Wetzel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHARIFF BUTLER, No. 4:23-CV-00859

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

JOHN E. WETZEL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEPTEMBER 11, 2026

Shariff Butler, a serial prisoner litigant, filed the instant pro se Section 19831

action, alleging fire-safety issues at the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon

(SCI Huntingdon). Following protracted motion-to-dismiss practice, his claims

have been winnowed to Eighth Amendment failure to protect against several

current or former SCI Huntingdon officials. Presently pending is Defendants’

motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the

remaining Section 1983 claims. Because there is no dispute of material fact

regarding the untimeliness of Butler’s lawsuit or the fact that he has already

litigated the same issues in federal court, the Court will grant judgment as a matter

of law in Defendants’ favor on all remaining Section 1983 claims.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Butler initially filed this case on May 19, 2023.3 He eventually filed an

amended complaint,4 and then a second amended complaint,5 which is the

operative pleading in this action.

The Court need not rehash the lengthy and litigious procedural history of

this case. Suffice it to say that Butler’s claims have been significantly narrowed

through extensive Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice to the following Section 1983

claims: (1) individual capacity Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against

the late Superintendent Kevin Kauffman (through Baily J. Kauffman, administrator

of the estate of Kevin Kauffman) and Safety Manager Anthony Scalia regarding

alleged fire-safety hazards at SCI Huntingdon; and (2) an official capacity Eighth

2 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. “Statements of material facts in support of, or

in opposition to, a motion [for summary judgment] shall include references to the parts of the

record that support the statements.” Id. Defendants filed their properly supported statement

of material facts, (Doc. 103), and Butler filed his responsive statement of facts, (Doc. 119). To

the extent that any statement of fact is undisputed, the Court may cite directly to Defendants’

statement of material facts rather than particular portions of the record.

3 See generally Doc. 1. Although both Butler and Defendants assert that Butler filed the instant

lawsuit on May 24, 2023, (see Doc. 104 at 8 n.1; Doc. 129 at 15), the Court observes that

Butler signed and dated his initial complaint on May 19, 2023, (see Doc. 1 at pp. 23, 24). The

Court will presume that it was given to prison officials for mailing on that same day and thus

was filed on May 19, 2023. See Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“The federal ‘prisoner mailbox rule’ provides that a document is deemed filed on the date it

is given to prison officials for mailing.”).

4 Doc. 23.

5 Doc. 44.

Amendment failure-to-protect claim against SCI Huntingdon’s current

Superintendent, John Rivello, that seeks prospective injunctive relief with respect

to the alleged fire-safety hazards.6

In his lawsuit, Butler recounts that on January 9, 2021, there was a fire in

another cell on his housing block and the prisoners had to be evacuated.7 Butler

alleges that this incident implicated numerous “fire safety hazards” at SCI

Huntingdon, including no initial sounding of a fire alarm, understaffing of

corrections officers, no “smoke exhaust fans,” no “adequately operable” ventilation

system, no master electronic locking system for all cells, no fire equipment to tend

to “major” fires, and no “adequately operable” fire exits.8 Butler avers that he

inhaled smoke during the evacuation and that his personal television set was

damaged.9 He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.

Defendants now move for summary judgement on the remaining Eighth

Amendment claims.10 That motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”11 Summary judgment is

6 See Doc. 61 at 2 ¶ 3; Doc. 68 ¶ 2.

7 See Doc. 44 ¶¶ 11-19.

8 Id. ¶ 21.

9 Id.

10 See generally Doc. 99.

11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”12 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”13

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”14 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”15 This evidence, however, must be

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

party on the claim or claims at issue.16 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

12 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

13 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

15 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

16 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”17 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.18

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants proffer numerous arguments as to why the Court should enter

judgment in their favor on Butler’s Eighth Amendment claims. They contend that

his claims are barred by the statute of limitations, have already been litigated and

are therefore barred by claim preclusion, are procedurally defaulted for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, fail to establish personal involvement, and are

precluded by qualified immunity.19 The Court need only address the first two

arguments because they are equally dispositive in this case.

A. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania

is two years.20 That two-year period accrues (or begins to run) when the plaintiff

“knew or should have known of the injury upon which his action is based”21 and

“the last act needed to complete the tort occurs.”22

17 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

18 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

19 See Doc. 104 at 9. Defendants also argue that any claims for compensatory damages are barred

by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because Butler suffered no personal injury. See id. at 9-10, 35-36.

20 See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(7).

21 Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation

omitted).

22 Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018).

It is indisputable that Butler has known about the alleged fire-safety hazards

at SCI Huntingdon for many years. In fact, he sued SCI Huntingdon officials

(including some of the very same Defendants) in 2019 for similar fire-safety

defects.23 In that prior lawsuit, Butler alleged nearly identical “fire safety hazards”

as those asserted in the instant case: no sounding of a fire alarm, no master locking

system for individual cells, no operational ventilation system, no smoke exhaust

fans, no “proper fire equipment,” understaffing, and fire exit doors “not

functioning properly.”24 It is therefore plainly obvious that Butler knew of the fire-

safety issues as early as 2019 (and likely much earlier). Thus, he should have

asserted his constitutional rights within the two-year statute of limitations that

expired years before he filed the instant case in 2023.25

To the extent that Butler contends that his present cause of action did not

accrue until the January 9, 2021 fire, he still fares no better. Taking at face value

Butler’s assertion that his “enforceable claim/right in this case came into existence

on January 9, 2021,”26 he did not file his prison grievance until January 27, 2021,27

after 18 days had already elapsed on his two-year statute of limitations. Butler

23 See generally Butler v. Wetzel, No. 4:19-cv-02171, Doc. 1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2019). In that

lawsuit, Butler alleges that he raised the fire-safety issues in prison grievances filed in

December 2017 and March 2019. See id., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 185, 197.

24 See id., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 82, 86-88, 95-96, 99, 107, 185, 197.

25 As explained in more detail below, Butler did in fact assert Eighth Amendment fire-safety

claims in his 2019 lawsuit.

26 Doc. 129 at 14, 15.

27 See Doc. 103-4 at 8.

then proceeded through the three-step prison grievance process, which tolled his

statute of limitations from January 27, 2021, until May 24, 2021, when the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals denied his final appeal.28

Butler then had 712 days remaining to file his lawsuit (or until May 8, 2023),29 but

he did not file it until May 19, 2023, almost two weeks too late.30

Butler once again appears to misunderstand what “tolling” means. Tolling

of a statute of limitations simply pauses or suspends the running of the limitations

period; it does not restart the limitations period from zero.31 Thus, while it is true

that the administrative grievance process tolls the two-year statute of limitations, it

does not restart the limitations period at zero when the grievance process is

completed. So even when using Butler’s preferred accrual date (January 9, 2021)

and applying the prisoner mailbox rule to establish the date the instant lawsuit was

filed (May 19, 2023), Butler’s Section 1983 claims—including those that were

28 See id. at 2; Pearson v. Sec’y Dept. of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that

“the PLRA is a statutory prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations while a

prisoner exhausts administrative remedies”).

29 The final day to file his lawsuit, May 6, 2023, fell on a Saturday, thus giving Butler until

Monday, May 8, 2023, to file his Section 1983 action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

30 See Butler v. Wetzel, No. 23-1761, 2024 WL 1007444, at *1 n.2 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2024) (per

curiam) (nonprecedential) (providing a similar Section 1983 statute-of-limitations calculation

that accounts for tolling during administrative exhaustion).

31 See Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 80 (2018) (“Ordinarily, ‘tolled’ . . . means that

the limitations period is suspended (stops running) while the claim is sub judice elsewhere,

then starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off.”); cf. Lozano

v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014) (noting that equitable tolling doctrine “pauses the

running of” a statute of limitations).

previously dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage—are plainly barred by the two-

year limitations period.

