The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEPHEN J. RUSHING
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 19-653-JWD-SDJ
JOHN YEARGAIN, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Steven J. Rushing’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Interlocutory Ruling on February 7, 2025 (Doc. 208) (“the Motion”) filed by
Plaintiff Steven J. Rushing (“Plaintiff” or “Rushing”). The Motion asks the Court to reconsider its
February 7, 2025, Ruling and Order (the “Ruling”) (Doc. 195), which granted the motions for
summary judgment (Doc. 90; Doc. 91) filed by Defendants John Crain, Tara Dupre, Erin Watson
Horzelski, and John Yeargain (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff argues reconsideration is
warranted under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “because intervening Fifth
Circuit authority issued on February 7, 2025 clarifies the governing legal standards applicable to
Plaintiff’s First Amendment and retaliation claims, and because revision is necessary to prevent
manifest injustice.” (Doc. 208 at 1.) Plaintiff thus requests that this Court vacate the dismissal of
his “First Amendment, Louisiana Constitution Article I § 7, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 retaliation
claims.” (Id. at 2.)
Defendants oppose the Motion. (Doc. 210). No reply was filed. Oral argument is not
necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments
and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion
is denied.
II. RELEVANT STANDARD
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “allows parties to seek reconsideration
of interlocutory orders and authorizes the court at any time to revise an order or other decision that
does not end the action.” Doe #1 v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech.
Coll., No. 21-564, 2025 WL 1879534, at *4 (M.D. La. July 8, 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
“Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it
deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification
of the substantive law.’” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)). While the
court has broad discretion to decide a Rule 54(b) motion to reconsider, courts consider factors such
as “whether 1) the judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law; 2) newly discovered or
previously unavailable evidence exists; 3) the initial decision was manifestly unjust; 4) counsel
engaged in serious misconduct; and 5) an intervening change in law alters the appropriate
outcome.” Adams v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting
Indus. of the U.S. & Can., AFL-CIO, Loc. 198, 495 F. Supp. 3d 392, 395 (M.D. La. 2020) (citing
Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475–76
(M.D. La. 2002)).
“Although courts are concerned with principles of finality and judicial economy, ‘the
ultimate responsibility of the federal courts, at all levels, is to reach the correct judgment under
law.’” Broyles v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., No. 10-854, 2015 WL 500876, at *1 (M.D. La. Feb. 5,
2015) (quoting Keys v. Dean Morris, LLP, No. 12-49, 2013 WL 2387768, at *1 (M.D. La. May
30, 2013)). “Nevertheless, ‘rulings should only be reconsidered where the moving party has
presented substantial reasons for reconsideration.’” Id. (quoting Louisiana v. Sprint Commc’ns
Co., 899 F. Supp. 282, 284 (M.D. La. 1995)).
Ultimately, a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and “should be used
sparingly in the interest of finality and [conservation] of judicial resources.” MMR Constructors,
Inc. v. JB Grp. of LA, LLC, No. 22-267, 2025 WL 2499086, at *2 (M.D. La. July 2, 2025) (quoting
Dixon v. D.R. Horton, Inc. - Gulf Coast, No. 22-01005, 2023 WL 2486587, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb.
24, 2023)). “The court should deny a motion for reconsideration when the movant rehashes legal
theories and arguments that were raised or could have been raised before the entry of the
judgment.” Doe #1, 2025 WL 1879534, at *4 (citing Adams, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 396).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff first argues that the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Biggers v. Massingill,
No. 23-11023, 2025 WL 429974 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) “clarifies the applicable standard for
material issues that directly bear on this Court’s analysis, warranting reconsideration.” (Doc. 208-
1 at 3.) Plaintiff claims Biggers and the case before this Court both involve, “(1) a limited public
forum, (2) a presiding official invoking ‘decorum’ or ‘disruption’ as justification, (3) the silencing
of a speaker who sought to criticize institutional actors, and (4) allegations that the stated reasons
for removal were simply pretexts for viewpoint discrimination.” (Id. at 5.) Thus, “these allegations
plausibly suggest that Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also asserts that this Court’s interpretation of “public concern” was too narrow.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s remaining arguments reallege issues he raised or could have raised in
opposition to Defendants’ motions (Doc. 90; Doc. 91). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges his
communications were protected by the First Amendment, and Horzelski and Yeargain denied him
the opportunity to speak. (Id. at 5–14.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ actions constitute
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 14–16.)
Defendants respond that the Biggers decision should not influence this Court’s ruling
because this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Dupre, Horzelski, and Yeargain for lack of
standing and against Crain for failure to show a violation of a constitutional right. (Doc. 210 at 4.)
In Biggers, on the contrary, the Fifth Circuit found that the lower court erred because its qualified
immunity analysis failed to address whether there was a violation of a constitutional right. (Id.)
“Plaintiff’s characterization of the decision is incorrect and materially misrepresents the Fifth
Circuit’s holding.” (Id. at 3.) “Plaintiff’s Motion is completely devoid of any reason or argument
as to why reconsideration is warranted aside from Biggers.” (Id. at 5.) Defendants also contend
that the remainder of the Motion is an attempt to rehash the arguments the Ruling addressed at
length. (Id. at 6.) Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to show sufficient reason for the
Court to reconsider” the Ruling, and the Motion should be denied. (Id.)
