The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ANDREA M. KESS,
Plaintiffs, ORDER
-against- CV 24-6226 (GRB) (AYS)
THE TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON; KATHEE
BURKE-GONZALEZ, as Town Supervisor; DAVID
LYS, as Council Member; CATE ROGERS, as Council
Member; THOMAS FLIGHT, as Council Member;
IAN CALDER-PIEDMONTE, as Council Member;
MICHAEL D. SARLO, as Chief of Police;
CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, as Captain; DANIEL
TOIA, as Lieutenant; GREGORY SCHAEFER, as
Lieutenant; CHELSEA TIERNEY, as Lieutenant;
WAYNE MATA, as Sergeant; GREGORY MARTIN, as
Sergeant; RYAN HOGAN, as Sergeant and RAYMOND
RAU, as Police Office, each sued in their official and
Individual capacities as employees of the TOWN OF
EAST HAMPTON,
Defendants.
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SHIELDS, Magistrate Judge:
This is a civil rights action brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the New York Human Rights Law, alleging gender discrimination, hostile work
environment, retaliation and equal protection violations. Before the Court is
Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery responses to certain document demands.
Defendants oppose the motion in all respects. Having reviewed the arguments from
both sides, the Court makes the following rulings.
I. Document Demands Nos. 5 and 7
Plaintiff’s Document Demand Number 5 seeks “[a]ll documents
identifying and relating to each disciplinary action within the East Hampton Police
Department from 2015 to present, specifically including the following individuals
. . . .” (Docket Entry (“DE”) [33-1].) The Demand goes on to list ten officers
whose disciplinary records are specifically requested. (Id.) Document Demand
Number 7 requests “[a]ll documents concerning any formal or informal
disciplinary actions initiated against any employee of the East Hampton Town
Police Department from 2015 to present. This includes, but is not limited to, initial
complaints, internal reviews, investigative files, findings, disciplinary
recommendations, penalties imposed, and final outcomes.” (Id.)
Defendants objected to these demands as vague, overbroad, burdensome and
irrelevant and produced no documents in response to Document Demand Number
5. With respect to Document Demand Number 7, Defendants relied principally
upon Plaintiff’s own disciplinary file, adding several isolated pages. (DE [33-2],
[33-3].) Defendants further argue that discovery of disciplinary history is limited to
conduct similar to the conduct alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint, and that, here,
there are no allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff was subjected to disciplinary
conduct similar to the records sought from Defendants.
“Plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to discovery of documents on prior
complaints and police histories of individual defendants because it could yield
relevant information.” Gibbs v. City of New York, 243 F.R.D. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (citing King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)) (additional
citation omitted). Whether such complaints are substantiated or unsubstantiated is
irrelevant. See id.; see also Saaveddra v. City of New York, No. 19 Civ. 7491,
2021 WL 104057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2021). The test is whether the
disciplinary conduct for which discovery is sought is “similar to the conduct
alleged in the complaint.” Id.; see also Gibbs, 243 F.R.D. at 96.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that there are no
allegations that Plaintiff was ever subjected to discipline by the Town of East
Hampton or any of the individual Defendants, other than one incident in which she
was compelled to write and re-write a memorandum concerning a specific event
that occurred. Accordingly, there is no basis for requiring Defendants to produce
the broad disciplinary records sought in Document Demands Numbers 5 and 7.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied with respect to Document Demands
Numbers 5 and 7 and Defendants are not required to respond to those Demands
any further.
II. Document Demand Number 6
Document Demand Number 6 seeks “[a]ll documents reflecting any
complaints, investigations, disciplinary actions, or personnel records involving [the
Individual Defendants], including but not limited to performance evaluations,
disciplinary history, internal complaints, commendations, training records, and
records of any administrative actions or findings.” (DE [33-1].) Defendants
objected to this Demand yet produced the personnel files of each of the Individual
Defendants nonetheless. Plaintiff now takes issue with the manner in which these
documents were produced, arguing that Defendants “did not identify which records
concern which defendant, which requested category each document answers,
whether complete files were produced, or whether responsive records were
withheld.” (DE [33].) In response, Defendants state that when the documents were
produced, the bates range for each officer’s personnel files was specified. (DE
[34].) Defendants again reiterate the bates range for each Individual Defendant in
their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their
burden of production with respect to Document Demand Number 6. Plaintiff’s
motion to compel is denied with respect to this Demand and Defendants need not
provide any further information.
III. Document Demands Nos. 13, 14, and 23
Document Demand Number 13 requests “[a]ll communications,
including emails, between the Town of East Hampton and Arthur Riegel
concerning his investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints . . . .” (DE [33-1].) Document
Demand Number 14 seeks “[a]ll notes, summaries, interview transcripts, or
findings created by Arthur Riegel in connection with his investigation related to
Plaintiff and/or the Town’s [investigation].” (Id.) Finally, Document Demand
Number 23 seeks, in part, “[a]ll records, including but not limited to agendas,
meeting minutes, transcripts, reports, memos, presentations, notes,
communications, and budget or financial documentation from any meeting of the
Town Board of the Town of East Hampton between 2015 and the present relating
to . . . . (d) The authorization, budgeting, scope, progress, or findings of the [Riegel
investigation].” (Id.) Defendants asserted the attorney-client and work product
privileges in response to Document Demands Numbers 13 and 14. While
Defendants objected to Document Demand Number 23, they nonetheless produced
a number of documents. (DE [33-2].) However, Defendants have not produced a
privilege log with respect to the foregoing documents.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ assertion of the attorney-client and work
product privileges, arguing that Riegel was “retained to conduct a factual
employment investigation” and was not “publicly describe[d] . . . as litigation
counsel retained solely to provide confidential legal advice.” (DE [33].)
Defendants argue that Reigel was not retained until after Plaintiff filed her
discrimination charge with the EEOC, thereby supporting their claim that he was
obtained to conduct an investigation in anticipation of litigation, rendering his
communications and notes privileged. (DE [34].)
“It is not just communications that are subject to the [attorney-client]
privilege. Internal investigation notes and documents also may be privileged.”
Urthtech LLC v. Gojo Indus., Inc., No. 22-CV-6727, 2024 WL 3989179, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-
91 (1981)). However, to qualify for the privilege, such communications must be
“made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice,” Favors v. Cuomo,
285 F.R.D. 187, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), and prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”
Koumoulis v. Independent Fin. Mktg. Group, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 39 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
Plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted to the extent that Defendants are
directed to serve Plaintiff with a privilege log with respect to the responsive
documents withheld on the basis of privilege in response to Document Demands
13 and 14 within one (1) week of the date of this Order. Upon review of that
privilege log, if Plaintiff feels she still has grounds to dispute the privilege
designation for any documents described therein, she may renew her motion to
compel within one (1) week of receipt of the privilege log. In all other respects, the
motion to compel is denied with respect to Document Demands Numbers 13 and
14.
With respect to Document Demand Number 23, Plaintiff’s motion to compel
is denied. Defendants produced documents responsive thereto. No further response
is required by Defendants.
IV. Document Demand Number 22
Document Demand Number 22 requests “[a]ny and all documents
upon which Defendants intend to rely in support of their defenses or in opposition
to Plaintiff Andrea M. Kess’s claims.” (DE [33-1].) Defendants object to the
Demand as premature as discovery is still ongoing and Defendants have not fully
articulated their defenses yet, particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff has yet to
be deposed. (DE [34].) Defendants’ response to the Demand therefore directed
Plaintiff to its entire document production. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff provides no legal authority for
why Defendants should do be required to set forth the evidence on which they
intend to rely at this juncture in the litigation. The time for such action will be in
connection with the creation of the joint pre-trial order or the filing of motions in
limine. Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to Document Demand Number 22 is denied.
V. Document Demand Number 25
Document Demand Number 25 seeks:
All documents identifying all East Hampton Police Department
employees from 2015 to the present who received or requested
investigative or law enforcement training, including but not limited to
BCI (Basic Criminal Investigation), FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) training, or any comparable courses, seminars, or
certifications. For each training program, produce records segmented
by year and identify the gender of each employee who requested the
training, whether the request was approved or disapproved, the
individual(s) who made the decision, the stated reasoning for that
decision, and any instances where training was requested but never
acted upon. For employees who attended training, identify the type of
training received, dates of attendance, whether the training was
completed or certified, and any resulting qualifications,
commendations, or evaluations.
(DE [33-1].) Plaintiff moves to compel more complete responses to this Demand,
asserting that while Defendants did produce documents responsive thereto, they
“never stated whether the production includes denied, ignored or unacted-upon
requests, gender, decisionmakers, or stated reasons,” as requested. (DE [33].) In
response, Defendants argue that they produced hundreds of pages responsive to the
Demand, bates stamped and sufficiently identified, and that all responsive
documents were disclosed. (DE [34].)
Plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to Document Demand Number 25
is denied. Defendants responded to the Demand and produced all documents
responsive thereto. As Defendants point out, it is not their job to review the records
demanded, organize them and summarize them for Plaintiff. Their duty is to
produce the documents, which they have fulfilled. No further production is
required from Defendants.
VI. Plaintiff’s Deposition
Despite a discovery deadline of March 18, 2026, which no party
sought to extend until after this Court certified discovery as complete, the parties
represented to the Court in their within letter motions that Plaintiff has yet to be
deposed. The Court finds this incredulous, given that this case commenced in
September 2024 and a discovery schedule was set during an initial conference held
in March 2025. Despite previously advising the parties that there would be no
further extensions of discovery, the Court is constrained to afford one FINAL
extension. Accordingly, all discovery, including any expert discovery, shall be
completed by November 10, 2026. NO further extensions will be granted.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
September 11, 2026
/s/ Anne Y. Shields
ANNE Y. SHIELDS
United States Magistrate Judge