Butler does not mention the continuing violations doctrine, although he

made that argument in his previous case. As in the prior litigation, that doctrine

does not apply. The continuing violations doctrine recognizes that a plaintiff’s

claim is timely if the defendant’s allegedly wrongful actions are part of a

continuing practice, the last act of which occurred before the expiration of the

limitations period.32 But the doctrine does not apply when the defendant’s

allegedly wrongful conduct has a “degree of permanence which should trigger [his]

awareness of and duty to assert his[] rights”33 or “when the plaintiff is aware of the

injury at the time it occurred.”34 Here, the alleged fire-safety hazards about which

Butler has been complaining for many years have a “degree of permanence” which

should (and arguably did) trigger awareness of and a duty to assert his rights.

Finally, Butler is wrong when he contends that he had to wait until the

January 9, 2021 fire to sue for injunctive relief to correct the alleged fire-safety

hazards at SCI Huntingdon.35 It is well settled that a plaintiff need not wait until a

tragic event occurs before seeking injunctive relief from an allegedly “unsafe, life-

32 Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014).

33 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Cowell

v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001)).

34 Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481 (quoting Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin &

Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003)).

35 See Doc. 129 at 15-16.

threatening condition in their prison[.]”36 Butler, who has been alleging since at

least 2019 that the at-issue fire-safety hazards create an imminent risk of serious

harm, did not need to wait until harm occurred to seek injunctive relief under

Section 1983.37 And even assuming arguendo that he did, his lawsuit was still

filed almost two weeks too late.

In summary, Butler’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims were

most likely filed years out of time, as he knew about the alleged fire-safety hazards

at least as early as 2019. But even when using Butler’s preferred date of accrual,

they are still unequivocally time-barred. Butler does not provide any reason why

he waited until May 19, 2023, to file the instant lawsuit. He does not argue for

equitable tolling or any other tolling basis that would save his untimely lawsuit.

Judgment, therefore, must be granted in Defendants’ favor on all remaining claims

because those claims were filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations.

B. Claim Preclusion

Discussion of the statute of limitations brings to light a separate, dispositive

issue: claim preclusion (sometimes referred to as res judicata). As noted above,

Butler previously filed a federal Section 1983 lawsuit in this Court in which he

36 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).

37 See id. at 33-34. As discussed in more depth below, Butler in reality did not wait to assert his

Eighth Amendment rights. Rather, he filed grievances in December 2017 and March 2019 and

a federal lawsuit in December 2019 that raised the instant fire-safety issues, alleging they

violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and seeking injunctive relief.

raised his Eighth Amendment fire-safety claims. Butler’s Eighth Amendment

claims were rejected at summary judgment by this Court and on appeal by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.38 He is therefore barred by

claim preclusion from relitigating those claims in a subsequent lawsuit.

Claim preclusion requires “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit

involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on

the same cause of action.”39 In evaluating whether these elements exist, courts do

not proceed mechanically, but instead “focus on the central purpose of the

doctrine[:] to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out of the same

occurrence in a single suit.”40 By doing so, courts “avoid piecemeal litigation and

conserve judicial resources.”41 To that end, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata bars not

only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have

been brought.”42 When considering the third “cause of action” element, “the focus

is on the facts rather than the legal theories,” because claim preclusion bars a claim

that “arises from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in the

earlier litigation.”43

38 See Butler, No. 23-1761, 2024 WL 1007444, at *1, *2.

39 Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

40 Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014)).

41 Id. (quoting Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277).

42 Id. at 342 (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)).

43 Id. (quoting Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277).

The elements of claim preclusion are satisfied here. Butler filed a previous

lawsuit, Butler v. Wetzel, No. 4:19-cv-02171 (M.D. Pa.), in which he alleged the

same fire-safety hazards asserted in the present case. He sued numerous SCI

Huntingdon officials, including the late Kevin Kauffman and then-Safety Manager

Robert Bilger in their individual and official capacities, alleging Eighth

Amendment violations and seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.44 In

that case, summary judgment was granted in Defendants’ favor, which judgment

was affirmed on appeal.

The grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and against Butler

plainly qualifies as a final judgment on the merits.45 Therefore, the first element of

claim preclusion is met.

The second element is also satisfied. First, Butler sued the late

Superintendent Kevin Kauffman (in his individual and official capacities) in both

lawsuits. Second, Superintendent John Rivello is in privity with Kauffman based

on a legal relationship. That is, Rivello was substituted as a defendant in this

action for Butler’s official capacity claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(d) when Kauffman passed away.46

44 See Butler, No. 4:19-cv-02171, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14, 24, 34, 254-57, 259-62.

45 See Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973) (citations omitted) (noting

summary judgment is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes).

46 See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) (controlling substitution of a public officer who is a party to an action

in an official capacity and who “dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the

action is pending”).

Finally, in the 2019 suit, Butler sued then-Safety Manager Bilger. Safety

Manager Bilger appears to have been replaced by Safety Manager Scalia, who

became SCI Huntingdon’s Correctional Institutional Safety Manager in December

2018.47 In this regard, Butler could have, and indeed should have, sued Safety

Manager Scalia regarding the alleged fire-safety hazards at SCI Huntingdon as part

of his 2019 lawsuit. Any claim that was previously adjudicated on the merits and

which is later reasserted against a closely related new defendant (here, Safety

Manager Scalia) is barred by nonmutual claim preclusion and application of

Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).48 As the Third Circuit

has explained, when a plaintiff like Butler asserts “essentially the same claim

against different defendants,” courts have enlarged the scope of res judicata to

exceed “any definable categories of privity between the defendants.”49

The final element of claim preclusion requires the subsequent suit to be

based on the same cause of action. That element, too, is satisfied. In his 2019

lawsuit, Butler raised, inter alia, a Section 1983 claim alleging a violation of his

47 See Doc. 103-15 at 4.

48 See Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840-42 (3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that second

lawsuit asserting identical cause of action but adding several new but closely related defendants

was barred by res judicata and Bruszewski doctrine); Bruszewski, 181 F.2d at 422; see also

18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 4464.1, at 702 (3d ed. 2017) (concluding that one “cogent argument in favor

of nonmutual claim preclusion is that the party to be precluded should have joined his new

adversary in the original litigation”).

49 Bruszewski, 181 F.2d at 422 & n.6.

Eighth Amendment rights based on a substantial risk of serious harm from the

alleged fire-safety hazards at SCI Huntingdon.50 He sought monetary damages and

injunctive relief.51 That is the same claim he is asserting in the instant case.

Butler challenges only the third element of claim preclusion. He argues that

his present Eighth Amendment claim is based on the January 9, 2021 fire and thus

it is not the “same cause of action” or “occurrence” as his prior lawsuit.52 Butler is

incorrect.

The only claims that survived Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny in this case allege

Eighth Amendment violations by Kauffman and Scalia, claiming that alleged fire-

safety hazards at SCI Huntingdon created a substantial risk of serious harm to

inmates. There is nothing specific to the January 9, 2021 fire that is material to the

remaining claims and instant Rule 56 motion. Indeed, any constitutional claims

regarding the specific conduct of prison officials on January 9, 2021 (e.g., failure

to protect or equal protection based on certain Defendants’ actions or inactions in

response to the fire) have already been dismissed with prejudice from this case.53

Instead, the only Eighth Amendment claim remaining in the case at bar is identical

to one of the Eighth Amendment claims Butler asserted in his 2019 lawsuit:

50 See Butler, No. 4:19-cv-02171, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 254-57, 259-62.

51 See id., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 257, 262, pp. 44-45 ¶¶ (D), (F), (H), (M), (N).

52 See Doc. 129 at 11-14.

53 See Doc. 36 at 9, 11-12, 13; Doc. 60 at 13-15, 18-19.

deliberate indifference by prison officials to alleged fire-safety hazards at SCI

Huntingdon. In other words, “the claims asserted here and in the complaint filed in

the 201[9] action involve the same underlying facts, the same cause[] of action,

and the same demands for relief.”54

Butler, however, does not get two bites at the apple. In the present case,

claim preclusion applies and bars relitigation of the Eighth Amendment claim

alleging fire-safety hazards at SCI Huntingdon because that claim has already been

decided on the merits in federal court. For this additional reason, summary

judgment must be granted in Defendants’ favor on the remaining Section 1983

claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

54 Gupta v. Wipro Ltd., 749 F. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential).