Griffin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

LEETRAVIS GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-66-PPS-JEM

RON NEAL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LeeTravis Griffin, a prisoner without a lawyer, brings two claims related to a fire

that occurred at Indiana State Prison (“ISP”) on January 14, 2023. First, he is proceeding

against Officer Kevin Cross, Lieutenant Nadine Smith-Robinson, Officer Darnell

Crockett, Sergeant Jeniene Walton, Lieutenant Dennis Koen, Case Worker Jacqueline

Mayes, and Dr. Christina Chico “in their personal capacity for money damages for

denying him medical care for injuries he suffered in a January 2023 fire in violation of

the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 11 at 11-12. Second, he is proceeding against

Commissioner Christina Reagle, Warden Ron Neal, Assistant Warden Dawn Buss,

Major Douglas Wardlow, Supervisor of Fire Training Gordon Beecher, and Safety

Hazard Manager Deborah Taylor “in their personal capacity for monetary damages for

deliberate indifference to the risk of harm posed by a fire that occurred in January 2023

in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. at 12. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to

these defendants collectively as the “state defendants”. The state defendants filed a

joint motion for summary judgment, which is fully briefed. ECF 131, 139, 140, 145, 146,

163, 164. The remaining defendant, Dr. Chico, filed a separate motion for summary

judgment, which is likewise fully briefed. ECF 134, 143, 144, 150, 151, 161.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

I. Claims Against the State defendants

Griffin is proceeding against the state defendants on two claims. First, he is

proceeding against one group of state defendants who were physically present for and

actively involved in responding to the January 14 fire – Officer Cross, Lt. Smith-

Robinson, Officer Crockett, Sgt. Walton, Lt. Koen, and Case Worker Mayes (collectively,

the “incident defendants”) – for denying him medical care for injuries he suffered

during the January 14 fire. ECF 11 at 11-12. Second, he is proceeding against another

group of state defendants who are supervisory officials at ISP – Commissioner Reagle,

Warden Neal, Assistant Warden Buss, Major Wardlow, Supervisor of Fire Training

Beecher, and Safety Hazard Manager Taylor (collectively, the “supervisory

defendants”) – for deliberate indifference to the risk of fire at ISP. Each claim will be

addressed in turn.

A. Incident Defendants

Griffin is proceeding against the incident defendants for denying him medical

care for injuries he suffered during the January 14 fire. Here are the undisputed facts:

During all relevant times, Griffin was living in Cell 358, a single-man cell on the third

floor of A Cellhouse (ACH). ECF 132-1 at 13-14. Around 11:00 a.m. on January 14, 2023,

a fire started in cell A252, which was a level below and three cells down from Griffin’s

cell. Id. at 20, 29-30. Griffin began to smell smoke and heard an inmate named Michael

Smith state there was a fire in his cell. Id. at 29-30. Inmates began yelling that there was

a fire and banging on their cell bars, and Griffin began to see flames coming up to the

third-floor range. Id. at 32. Because of where his cell was located, Griffin could not see

anything that occurred on the second floor and could not see who responded to the fire.

Id. at 30, 33.

At around 10:58 a.m., prison staff heard the fire alarm in ACH go off and inmates

yelling, prompting them to respond. ECF 132-11 at 2. Sgt. Walton called a 10-71, which

is the signal for a fire in ACH. ECF 132-11 at 2; ECF 106 at 5. Officer Cross grabbed a fire

extinguisher from the officer’s station, and he and Officer Crockett went to the 200

North range with the fire extinguisher and the keys to the range. ECF 132-3 at 3; ECF

132-11 at 2. Once they were on the 200 range, they realized the location and size of the

fire. Id. They proceeded to Cell A252, but it was hard to get near the front of the cell to

manually unlock the door because of the intensity of the fire. Id. Officer Cross used the

fire extinguisher, but it was not able to put out the fire. ECF 132-3 at 3. Officer Cross had

unknowingly grabbed a water-based fire extinguisher and realized he needed an ABC

fire extinguisher instead. ECF 132-3 at 2-3; ECF 132-11 at 2. He went back downstairs

and met Lt. Smith-Robinson, who handed him an ABC fire extinguisher by the stairs to

the second floor. ECF 132-3 at 3; ECF 132-4 at 2. At approximately 10:59 a.m., Officer

Cross returned to Cell A252 with the ABC fire extinguisher and passed it to Officer

Crockett, who deployed it to control the fire. ECF 132-11 at 2; ECF 132-3 at 3.

First responders then arrived on the scene, including Lt. Koen. ECF 132-11 at 2;

ECF 132-5 at 2. Lt. Koen was able to open the door to Cell A252 as staff continued to try

to put out the fire. ECF 132-11 at 2-3; ECF 132-5 at 2. A team of inmate firefighters also

arrived on the scene and were able to extinguish the fire. ECF 132-11 at 3.

While the fire was ongoing, Griffin turned on his fan to keep the smoke out of his

cell. ECF 132-1 at 34-36. At some point, he began vomiting in his toilet and lost

consciousness while on his bed. Id. at 40-41. He experienced lightheadedness, shortness

of breath, blurriness of sight, and burning of his sinuses, throat, and eyes. Id. at 46.

Once the inmate firefighters arrived on the scene and began extinguishing the

fire, Captain McCann gave permission to evacuate all the other inmates in ACH to the

recreation yard. ECF 132-4 at 2; ECF 132-11 at 3. Cells were unlocked, and correctional

officers performed a sweep of each range to ensure all inmates had left the cellhouse.

ECF 132-4 at 2. Because Griffin was on the 300 range, which had an electronic locking

mechanism, his cell opened automatically when the doors were unlocked at the end of

the range, and he was able to physically open his cell door and head down the stairs.

ECF 132-1 at 49. Griffin exited ACH through the front door. Id. at 52.

While Griffin was leaving the ACH, he stated aloud that he believed he had

passed out, was lightheaded, and needed medical attention. ECF 132-1 at 52-54. Griffin

did not know who exactly he was talking to at the time, but he was in the “vicinity” of

Officer Cross, Officer Crockett, Lt. Smith-Robinson, Sgt. Walton, and Lt. Koen. Id. None

of those defendants responded or gave any indication they heard what he said, but

Griffin testified he would “like to believe that they heard me” because they were in

close proximity. Id. at 58. Griffin testified it was “fair” to say he was not sure whether

they heard him or not. Id. All inmates were evacuated to the gym, while inmates

experiencing apparent medical emergencies were taken straight to the medical unit.

ECF 132-5 at 3.

Once Griffin arrived at the gym, he spoke to Case Worker Mayes and told her

that he was feeling “lightheaded” and “short of breath,” and she responded that they

were “counting currently.” ECF 132-1 at 59. Captain McCormick then told Case Worker

Mayes that custody staff were able to handle the situation, and Mayes then left the area.

ECF 132-6 at 2. She did not have any further involvement with any inmate, and Griffin

did not speak to any other staff while he was in the gym. Id.; ECF 132-1 at 60.

Once ACH was cleared and it was determined the cellhouse was safe to return,

inmates were sent back to their cells and placed on lockdown. ECF 132-3 at 4; ECF 132-4

at 2; ECF 132-1 at 70. Griffin returned to his cell and did not have any further

conversations with any of the incident defendants. ECF 132-1 at 63-64, 72-73. Inmates

who requested medical attention but did not appear to be suffering from a medical

emergency were secured back in their cells so that staff could perform a triage and

coordinate treatment with medical staff. ECF 132-5 at 3.

Once the inmates in ACH were back in their cells, Lt. Smith-Robinson and other

custody staff did rounds and performed a count. ECF 132-4 at 2-3. Lt. Smith-Robinson

and other staff spoke with numerous inmates and informed medical staff if any of them

required assistance. Id. at 3. Dr. Chico also came to the prison to assist with triaging

ACH after the fire. ECF 135-1 at 2-3. Griffin spoke with Dr. Chico at his cell and told her

that he needed medical attention, but he was not taken to the medical unit that day.

ECF 132-1 at 63. He only spoke to Dr. Chico at his cell and did not speak to any of the

incident defendants. Id. at 63-64. Griffin later attempted to submit a healthcare request

form to be seen by medical, but when he requested the form from officers, they would

not provide the form. Id. at 66. He could not recall which officers he requested

healthcare request forms from. Id. He was not seen by medical staff on the day of the

fire. When he was eventually seen by medical staff, he was focused on receiving

treatment for his preexisting conditions and did not request any treatment for his

symptoms related to the fire. Id. at 67-69.1 Because neither party disputes these facts, I

accept them as undisputed.