B. Analysis
Plaintiff has not presented the Court with substantial reasons for reconsideration.
Accordingly, none of Plaintiff’s arguments persuade this Court to reach a conclusion different
from the one reached in the Ruling (Doc. 195).
1. Biggers v. Massingill is inapplicable.
Plaintiff argues the Biggers opinion “provides persuasive authority on the material issues
in this case that were not previously addressed by published Fifth Circuit precedent.” (Doc. 208-1
at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims Biggers clarifies “that allegations of viewpoint discrimination
and pretextual reliance on the alleged ‘disruption’ are fact-intensive and not suitable for summary
judgment.” (Id. at 2.) Defendants assert this characterization of Biggers “is incorrect and materially
misrepresents the Fifth Circuit’s holding.” (Doc. 210 at 3.) The Court agrees with Defendants.
In Biggers, the plaintiff, Steve Biggers, spoke during the open-comment period at multiple
public meetings, and he criticized public officials during his speeches. Biggers, 2025 WL 429974,
at *1. Biggers was removed from each of these meetings. Id. The supposed reason for his removal
was enforcement of a decorum rule, but Biggers alleged he was removed due to the viewpoint
expressed in his speech. Id. The lower court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity. Id. The Fifth Circuit overturned this ruling because the lower court “did not
address the first qualified immunity prong, but Biggers’s allegations plainly satisfy it.” Id. at *2.
The court found that Biggers’s allegations, if proven, would clearly show a First Amendment
violation. Id.
The Biggers opinion involves a ruling on a motion to dismiss at the pleadings stage, not a
motion for summary judgment, and finds reversible error from the lower court’s failure to analyze
the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Id. This Court, on the contrary, dismissed the
federal claims against Dupre, Horzelski, and Yeargain for lack of standing, and therefore, did not
need to perform a qualified immunity analysis. (Doc. 195 at 43.) Additionally, the federal claims
against Crain were dismissed because Plaintiff did not carry his summary judgment burden and
failed to show a violation of his First Amendment right. (Id. at 50–51.) Thus, the Court dismissed
the claims against Crain under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Biggers is inapplicable to this case and does not provide a reason for the
Court to reconsider its Ruling.
2. Plaintiff’s other arguments are unsupported and unavailing.
Plaintiff claims this Court’s construction of the term “public concern” was too narrow.
(Doc. 208-1 at 2.) He does not, however, provide the Court with any argument to support this
contention or to connect any authority cited in the Memorandum in Support (Doc. 208-1) to the
contention. The Court assumes Plaintiff meant to assert that the Court’s use of the “malfeasance,
corruption or breach of the public trust” interpretation of “public concern” was too narrow and that
the proper construction includes speech that can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community” or that “is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” (See id. at 7 (quoting
Bevill v. Wheeler, 103 F.4th 363, 375 (5th Cir. 2024)).) “It is well established that speech exposing
or otherwise addressing malfeasance, corruption or breach of the public trust, . . . touches upon
matters of public concern.” (Doc. 195 at 34 (quoting Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731,
738 (5th Cir. 2015)); Bevill, 103 F.4th at 376 (quoting Graziosi, 775 F.3d at 738).) And as noted
in the Ruling, Plaintiff claimed he spoke or attempted to speak about fraud and misconduct within
the university. (Doc. 195 at 34 (citing Doc. 98 at 28).) Thus, the Court’s use of the “malfeasance,
corruption or breach of the public trust” construction of “public concern” was consistent with what
Plaintiff argued was the content of the communications and also was consistent with Fifth Circuit
precedent. Therefore, reconsideration is not warranted.
Plaintiff also argues reconsideration is warranted because this Court “resolved disputed
facts regarding forum rules, alleged disruption, and motive in Defendants’ favor.” (Doc. 208-1 at
2.) Neither the Motion nor the Memorandum in Support addresses which portions of the Ruling
allegedly resolved disputed facts in Defendants’ favor. Instead, Plaintiff attempts to re-argue that
his speech and attempted speech are protected by the First Amendment and again claims he
“intended to address matters of significant public concern through his proposed agenda items and
incidental motions” at the September 26, 2018, and October 3, 2018, meetings. (Doc. 208-1 at 5–
9.) Plaintiff also rehashes his arguments that he was denied the opportunity to speak and subjected
to retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 9–16.) “The court should deny a motion
for reconsideration when the movant rehashes legal theories and arguments that were raised or
could have been raised before the entry of the judgment.” Doe #1, 2025 WL 1879534, at *4 (citing
Adams, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 396). Because Plaintiff raised or could have raised these arguments in
his opposition briefs prior to the Court’s Ruling, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Plaintiff Steven J. Rushing’s Motion for Reconsideration of Interlocutory
Ruling on February 7, 2025 (Doc. 208) is DENIED, as described herein.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 11, 2026.
S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA