3848494 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2021) (quoting Santilli

v. CHP Inc., 274 A.D.2d 905, 907, 711 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)); N.Y. Pub.

Health Law § 2805-D(3) (stating, to establish a medical malpractice cause of action

based on lack of consent “it must also be established that a reasonably prudent person

min the patient's position would not have undergone the treatment or diagnosis if he had

been fully informed and that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the

injury”). Indeed, he provides that after the sedative was administered, he was treated

with activated charcoal, which presumably assisted him with the condition for which he

came to the emergency room - the effects of crack cocaine consumption. Accordingly,

as plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the elements required, it is recommended that

plaintiffs negligence claim based on informed consent be dismissed. Out of special

solicitude to the pro se plaintiff, it is recommended that plaintiff be permitted an

opportunity to amend.

ii. Medical Malpractice

Insofar as plaintiff argues medical malpractice, although plaintiff summarily states

"| that the St. Peter’s defendants deviated from acceptable standards of medical practice,

apart from citing the lack of informed consent issue, noted above, plaintiff does not

identify what measures any defendant took that departed from accepted standards of

medical procedure and caused him injury. Accordingly, plaintiff's medical malpractice

claim does not provide sufficient notice to the defendants and fails to meet Rule 8’s

pleading requirements. Moreover, plaintiff does not identify which defendant allegedly

committed medical malpractice, referring to defendants generally. Accordingly, it is

recommended that plaintiff's medical malpractice claim be dismissed without prejudice

and with leave to amend.

d. Invasion of Privacy: Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13

Plaintiff contends that defendants “negligently and maliciously disregarded

Plaintiff's explicit request for privacy, publicly exposing his sensitive health condition in

m| the waiting area and hallway, in violation of state law.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiff references

New York Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.§ 2302(a). This statute does

create liability for the type of allegations plaintiff raises in his complaint. Plaintiff does

not contend that doctors discussed plaintiff's mental health condition verbally or through

his clinical chart. Rather, he states that he was allowed to be in public view while

undergoing a drug-induced psychosis, suggesting that members of the public would

become aware of his substance use disorder.

Further, even if it did extend to his status as a person with substance use

disorder, his mere presence in the hospital waiting room or in the emergency room’s

hallway does not amount to disclosure of a clinical record under the statute. Lastly, he

“| does not contend that St. Peter's Hospital emergency room is a facility operated,

licensed, or funded by the Office of Mental Health or the Office for People with

Developmental Disabilities.

Accordingly, it is recommended that this claim be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. It is recommended that this claim be dismissed with prejudice as it cannot be

cured by a better pleading.

e. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision

Plaintiff contends that the St. Peter’s defendants “were negligent in hiring and

retaining security staff, including Defendant Jane Doe, who they knew or should have

known had a history or propensity of malicious conduct and unprofessionalism.” Compl.

at 8.

To state a claim for negligent hiring, retention or supervision . . . , a plaintiff

must plead, in addition to the elements required for a claim of negligence:

(1) the existence of an employee-employer relationship; (2) that the

employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the

conduct which caused the injury; and (3) “a nexus or connection between

the defendant's negligence in hiring and retaining [or supervising] the

offending employee and the plaintiffs injuries.” Sokola v. Weinstein, No.

950250/2019, 2023 WL 2055855, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 7,

2023) (citing Kenneth R., 229 A.D.2d at 161, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791) (internal

citations omitted).

In re Roman Cath. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., New York, 651 B.R. 146, 161 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Even assuming for sake of this review that security staff are Albany Medical

Center Employees rather than employees of an outside contractor, plaintiff does not

meet the requirements of demonstrating negligence such that he can state a claim for

negligent hiring. As far as plaintiff refers to the negligent hiring, training, or retention of

Jane Doe Security Officer, plaintiff states only that the security officer told him that she

| remembers him from jail. He does not contend that this security officer was involved in

any physical assault or participated in the restraint. Thus, even if he believed the

security officer was hostile to him, he does not demonstrate that plaintiff suffered injury

as a result of his interaction with this officer.

Insofar as plaintiff states that other Doe security officers held him down and

“surrounded him with clenched fists and open hostility,” Compl. at 4, although he does

allege that the security officers actually punched him, he arguably suggests that

security officers caused him injury by restraining him. However, plaintiff has not

provided sufficient facts to demonstrate that their participation in restraining him was an

act of negligence rather than necessitated by his behavior. Plaintiff does not contend

that he was calm, responsive, and complaint. The complaint provides that he was

suffering a drug-induced delirium. If it is the case that plaintiff was aggressive, it would

m| Not follow that security officers assisting in retraining plaintiff would amount to negligent

supervision or retention. Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege which of the named St.

Peter's defendants had hiring, supervision, or training authority over the security

officers.

As to negligent hiring, plaintiff does not contend that defendants were aware that

the particular security officers involved in restraining him had any history of related

inappropriate conduct prior to their time of hiring. See Doe v. Alsaud, 12 F. Supp. 3d

674, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding negligent supervision and retention “claims require

specific allegations of the employee's past wrongdoing to provide a basis from which to

infer the employer's knowledge.”); see a/so Lee v. Aloarran, No. 23-CV-11215 (NSR),

2024 WL 4987310, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2024) (stating, where the plaintiff argued that

“lit has to accept all facts in complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences, the

plaintiff's statement that the defendants should have known about employee's prior

conduct, with “no factual averments to justify such a conclusion[,]’ does not suffice to

support a negligent hiring or supervision claim.). Accordingly, it is recommended that

plaintiff's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim be dismissed without

prejudice and with leave to amend.

f. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff contends that the St. Peter’s defendants are liable for the acts and

omissions of their employees under the theory of respondeat superior. However, there

is no standalone cause of action for respondeat superior under New York State law.

See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Rochester, No. 21-CV-6764-FPG, 2022 WL 2356630, at *3

(W.D.N.Y. June 30, 2022) (“Respondeat superior is not a standalone claim.”) (citing

mi| Rodriguez v. City of New York, No. 18 CIV. 4805 (NRB), 2021 WL 5360120, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021)); Jain v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-5442 (JMF), 2021 WL

6064204, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021) (“Under New York law,’ however, ‘respondeat

superior does not stand alone as a substantive cause of action.’””) (quoting Biswas v.

City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “Rather, it is a vehicle

through which a plaintiff can hold an employer responsible for the torts committed by its

employees.” Andrews, 2022 WL 2356630, at *3 (citing Rosenfeld v. Lenich, 370 F.

Supp. 3d 335, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Under the New York common law doctrine of

respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its

employees only if those acts were committed in furtherance of the employer's business

and within the scope of employment.”’).

Accordingly, it is recommended that such claim be dismissed. Out of special

solicitude to plaintiff pro se, it is recommended that the claim be dismissed without

prejudice and with opportunity to amend should he wish to allege respondeat superior

liability as part of a state law claim against the St. Peter’s defendants.

E. Sanctions

Plaintiff requests sanctions against the St. Peter’s defendants for spoliation of

evidence insofar as they failed to respond to his request to preserve surveillance

footage from July 30, 2024. See Compl. at 8-9. It is recommended that plaintiff's

request be denied. Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the St. Peter’s defendants did

not preserve video footage or when such footage was destroyed only that they did not

respond to his requests to preserve the footage. Yet, plaintiff did not advise when he

informed St. Peter's defendants of his request to preserve video footage or who he

m| contacted. Considering that plaintiff commenced this action in October 2025 and the

incidents in question occurred in July 2024, if plaintiff did not request such a hold until

around the time he commenced this action, it is entirely possible that such footage

would be destroyed in the course of business well before St. Peter's defendants had

any knowledge of plaintiff's commencement of this action.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit describes spoliation as “the

destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve

property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably

foreseeable litigation.” West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776,

779 (2d Cir. 1999). A federal district court may impose sanctions under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) when a party spoliates evidence in

violation of a court order. /d. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); John B. Hull,

Inc., v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1176 (2d Cir.

1988)). Even without a discovery order, a federal district court may impose

sanctions for spoliation under “its inherent power to control litigation.” /d.

(citations omitted).

Andrews v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-2411 (LTS), 2023 WL 3724978, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023). It is recommended that plaintiff's request for sanctions be

denied without prejudice to renew at a later date should this litigation be permitted to

proceed.

V. Conclusion"®

Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. Nos. 4, 6) is

GRANTED, and it is

RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be addressed as follows:

(1) Section 1983(5) conspiracy/joint claims alleging violations of his First, Fourth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights be DISMISSSED without prejudice and without

opportunity to amend;

tri (2) Title Ill Americans with Disabilities Act monetary damages claims be

DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend;

16 “Generally, leave to amend should be freely given, and a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded

every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62

(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000)). A court may, however, in its

discretion, deny leave to amend “for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue

prejudice to the opposing party.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hereford Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 77, 90

(2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Bensch v. Est. of Umar, 2 F.4th 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2021)).

(3) EMTALA claim as pled against St. Peter’s Hospital be DISMISSED without

prejudice and with opportunity to amend, and as pled against all other defendants,

such claim, be DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend;

(4) Claims against the City of Albany Police Department be DISMISSED with

prejudice and without leave to amend as against the City of Albany Police

Department but with leave to amend to name the City of Albany;

(5) Claims against Doe (Moe) City of Albany Police Commissioner and City of

Albany Police Sergeant in their official capacities be DISMISSED with prejudice and

without leave to amend;

(6) Claims against Doe (Moe) City of Albany Police Commissioner and City of

Albany Police Sergeant in their individual capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice

with leave to amend;

(7) State law claims against the municipal defendants for Assault and Battery;

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Respondeat Superior; Negligent Hiring,

Retention, and Supervision; and Respondeat Superior be DISMISSED with prejudice

and without leave to amend;

(8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim against the St. Peter’s

defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend;

(9) Respondeat Superior claim against the St. Peter's defendants, insofar as it |

raised as a standalone claim under New York State law, be DISMISSED with prejudice

and without leave to amend;

(10) Negligent Hiring, Retention, Supervision claim be DISMISSED without

prejudice and with leave to amend insofar as it is relates to the alleged incident

involving St. Peter’s Hospital Doe security officers’” who participated in restraining him

and be DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend as to all remaining

St. Peter's defendants;

(11) Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 claim against the St. Peter’s defendants be

DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend due to lack of subject

matter jurisdiction;

(12) Medical Malpractice claim against the St. Peter’s defendants be DISMISSED

without prejudice and with leave to amend;

(13) All Claims against John/Jane Does ## 1-15, Sean Keane, Dennise Allen,

and Erica Brandt be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend;

(14) Request for sanctions against the St. Peter’s defendants for spoliation of

evidence be DENIED with leave to renew; and it is further

IT IS SO ORDERED. '®

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) days within which to

file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the

Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984

m| F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d

15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 72.19

17 Plaintiff is advised that he will be required to timely identify the Doe defendants and then seek to

amend the complaint once the Doe defendant(s) are identified and serve such defendants.

18 Plaintiff is advised that, if the District Judge permits him to amend his complaint as herein

recommended, any amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint in its entirety,

must include all facts and defendants against whom claims were either permitted to proceed or permitted

an amendment, must not incorporate by reference any portion of the original complaint, and may not

allege any claims or defendants dismissed from the action without opportunity to amend.

18 |f you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail,

three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days

Dated: September 11, 2026

Albany, New York

fem

Paul J. Evangelista

U.S. Magistrate Judge

from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections.

See FED. R. Clv. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

federal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday,

or legal federal holiday. See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.