As discussed, Griffin is proceeding against the incident defendants “for denying

him medical care for injuries he suffered” during the January 14 fire. ECF 11 at 11-12.

The incident defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor on this

claim because (1) Griffin did not suffer any objectively serious medical condition,

(2) they were not deliberately indifferent to that condition, and (3) they are entitled to

qualified immunity.

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to ensure inmates

receive constitutionally adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).

To establish liability for an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must show: (1) his

medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate

1 It is unclear from the record when Griffin was first seen by medical staff following the January

14 fire. He testified only that he did not see medical staff on the day of the fire.

indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy

the second prong, Griffin must show the incident defendants “acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was

at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm

from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d

469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations

omitted). “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and poses a

‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a total

unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v. Milwaukee

County, 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)). The deliberate-indifference inquiry is subjective: the

defendant must be aware of facts supporting an inference that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists and must actually draw that inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 961 (7th Cir. 2024).

Here, with regard to Officer Cross, Lt. Smith-Robinson, Officer Crockett, Sgt.

Walton, and Lt. Koen, there is no evidence that any of them knew Griffin had a serious

medical need, much less that they were deliberately indifferent to it. Griffin

encountered these defendants while they were assisting in the evacuation of him and

the other inmates in ACH to the gym. Griffin testified that, during the evacuation, he

stated aloud that he needed medical attention while he was in the “vicinity” of these

defendants, but he could not say whether any of them heard him. ECF 132-1 at 53-55,

57-58. These defendants attest they have no recollection of Griffin ever asking them for

medical attention. ECF 132-3 at 4; ECF 132-4 at 3; ECF 132-5 at 3; ECF 132-11 at 3. Griffin

further conceded that he did not speak with any of these defendants once he arrived at

the gym and did not see any of them again after he was returned to his cell. ECF 132-1

at 60-64. Thus, even construing the evidence in Griffin’s favor, the record would permit

a jury to find only that he requested medical attention while these defendants were

nearby—not that any of them heard the request or otherwise knew he needed medical

care. Without evidence that these defendants were aware of Griffin’s need for medical

attention, no reasonable jury could conclude that they exhibited “a total unconcern” for

his welfare “in the face of serious risks” by assisting in his evacuation to the gym

without providing him immediate medical treatment. Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615.

With regard to Case Worker Mayes, Griffin testified that he spoke with her at the

gym and told her he was feeling lightheaded and experiencing shortness of breath, to

which she responded, “We counting currently.” ECF 132-1 at 59. That was the only

conversation Griffin had with Case Worker Mayes at that time, and Case Worker Mayes

thereafter left the area after Captain McCormick informed her that custody staff could

handle the situation. ECF 132-6 at 2.

Even accepting Griffin’s testimony, no reasonable jury could conclude that Case

Worker Mayes acted with deliberate indifference. Although Griffin told Case Worker

Mayes he was experiencing lightheadedness and shortness of breath, there is no

evidence that his condition appeared so severe or urgent that Case Worker Mayes

would have understood he required immediate medical intervention rather than

medical attention through the ordinary channels available to him. The Eighth

Amendment did not require Case Worker Mayes to interrupt her count to personally

secure immediate treatment under these circumstances, particularly where custody staff

remained present to address Griffin’s needs and he could seek medical attention

through the ordinary procedures once the evacuation had concluded. See Hayes v.

Zatecky, No. 1:21-CV-00630-JPH-KMB, 2023 WL 5722673, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2023)

(“to the extent Mr. Hayes told these administrators about medical problems when he

was not experiencing a medical emergency, the Eighth Amendment did not obligate

them to ensure that he received treatment when Mr. Hayes could instead interact with

the medical staff through the appropriate channels for him to do so.”) (citing Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is

entitled to insist that one employee do another’s job.”)); Robertson v. Liedtke, No. 3:23-

CV-514-HAB, 2026 WL 274603, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2026) (concluding that a nurse

did not act with deliberate indifference by declining to interrupt medication pass to

provide immediate care for non-emergency medical complaints where the inmate could

seek treatment through the ordinary procedures). On this record, Case Worker Mayes’s

decision to continue with the count rather than immediately act on Griffin’s request for

medical attention does not satisfy the “high hurdle” of showing “a total unconcern” for

Griffin’s welfare “in the face of serious risks.” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615.

In his response, Griffin raises two arguments that must be addressed. First,

contrary to his deposition testimony, he now asserts that he “expressly told each

individual incident defendant that I had lost consciousness, had difficulty breathing,

was experiencing severe pain and burning sensations in my eyes, nasal cavity, throat,

and chest, and was violently vomiting,” but that they nevertheless refused to facilitate

his access to medical care. ECF 145-1 at 18-19. This account cannot be reconciled with

Griffin’s deposition testimony. At his deposition, Griffin testified that: (1) as to Officer

Cross, Lt. Smith-Robinson, Officer Crockett, Sgt. Walton, and Lt. Koen, he merely stated

that he needed medical attention while he was in their “vicinity” and could not say

whether any one of them specifically heard him; and (2) as to Case Worker Mayes, he

told her only that he was feeling “lightheaded” and “short of breath” while she was

conducting a count at the gym. ECF 132-1 at 52-55, 57-59. Griffin may not create a

genuine dispute of material fact by offering a later account that directly contradicts his

earlier sworn deposition testimony without explaining the discrepancy. See James v.

Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 316 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the sham-affidavit rule “prohibits

a party from submitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s prior deposition or

other sworn testimony”). Accordingly, Griffin’s later assertion that he specifically

described these additional and more severe symptoms to each defendant does not

create a genuine factual dispute.

Second, Griffin argues that, even if the incident defendants were not “specifically

or individually made aware of my serious medical need,” they nevertheless knew he

required medical attention because they were aware that he had been exposed to

smoke. ECF 145-1 at 19-20. But general knowledge that Griffin had been exposed to

smoke does not establish that any particular defendant knew he faced a serious medical

risk requiring additional intervention. The undisputed evidence shows that the

defendants evacuated Griffin and the other inmates in ACH to the gym, sent inmates

exhibiting emergency medical needs to the medical unit, returned the remaining

inmates to ACH once it was cleared, and then arranged for inmates to be triaged in their

cells to identify those requesting medical attention. After Griffin returned to his cell, he

spoke with Dr. Chico but did not see or speak with any of the incident defendants.

Thus, the record does not show that the incident defendants ignored a known

risk to Griffin’s health. On the contrary, they participated in an evacuation and triage

process designed both to identify inmates requiring emergency treatment and to

provide a means for the remaining inmates to request medical attention. Absent

evidence that any of these defendants knew Griffin personally required additional or

immediate medical care, no reasonable jury could conclude that they exhibited “a total

unconcern” for his welfare “in the face of serious risks.” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615.

Accordingly, there is no evidence that Officer Cross, Lt. Smith-Robinson, Officer

Crockett, Sgt. Walton, or Lt. Koen knew Griffin had a serious medical need, much less

that they were deliberately indifferent to it. And although Griffin testified that he

informed Case Worker Mayes that he was experiencing lightheadedness and shortness

of breath, her decision not to secure immediate medical care did not demonstrate “a

total unconcern” for his welfare, particularly where other procedures were in place to

identify inmates requiring medical attention. Summary judgment is therefore

warranted in favor of the incident defendants on this claim.2

2 Because the undisputed facts show the incident defendants were not deliberately indifferent to

Griffin’s serious medical need, I do not reach their alternative arguments that Griffin did not have an

objectively serious medical need or that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Supervisory Defendants

Griffin is proceeding against the supervisory defendants on a deliberate-

indifference claim based on the risk of harm posed by the January 2023 fire. At the

outset, there is no evidence that any of these defendants were present for or personally

involved in responding to the January 14 fire. Rather, Griffin’s claim concerns their

conduct before the fire: he contends that they knew conditions in ACH created a

substantial risk of serious harm in the event of a fire but failed to take reasonable

measures to address that risk. See ECF 145-1 at 21 (“To be clear, I am not claiming that

Supervisory Defendants are liable because they approved, condoned, or turned a blind

eye to the actions taken by Incident Defendants on January 14, 2023. Rather, I am

asserting an independent theory of deliberate indifference as to the Supervisory

Defendants. Specifically, that they were aware of dangerous conditions in [ACH] and

the substantial risk these conditions posed in an event of a fire, but that they failed to

take reasonable action in response to this risk.”).

The supervisory defendants submit affidavits from ISP Safety Hazard Manager

Taylor and Warden Neal describing the fire-prevention and response measures in place

at ISP at the time of the January 14 fire. They attest to the following facts:

ISP maintains its own on-site inmate fire department, whose members receive

statewide firefighter certification and training through the State Fire Marshal, allowing

the facility to respond to fires more quickly than if it had to wait for an outside fire

department. ECF 132-7 at 2. ISP also equips its fire department with the latest

firefighting and smoke-control equipment, including foam backpack fire-suppression

systems and smoke-evacuation systems. Id. All fire alarms were operational at the time

of the January 14 fire, several had been newly installed or refurbished, and the dampers

and exhaust systems in the cellhouses were regularly repaired and replaced as needed

to ensure they remained operational. Id.

ISP had also implemented additional fire-safety measures following a 2017 fire. It

purchased additional water and ABC fire extinguishers, which were placed at officers’

stations and on the endcaps of each cell range; reduced the amount of property inmates

could keep in their cells; and replaced plastic property boxes with more fire-resistant

steel boxes. ECF 132-7 at 2-3. The housing units themselves are primarily constructed of

steel and concrete, and ISP uses fire-retardant mattresses. Id. at 4. In 2019, ISP also

upgraded all of its fire hydrants. Id.

These measures were supplemented by regular inspection, training, and

emergency-planning procedures. The ISP Fire Department conducted bimonthly

inspections of all fire extinguishers, and there were no reports of inoperable or empty

extinguishers in ACH leading up to the January 14 fire. ECF 132-7 at 4; ECF 132-8 at 2.

The Safety Hazard Manager and ISP Fire Department also conducted four fire drills per

year for each building. Id. Finally, ISP maintained a Fire Plan setting out staff

procedures for fire prevention and evacuation, and all staff received training on the

plan and were required to complete a questionnaire testing their knowledge of those

procedures. ECF 132-7 at 4-5; ECF 132-8 at 2.

All supervisory defendants attest they were unaware of any infrastructural

issues or conditions at ISP that created a fire risk or threatened the lives of inmates

living in ACH. ECF 132-2 at 1; ECF 132-7 at 6; ECF 132-8 at 4; ECF 132-9 at 3; ECF 132-10

at 2. The January 14 fire was investigated by both the State Fire Marshal and ISP’s

Internal Affairs Division, and neither party was able to determine the cause of the fire.

ECF 132-7 at 7.

In his response, Griffin lists twenty-five conditions he contends made ACH

unsafe and created a substantial risk of harm in the event of a fire: (1) no inmate

firefighters were housed in ACH; (2) fire signals were not called promptly; (3) staff did

not promptly release inmate firefighters to respond to fires; (4) electrical outlets were

not grounded; (5) the smoke-ventilation exhaust system was inoperable; (6) fire

extinguishers were either inoperable or insufficient in number; (7) staff were

inadequately trained; (8) automatic smoke alarms were inoperable; (9) the paint was

flammable; (10) staff training was deficient; (11) cells lacked emergency call buttons;

(12) staff did not perform timely security checks; (13) cells had double-locking manual

doors; (14) most fire extinguishers were water-based rather than ABC extinguishers;

(15) staff cheated on fire-preparation questionnaires; (16) staff conducted sham fire

drills; (17) there was no automated fire-suppression system; (18) the smoke-ventilation

exhaust systems were not operational; (19) smoke detectors were positioned too high;

(20) there were widespread problems with electrical outlets; (21) too few fire drills were

conducted; (22) inmates were not provided storage containers with lids or covers;

(23) staff failed to comply with recommendations made after the 2017 fire; (24) fire-

safety equipment was not meaningfully inspected; and (25) staff were not properly

questioned regarding their knowledge of fire-safety procedures. ECF 145-1 at 22-23.

In support of these arguments, Griffin merely states that he “has provided a

panoply of evidence,” yet only has citations for four of the listed conditions. And those

sparse citations are largely lacking, or even contradict his assertions. For example, for

his contention that there was no operational smoke ventilation exhaust systems, he cites

Jenkins v. Bass, 2025 WL 1916106 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2025), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL

2982380 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2025). He states that this case, which was also about a fire in

the prison, made the supervisory defendants aware that the exhaust system was

inoperable. ECF 145-1, 23. But that is not what the case, which granted summary

judgment to the moving defendants, stated. Jenkins¸ 2025 WL 1916106 at *4. Much the

opposite, that opinion stated that the smoke was cleared “using exhaust fans and other

fans brought to the unit.” Id. at *2. At the summary judgment stage, I may disregard

unsupported factual contentions and need not scour the record for any possible

evidence that might be relevant to Griffin’s contentions here. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.,

870 F.3d 562, 572 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that a court need not “scour the record in

search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

Regardless, the question is not whether ISP could have done more; it is whether

the supervisory defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious

harm. Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even objective

recklessness. Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615. An official who takes reasonable measures to

address a known risk is not deliberately indifferent merely because additional

precautions were available or the measures taken ultimately proved insufficient. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (an official who responds reasonably to a known substantial risk

cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment even if the harm is not ultimately

averted); Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2023) (an official is not liable

where the measures taken were “reasonably calculated” to address the risk, even

though they ultimately failed to prevent the injury); Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 647-48

(7th Cir. 1997) (officials who took reasonable steps to prevent harm were not

deliberately indifferent even though they may have acted negligently or failed to

eliminate the risk as quickly as possible). Thus, Griffin cannot establish deliberate

indifference simply by identifying additional fire-safety measures that ISP could have

implemented.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that the supervisory defendants took

numerous steps “reasonably calculated” to address the risk posed by a fire. See id.

Before the January 14 fire, ISP had: (1) established an on-site inmate fire department

whose members received statewide firefighter certification; (2) repaired and replaced

dampers, exhaust systems, fire alarms, and fire extinguishers as needed; (3) purchased

updated firefighting equipment, including foam backpack fire-suppression systems and

smoke-evacuation systems; (4) purchased additional water and ABC fire extinguishers;

(5) reduced the amount of property inmates could keep in their cells; (6) replaced plastic

property boxes with more fire-resistant steel boxes; (7) upgraded its fire hydrants; (8)

regularly inspected its fire extinguishers; (9) conducted fire drills four times per year;

(10) implemented a Fire Plan governing fire prevention and evacuation; and (11) trained

and tested staff on that plan.

Griffin lists various ways in which he believes these precautions were inadequate

or could have been implemented more effectively. But, as I noted above, the Eighth

Amendment does not require the supervisory defendants to eliminate every

conceivable fire hazard or adopt every additional precaution that might have reduced

the risk further. The undisputed evidence instead shows a substantial system of fire-

prevention, firefighting, evacuation, inspection, and training measures directed at the

very risk Griffin contends the defendants ignored. That those measures did not prevent

Griffin from suffering injury during the January 14 fire does not itself permit a

reasonable jury to conclude that the supervisory defendants exhibited “a total

unconcern” for his safety. Summary judgment is therefore warranted in favor of the

supervisory defendants on this claim.

Accordingly, for these reasons, summary judgment is warranted in favor of all

state defendants on both of Griffin’s claims.

II. Claims Against Dr. Chico

Griffin is proceeding against Dr. Chico on an Eighth Amendment claim that she

was deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care following the January 14 fire.

ECF 11 at 11-12. Dr. Chico moves for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence

does not permit a reasonable jury to find that she was deliberately indifferent to any

serious medical need. ECF 134; ECF 137.

Dr. Chico provides an affidavit in which she attests to the following facts: During

all relevant times, Dr. Chico worked at ISP as a psychologist providing mental health

services to inmates. ECF 135-1 at 1. She was not scheduled to work on January 14, 2023,

but was called after the fire in ACH and asked to come to the prison to check on the

inmates’ mental health. Id. at 2. By the time she arrived, the fire had been extinguished.

Id. Dr. Chico spent the next four or five hours walking each range of ACH and checking

on each inmate, including Griffin. Id. She reminded inmates that she was available for

mental health counseling, and several inmates who requested follow-up mental health

treatment were scheduled for appointments. Id.

Because Dr. Chico is a psychologist rather than a medical doctor, she did not

evaluate inmates for specific medical treatment during these rounds. ECF 135-1 at 2. If

an inmate requested medical care, however, Dr. Chico attests that she recorded the

inmate’s cell location on a list and provided the list to custody staff so the inmate could

be taken to the medical unit. Id. at 2-3. She did not have authority to personally escort

inmates to the medical unit. Id. at 3. Dr. Chico does not specifically recall whether

Griffin requested medical care when she spoke with him, but she attests that, if he did,

she would have included his cell location on the list provided to custody staff. Id. She

further attests that she observed no inmate displaying obvious signs of a medical

emergency and believed that inmates who requested medical treatment would be taken

to the medical unit. Id. After completing her rounds and providing her list of cell

locations to custody staff, Dr. Chico left the prison. Id.

In his response, Griffin states that, when Dr. Chico saw him during her rounds,

he told her that he had lost consciousness during the fire, was having difficulty

breathing, and was experiencing severe pain in his eyes, sinuses, throat, and chest. ECF

143-1 at 3. He asserts he was not taken to the medical unit despite reporting these

symptoms, and argues Dr. Chico was therefore deliberately indifferent for several

reasons.

First, Griffin argues that Dr. Chico acted with deliberate indifference by

providing the list of inmates requesting medical attention to custody staff rather than

directly to medical staff. ECF 143-1 at 9. That conduct does not permit a reasonable

inference of deliberate indifference. Dr. Chico attests that she provided the list to

custody staff so that those inmates could be taken to the medical unit for evaluation.

Even if Griffin believes it would have been preferable for Dr. Chico to communicate

directly with medical staff, the Eighth Amendment did not require her to personally

undertake every step necessary to secure treatment where she reasonably referred the

matter to other prison employees responsible for arranging access to the medical unit.

See Burks, 555 F.3d at 595 (“Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist

that one employee do another’s job.”). On this record, the evidence does not come close

to showing that Dr. Chico exhibited “a total unconcern” for Griffin’s welfare.

Second, Griffin argues that Dr. Chico “failed to notify medical staff (or any other

staff for that matter) of my need for medical attention, and instead rushed back home to

continue enjoying her day off and entertaining her house guests.” ECF 143-1 at 3. Dr.

Chico, however, attests that “[a]ll offender requests for medical treatment that were

made to me were recorded and delivered to custody staff.” ECF 135-1 at 3. Griffin has

no personal knowledge of what Dr. Chico did after leaving his cell and therefore cannot

contradict her testimony based on his own observations. He nevertheless argues that

the circumstantial evidence creates a genuine dispute as to whether Dr. Chico actually

provided the list of inmates requesting medical attention to custody staff. ECF 143-1 at

10-11.

Griffin argues that the incident defendants’ attestations that they were unaware

of his request for medical attention create a factual dispute as to whether Dr. Chico ever

provided the list of cell locations to custody staff. ECF 143-1 at 10. But Dr. Chico does

not identify which member of custody staff received the list, and there is no evidence

that she provided (or was expected to provide) the list to any of the incident defendants

specifically. The fact that those defendants were unaware of Griffin’s request therefore

does not contradict Dr. Chico’s testimony that she provided the list to custody staff; she

could have provided it to another employee who is not a defendant in this case.

Griffin also argues that the fact custody staff did not ultimately send him for

medical treatment creates a genuine dispute as to whether Dr. Chico actually provided

the list of cell locations to custody staff. Similar arguments were recently addressed by

the Seventh Circuit in Taylor v. Reagle, No. 25-2338, 2026 WL 1951623 (7th Cir. July 6,

2026), and Barghouti v. Hansen, No. 24-2610, 2026 WL 2169044 (7th Cir. July 28, 2026).

Although both are nonprecedential dispositions, they are persuasive because they

address similar attempts to infer from a plaintiff’s subsequent failure to receive

treatment that a defendant never relayed his request for medical assistance.

In Taylor, the district court determined that defendant Sergeant Williams was not

deliberately indifferent to Taylor’s serious medical need after crediting Sgt. Williams’s

testimony that he telephoned medical staff and relayed Taylor’s complaints. On appeal,

Taylor argued that Sgt. Williams’s testimony was contradicted by Taylor’s own sworn

statements and the absence of an entry documenting the call in the relevant logbook.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that “neither Taylor’s statements nor the lack

of entry in the logbook create a genuine dispute of fact.” Id. at *2. Because Taylor lacked

personal knowledge of whether Sgt. Williams contacted medical staff, he could not

genuinely dispute Sgt. Williams’s sworn testimony that he had done so. Id. (citing

Payne, 337 F.3d at 772). Nor did the absence of a logbook entry, “without more,” permit

a reasonable inference that the call never occurred. Id. (citing Estate of Biegert ex rel.

Biegert v. Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2020)).

Similarly, in Barghouti, the plaintiff argued that correctional officers had lied

when they testified that they contacted medical staff about his complaints. 2026 WL

2169044, at *3. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument because there was no record

evidence contradicting the officers’ accounts, explaining that “[m]ere speculation cannot

defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Although the court expressed concern that

Barghouti had waited as long as a day and a half for medical attention, that delay did

not establish that the officers had failed to contact medical staff because “the record

does not indicate why the delay occurred or who was responsible, much less whether

the delay was the result of deliberate indifference.” Id.; see also Walker v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that the

defendant’s actions or inaction caused the delay in his treatment.”).

The same reasoning applies here. Griffin has no personal knowledge of what Dr.

Chico did after leaving his cell and relies on the fact that he was not subsequently taken

to the medical unit to infer that she must not have delivered the list to custody staff. But

the fact that Griffin ultimately did not receive medical attention on the day of the fire

does not reveal where the process broke down, much less permit a reasonable jury to

attribute that failure to Dr. Chico. See Barghouti, 2026 WL 2169044, at *3; Walker, 940 F.3d

at 964. There is no evidence contradicting Dr. Chico’s sworn testimony that she

recorded all requests for medical treatment and delivered them to custody staff. On this

record, concluding that she failed to do so merely because Griffin was not ultimately

taken to the medical unit would rest on speculation rather than a reasonable inference

from the evidence. See Taylor, 2026 WL 1951623, at *2; Biegert, 968 F.3d at 701; Payne, 337

F.3d at 772.

Moreover, even if a reasonable jury could infer that Dr. Chico failed to provide

Griffin’s cell location to custody staff, there is no evidence that any such omission

amounted to deliberate indifference rather than negligence. Nothing in the record

suggests that Dr. Chico intentionally withheld Griffin’s cell location, deliberately

omitted it from the list, or otherwise consciously chose to prevent him from receiving

medical care. Thus, even assuming some breakdown attributable to Dr. Chico occurred,

the record would permit only speculation as to whether that breakdown was

inadvertent or reflected the culpable state of mind required for an Eighth Amendment

violation.

Third, to the extent Griffin’s claim rests on a delay in receiving medical care, he

has not produced verifying medical evidence that the delay itself caused him additional

harm. See Barnes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 177 F.4th 825, 833 (7th Cir. 2026) (“In

cases such as this one—where the plaintiff alleges the defendant delayed, rather than

denied, medical treatment—we have required that the plaintiff present ‘verifying

medical evidence’ that the delay, and not the underlying condition, caused some

harm.”). Griffin testified that, when he eventually saw medical staff, he sought

treatment focused on his preexisting medical conditions, and there is no evidence that

he received or required any treatment for injuries caused by the January 14 fire. Thus,

there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that any delay attributable

to Dr. Chico exacerbated Griffin’s condition or otherwise caused him additional harm.

See Barnes, 177 F.4th at 833; Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, even accepting Griffin’s testimony that he informed Dr. Chico of

symptoms requiring medical attention, there is no nonspeculative evidence that Dr.

Chico consciously disregarded that need. The only competent evidence addressing

what Dr. Chico did after speaking with the inmates shows that she recorded requests

for medical care and provided the resulting list to custody staff, and Griffin has

produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find either that she failed to

do so in his case or, even if she did, that the omission was anything more than

negligent. Summary judgment is therefore warranted in Dr. Chico’s favor. Summary

judgment is therefore warranted in Dr. Chico’s favor.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 131);

(2) GRANTS Dr. Chico’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 134); and

(3) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against

LeeTravis Griffin and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 11, 2026.

/s/Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT