Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHILD DOE 1, a minor, by and

through parent and next friend,

PARENT DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 24-cv-380-SEH-CDL

v.

TULSA COUNTY, ex. rel.

JUVENILE BUREAU OF THE

TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT

COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Thirty-seven plaintiffs, primarily minors, allege through a third amended

complaint that detention officers and staff at the Tulsa County Juvenile

Detention Center (“JDC”) physically and sexually assaulted, harassed, and/or

raped them during their detention at the facility. [ECF No. 176]. They

further allege inadequate medical care, prolonged isolation, failure to meet

basic needs, and an absence of oversight. [Id.]. They sue various county

officials and detention staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming cruel and

unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violations of

their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. They advance

theories of individual, supervisory, and municipal liability, and further bring

a failure to intervene claim. [Id. at ¶¶ 313–366]. Plaintiffs also assert a

breach of third-party contract claim against Defendants Juvenile Bureau of

the Tulsa County District Court (“Juvenile Bureau”), Board of County

Commissioners of Tulsa County (“BOCC”), and the Office of Juvenile Affairs

(“OJA”), and negligence claims against Defendant Turn Key Health Clinics,

LLC (“Turn Key”). [Id. at ¶¶ 367–384]. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, a

permanent injunction, and declaratory relief that would compel Defendants

to implement constitutional policies, training, and supervision, and repair

“institutional guardrails.” [Id. at ¶¶ 385–394]. They also request that the

Court order independent audits and monitoring of the JDC to ensure

compliance and safety. [Id. at ¶¶ 389–90].

Multiple Defendants move to dismiss these claims. [ECF Nos. 98, 207,

218–21, 227–28, 230–32, 268–69, 294, 296]. Defendants Turn Key and Mandi

Lee Raymond move to sever, arguing that the claims against them do not

arise from the same transaction or occurrence. [ECF No. 209].

For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Turn Key’s [ECF No.

207], Juvenile Bureau’s [ECF No. 219], Parker’s [ECF No. 227], Cartmell’s

[ECF No. 230], Holt’s [ECF No. 231], and Brown’s [ECF No. 232] motions to

dismiss; DENIES Judge Gray’s [ECF No. 218], Currington, Edwards, Tunley,

and Williams’s [ECF No. 221], BOCC’s [ECF No. 228], and Taylor’s [ECF No.

268] motions to dismiss; and GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part T. Gray,

Harris, Lavine, Powell, and Wilson’s [ECF No. 220], Treadway, Johnson,

Loyd, and Slife’s [ECF No. 269], Doyle’s [ECF No. 296], and McCoy’s [ECF

No. 294] motions to dismiss. Also for the reasons set out below, Turn Key and

Raymond’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint [ECF No. 98] is

MOOT, and Turn Key and Raymond’s motion to sever [ECF No. 209] is

DENIED as to Raymond and MOOT as to Turn Key.

I. Party Introductions1

Plaintiffs were each detained at the JDC during various periods between

2021 and 2024. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 1–28]. Some were detained multiple

times. [Id.]. Because the JDC is a juvenile detention center, Plaintiffs were

all minors during these custodial periods. [Id. at ¶ 70]. Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants violated their constitutional rights by providing inadequate

housing and supervision, and that some detention officers and staff

physically and sexually assaulted, harassed, and raped them. [See, e.g., id. at

¶¶ 29–30, 135, 185, 236–37, 239, 290, 298, 301, 303–05, 341, 343, 346, 351,

353, 360, 363, 365–66].

1 Because certain defendants challenge the sufficiency of the third amended

complaint (“complaint”), the Court accepts as true all material allegations of the

complaint and construes them in favor of the plaintiffs, as it must at this stage in

the litigation. COPE v. Kansas State Bd. of Educ., 821 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.

2016). To this end, the Court presents facts throughout this opinion and order from

the perspective of the plaintiffs, as alleged in the complaint. But material factual

allegations are taken as true only for purposes of determining the motions

presented.

A. Organizational Defendants

BOCC is a statutorily created governmental entity that is responsible for

the operation and maintenance of the JDC through its oversight of the

Juvenile Bureau. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 37]. BOCC contracted with the OJA

regarding the JDC. [Id.]. The Juvenile Bureau is a county agency that

contracts with OJA, through BOCC, “for secure detention services.” [Id. at

¶ 38].

B. OJA Leadership

As Director of the OJA, Defendant Jeffrey Cartmell is “responsible for the

care and custody of a youthful offender who has been placed in the custody of

the [OJA], and shall have the duty and the authority to provide food,

clothing, shelter, ordinary medical care, education, discipline and in an

emergency to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care.” [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 65 (quoting 10A O.S. § 2-5-212(D))]. Defendant Rachel Holt was Director of

the OJA until October 2023. [Id. at ¶ 66]. Defendant Ben Brown is OJA’s

General Counsel. [Id. at ¶ 67].

C. JDC Supervisors

As chief judge of the Juvenile Division of the Tulsa County District Court,

Defendant Kevin Gray (“Judge Gray”) has “general administrative authority”

over the Director of the Juvenile Bureau. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 38].

Each of the following defendants, as Juvenile Bureau administrators, were

“in part, responsible … for overseeing Plaintiffs’ health and well-being, and

assuring housing and security needs of Plaintiffs and other juveniles were

met,” at the JDC:

• Anthony Taylor (Former Director)

• Alondo Edwards (Acting Director)

• Curtice Williams (Interim Superintendent)

• Douglas Currington (Interim Superintendent)

• Cortez Tunley (Former Superintendent)

[ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 40–44].

Defendant David Parker is the Manager of the JDC. [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 39]. He was also, in part, responsible for overseeing Plaintiffs’ health, well-

being, housing, and security at the JDC. [Id.].

D. JDC Detention Officers and Staff

Various employees are alleged to have committed specific acts against

Plaintiffs while “employed by Defendant BOCC,” and while “acting within the

scope of [their] employment and under the color of state law.” [ECF No. 176

at ¶¶ 45–63].

The following defendants are alleged to have “abused, harassed,

mistreated, raped, and/or sexually assaulted at least one Plaintiff and other

juveniles” at the JDC:

• Cindy Treadway2 (Detention Officer)

• Jonathan Hines (Detention Officer)

• Austin Zenzen (Detention Officer)

• Dquan Doyle (Detention Officer)

• Derek Harris (Detention Officer)

• Dustin Slife (Detention Officer)

• Cierra Manning (Nurse)

• Mandi Lee Raymond (Nurse)

[ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 30, 45–49, 315]. Hines, Zenzen, Doyle, Treadway, and

Raymond are alleged to have each sexually abused juvenile detainees with

“deliberate indifference toward known risks to the health and safety of

juvenile detainees like Plaintiffs.” [Id. at ¶ 309].

The following defendants are alleged to have “knowingly allowed the

abuse, harassment, mistreatment, rape, and/or sexual assault of multiple

Plaintiffs and other juveniles to occur, both at the hands of Juvenile Bureau

detention officers and staff as well as other detainees” at the JDC:

• Cindy Treadway (Detention Officer)

2 Defendant Treadway asserts that Plaintiffs have been made aware that the

Juvenile Bureau never employed an individual by the name of “Cindy” Treadway

but did employ Sydney Treadway. [ECF No. 269 at 5 n.1]. Plaintiffs respond that

“Cindy Treadway” identified in the complaint is “Sydney Treadway.” [ECF No. 272

at 7 n. 2]. However, to avoid confusion, the Court refers to this defendant as named

in the complaint.

• Sparkle Johnson (Detention Officer)

• Shaylonda Powell (Detention Officer)

• Kelly Lavine (Detention Officer)

• Carrie Loyd (Detention Officer)

• T. Gray (Detention Officer)

• Jane Doe 1 (Nurse)

[ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 50–51, 53–57].

The following defendants allegedly “assaulted and harassed one or more

Plaintiffs and other juveniles” at the JDC:

• John Doe 1, a/k/a “Jeff” (Detention Officer)

• John Doe 2, a/k/a "Deandre” (Detention Officer)

• Derek Harris (Detention Officer)

• Steven McCoy (Detention Officer)

• Dustin Slife (Detention Officer)

[ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 58–62].

Defendants Jane Does 2–10 are current and former detention officers who

are alleged to have “either sexually abused and assaulted, or knowingly and

intentionally allowed the abuse, harassment, mistreatment, rape, and/or

sexual assault of, multiple Plaintiffs and other juveniles to occur, both at the

hands of Juvenile Bureau detention officers and staff as well as other

detainees.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 63].

Defendant Sharon Wilson is the JDC’s kitchen manager. [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 52]. She allegedly fed Plaintiffs food “for the specific purpose of triggering

these juveniles’ diagnosed medical food allergies and causing personal

injury(ies).” [Id.].

Finally, Turn Key oversees the JDC’s day-to-day healthcare operations,

including the appointment of various healthcare professionals and nurses.

[ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 68, 72].

II. Relevant Factual Allegations

The Juvenile Bureau opened the JDC in December 2019. [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 71]. The JDC was subject to routine inspections between 2020 and 2024 by

the OJA. [Id. at ¶¶ 73–78]. Within the first two years, the OJA noted that the

JDC was improperly using room confinement and locking residents down for

too long during the day. [Id. at ¶¶ 74–75].

A. 2022 Allegations

In May 2022, Brown wrote to all members of the BOCC, noting continued

deficiencies, which included extended room confinement. [ECF No. 176 at ¶

76]. A few days later, OJA representatives met with Tulsa County

representatives and stakeholders to discuss concerns raised by the licensing

and certification assessment. [Id. at ¶ 77]. To address these concerns, the

OJA continued to monitor developments over the following year and made

unannounced visits to the facility. [Id. at ¶ 78].

B. 2023 Allegations

In May 2023, Brown met with the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office.

[ECF No. 176 at ¶ 79]. At the meeting, Brown noted the Public Defender’s

concerns about juvenile residents not going to school regularly and spending

significant time on lockdown. [Id.]. He further noted concerns that members

of the JDC staff were intoxicated at work, that the residents had access to

“vape pens,” and that medications were not being properly dispensed,

administered, or monitored. [Id.]. Two days later, the OJA placed the JDC on

probation. [Id. at ¶ 80].

Approximately two weeks later, Brown, Holt, Taylor, Edwards, Tunley,

and representatives from the Tulsa County District Attorney’s Office, Tulsa

County Public Defender’s Office, and at least one member of the BOCC, met

to address a corrective plan. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 81]. The Juvenile Bureau

denied issues at the JDC, and a member from the Tulsa County Public

Defender’s office advised BOCC that it was subjecting itself to a federal civil

rights lawsuit if it did not correct the identified conditions. [Id.].

In August 2023, an OJA licensing specialist emailed the BOCC, detailing

multiple areas the Juvenile Bureau needed to remedy at the JDC and

extended probation for 90 days. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 82]. In November, the

same licensing specialist recommended to Brown that the JDC receive a

permanent two-year license. [Id. at ¶ 83]. However, against the OJA licensing

specialist’s recommendation, Brown extended probation for another 90 days.

[Id. at ¶ 84].

C. 2024 Allegations

In February 2024, despite continued documented reports of non-

compliance, the Juvenile Bureau received a two-year license for the operation

of the JDC. Two months after the license issued, Hines raped Plaintiff Child

Doe 1. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 236].

In April 2024, Currington, Williams, Lavine and other personnel within

the JDC held a meeting with multiple juvenile male residents of “Unit A”

who witnessed, or were otherwise aware of, Hines’s rape of Child Doe 1. [ECF

No. 176 at ¶ 252]. During the meeting, Currington told the residents that

they could not talk about the Hines incident to their therapists, workers,

other residents, or staff. [Id.]. Lawyers and families were not notified of this

meeting. [Id.].

On April 19, 2024, Johnson threatened Child Doe 1 into silence about his

April 6, 2024 rape, by approaching Child Doe 1’s public defender and making

multiple statements, including, “you need to tell your client to keep his

mouth shut.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 253].

Five days later, Judge Gray emailed Taylor about correspondence he

received earlier that morning from the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office.

[ECF No. 176 at ¶ 255]. He copied Currington and Brown. [Id.]. In his email,

Judge Gray noted his concerns about Johnson’s comments and called for a

mandatory meeting and immediate training to discuss issues related to

inappropriate sexual contact with detainees. [Id.]. He further stated that he

would like to review the JDC’s policies about the reporting of critical

incidents to ensure the policies and procedures reflect an appropriate

response and reporting to law enforcement. [Id.].

Taylor responded to Judge Gray’s email the same day. [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 256]. He noted that Johnson had denied making the comments and stated,

“continued improvement is reflected in the increased confidence of employees

when working with complex and hostile residents.” [Id. (emphasis in

original)]. Taylor wrote this, despite his awareness of Child Doe 1’s rape.

[Id.]. Taylor also touted that the JDC “continues to receive accolades from our

state licensing agency, [OJA], which monitors our facility monthly.” [Id. at ¶

257].

On April 25, 2024, the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office sent

correspondence to Brown, copying Cartmell, Judge Gray, and Tulsa County

District Judge Dawn Moody, requesting “immediate action.” [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 258]. The correspondence outlined the April 6, 2024 rape, past incidents of

sexual assaults that occurred within the JDC during the previous 18 months,

and physical threats made on April 19, 2024 to a public defender to bully

Child Doe 1 into silence. [Id.].

On May 6, 2024, Taylor was fired as Director of the Juvenile Bureau.

[ECF No. 176 at ¶ 268]. Edwards, who was the First Deputy Director at the

time, replaced Taylor as the Acting Director. [Id.]. Approximately two months

later, the OJA placed the JDC back on probation. [Id. at ¶ 275].

On July 19, 2024, BOCC assumed management of the JDC and hired

Parker as the manager. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 278]. Five days later, Defendant

John Doe 3 sexually assaulted Child Doe 20 by purposefully groping Child

Doe 20’s genitalia during his intake. [Id. at ¶ 279]. After the incident,

Defendant John Doe 3 repeatedly came to Child Doe 20’s cell asking if he

“wanted anything,” inferring that John Doe 3 wanted to engage in further

sexual activities. [Id. at ¶ 280].

Upon discovery of the intake incident, Tulsa County Public Defender Lora

Howard issued a statement to Cartmell, all three members of BOCC, Parker,

and others. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 281]. In her statement, Ms. Howard requested

immediate closure of the JDC, for a brief interim period, to allow Parker to

build a new team from the ground up. [Id.]. To date, no publicly available

corrective action by Juvenile Bureau or the OJA has taken place. [Id. at

¶ 282].

III. Procedural History

On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs brought civil rights claims, under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. [ECF No. 2]. Plaintiffs amended

the complaint five days later, adding additional plaintiffs, defendants, factual

allegations, and claims for relief. [ECF No. 6]. About a month later, Plaintiffs

moved for an emergency preliminary injunction. [ECF No. 24]. The motion

was held in abeyance until all the defendants were served or the district

court determined venue. [ECF No. 34]. Plaintiffs’ counsel was directed to

advise the district court when all the defendants had been served, and the

case was ready for a hearing. [ECF No. 61].

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, adding

additional plaintiffs, defendants, factual allegations, and claims for relief.3

[ECF No. 31]. The case transferred to this district on August 15, 2024. [ECF

Nos. 87, 111, 112]. Before the case transferred, Defendants Raymond and

Turn Key moved to dismiss the second amended complaint and alternatively

moved to transfer the case to this district. [ECF No. 98].

Plaintiffs sought leave to amend a third time, to include additional

plaintiffs, defendants, and operative facts. [ECF No. 109]. After considering

the parties’ briefing, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a third

amended complaint. [ECF No. 175]. It was filed on October 10, 2024. [ECF

3 The first amended complaint listed 32 plaintiffs, 21 defendants, and was 46 pages

long. [ECF No. 6]. The second amended complaint listed 30 plaintiffs, 30

defendants, and spanned 70 pages. [ECF No. 31].

No. 176].4 About two weeks later, Raymond filed an answer and moved to

sever her claims from the other defendants. [ECF Nos. 208, 209]. Turn Key,

Judge Gray, Juvenile Bureau, T. Gray, Harris, Lavine, Powell, Wilson,

Currington, Edwards, Tunley, Williams, Parker, BOCC, OJA, Cartmell, Holt,

Brown, Taylor, Treadway, Johnson, Loyd, Slife, McCoy, and Doyle all move to

dismiss the complaint. [ECF Nos. 207, 218–21, 227–32, 268–69, 294, 296]. On

December 20, 2024, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against OJA,

without prejudice. [ECF No. 267]. Plaintiffs’ claims against all other

defendants remain pending.

4 The third amended complaint is the operative complaint. It lists 37 plaintiffs, 34

defendants, and spans 80 pages. [ECF No. 176].

IV. Discussion

The complaint raises seven claims for relief, categorized by type below:

Claim Theory Defendants

(I) Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment Claims

(42 U.S.C. § 1983)

First Claim: Individual Hines, Zenzen, Doyle,

Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Liability Raymond, Treadway,

Wilson, Harris, McCoy,

Slife, Jane Doe 1, John

Does 1-3

Municipal / BOCC and Juvenile

Monell5 Bureau

Liability

Supervisory Judge Gray, Parker,

Liability Taylor, Edwards,

Williams, Currington,

Tunley, Cartmell, Holt

Second Claim: Individual Treadway, Powell,

Failure to Intervene Liability Lavine, Loyd, T. Gray

(II) State-Law Claims

Third Claim: BOCC, Juvenile

Breach of Third-Party Beneficiary Bureau

Contract

Fourth Claim: Turn Key

Negligence

Fifth Claim: Turn Key

Negligent Hiring Training,

Supervision, Retention, and

Maintenance

(II) Claims for Relief

Sixth Claim: BOCC, Juvenile

Injunctive Relief Bureau

Seventh Claim: All Defendants

Punitive Damages

5 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

As an initial matter, the Court must address claims that Plaintiffs assert

on behalf of others. These include references to “other juveniles” in the

allegations set out above. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on behalf of

others. See Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff

lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of other prisoners); see also

Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1990) (referencing the

“well-settled principle that a section 1983 claim must be based upon the

violation of plaintiff’s personal rights, and not the rights of someone else”).

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of those not a party

to this action, those claims are dismissed.

Relatedly, the Court will dismiss some of the parties sua sponte. The

complaint shows multiple plaintiffs failing to make factual allegations

against any particular defendant. For example, Plaintiff John Doe 4 alleges

that he was “repeatedly abused and mistreated by staff and other

representatives, including some of the Defendants, at the [JDC].” [ECF No.

176 at ¶ 87]. Similarly, some allegations identifying a defendant fail to

identify a particular plaintiff. For instance, all Plaintiffs generally allege that

Defendant Manning “abused, harassed, mistreated, raped, and/or sexually

assaulted at least one Plaintiff” and “was terminated … for having an

‘Inappropriate Relationship’ with a juvenile resident.” [Id. at ¶¶ 49, 206].

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants John and Jane Does 2–10 “each either

committed one or more sexual abuses on juvenile detainees, or witnessed or

had personal knowledge of such abuses, including but not limited to

Plaintiffs, during their period of employment at the [JDC].” [Id. at ¶ 311].

Except for John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, none of these defendants are

mentioned anywhere else in the complaint.

In § 1983 cases, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires a party to “make clear exactly

who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with

fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished

from collective allegations against the state.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, ex rel.,

Dept. of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in

original). The examples the Court lists above do not give sufficient notice to

any defendant.

Sua sponte dismissal of meritless claims are permissible under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 922 (2001). And the Federal Rules permit the Court to

dismiss parties in addition to claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(b) vests in the district

court the discretion to order separate trials or make such other orders as will

prevent delay, expense, or other prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 allows a court to

sua sponte add or drop a party “at any time, on just terms.” Requiring

defendants to proceed in this action who are not given adequate notice of the

claims against them will undermine the principle of fundamental fairness

implicit in Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. For this reason, the

following defendants are dismissed as parties to this action: Manning, Jane

Does 2–10, and John Does 4–10.

Because some plaintiffs fail to make allegations identifying any defendant,

the following plaintiffs are dismissed as parties: John Doe 4 and Child Does

22–30. Each dismissed Plaintiff may proceed in his or her own individual

action.

As to the remaining parties, Plaintiffs’ allegations involve serious official

misconduct. For the defendants who have not moved to dismiss the claims

against them, the Court need not address the sufficiency of those claims.

Therefore, the remainder of this opinion and order is limited to the

determination of whether claims challenged by the moving defendants should

be dismissed from the complaint.

A. Claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows an injured person to seek damages against

an individual who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under

color of state law.” Davis v. Clifford, 825 F.3d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 2016)

(quotation omitted).

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant may move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based on a

plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive

such a motion, “a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations ‘to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v.

NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id.

When determining whether to dismiss a complaint, the court “must accept

all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Alvarado v. KOB-TV,

L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). The analysis requires a two-

pronged approach. First, the court identifies “the allegations in the complaint

that are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” i.e., those allegations which

are merely conclusory. Iqbal, 56 U.S. at 680–81. Although “legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.” Id. at 679. “[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual

averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.”

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Second, the court

assumes the veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations” and determines

“whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. If the

allegations state a plausible claim for relief, the claim survives the motion to

dismiss. Id.

Here, the Court is tasked with deciding whether claims should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). However, because Plaintiffs and some

defendants assert certain facts in their briefing not alleged in the complaint

and attach exhibits to their pleadings, the Court must first address what it

can properly consider when deciding Defendants’ motions under the Rule. In

some responses, Plaintiffs assert facts not asserted in the complaint. [ECF

No. 259 at 8–10, 12, 19, 27, 29–31; ECF No. 260 at 8–10; ECF No. 260-1; ECF

No. 266 at 6–10; ECF No. 272 at 2–6]. They also attach exhibits to responses

that were not attached to the complaint. [ECF Nos. 259-1, 259-2, 259-3, 259-

4, 259-5, 259-6, 260-1]. Defendant BOCC does the same in its motion to

dismiss, [ECF Nos. 228, 228-1; ECF No. 277-1], as do Cartmell and Holt [ECF

Nos. 230, 230-1, 230-2, 230-3, 231, 231-1].

It is well-established that, when deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court

must consider whether the facts alleged in the complaint state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir.

1991) (“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh

potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess

whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for

which relief may be granted.”). If the Court considers matters outside the

complaint, it may transform Defendants’ motions into one for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) …

matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,

the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).

Generally, “a motion to dismiss should be converted to a summary judgment

motion if a party submits, and the district court considers, materials outside

the pleadings.” Alvarado, 493 F.3d at 1215 (quotation omitted).

But “the district court may consider documents referred to in the

complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties

do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co.,

287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002). It may also take judicial notice of “facts

which are a matter of public record” without converting a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion into a motion for summary judgment. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244,

1264 n. 24 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

Under these standards, BOCC submits as exhibits: the JDC’s policy

manual [ECF No. 228-1], its contract with the OJA [ECF No. 228-3], pages

from the JDC resident orientation manual [ECF No. 277-1], and a copy of

1968 session laws authorizing the temporary detention of children [ECF No.

228-2]. [ECF No. 228 at 10–12]. Because the complaint references the policy

manual throughout and Plaintiffs allege a breach of the attached contract,

the Court finds these documents are central to the asserted claims. Plaintiffs

also do not dispute the documents’ authenticity in their response. [ECF No.

261]. Therefore, the Court will consider the policy manual and contract and

take judicial notice of the session laws when determining BOCC’s motion to

dismiss. However, the Court will not consider pages from the resident

orientation manual. BOCC attaches these to their reply, which does not

afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to object to this exhibit’s authenticity. [ECF

No. 277].

Cartmell and Holt each attach press releases to their motions to dismiss,

apparently to show when they became OJA Executive Director. [ECF No. 230

at 12; ECF Nos. 230-1, 230-2, 230-3; ECF No. 231 at 7; ECF No. 231-1]. They

explain that their attachments relate to the Court’s determination of subject

matter jurisdiction for any official-capacity claims Plaintiffs bring against

them. [ECF No. 230 at 14–15; ECF No. 231 at 15]. However, Plaintiffs

concede that official-capacity claims against Cartmell and Holt are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. [ECF No. 262 at 6 n.2]. Therefore, the Court will

not consider these exhibits, or any fact pertaining to them that is extraneous

to the complaint, when deciding Cartmell and Holt’s motions to dismiss.

As to additional facts raised in Plaintiffs’ briefing, “it is axiomatic that the

complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to

dismiss.” Kearney v. Dimanna, 195 F. App’x 717, 721 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quotation and brackets omitted). It is also well-established “that in

determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the district court … [is]

limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained within

the four corners of the complaint.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494 (10th

Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the only factual allegations the Court considers are

those in Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint.

Plaintiffs attach to some of their responses: (1) an email between Judge

Gray and Taylor, dated April 24, 2024 [ECF No. 260-1]; (2) a letter Judge

Gray wrote to the BOCC, dated July 10, 2024 [ECF No. 259-1]; (3) various

publications on solitary confinement and mental health [ECF Nos. 259-2–

259-5]; and (4) an online news article about Parker becoming manager of the

JDC [ECF No. 259-6]. Because the email between Judge Gray and Taylor is

referenced and quoted in the complaint, the Court finds it central to

Plaintiffs’ claims. Judge Gray nor Taylor raise any objection to the email’s

authenticity. So, the Court will consider this exhibit in determining Judge

Gray and Taylor’s motions to dismiss. However, the Court will not consider

the remaining exhibits Plaintiffs attach to their responses. The letter Judge

Gray wrote to the BOCC is not referenced in the complaint. Nor are any of

the publications. The news article is also not mentioned in the complaint.

Because these materials are not central to Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court will

not consider them in determining the pending motions.

2. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims

“[T]he factors necessary to establish a § 1983 violation depend upon the

constitutional provision at issue, including the state of mind required to

establish a violation of that provision.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185,

1204 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S.at677). Plaintiffs assert that the

complaint alleges four categories of constitutional violations: sexual abuse,

conditions of confinement, medical neglect, and excessive force. [ECF No. 261

at 18; ECF No. 259 at 15]. However, the face of the complaint does not cabin

its allegations into these categories. And the Tenth Circuit classifies such

claims generally, as either “conditions of confinement” or “excessive force”

claims. See Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2020) (treating

medical neglect as a claim of “deliberate indifference” which differed from an

“excessive force claim”); Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir.

2018) (recognizing both the “conditions-of-confinement framework” and

“excessive-force framework”). Here, Plaintiffs’ claims of extended room

confinement and medical neglect will be analyzed under a “conditions-of-

confinement” framework, and their claims of excessive force and sexual abuse

analyzed under an “excessive-force” framework. Thompson v. Lengerich, No.

22-1128, 2023 WL 2028961, at *3–4 (Feb. 16, 2023) (conditions of

confinement); Strain, 977 F.3d at 991 (medical neglect); Redmond, 882 F.3d

at 936 (excessive force); Works v. Byers, 128 F.4th 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2025)

(sexual abuse).

Although Plaintiffs bring their claims under both the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, they do not indicate whether they were pretrial

detainees or adjudicated delinquents at the time of the alleged conduct. The

Eighth Amendment “applies to those who have been convicted of crime, so

they usually cannot complain of confinement itself.” Colbruno v. Kessler, 928

F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). But the Eighth

Amendment protects against “unjustifiable conditions of confinement, such as

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or deliberate indifference to an

excessive risk to a prisoner’s health.” Id. (cleaned up). For pretrial detainees,

claims of mistreatment are evaluated under the Due Process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and its protection against arbitrary governmental

action by state authorities. Id. (citations omitted).

(a) Excessive Force

Adjudicated Detainees (Eighth Amendment)

The standards for evaluating excessive force claims differ based on a

detainee’s adjudication status. “In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual

punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials,

who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1970). It also requires officials to

provide humane conditions of confinement, such as ensuring that “inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). An Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim “involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks if the

alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a

constitutional violation, and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff

must show that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Redmond, 882 F.3d at 936.

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary …

violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Marshall v. Milyard, 415 F. App’x

850, 852–53 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992)). But the “Supreme Court has suggested that even a de minimis use of

physical force may violate the Eighth Amendment if it is ‘of a sort repugnant

to the conscience of mankind.’” Ali v. Duboise, 763 F. App’x 645, 650 (10th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). Thus, the “Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the

use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Ullery v.

Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at

9–10) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Conduct is repugnant to the conscience of mankind when it is

‘incompatible with evolving standards of decency’ or involves ‘the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Ullery, 949 F.3d at 1290 (quoting

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). “[E]ven if a use of force is deemed unnecessary after

the fact, if it was both de minimus and ‘not of a sort repugnant to the

conscience of mankind,’ it will not sustain an excessive-force claim.”

Marshall, 415 F. A’ppx at 853 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10); Wilkins v.

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (“An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’

that causes no discernable injury almost certainly fails to state a valid

excessive force claim.”).

“[P]sychological harm, as well as physical injury, can implicate the Eighth

Amendment.” Colbruno, 928 F.3d at 1162 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 16

(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is not hard to imagine

inflictions of psychological harm—without corresponding physical harm—

that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment.”)

“An official has a culpable state of mind if he uses force ‘maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’ rather than ‘in a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Redmond, 882 F.3d at 936 (quoting

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)).

Pretrial Detainees (Fourteenth Amendment)

“[T]he appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim

is solely an objective one” and therefore, “a pretrial detainee must show only

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015); see also

Colbruno, 928 F.3d at 1163 (“[T]here is no subjective element of an excessive-

force claim brought by a pretrial detainee.”). Because due process forbids

punishment before adjudication of guilt, “a court must decide whether the

disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an

incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Colbruno, 928 F.3d

at 1162 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). If “not reasonably

related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court

permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is

[unconstitutional] punishment.” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539). Therefore,

“a pretrial detainee can establish a due-process violation by ‘providing only

objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally

related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in

relation to that purpose.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97).

Because the sexual abuse of prisoners is treated “as a species of excessive-

force claim,” a pretrial detainee bringing such a claim is also not required to

meet the “subjective element” required of Eighth Amendment excessive-force

claims. Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal

citations omitted).

(b) Conditions of Confinement

The standards for evaluating Plaintiffs conditions-of-confinement claims

are similar under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Strain,

977 F.3d at 989 (holding that deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s

serious medical needs includes both an objective and subjective component);

see also Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Although the

Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional

conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides the

benchmarks for such claims.” (citation omitted)). To show a conditions-of-

confinement violation, Plaintiffs must meet two requirements.6 First,

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation “is ‘sufficiently

serious’ to implicate constitutional protection.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d

965, 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And second, they must show that the prison

6 An exception exists for pretrial detainees held in a condition of confinement that

amounts to punishment. A pretrial detainee “may not be punished prior to an

adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.

But pretrial detainees may be held in detention “so long as those conditions and

restrictions do not amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id.

at 536–37.

official had “a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).

Being “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm” is enough to satisfy the first requirement. DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 973.

“A medical need is [objectively] serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by

a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Strain,

977 F.3d at 990 (alteration in original and quotation omitted).

The required state of mind in prison-conditions cases is one of ‘deliberate

indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”7 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. (citations

omitted). “Deliberate indifference” is defined as knowing and disregarding a

substantial risk to an inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 842. Thus, when “a

prison official has knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates,

he is not deliberately indifferent to that risk unless he is aware of and fails to

take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912,

916 (10th Cir. 2008). “An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk of

which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk or how gross his

7 “Section 1983 claims made under the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate

indifference are evaluated under the same standard as section 1983 claims made

under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference.” Smith v. Allbaugh, 987

F.3d 905, 910 n.1 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Quintana v. Santa Fe Cty. Bd. of Commrs,

973 F.3d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 2020)).

negligence in failing to perceive it, is not an infliction of punishment and

therefore not a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

But “[t]he official’s knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a

substantial risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular

manner in which injury might occur.” Id. (emphasis in original). Although

deliberate indifference may be inferred “based solely on the obviousness of

the threat posed to inmates … the mere showing of negligence by an

employee over whom the official exercised supervisory responsibility is

insufficient for liability to attach.” Id. at 922 (citing Garrett v. Stratman, 254

F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001). Therefore, to establish deliberate-indifference,

a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant “was aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed;

(2) that he actually drew that inference; and (3) that he was aware of and

failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Perry v. Durborow, 892

F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

(c) Generally

For § 1983 actions, “[i]t is well settled that a plaintiff must prove each

defendant personally participated in a constitutional violation.” Griffith v. El

Paso County, Colorado, 129 F.4th 790, 822 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing Pahls v.

Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1231 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Liability under § 1983 ...

requires personal involvement.”)). “Section 1983 also requires proof of an

affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular

person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitutional deprivation.” Tafoya,

516 F.3d at 922 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This

requires the plaintiff to show that “an official’s acts or omissions were the

cause—not merely a contributing factor—of the constitutionally infirm

condition.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege a myriad of claims against various individual

defendants. Although some of the allegations rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, many do not. This does not make the alleged conduct

morally acceptable or any less egregious. But the Court does not sit to

reprimand conduct that is uncivilized or morally unacceptable. The Court’s

job in this context is to consider whether Plaintiffs have stated viable claims

against each moving defendant.

Furthermore, the Court recognizes that much of the applicable law is

derived from cases involving incarcerated adults. Although it seems

reasonable that a different standard should apply to a vulnerable class like

detained children, the parties submit no law, and the Court is aware of none,

that applies a different standard for analyzing alleged constitutional

violations occurring within a juvenile detention center. Therefore, the Court

will apply the law as set out above to the allegations brought in the

complaint.

Individual Liability Claims

Doyle

Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2

Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 allege:

From June to August 2023, Doyle repeatedly sexually assaulted and

harassed Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 142]. He routinely

made sexually explicit remarks and verbal advances to both girls and gave

them unauthorized privileges, such as the use of his cell phone and computer

facilities, and unauthorized freedom to physical spaces within the JDC. [Id.

at ¶¶ 148–49]. During a time Jane Doe 2 used the women’s restroom, Doyle

stated that he had found her friend on Facebook. [Id. at ¶ 147]. Doyle licked

and choked Jane Doe 1, grabbed his penis in front of her, showed her a

picture of his penis, repeatedly attempted to have her touch him sexually,

and told her to lift her shirt and expose her breasts to him. [Id. at ¶ 146].

Jane Doe 1 complied with Doyle’s instruction to lift her shirt. [Id.].

Jane Doe 2 was released at some point between June and August 2023.

[Id. at ¶ 145]. While she was released, Doyle sent her two unprovoked

messages requesting sex and sent her a picture of his penis. [Id.].

Before Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were both released, they were

interviewed about allegations that Doyle was providing residents gummies

amid multiple residents testing positive for marijuana. [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 154]. During her interview, Jane Doe 1 made a written statement and

disclosed Doyle’s sexual assaults and harassment, as well as improprieties of

other defendants. [Id. at ¶ 155]. Jane Doe 2 also disclosed various

improprieties of JDC personnel, including Doyle’s, and specifically disclosed

that cameras in “Unit B” were inoperable. [Id. at ¶ 156]. Her interview was

recorded. [Id.]. The discovery of Doyle’s actions led to state charges of felony

sexual battery, indecent exposure, abetting a minor in a drug crime, and

possession of contraband in jail. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 157].

Doyle moves to dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted against him, pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 296]. He argues that several of the allegations fail

to demonstrate a constitutional violation or are impermissibly conclusory and

vague. [Id. at 6–7; ECF No. 3 at 10]. As to Jane Doe 1’s alleged sexual abuse,

Doyle argues that the claim is deficient because it fails to plead her lack of

consent. [ECF No. 296 at 6].

Plaintiffs respond that they more than adequately allege constitutional

violations.8 [ECF No. 297 at 1]. They argue that the alleged sexual abuse

(including verbal sexual assault), extended room confinement, incidents of

contraband, and use of force are all viable claims of cruel and unusual

8 Because all responses are styled in the collective, the Court sets out arguments

throughout this order as if asserted by all Plaintiffs. However, it addresses specific

claims as the individual plaintiffs assert them.

punishment. [ECF No. 266 at 12–17, 19–20].9 Citing no authority, Plaintiffs

contend that “a prison guard’s drug smuggling to child detainees is per se

deliberate indifference to the health, safety, and wellbeing of those children.”

[ECF No. 297 at 5]. As to Doyle’s alleged sexual abuse, Plaintiffs argue they

have met their burden of showing these acts were nonconsensual. [Id. at 7].

Jane Doe 1

The Court agrees that Jane Doe 1 sufficiently states a § 1983 claim of

cruel and unusual punishment against Doyle.

“A guard’s sexual abuse of an inmate rises to cruel and unusual

punishment because sexual abuse has no legitimate penological purpose, and

is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society.” Works, 128 F.4th at 1163 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Because sexual assault claims are analyzed under the

excessive-force framework, to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Jane Doe 1

is required to allege “(1) objectively harmful conduct to establish a

constitutional violation and (2) [that Doyle] acted with a sufficiently culpable

mental state.” Id. at 1163–64.

For the first element, “a correction officer’s nonconsensual sexual abuse of

9 Plaintiffs’ response adopts the legal argument from their response to Wilson,

Powell, Lavine, T. Gray, and Harris’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 266]. Therefore,

the Court cites to either motion when addressing Plaintiffs’ response.

a prisoner is objectively harmful enough to establish a violation of the Eighth

Amendment.” Works, 128 F.4th at 1164. “When a prison guard violates an

inmate’s bodily integrity, the nature of the force shows objective harm to the

inmate and establishes a violation of her constitutional rights.” Id. A

“significant injury” is not required to pursue an Eighth Amendment claim;

instead, the inquiry is on the “nature of the force.” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 559

U.S. at 37).

Here, the Court concludes that Doyle’s alleged licking, choking, attempts

at sexual touching, and his telling Jane Doe 1 to lift her shirt to expose her

breasts would be a use of force that invaded Jane Doe 1’s bodily integrity. See

Ullery, 949 F.3d at 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that a guard pressing

his genitals to an inmate’s buttocks and grabbing her breast and crotch

violates the Constitution). Therefore, if Doyle committed these acts without

Jane Doe 1’s consent, they were objectively harmful.

Doyle argues that Jane Doe 1’s claim of sexual abuse is defective because

it fails to plead that the alleged acts were nonconsensual. [ECF No. 296 at

17]. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Jane Doe 1, the Court

disagrees and finds that her allegations plausibly demonstrate a lack of

consent. She alleges Doyle repeatedly attempted to have her touch him

sexually and that she exposed her breasts to Doyle upon his command. [ECF

No. 176 at ¶ 146]. She further alleges that Doyle gave her unauthorized

privileges, such as the use of his cell phone and computer facilities, and

unauthorized freedom to physical spaces within the JDC. [Id. at ¶ 149]. This

raises an inference of coercion, which supports a lack of consent. Works, 128

F.4th at 1163; Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th

Cir. 2013) (“coercive factors include favors, privileges, or any type of exchange

for sex.”). Notably, the complaint alleges that after Jane Doe 1 disclosed

Doyle’s acts, he was charged with sexual battery and indecent exposure. [Id.

at ¶¶ 155–57]. The Court finds Jane Doe 1 has met her burden of alleging

Doyle’s sexual acts were objectively harmful enough to establish a violation of

the Eighth Amendment.

Jane Doe 1 also sufficiently alleges the second element of her excessive

force claim. She alleges Doyle acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind

by using force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm.” Redmond, 882 F.3d at 936. “Where no legitimate penological purpose

can be inferred from a prison employee’s alleged conduct, including but not

limited to sexual abuse or rape, the conduct itself constitutes sufficient

evidence that force was used ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.’” Works, 128 F.4th at 1165. No legitimate

penological purpose can be inferred from Doyle’s alleged sexual acts with

Jane Doe 1. Therefore, Jane Doe 1 pleads sufficient facts to establish a

plausible § 1983 claim against Doyle.10 Doyle’s motion to dismiss as to Jane

Doe 1’s § 1983 claim is denied.

Jane Doe 2

Jane Doe 2 fails to state a § 1983 claim against Doyle.

In contrast to Jane Doe 1’s allegations, Jane Doe 2 does not allege

objectively harmful conduct that establishes a constitutional violation

because she does not allege a use of force that invaded her bodily integrity.

Although Jane Doe 2 states that Doyle repeatedly sexually assaulted her, she

fails to support this conclusory allegation with any facts demonstrating

sexual assault. Therefore, the Court is not bound to accept this allegation as

true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Nor is Jane Doe 2’s allegation that Doyle spoke to her while she used the

women’s restroom sufficient to show he violated her constitutional rights.

Jane Doe 2 does not allege that Doyle viewed her when he made this

statement or otherwise entered the restroom. Therefore, this conduct is not

objectively harmful.

Doyle’s statement also constitutes “undue familiarity,” as opposed to

10 A pretrial detainee bringing a sexual abuse claim is not required to meet the

“subjective element” required of Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims. Brown,

974 F.3d at 1182–83. Therefore, because the Court finds Jane Doe 1 has alleged

both objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim, she has also

stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (in the event she was a pretrial

detainee at the time of the alleged conduct).

“sexual misconduct.” See Keith v. Koerner (Keith II), 843 F.3d 833, 840 (10th

Cir. 2016) (“‘Undue familiarity’ includes conduct that can range from casual

conversation all the way to sexual misconduct, whereas ‘sexual misconduct’ is

defined as sexual behavior that is directed by an employee toward an

[inmate].” (cleaned up)). “[U]ndue familiarity—even if crude, boorish,

inappropriate, and disgusting—” does not violate “a prisoner’s constitutional

rights.” Id. at 843. Although Doyle’s alleged acts with Jane Doe 2 are “highly

inappropriate … not all misbehavior by public officials, even egregious

misbehavior, violates the Constitution.” Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125.

Because Doyle sent unprovoked requests for sex and a picture of his penis

during a period of Jane Doe 2’s release, those acts could not have violated the

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.

Last, Jane Doe 2’s allegations of harassment also do not sufficiently

support her claim. She alleges that Doyle “repeatedly made sexually-explicit

remarks and verbal advances” toward her between June and August 2023 but

does not specify what Doyle allegedly said. [ECF No. 176 a ¶ 148]. Although

detainees have the “right to be secure in [their] bodily integrity and free from

attack by prison guards,” acts of verbal sexual harassment and intimidation

alone, even if severe, are not sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 n. 11 (10th Cir. 1998).

However, “allegations of verbal harassment of female prisoners by officers

may be cognizable when such harassment is combined with sexual assaults.”

Castillo v. Day, 790 F.3d 1013, 1021 n.7 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Barney, 143

F.3d at 1310 n. 11).

Where sexual harassment or sexual abuse has been alleged in the prison

context, “the alleged limited, nonphysical conduct is not objectively,

sufficiently serious to give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Folsom v.

Knutson, No. CIV-13-632-D, 2015 WL 13742442, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 4,

2015) (collecting cases). The Tenth Circuit has found “[m]ere verbal threats or

harassment do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless they

create ‘terror of instant and unexpected death.’” Alvarez v. Gonzales, 155 F.

App’x 393, 396 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding no constitutionally protected right

where plaintiff claimed guard antagonized him with sexually inappropriate

comment) (quoting Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.

1992)); see also McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, at 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001)

(“[A]cts or omissions resulting in an inmate being subjected to nothing more

than threats and verbal taunts do not violate the Eighth Amendment.”).

Therefore, courts must parse the boundary between conduct that rises to the

level of a constitutional violation (threats or verbal comments paired with an

actual attempt or clear capability to inflict serious harm) and conduct that,

although despicable, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Here, because Jane Doe 2 does not allege facts demonstrating Doyle sexually

assaulted or terrorized her with verbal threats, she has not sufficiently

alleged a § 1983 claim against him. Jane Doe 2’s § 1983 claim against Doyle

is dismissed.

Child Doe 19 and John Doe 1

Child Doe 19 and John Doe 1 also fail to sufficiently state a claim against

Doyle. The Court addresses Child Doe 19 and John Doe 1’s claims together

because they concern similar allegations:

Child Doe 19

In the Fall of 2023, Doyle gave Child Doe 19 two white pills and two

gummies to “help” him sleep. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 125]. Child Doe 19 assumed

he received marijuana. [Id.]. After consuming the pills and gummies he

received from Doyle, Child Doe 19 went on an extended room confinement

with most of his unit. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 125]. Shortly thereafter, he started

vomiting and passed out for more than 24 hours. [Id.]. He was later advised

that he was taken to the hospital, due to a drug overdose. [Id.]. Doyle is

alleged to have widely disseminated drugs to multiple juvenile residents at

the same time. [Id. at ¶¶ 125, 143].

John Doe 1

Doyle “further abused an unknown number of juvenile detainees,

including John Doe 1, within the [JDC], resulting in the widespread

dissemination of marijuana-based products through the [JDC].” [ECF No. 176

at ¶ 318].

These allegations do not plausibly show a constitutional violation. To

prevail on their conditions-of-confinement claims, Child Doe 19 and John Doe

1 must each prove: (1) the “conditions [were] sufficiently serious to implicate

constitutional protection” and (2) that Doyle “acted with deliberate

indifference to [their] health or safety.” DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 971. To satisfy

the first requirement, these plaintiffs must show they were “incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. To show

deliberate indifference, they must show (1) that Doyle “was aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm existed; (2) that he actually drew that inference; and (3) that he was

aware of and failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Perry, 892

F.3d at 1122 (cleaned up).

Child Doe 19’s allegation that he received marijuana from Doyle fails to

show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm, or that Doyle acted with deliberate indifference. Child Doe 19

alleges that he vomited and passed out shortly after he consumed the pills

and gummies Doyle gave him and was later advised that he was taken to the

hospital for a drug overdose. However, Child Doe 19 does not allege that

Doyle was aware of any facts from which he could infer that a serious risk of

harm existed to Child Doe 19. Therefore, Child Doe 19’s allegations involving

drugs do not sufficiently show a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Nor does Child Do 19’s allegation of extended room confinement state a

cognizable constitutional claim. Although he alleges that he “went on an

extended room confinement,” he does not include sufficient facts to show the

duration of that confinement or whether it was imposed as punishment. He

also fails to explain how his extended confinement resulted in a substantial

risk to his health or safety to which Doyle was deliberately indifferent. For

these reasons, he fails to state a viable Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment

claim against Doyle based upon his alleged room confinement.

John Doe 1’s allegation that Doyle’s abuse of him “resulted in widespread

dissemination of marijuana-based products through the [JDC]” also fails to

show that Doyle violated his constitutional rights. Child Doe 19 and John

Doe 1 must allege facts that demonstrate not only access to controlled

substances and/or extended room confinement, but facts which show Doyle

was aware of a pervasive safety risk yet chose to ignore it. Because they each

fail to do so, their claims against Doyle are dismissed.

John Doe 3

John Doe 3 fails to state an excessive force claim against Doyle. John Doe

3 alleges that Doyle threatened to “beat [his] ass,” after John Doe 3 had

personally observed Doyle physically assault another resident. [ECF No. 176

at ¶ 94]. John Doe 3 further alleges that he was repeatedly abused and

mistreated by “staff and other representatives, including some of the

Defendants” while he was incarcerated at the JDC at various periods

between 2021 and early 2024. [Id. at ¶¶ 26, 90].

The first prong of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim requires

“the alleged wrongdoing [to be] objectively harmful enough to establish a

constitutional violation.” Redmond, 882 F.3d at 936. Although “psychological

harm, as well as physical injury, can implicate the Eighth Amendment,”

Colbruno, 928 F.3d at 1162, “threats and verbal taunts” are not enough.

McBride, 240 F.3d at 1291 n.3; Ortiz v. Torgenson, No. 2:17-cv-328-TC, 2024

WL 1912424, at *9 (D. Utah April 30, 2024) (“threats alone do not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation”); Borrego v. Mathews, No. 08–cv–00735–

WYD–MJW, 2009 WL 812158, at *9 (D. Col. March 26, 2009) (“verbal threats

and harassment … without more, do not state a claim of constitutional

dimension”) (collecting cases). Here, John Doe 3 does not sufficiently allege

an Eighth Amendment claim against Doyle because he alleges only a verbal

threat and does not allege Doyle participated in any repeated act against

him.

Nor has he plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim. “[A] pretrial

detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. John Doe 3

does not allege that Doyle used any measure of force against him.

Consequently, John Doe 3’s § 1983 claim against Doyle is dismissed.

Doyle’s motion to dismiss is therefore granted, in part, and denied, in part,

as set out above.

McCoy

Child Doe 17

Child Doe 17 plausibly states a § 1983 claim against McCoy. In count one,

he alleges that McCoy supplied him with methamphetamine in July 2024,

which necessitated a visit to the hospital. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 326]. Child Doe

17 avers that McCoy gave him “two white pills and one red pill” and that he

took them “all at once.” [Id. at ¶ 277]. At the hospital, he tested positive for

methamphetamine. [Id. at ¶¶ 277, 326]. His overdose is alleged to have

occurred the day after a federal search warrant was served on the Juvenile

Bureau. [Id. at ¶¶ 276–77].

McCoy moves to dismiss Child Doe 17’s § 1983 claim against him under

Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 294]. He argues that the complaint alleges “an

isolated incident of individual misconduct,” and is absent of “well-pleaded

facts to support the elements necessary to state a claim.” [Id. at 7]. The Court

disagrees.

The allegations of the complaint plausibly show that McCoy violated Child

Doe 17’s constitutional rights. As discussed above, claims related to

conditions of confinement must demonstrate sufficient seriousness of the

condition complained of and the prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to

inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

A sufficiently serious deprivation exposes an inmate to “a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Methamphetamine indisputably

poses a danger to those who ingest it. Child Doe 17’s reaction to ingesting the

drugs he received from McCoy necessitated a visit to the hospital. [Id. at

¶ 326]. “[T]he inherent danger of drugs is magnified when introduced to a

controlled environment like a prison.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 470 (quoting

United States v. Colon, 246 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2007)). The allegations

are therefore sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth

Amendment claim.

To allege deliberate indifference, Child Doe 17 must show (1) that McCoy

“was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed; (2) that he actually drew that

inference; and (3) that he was aware of and failed to take reasonable steps to

alleviate that risk.” Perry, 892 F.3d at 1122 (cleaned up). Awareness can be

demonstrated through “inference from circumstantial evidence, ... and a

factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from

the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citations

omitted). Plaintiffs argue that McCoy gave Child Doe 17 drugs while knowing

that the JDC “was not safe for children,” and “amid a multi-agency federal

subpoena and investigation.” [ECF No. 297 at 3]. They further argue that the

act of prison guards smuggling drugs to inmates is a constitutional violation

“on its face.” [Id. at 4]. Despite Plaintiff’s contention, the complaint does not

allege McCoy was aware of any safety issue at the JDC. The Court also does

not find the timing of the federal investigation particularly relevant, because

the complaint fails to show the issued warrant concerned any alleged

overdose or that McCoy was even aware of the investigation.

However, the complaint contains sufficient facts from which McCoy could

infer that a serious risk of harm existed to Child Doe 17. When “a prison

official has knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates, he is

not deliberately indifferent to that risk unless he is aware of and fails to take

reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916. The

complaint alleges: (1) McCoy “supplied Child Doe 17 with methamphetamine”

[id. at ¶ 326]; (2) gave him “two white pills and one red pill, which Child Doe

17 took all at once” [id. at ¶ 277]; and that (3) “Child Doe 17 was taken to the

hospital where [he] tested positive for methamphetamine.” [Id.]. Although

the complaint does not explicitly state that the substance of the pills McCoy

allegedly provided to Child Doe 17 was methamphetamine, the circumstances

described are enough, taken together, to allege they contained the drug. The

risk of providing methamphetamine to Child Doe 17 was obvious. “[I]f a risk

is obvious, so that a reasonable man would realize it, we might well infer that

[the prison official] did in fact realize it.” Tafoya 516 F.3d 912 at 917 (citing

Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, Child

Doe 17’s allegations sufficiently allege a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. McCoy’s motion to dismiss is denied as to Child Doe 17’s claim.

All Plaintiffs

McCoy also moves to dismiss claims brought against him by all Plaintiffs.

[ECF No. 294 at 4–5]. Plaintiffs allege that McCoy “assaulted and harassed

one or more Plaintiffs and other juveniles, during the time they were in

custody of the [JDC].” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 61]. In count one, Plaintiffs include

an allegation against McCoy and 12 other defendants that each “sexually

abused one or more of the Plaintiff’s within the [JDC], between 2023 and the

present.” [Id. at ¶ 315]. Plaintiffs cannot paper over absent facts with

conclusory allegations. The complaint alleges no facts articulating McCoy’s

alleged sexual abuse, assault, or harassment of any plaintiff. Nor does it

demonstrate a causal connection between McCoy and the specific claims of

sexual abuse, assault, and harassment, which is required to establish § 1983

liability. Therefore, it does not contain any factual support for these

conclusory allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiffs’ collective § 1983

claim of sexual abuse against McCoy is dismissed.

McCoy’s motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part, in

accordance with the above.

Wilson, Powell, Lavine, T. Gray, Harris, Treadway, Johnson, Loyd,

and Slife

Wilson, Powell, Lavine, T. Gray, Harris, Treadway, Johnson, Loyd, and

Slife also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against them under Rule

12(b)(6). [ECF No. 220; ECF No. 269]. The collective arguments of these

defendants include:11

(1) The allegations of the complaint are conclusory and fail to put them on

notice of the alleged constitutional violations. [ECF No. 220 at 8–9;

ECF No. 269 at 8–9];

(2) Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to isolated incidents of employee

misconduct that fail to demonstrate a substantial risk to their health

or safety. [ECF No. 220 at 12; ECF No. 269 at 12];

(3) Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims are insufficient to establish a

constitutional violation, because they lack specific, non-conclusory

11 Plaintiffs argue that these defendants raise arguments substantially similar to

one another and to those raised by the Juvenile Bureau [ECF No. 219], Taylor [ECF

No. 268], Edwards, Williams, Currington, and Tunley [ECF No. 221]. [ECF No. 266

at 6; ECF No. 272 at 1]. The Court agrees. For clarity and judicial efficiency, the

Court acknowledges these shared arguments. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs

adopt legal argument across their responses, including responses to motions to

dismiss filed by Judge Gray [ECF No. 259], Taylor [ECF No. 272], Edwards,

Williams, Curington, Tunley [ECF No. 265], Wilson, Powell, Lavine, T. Gray, Harris

[ECF No. 266], Treadway, Johnson, Loyd, and Slife [ECF No. 272].

factual allegations demonstrating more than de minimus force that

posed an objectively unreasonable threat to health or safety. [ECF No.

220 at 14; ECF No. 269 at 16]; and

(4) As to Plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claims, Powell, Lavine, T. Gray,

Treadway, and Loyd argue that the complaint lacks a causal

connection between alleged constitutional violations and each

defendant’s knowledge of and opportunity to prevent them. [ECF No.

220 at 12, 16; ECF No. 269 at 12–13, 18–19].

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the complaint details the “systemic

sexual, physical, medical, and emotional abuses” they suffered within the

JDC. [ECF No. 266 at 6; ECF No. 272 at 10]. As to the failure-to-intervene

claims, Plaintiffs argue that they need not provide a date certain as to when

the JDC Employees were aware of Doyle’s sexual abuse acts. [ECF No. 266 at

23]. They contend the complaint sufficiently alleges a failure to intervene

because it shows that the JDC Employees personally witnessed Doyle’s

sexually abusive behaviors from June to August 2023. [Id.]. Plaintiffs argue

that it is “undisputed that the JDC Employees have known of the multitude

of abuses and deprivations within the [JDC].” [Id.].

Although the Court understands Plaintiffs bring their claims under a

systemic-failure theory of liability, it still must independently evaluate their

individual liability claims. “[C]ommon to all § 1983 … claims is the

requirement that liability be predicated on a violation traceable to a

defendant-official’s own individual actions.” Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1225 (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). But the “personal-involvement

requirement” does not require “direct participation,” because “government

officials may be held responsible for constitutional violations under a theory

of supervisory liability.” Id. (citing Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199.

Here, some plaintiffs allege that certain defendants violated their

constitutional rights directly, e.g., through sexual or physical abuse.

Plaintiffs also assert a discrete claim of failing to intervene against

Treadway, Powell, Lavine, Loyd, and T. Gray by alleging they each failed to

stop other detention officers from violating their constitutional rights. [ECF

No. 176 at ¶¶ 359–366]. And Plaintiffs base their claims against the JDC

Supervisors and OJA Leadership on supervisory liability. But Plaintiffs do

not identify any authority that allows the Court to consider their individual

liability claims collectively. In “suits involving multiple defendants … it is

incumbent upon a plaintiff to identify specific actions taken by particular

defendants in order to make out a viable § 1983 … claim.” Pahls, 718 F.3d at

1225–26 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original). Defendants in § 1983 cases “often include the government agency

and a number of government actors sued in their individual capacities.”

Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249–50. So, “it is particularly important … that the

complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to

provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against

him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Id.

at 1250 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Court addresses each

individual liability claim against the JDC employees, in turn.

Wilson

John Doe 1 and Child Doe 2

John Doe 1 and Child Doe 2 fail to state § 1983 claims against Wilson.

John Doe 1 alleges that Wilson fed him pineapple-soaked chicken with the

knowledge that he was allergic to pineapple. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 112]. After

John Doe 1 consumed the chicken, Wilson allegedly said, “Let me know how

your nurse trip goes.” [Id.]. Child Doe 2 also alleges that Wilson intentionally

fed him foods to which she knew he was allergic. [Id. at ¶ 113].

Wilson moves to dismiss John Doe 1’s and Child Doe 2’s § 1983 claims

against her under Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 220]. She argues that their

allegations are not constitutional violations and therefore do not give rise to a

viable § 1983 claim. [ECF No. 281 at 5]. John Doe 1 and Child Doe 2 respond

that Wilson’s “outright assault … by intentionally triggering a known food

allergy is violative on its face and needs no further explanation.” [ECF No.

266 at 20].

To prevail on their conditions-of-confinement claims, John Doe 1 and

Child Doe 2 must each prove: (1) the “conditions [were] sufficiently serious to

implicate constitutional protection” and (2) that Wilson “acted with deliberate

indifference to [their] health or safety.” DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 971. To satisfy

the first requirement, they must show they were “incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. The Eighth

Amendment guarantees that “inmates receive the basic necessities of

[nutritionally] adequate food.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th

Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). But the “Constitution

does not require prison officials to prepare a medical diet in the manner”

inmates request. Overton v. Cotton, No. CIV–10–292–FHS–SPS, 2012 WL

1085509, at *13 (N.D. Okla. March 30, 2012) (granting summary judgment on

a similar claim when the plaintiff failed to allege “that he suffered actual

physical harm” from consuming food to which he was allergic).

John Doe 1 and Child Doe 2 each fail to meet the objective element of their

claims because neither allege that Wilson placed them at a serious risk of

harm by virtue of consuming the food she served. And neither allege an

allergic reaction they sustained that would show their conditions of

confinement were sufficiently serious. Therefore, they each fail to plausibly

state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Accordingly, their asserted claims against

Wilson are dismissed.

All Plaintiffs

In count one, Plaintiffs include Wilson with 12 other defendants in

alleging “[e]ach of these Defendants sexually abused one or more of the

Plaintiff’s within the [JDC], between 2023 and the present.” [ECF No. 176 at

¶ 315]. Like the same allegation against McCoy, the complaint contains no

facts articulating Wilson’s alleged sexual abuse of any plaintiff. Nor does it

demonstrate a causal connection between Wilson and the specific claim of

sexual abuse, which is required to establish § 1983 liability. Therefore, it does

not contain any factual support for this conclusory allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679. Plaintiffs’ collective § 1983 claim of sexual abuse against Wilson is

dismissed.

Harris

John Doe 1

John Doe 1 has sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against Harris. He

alleges that Harris routinely placed him on room confinement because of

verbal comments he made that “outlined [his] personal feelings toward”

Harris. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 102]. During many of these instances, Harris

allegedly noted the disciplinary action as “resident request” to avoid filling

out required disciplinary paperwork. [Id.]. John Doe 1 further maintains that

Harris regularly placed him on room confinement “as a matter of routine

discipline.” [Id. at ¶ 328].

Harris argues that these allegations do not amount to a constitutional

violation because John Doe 1 does not indicate for how long he was placed on

room confinement or state any harm he suffered as a result. [ECF No. 281 at

6].

To state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, John Doe

1 must plausibly allege that Harris knew of and disregarded a substantial

risk that these room confinements posed to his health or safety. DeSpain, 264

F.3d at 973. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must

demonstrate: an objective component showing “that he is incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”—and a subjective

component—“that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to his

safety.” Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Conditions are sufficiently serious if they “deprive

an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as

adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and safety. Thompson,2023

WL 2028961, at *3. However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment ‘does not mandate

comfortable prisons,’ and conditions imposed may be ‘restrictive and even

harsh.’” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311 (citation omitted).

The Court finds that John Doe 1 does not state an Eighth Amendment

claim because he does not allege a deprivation of basic necessities.

“[G]uidance from this Circuit and others suggests that confining inmates to

their cells for twenty-four hours per day or suspending visitation, even for

extended durations, does not constitute sufficiently serious deprivations” to

state an Eighth Amendment claim. May v. Segovia, No. 15–cv–00405–NYW,

2017 WL 57257, at *6 (D. Col. Jan. 2017) (collecting cases). Because John Doe

1 fails to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analyses, he

has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual

punishment against Harris.

But John Doe 1 has sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process claim against Harris. He sets forth sufficient facts showing that he

was placed on room confinement as a form of disciplinary action.

“[P]unishment is never constitutionally permissible for presumptively

innocent individuals awaiting trial.” Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1241

(10th Cir. 2013) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (emphasis in original)). But the

government may subject pretrial detainees “to the restrictions and conditions

of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not

amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell at 536–

37. So, a court “must ask whether an expressed intent to punish on the part

of detention facility officials exists. If so, liability may attach. If not, a

plaintiff may still prove unconstitutional punishment by showing that the

restriction [or condition] in question bears no reasonable relationship to any

legitimate governmental objective.” Blackmon, 734 F.3dat 1241 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, John Doe 1 alleges that Harris routinely placed him on room

confinement to punish his verbal comments. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 102]. He

characterizes Harris’s use of room confinement as a “disciplinary action” that

would have required Harris to fill out “disciplinary paperwork” had he not

noted the confinement was at John Doe 1’s request. [Id.]. The Court finds this

sufficient to demonstrate Harris’s expressed intent to punish John Doe 1 by

placing him on room confinement. This finding extinguishes the need for the

Court to determine whether John Doe 1 has shown that the room

confinement bore “no reasonable relationship to any legitimate governmental

objective.” Blackmon, 734 F.3d at 1241. To the extent John Doe 1 was a

pretrial detainee during the alleged conduct, he has stated a plausible claim

that Harris violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

Child Doe 19

Child Doe 19 sufficiently pleads an Eighth Amendment excessive force

claim against Harris. He alleges that Harris threw him against a wall and

repeatedly punched him, causing physical injury. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 124].

Harris argues the allegation “is limited to a single incident” and does not

show the “resulting injury or punitive impetus, untethered to proper

penological objectives” necessary to amount to a Constitutional violation.

[ECF No. 281 at 6].

Although “[n]ot every push or shove … violates a prisoner’s constitutional

rights,” Marshall, 415 F. App’x at 852–53, conduct violates the Eighth

Amendment, “when it is ‘incompatible with evolving standards of decency’ or

involves ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Ullery, 949 F.3d at

1290 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). An Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim has both an objective prong—which “asks if the alleged

wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional

violation” and a subjective prong—where “the plaintiff must show that the

officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Redmond, 882 F.3d

at 936 (quotation omitted). “An official has a culpable state of mind if he uses

force ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’

rather than ‘in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’”

Redmond, 882 F.3d at 936 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21). “To

determine whether prison officials applied force maliciously and sadistically

or, rather, in good faith, [courts] consider (1) the need for the force, and (2)

whether the officers used a disproportionate amount of force.” Id. at 937.

“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,

contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Id. (quotation

omitted).

Child Doe 19’s allegations sufficiently allege both the objective and

subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Contrary

to Harris’s assertion, Child Doe 19 need not describe the extent of his injuries

to sustain his claim. “[A]llegations of significant injury are also not required

for the objective component of an [Eighth Amendment] excessive force claim.”

Gilmore v. Neph, No. 23-3134, 2024 WL 48989, at *2 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 9). Moreover, “injury and force are not perfectly

correlated and that the lack of the former does not doom an excessive force

claim.” Id. (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38 (“An inmate who is gratuitously

beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”));

accord United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 688 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding

“certain level or type of injury” is not required to establish objective

component of excessive force claim).

Child Doe 19 has also sufficiently alleged an excessive force claim against

Harris under the Fourteenth Amendment. “[A] pretrial detainee must show

only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

unreasonable.” Kingsly, 576 U.S. at 396–97. Courts must determine

reasonableness “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. at 397. “A court must also account for the ‘legitimate interests

that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the

individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that

in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and

discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S.

at 540, 547). The following non-exhaustive factors may be considered: “the

relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force

used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at

issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the

plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. (citation omitted).

Child Doe 19’s allegation that Harris threw him against a wall, repeatedly

punched him, and caused him physical injury plausibly alleges an

unreasonable use of force that serves no penological objective. Therefore,

Child Doe 19 has sufficiently stated a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force

claim against Harris. For these reasons, Harris’s motion to dismiss is denied

as to Child Doe 19’s claims.

Child Doe 12

Child Doe 12 fails to plausibly state a § 1983 claim against Harris. He

alleges that Harris repeatedly confiscated his family photos and letters from

his personal cell. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 164]. He further maintains that Harris

denied him access to a shower for more than a week, and on occasion, refused

to allow him to shower with soap or shampoo. [Id. at ¶¶ 165–66].

Harris argues that these allegations do not show a violation of Child Doe

12’s constitutional rights because denial of such amenities did not result in a

substantial risk to Child Doe 12’s health or safety to which Harris was

deliberately indifferent. [ECF No. 220 at 11; ECF No. 281 at 6]. Child Doe 12

responds that Harris’s deprivations, coupled with the improper use of room

confinement, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [ECF

No. 266 at 17]. The Court is unconvinced.

Claims related to conditions of confinement must include allegations that

demonstrate sufficient seriousness of the conditions and the prison official’s

“deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

A sufficiently serious deprivation exposes an inmate to “a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Id. “The mere deprival of cosmetics or family photographs in

one’s cell does not present the extreme type of situation required to establish

an Eighth Amendment infraction.” Sledge v. Carlson, 405 F. Supp. 1315,

1317 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 1975). Nor does the lack of daily shower access rise

to the level of a constitutional violation. See Hauschulz v. Bourbon Cty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, No. No. 04–3475–KHV, 2006 WL 1675907, at *10 (D. Kan. June 14,

2006) (finding access to a shower once every three days did not amount to a

constitutional violation). Therefore, Child Doe 12’s claim against Harris is

dismissed.

Child Doe 15, Child Doe 16, and John Doe 2

Child Doe 15, Child Doe 16, and John Doe 2 also fail to plausibly allege

§ 1983 claims against Harris. These plaintiffs allege that Harris made

sexually explicit disclosures and that they executed a group grievance to

report Harris’s statements. [ECF No. 176 at 269–70]. Harris argues that

these allegations are not sufficient to state constitutional claims because they

were not coupled with physical interaction. [ECF No. 220 at 13; ECF No. 281

at 6]. Child Doe 15, Child Doe 16, and John Doe 2 argue that Harris’s

sexually explicit disclosures, made weeks after Hines’s alleged rape,

confirmed “that Harris could do whatever he wanted, whenever he wanted,”

and that Hines getting caught would not stop the “business-as-usual” practice

of sexual misconduct at the JDC. [ECF No. 266 at 20].

For substantially the same reasons Jane Doe 2’s claim of sexual

harassment against Doyle is dismissed, so too are the claims of Child Doe 15,

Child Doe 16, and John Doe 2 against Harris. Acts of verbal sexual

harassment and intimidation alone, even if severe, are not sufficient to state

an Eighth Amendment claim. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 n. 11. In the prison

context, “alleged limited, nonphysical conduct is not objectively, sufficiently

serious to give rise to” a constitutional violation. Folsom, No. CIV-13-632-D,

2015 WL 13742442, at *7 (collecting cases). Therefore, Child Doe 15’s, Child

Doe 16’s, and John Doe 2’s § 1983 claims against Harris are dismissed.

All Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs include Harris with 12 other defendants in count one’s allegation

that each “sexually abused one or more of the Plaintiff’s within the [JDC],

between 2023 and the present.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 315]. For the same reasons

this § 1983 claim of sexual abuse is dismissed against McCoy and Wilson, it

is dismissed against Harris. The complaint contains no factual allegations

demonstrating that Harris committed or caused the sexual abuse of any

plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ collective § 1983 claim of sexual abuse against Harris is

dismissed.

Treadway

Plaintiffs on behalf of an unidentified male juvenile detainee

Plaintiffs, on behalf an unidentified male juvenile detainee, fail to state a

§ 1983 claim against Treadway. Plaintiffs allege that Treadway was involved

in a “relationship” with a male juvenile detainee and “recruited” Jane Doe 1

and Jane Doe 2 to write and pass this detainee romantic notes. [ECF No. 176

at ¶¶ 151, 320]. Treadway argues that this allegation is insufficient to state a

constitutional violation for two reasons: first, because Plaintiffs lack standing

to establish a constitutional violation on behalf of another juvenile detainee;

and second, because Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 do not claim Treadway made

any sexually inappropriate remarks or advances toward them. [ECF No. 269

at 15].

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim on behalf

of an unidentified male juvenile detainee. See Swoboda, 992 F.2d at 290

(plaintiff lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of other prisoners);

Archuleta, 897 F.2d at 497 (noting the “well-settled principle” that § 1983

claims “must be based upon the violation of plaintiff’s personal rights, and

not the rights of someone else”).

To the extent this allegation could be construed as Jane Doe 1 and Jane

Doe 2 bringing a claim against Treadway for sexual harassment, it is

dismissed for substantially the same reasons Jane Doe 2’s claim of sexual

harassment against Doyle is dismissed, supra. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 n.

11.

All Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs further allege that Treadway, with six other defendants,

“sexually assaulted, harassed, and/or raped” each of them during their

detentions at the JDC. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 30]. They maintain these

defendants “exploited their positions of power to abuse, harass, rape, and

sexually assault defenseless minor children.” [Id.]. In count one, Plaintiffs

include Treadway with 12 other defendants in alleging each “sexually abused

one or more of the Plaintiff’s within the [JDC], between 2023 and the

present.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 315]. For substantially the same reasons this

§ 1983 claim of sexual abuse is dismissed against McCoy, Wilson, and Harris,

it is dismissed against Treadway. The complaint contains no factual

allegations demonstrating that Treadway committed or caused the sexual

abuse of any plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ collective § 1983 claim against Treadway is

dismissed.

Johnson

Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13

Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13 have each failed to state

§ 1983 claims against Johnson. Child Doe 1 alleges that Johnson threatened

him into silence about his April 6, 2024 rape, by approaching his counsel on

April 19, 2024 and making several statements, including, “you need to tell

your client to keep his mouth shut.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 253]. Child Doe 5 and

Child Doe 13 allege that Johnson disclosed in a June 2024 group meeting

that every juvenile resident in their unit were “responsible” for Hines being

charged with raping Child Doe 1. [Id. at ¶ 271]. Johnson allegedly stated that

they all got what they bargained for by receiving money, snacks, etc. in

return for tolerating Hines’s sexual advances. [Id.]. Child Doe 13 alleges that

Johnson called him a racially-derogative nickname. [Id.]. Child Doe 5

maintains that Johnson intentionally mispronounced his last name in a

racially-derogatory manner, made him feel unsafe and uncomfortable by

specifically targeting him, and implied that he also engaged in sexual activity

with Hines. [Id.]. Child Doe 5 further avers that Johnson confronted him

again about the rape incident between June 18 and June 27, 2024. [Id. at

¶ 273].

Johnson moves to dismiss the claims against her on the basis that

Plaintiffs did not name her in any claim for relief. [ECF No. 269 at 8, 16]. To

the extent Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13’s allegations against

her could be construed as a claim arising under § 1983 for cruel and unusual

punishment, she argues that these allegations are insufficient to state a

constitutional violation because they only involve verbal harassment. [Id.;

ECF No. 282 at 6].

The Court notes that Johnson is not named in any count in the complaint.

However, she provides no authority to show that the Court must dismiss in

this circumstance if the facts alleged in the complaint otherwise plausibly

state a claim for relief. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

And the Court must assess “the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained

within the four corners of the complaint.” Jojola, 55 F.3d at 494. Accordingly,

despite the omission of Johnson’s name from the section of the complaint

setting out the claims for relief, the Court will consider Child Doe 1, Child

Doe 5, and Child Doe 13’s allegations and determine whether they

sufficiently state § 1983 claims.

Construing the allegations against Johnson as Eighth Amendment claims

for cruel and unusual punishment or Fourteenth Amendment due process

claims, the Court finds that Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13 have

not sufficiently stated such claims for relief. For substantially the same

reasons sexual harassment, alone, does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation, Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13’s claims of verbal

threats and harassment are also insufficient. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 n. 11.

“Mere verbal threats or harassment do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation unless they create ‘terror of instant and unexpected death.’” Alvarez,

155 F. App’x at 396 (quoting Northington, 973 F.2d at 1524). “[E]ven extreme

verbal abuse typically is insufficient to establish a constitutional

deprivation.” Abeyta by & Through Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch.

Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Collins v. Cundy, 603

F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (a sheriff’s threat to hang a prisoner was

verbal harassment or abuse not sufficient to state a § 1983 constitutional

deprivation); Walker v. Young, 958 F.2d 381 (Table), 1992 WL 49785, at *2

(10th Cir. March 17, 1992) (affirming dismissal when plaintiff alleged officer

threatened to “get even” with him and labeled him a “snitch”). And although

a prison official making racist remarks is “deplorable and unprofessional,” it

does not constitute a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Williams v.

Levansailor, 153 F.3d 730 (Table), 1998 WL 426865, at *1 (10th Cir. July 21,

1998). Because Child Doe 1, Child Doe 5, and Child Doe 13 allege no facts

demonstrating that Johnson’s statements created terror of instant and

unexpected death, they have not sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims against

her.

Moreover, to the extent these allegations show Johnson engaged in victim

and witness intimidation, they are not enough to give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Not all criminal misconduct by public officials violates the constitution.

Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125; see also Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th

Cir. 1994) (“[A] violation of state law alone does not give rise to a federal

cause of action under § 1983.”); Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345

F.3d 1157, 1164 (10th Cir. 2003) (same). Child Doe 1’s, Child Doe 5’s, and

Child Doe 13’s claims against Johnson are dismissed.

Slife

Child Doe 18

Child Doe 18 alleges that Slife made sexually inappropriate comments to

him, by telling Child Doe 18 he was a “male stripper” and that Slife would

like to see him strip. [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 261]. As explained above, sexual

harassment, alone, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 n. 11. Therefore, Child Doe 18 fails to state a § 1983

claim against Slife.

All Plaintiffs

Slife is included in Plaintiffs’ allegation against him and 12 other

defendants that each “sexually abused one or more of the Plaintiff’s within

the [JDC], between 2023 and the present.” [ECF No. 176 at ¶ 315]. For

substantially the same reasons this § 1983 claim of sexual abuse is dismissed

against McCoy, Wilson, Harris, and Treadway, it is dismissed against Slife.

The complaint contains no factual allegations demonstrating that Slife

committed or caused the sexual abuse of any plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ collective

§ 1983 sexual abuse claim against Slife is dismissed.

Failure to Intervene

In count two, Plaintiffs assert a discrete claim alleging that Treadway,

Powell, Lavine, Loyd, and T. Gray failed to intervene to stop other detention

officers from violating their constitutional rights. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 359–

366]. Plaintiffs allege that these defendants “knowingly allowed the abuse,

harassment, mistreatment, rape, and/or sexual assault of multiple Plaintiffs

and other juveniles to occur, both at the hands of Juvenile Bureau detention

officers and staff as well as other detainees.” [Id. at ¶¶ 50–51, 53–57].

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that between June 2023 and August 2023,

Treadway, Powell, Lavine, Loyd, and T. Gray “all witnessed and personally

observed” Doyle’s “sexually inappropriate behavior” towards Jane Doe 1 and

not only failed to intervene but encouraged that behavior. [Id. at ¶¶ 153, 360,

361, 362]. Plaintiffs allege, despite these defendants’ personal knowledge of

one or more sexual abuses within the JDC, including Doyle’s abuse of Jane

Doe 1, each elected not to report the abuses and conspired to allow them to

continue. [Id. at ¶¶ 310, 361].

Plaintiffs maintain these defendants “each stood by without intervening to

prevent” the constitutional violations committed by Doyle and other

defendants, despite having personal knowledge of the violations and an

opportunity and duty to do so. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 360, 363]. They state these

defendants “had a reasonable opportunity to prevent this harm but failed to

do so.” [Id. at ¶ 364]. They further maintain that the conduct described “was

objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally, with malice,

willful and/or reckless indifference” to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. [Id. at

¶ 365].

Treadway, Powell, Lavine, Loyd, and T. Gray move to dismiss Plaintiffs’

failure-to-intervene claim under Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF Nos. 220, 269]. These

defendants contend that the complaint lacks a causal connection between

alleged constitutional violations, their knowledge of those violations, and

their opportunity to prevent them. [ECF No. 220 at 12, 16; ECF No. 269 at

12–13, 18–19].

The Court finds that Jane Doe 1 plausibly alleges a § 1983 failure to

intervene claim against these defendants. However, the remaining plaintiffs

do not set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible basis for this claim.

“[A]ll law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to

protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law

enforcement officers in their presence.” Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 616

(10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To bring a

failure-to-intervene claim, a plaintiff must allege “that 1) a government

officer violated his constitutional rights, 2) a different government actor (the

defendant) observed or had reasons to know about that constitutional

violation, and 3) the defendant had a realistic opportunity to intervene, but

failed to do so.” Id. (citations omitted).

Bledsoe is instructive. After spending 16 years in prison for a murder he

did not commit, Mr. Bledsoe brought a § 1983 action against 10 defendants,

most of whom were law enforcement officers. Bledsoe, 53 F.4th at 594. He

brought a failure-to-intervene claim, alleging the appellants violated his

constitutional rights by conspiring to frame him. Id. at 594–95. When the

district court denied a motion to dismiss, four sheriff’s deputies appealed. Id.

at 595. As relevant here, Mr. Bledsoe alleged:

• that one of the deputies “knowingly and purposefully falsified”

statements against him and was at the meeting where the

conspiracy was hatched;

• another deputy “purposefully withheld documentation of [another

suspect’s] inculpatory statements” and “declined” to search the

home of that suspect; and

• a third and fourth deputy “intentionally” and “purposefully

declined” to search the other suspect’s home, room, clothing, or

truck (where that suspect said he shot the victim) and shovel that

the suspect said he used to bury the victim.

[Id. at 598–600].

The Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Bledsoe had adequately stated all the

necessary elements of a § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim. Id. at 616. First,

the court found Mr. Bledsoe had alleged constitutional violations in several

ways, including fabricating false evidence. Id. Second, he had sufficiently

alleged that each appellant knew of the ongoing constitutional deprivations.

Third, the court found that each appellant had been given a reasonable

opportunity to intervene to prevent harming Mr. Bledsoe, and failed to do so,

based on the alleged conspiracy unfolding “over months and months.” Id.

Likewise, here, Jane Doe 1 sufficiently alleges all the elements of a § 1983

failure-to-intervene claim. First, she alleges Doyle violated her constitutional

rights by sexually abusing her, as shown above. Second, she sufficiently

alleges that Treadway, Powell, Lavine, Loyd and T. Gray knew of the ongoing

sexual abuse by stating these defendants “witnessed … personally observed

… and encouraged” Doyle’s “sexually inappropriate behavior” with her. [ECF

No. 176 at ¶¶ 153, 361]. Third, she demonstrates that each of these

defendants had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and yet did not by

alleging each “elected not to report” the abuse and “conspired” to allow it over

a period of months. [Id. at ¶¶ 310, 361, 363, 364].

Treadway, Powell, Lavine, Loyd, and T. Gray’s motions to dismiss are

denied as to Jane Doe 1’s § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim. As to the

remaining plaintiffs’ failure-to-intervene claims, their motions are granted.

Supervisory Liability

Plaintiffs bring § 1983 claims against Judge Gray, Parker, Taylor,

Edwards, Williams, Currington, Tunley, Cartmell, and Holt under a theory of

supervisory liability. They bring § 1983 claims against the Juvenile Bureau

and the BOCC under a theory of Municipal / Monell liability. Before

beginning the analysis of these claims, the Court will first discuss the legal

framework.

For supervisory liability claims, § 1983 does not “authorize liability under

a theory of respondeat superior.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police

Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Thus, it is not

enough that a supervisor acts in a supervisory role when a subordinate

violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 838. Instead,

a plaintiff must show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the

constitutional violation. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195. “This requires … more than

a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s conduct.” Schneider, 717

F.3d at 767 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “affirmative

link” requirement is embodied in the three elements of a supervisory liability

claim: “(1) personal involvement; (2) causation[;] and (3) state of mind.” Id.

As to personal involvement, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 768 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676). A plaintiff may also establish personal involvement by showing “the

supervisor promulgated, created, implemented, or possessed responsibility for

the continued operation of a policy, or the establishment or utilization of an

unconstitutional policy or custom, provided the policy or custom resulted in a

violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d

960, 997 (10th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Personal involvement can also be

demonstrated by showing the supervisor “was responsible for but failed to

create and enforce policies to protect” the plaintiff from a constitutional

harm. Perry, 892 F.3d at 1121–22 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In contrast to the individual liability claims discussed above, the

Court considers the “conditions of confinement as a whole” in determining

whether the facts alleged present a reasonable inference that a defendant-

supervisor was personally involved in failing to enforce policies in a way that

allowed for a constitutional violation. See Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 840, 846–47

(considering “the evidence as a whole” and concluding a reasonable jury could

infer defendant warden was personally involved by failing to enforce policies

in a way that allowed sexual misconduct to occur within the prison); see also

Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 920 (recognizing several failures by the defendant sheriff

but finding “perhaps most troubling” his failure to implement an adequate

grievance procedure including “serious investigation and response”).

For causation, a plaintiff must show “the defendant set in motion a series

of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would

cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Schneider,

717 F.3d at 768 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]

supervising official’s management actions may be sufficient to establish

causation.” Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 847; see Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 922 (“[A]cts or

deficiencies that result in a jail atmosphere in which discipline and

supervision is entirely lacking, may be sufficiently related to a particular

instance of assault that a jury is permitted to conclude that the conditions

proximately caused the assault.”).

The state of mind requirement turns on the type of claim a plaintiff

brings. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Dodds, 614

F.3d at 1204–05). For an alleged Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation,

the plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference. Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 848;

Burke, 935 F.3d at 997. “The standard is subjective, requiring that the official

actually be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 848 (cleaned up). “To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff

must produce ‘evidence showing that the defendant knowingly created a

substantial risk of constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d at

769). In some cases, inaction can be enough—“[a] local government

policymaker is deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously

fails to act when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which

will almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced

by the plaintiff.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769 (cleaned up). But a prison official

“is not deliberately indifferent to that risk unless he is aware of and fails to

take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 848

(quoting Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916). In identifying the risk, the focus is not “on

the risk to a specific inmate by a specific employee[.]” Id. Instead, courts

“analyze whether the combined circumstances created a risk for inmates in

the plaintiff’s situation.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not

matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any

more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for

reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a

risk.”)).

Municipal / Monell Liability

“A municipality or other local government may be liable under” § 1983 “if

the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or

‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). The “under color of state law” element of a § 1983

municipal liability claim requires that the constitutional deprivation occurred

pursuant to official policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978). To establish a viable claim under Monell, a plaintiff must

first point to an underlying constitutional violation for which the governing

body is responsible. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782

(10th Cir. 1993) (without sufficient evidence for a jury to find an underlying

constitutional violation, no basis exists for imposing municipal liability under

§ 1983); see also Contreras on behalf of A.L. v. Dona Ana Cty. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs, 965 F.3d 1114, 1115 n.1 (10th Cir. 2020) (per curium) (“[A]lthough

qualified immunity only shields individuals—municipal liability for claims of

deliberate indifference must follow only from clearly established

constitutional violations.”).

A plaintiff is also required to demonstrate that “the [governing body] itself

cause[d] the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (emphasis in original). Local governing bodies can be

held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officers only if the officers

implement or execute “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690. To ensure that a government body is being held liable for its own

conduct, a plaintiff seeking to hold it liable for an officer’s wrongdoing must

show that (1) an official policy or custom (2) caused the plaintiff’s injury, and

(3) was “enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost

inevitable constitutional injury.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769.

An official policy or custom may arise in many forms, including “a formal

regulation or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a

widespread practice, decisions of municipal employees with final

policymaking authority, ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of

subordinates to whom authority was delegated, and the deliberately

indifferent failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Hinkle v.

Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1239–40 (quotation

omitted). “The custom or practice giving rise to liability must be so well

settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can

be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to

end the practice.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 998 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Waller v. City & Cty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283

(10th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that a practice “so permanent and well settled

as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law” can give rise to

municipal liability).

Causation may be established when a plaintiff shows “the municipality

was the moving force behind the injury alleged.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Where a plaintiff claims that the

municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused

an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be

applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions

of its employee.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To show that “a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to

violate a plaintiff’s rights,” the plaintiff must show that the action “was taken

with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences.”

Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality

has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is

substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously

or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Waller, 932 F.3d at

1284 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although notice is

typically “established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious

conduct,” it can also be established “in a narrow range of circumstances

where a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or a plainly obvious

consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Id. (cleaned up).

Generally, the question of whether a municipality is liable turns “on

whether a specific municipal officer violated an individual’s constitutional

rights.” Crowson v. Washington Cty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir.

2020). However, a limited exception exists in cases involving systemic

failures: “where the alleged violation occurred as a result of multiple officials’

actions or inactions.” Id.

Supervisory and municipal liability—Same elements in this case

“Supervisory and municipal liability differ in that the former is imposed

on an individual and the latter on an entity.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 998. But like

supervisory liability, “a municipality may be liable only if a municipal actor

committed a constitutional violation.” Id. (citation omitted). So, “[a] claim

asserted against a supervisory official in both her individual and official

capacities can serve as the basis for imposing both personal liability against

the supervisor, and municipal liability (the official-capacity claim) if the

supervisor is a municipal policymaker.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the BOCC personally participated in an

underlying constitutional violation. And supervisory liability is predicated on

the JDC supervisors maintaining a policy or custom that resulted in the

underlying violations. Therefore, the “same policy-or-custom element is

required” for municipal liability as is required for the supervisory-liability

claims. Burke, 935 F.3d at 999. Because both supervisory and municipal

liability also require: “(1) a causal relationship between the policy or custom

and the underlying violation and (2) deliberate indifference,” the “elements

for supervisory and municipal liability are the same in this case.” Id.

The Court begins its analysis with the Monell claims against the Juvenile

Bureau and the BOCC.

Juvenile Bureau

The Juvenile Bureau moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it on

three bases. [ECF No. 219]. First, it argues that it is an arm of the state and

therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. [Id. at 7–10]. Next, it

alternatively argues, to the extent it is considered a county entity, it is part of

Tulsa County and therefore a duplicative party to BOCC and other county

employees sued in their official capacities. [Id. at 10–11]. Last, it argues that

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against it upon which relief can be

granted. [Id. at 11–26].

Juvenile Bureau should be regarded as a county entity that is a

duplicative party to BOCC. Oklahoma law provides for the creation of

juvenile bureaus in counties having a population of more than eighty

thousand (80,000) residents. 10A O.S. § 2-4-101. Juvenile bureaus consist of a

“director” and “other personnel,” see id. § 2–4–102, whose duties include

“investigat[ing] and report[ing] on all cases that are pending in the Juvenile

Docket of the district court, and investigat[ing] and report[ing] on all cases of

delinquent children and children in need of supervision, residing or being in

the county,” see id. § 2–4–104. The director is “subject to the direction and

supervision of the judge of the Juvenile Division[.]” Id. at § 2–4–102. “The

director may be removed by the judge of the Juvenile Division … at any

time.” Id. “[O]ther employees may be removed by the director.” Id.

Under Oklahoma law, “[a] detention home … may be established as part[]

of the juvenile bureau of the court.” 10A O.S. § 2-4-108. And “[t]he judge of

the Juvenile Division … may appoint necessary technicians and other

employees for such homes in the same manner as … the appointment of other

employees of the bureau.” Id. “The salary of the director and other employees

of the bureau and any detention home established pursuant to Section 2-4-

108 … shall be fixed by the judge of the Juvenile Division, subject to the

general administrative authority of the county commissioners of the

contracting county.” Id. at § 2-4-107(A).

“The board of county commissioners of every county shall provide for the

temporary detention of a child who is or may be subject to secure detention

and may construct a building or rent space for such purpose.” 10A O.S. § 2-3-

103(C)(2). The enabling statutes further declare that the boards of county

commissioners in the designated host counties shall …. “operate the juvenile

detention facility through a statutorily constituted juvenile bureau subject to

the supervision of the district court, or (b) operate the juvenile detention

facility by employing a manager who may employ personnel and incur other

expenses as may be necessary for its operation and maintenance….” 10A O.S.

§ 2-3-103(C)(3).

Each organized county in Oklahoma can sue and be sued. 19 O.S. § 1. “In

all suits or proceedings by or against a county, the name in which a county

shall sue or be sued shall be, ‘Board of County Commissioners of the County

of [Tulsa].’” 19 O.S. § 4. But “a county’s board of county commissioners is not

a separate legal entity from the county.” Snow v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty.

of McClain, No. CIV-14-911-HE, 2014 WL 7335319, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec.

19, 2014). Rather, “it exercises the powers of the county.” Id. So, “[a] suit

brought against a county’s board of county commissioners is the way

Oklahoma law contemplates suing the county.” Id. (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 19,

§ 4). In the event of a lawsuit against a juvenile bureau, the relevant county

must provide legal representation to the juvenile bureau, either through the

district attorney’s office or other means. 10A O.S. § 2-4-107(D) (“[T]he district

attorney of the county in which the juvenile bureau is located shall represent

the juvenile bureau and any employee who was acting in his or her official

capacity at the time of the act or omission complained of in any lawsuit.”). If a

conflict of interest arises, “the county commissioners may request the

assistance of the Attorney General or authorize the employment of private

counsel for the juvenile bureau and its employees in their official capacity.”

Id.

The statute creating the juvenile bureaus at one time contained language

that juvenile bureaus “were to be considered departments of the county ‘for

legal representation purposes only.’” Reynolds v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the

Cty. of Okla., No. No. CIV–14–0250–HE, 2014 WL 6455508, at *2 (W.D. Okla.

Nov. 13, 2014). That language has since been deleted. Removal of this

language suggests that “juvenile bureaus are to be regarded as county

departments for all purposes.” Id. The statutory sections cited above support

this conclusion.

The Court also finds persuasive Juvenile Bureau’s argument that district

courts within the Tenth Circuit “have consistently held that detention

facilities deemed subdivisions of a county are not separately suable entities

from the county itself.” [ECF No. 285 at 4]. In addition to the cases Juvenile

Bureau cites in their briefing, the Court has found independent authority

supporting that assertion. See Carroll v. Comanche Cty. Detention Ctr., No.

CIV-18-0482-D, 2018 WL 4442282, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 1, 2018) (“A county

jail in Oklahoma, as a subdivision of the county in which it is located, has no

separate legal identity under Oklahoma law[.]”); White v. Utah, 5 F. App’x

852, 853 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of county jail; although

applicable state law provided that county may sue or be sued, no state law

supported directing a cause of action directly against a county’s subdivisions,

including its jails); see also Aston v. Cunningham, No. 99-4156, 2000 WL

796086, at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000) (affirming dismissal of county jail

as defendant in prisoner’s § 1983 action on basis that “a detention facility is

not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued”).

As a statutorily constituted Oklahoma juvenile bureau, the Court finds

Juvenile Bureau to be a duplicative party to the BOCC. Therefore, the claims

against it are dismissed.12

Claims asserted against the BOCC and BOCC employees in their

official capacities are redundant.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 official-capacity claims against BOCC employees

“represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55. For this reason, the

official-capacity claims against Parker, Taylor, Edwards, Williams,

Currington, Tunley (JDC Supervisors), Doyle, Raymond, Treadway, Johnson,

Wilson, Powell, Lavine, Loyd, T. Gray, Harris, McCoy, and Slife (JDC staff)

12 Because the Court grants Juvenile Bureau’s motion to dismiss on this basis, it

will not address its remaining arguments.

are effectively claims against BOCC.13 This is also why official-capacity

claims against Taylor, Currington, and Tunley transferred to their

successors, Parker and Williams, when they left office. See Burke, 935 F.3d at

998 (an official-capacity § 1983 claim against a retired sheriff transferred to a

new sheriff).

Plaintiffs have sued the BOCC, Juvenile Bureau administrators in their

official capacities, and JDC staff in their official capacities. These claims all

amount to actions against the county and are permissible methods of

pleading a Monell claim. Powell v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Okla. Cty., No. CIV-

18-294-D, 2019 WL 2238022, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 23, 2019). Although

permissible under § 1983, such claims are duplicative and unnecessary given

that Plaintiffs have named the BOCC as a defendant. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“an official capacity suit is, in all respects

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”); 19 O.S. § 4 (a

suit against a county must be brought by naming the board of county

commissioners of that county); Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th

Cir. 2009) (bringing “a claim against [a sheriff] in his official capacity ... is the

same as bringing a suit against the county”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims

13 Plaintiffs concede that official-capacity claims against Judge Gray, Cartmell,

Holt, and Brown are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. [ECF No. 259 at 6, n.3;

ECF No. 262 at 6, n.2].

against Parker, Taylor, Edwards, Williams, Currington, Tunley (JDC

Supervisors), Doyle, Raymond, Treadway, Johnson, Wilson, Powell, Lavine,

Loyd, T. Gray, Harris, McCoy, and Slife (JDC staff) in their official capacities

are dismissed.

BOCC

The BOCC moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 228]. Specifically, it argues that it is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because it acts as an arm of the

State regarding the JDC. [Id. at 12–15]. It further argues that Plaintiffs fail

to state a § 1983 municipal liability claim because it was not the governing

body of the JDC before July 19, 2024, and conduct that allegedly occurred

since did not violate the constitution. [Id. at 15–25]. Last, the BOCC argues

that Plaintiffs’ state law breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law and

that punitive damages are not recoverable. [Id. at 25–30].

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the BOCC is not entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity because counties are not afforded that protection.

[ECF No. 261 at 12–15].

As to their Monell claim, Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately

alleged constitutional violations and their municipal liability theory “is based

on the BOCC’s deliberate indifference in the hiring, training, and supervision

of employees, which lead [sic] to the consistent abuses and neglect occurring

within the confines of the Juvenile Detention Center, for years.” [ECF No.

261 at 18]. They rely on Crowson v. Washington Cty., Utah, 983 F.3d 1166,

1191 (10th Cir. 2020) in asserting the BOCC cannot “escape liability by

spiderwebbing responsibility across multiple entities.” [Id. at 7].

Although the complaint does not assert punitive damages against the

BOCC specifically, Plaintiffs explain that they are not seeking punitive

damages against this defendant.14 [ECF No. 261 at 8 n. 1]. Plaintiffs also

concede that their cause of action for breach of a third-party beneficiary

contract against the BOCC should be dismissed.15 [ECF No. 261 at 8 n.1].

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Court finds that the BOCC is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. The BOCC argues that the Oklahoma legislature “explicitly

recognizes that the operation of the [JDC] is a state function.” [ECF No. 228

at 12]. The Oklahoma Juvenile Code states: “The operation of a juvenile

detention facility by a county shall constitute a quasi-judicial function and is

also hereby declared to be a function of the State of Oklahoma for purposes of

14 To the extent Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against the individual defendants,

punitive damages are a potential remedy, not a claim for relief, and ruling on the

issue is premature at this early stage.

15 Because Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Juvenile Bureau should also be

dismissed from this claim [ECF No. 260 at 7 n.1], and Defendant OJA has

previously been dismissed from this matter [ECF No. 267], count three of the third

amended complaint is dismissed.

the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 10A O.S. § 2-3-

103(C)(7). The BOCC relies on this statutory language in arguing that it is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. [ECF Nos. 228 at 12–15; 277 at

1–3]. However, the Court is unpersuaded. The BOCC presents no authority

from the Supreme Court, or any court within the Tenth Circuit,

demonstrating that a board of county commissioners acts as an arm of the

state in any capacity.

In response, Plaintiffs direct the Court to Reynolds v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs

of the Cty. of Okla., No. CIV–14–0250–HE, 2014 WL 6455508 (W.D. Okla.

Nov. 13, 2014). [ECF No. 261 at 12]. Reynolds involved an Oklahoma board of

county commissioners citing 10A § 2-3-103(C)(7) and claiming Eleventh

Amendment immunity in defense of an employment law claim brought by a

juvenile bureau employee. Id. at *1–2. The district court found, “[a]s the

State has set up the juvenile bureaus to operate as county offices, rather than

as arms of the State, more than the language in § 2-3-103C(7) will be

required to cloak [them] with Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at *2.

Although Reynolds did not involve the operation of a juvenile detention

center, the Court finds its reasoning persuasive.

Also, in Burke v. Muskogee Cty. Council of Youth Services, a more recent

§ 1983 case arising from the death of a juvenile at the Muskogee County

Regional Juvenile Detention Center, the district court likewise held that the

board of county commissioners was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. No. CIV-18-108-RAW, 2018 WL 11271520, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Nov.

14, 2018). The Burke court found, “Eleventh Amendment immunity … is a

creature of federal, not state, law, and the Supreme Court ‘has repeatedly

refused to extend sovereign immunity to counties.’” Id. (quoting Northern Ins.

Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006)).

“It is well established that counties are not entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Estate of Goodwin by and through Alvarado v.

Connell, 376 F. Supp.3d 1133, 1148 (D. Col. March 12, 2019) (citing Lake

Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401

(1979) (“[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh]

Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and

municipalities, even though such entities exercise a ‘slice of state power.’”).

Notwithstanding the language of the Juvenile Code, the Court finds that the

BOCC is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Municipal / Monell Liability

The Court further finds that Plaintiffs plausibly allege a § 1983 municipal

liability claim against the BOCC. As set forth above, “[a] Monell claim

generally requires the plaintiff to allege facts showing: (1) an official policy or

custom, (2) causation, and (3) deliberate indifference.” Myers v. Turn Key

Health Clinic, LLC, No. 24-5113, 2026 WL 73939, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 9,

2026) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Tenth Circuit recognizes several types of Monell claims. One type is a

failure to train/failure to supervise claim, which requires a plaintiff to show

that failures of a municipality “are the driving force behind a constitutional

violation by a specific municipal employee.” Myers, 2026 WL 73939, at *5

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Whitewater v. Goss, 192 F.

App’x 794, 797 (10th Cir. 2006) (failure to supervise claims “often may be

indistinguishable from failure to train” claims).

Another type of Monell claim alleges that “a formally promulgated policy,

well-settled custom or practice, or final decision by a policymaker ... ‘itself is

unconstitutional.’” Crowson, 983 F.3d at 1187 (citation omitted). “Because

municipalities act through officers, ordinarily there will be a municipal

violation only where an individual officer commits a constitutional violation.”

Id. at 1191. But “[w]here the sum of multiple officers’ actions taken pursuant

to municipal policy results in a constitutional violation, the municipality may

be directly liable. That is, the municipality may not escape liability by acting

through twenty hands rather than two.” Crowson, 983 F.3d at 1191. This

type of claim is sometimes referred to as a “systemic” theory of municipal

liability. Myers, 2026 WL 73939, at *5; see Thao v. Grady Cnty. Crim. Just.

Auth., 159 F.4th 1214, 1233 n.13 (10th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “such a

claim represents a different theory of municipal liability”). “In [these]

situations, the policies may be unconstitutional precisely because they fail to

ensure that any single officer is positioned to prevent the constitutional

violation.” Crowson, 983 F.3d at 1191.

The Court construes Plaintiffs’ Monell claim as alleging a “systemic”

theory of municipal liability.

Analysis

As shown above, Plaintiffs rely upon an alleged pattern of similar

constitutional violations by JDC employees, i.e., sexual and physical abuse,

which Plaintiffs experienced for years. In the absence of an official policy, a

plaintiff seeking to impose municipal liability under § 1983 may point to “an

informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not

authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and

well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Bryson

v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is premised on

the BOCC’s responsibility to operate the JDC and its repeated failure to

supervise, discipline employee misconduct, and a failure to enact appropriate

policies. [See, e.g., ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 303, 341]. Therefore, Plaintiffs point to

an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice. Plaintiffs further

allege these failures caused the constitutional violations with the BOCC

“perpetuating rape culture within the JDC.” [Id. at ¶ 305]; see Cordova v.

Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A failure to investigate or

reprimand might also cause a future violation by sending a message to

officers that such behavior is tolerated.”). As to the BOCC’s state of mind,

Plaintiffs allege that complaints of sexual abuse by detention officers were

made but the BOCC took no corrective action. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 293–95].

“Evidence of prior complaints can be sufficient to show that a municipal

Defendant and the officials ignored the officers’ misconduct.” Est. of Holmes

by & through Couser v. Somers, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1263 (D. Kan. 2019).

Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a municipal liability claim

against the BOCC.

Although the BOCC argues that it cannot be liable because it assumed

management of the JDC from the Juvenile Bureau on July 19, 2024, the

Court is unable to determine from the parties’ briefing or from the complaint

how the assumption of management was accomplished. And if the BOCC had

the authority to take over the JDC in 2024, without any change in the

applicable law or administrative code, it must have had the ability to do so

before that time. Also, according to the policy manual the BOCC attaches to

its motion, the judge of the Juvenile Bureau acted under the administrative

authority of the BOCC before 2024. [ECF No. 228-1 at 11].

Because Plaintiffs have made a plausible claim for relief, the Court finds

that the BOCC’s motion to dismiss should be denied. At this stage of the case,

the BOCC has raised a fact-intensive argument that is better suited for

resolution on a motion for summary judgment. The BOCC’s argument that its

authority over the JDC was limited is a factual issue that cannot be resolved

on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the BOCC’s motion to dismiss is denied.

JDC Supervisors and OJA Leadership

Plaintiffs base their claims against the JDC Supervisors and OJA

Leadership on supervisory liability.

Judge Gray

Judge Gray moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 supervisory liability claim

against him in his individual capacity, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No.

218].16 He argues that several of the plaintiffs’ allegations fail to demonstrate

a constitutional violation and that the collective allegations in the complaint

fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. [ECF No. 218 at 5–7]. Judge Gray

further contends that the complaint does not allege any identified policy was

unconstitutional. [Id. at 7–8]. To the extent the complaint makes out a

constitutional violation, Judge Gray argues that those allegations do not

show his personal involvement, establish causation, or demonstrate that he

16 Plaintiffs concede that an official-capacity claim against Judge Gray is barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. [ECF No. 259 at 6, n.3].

was deliberately indifferent. [Id. at 8–9]. Last, he argues that he supervised

only the director of the Juvenile Bureau, pursuant to his statutory authority.

[Id. at 9]. Therefore, Judge Gray claims “there can be no ‘affirmative link’

between” himself and Plaintiffs’ allegations without a showing of his personal

involvement with Taylor and/or Edwards. [Id. at 9–10].

Plaintiffs respond that Judge Gray is liable because he “was statutorily

responsible for the supervision and administration of the Juvenile Detention

Center,” knew about the constitutional violations occurring within the JDC,

and did nothing about them. [ECF No. 259 at 9–12].

The Court finds that Plaintiffs state a plausible § 1983 supervisory

liability claim against Judge Gray. That is, they allege an “affirmative link”

between Judge Gray and a constitutional violation. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195.

The “affirmative link” requirement is embodied in the three elements of a

supervisory liability claim: “(1) personal involvement; (2) causation[;] and (3)

state of mind.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 767.

Plaintiffs allege Judge Gray was personally involved by “perpetuating

rape culture” within the JDC and failed to create and enforce policies to

protect Plaintiffs from constitutional harm. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 291–95, 304–

05]. To be sure, each plaintiff had a constitutional right not to be raped by a

detention officer in the JDC. See Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 837. Personal

involvement can be demonstrated by showing the supervisor “was responsible

for but failed to create and enforce policies to protect” the plaintiff from a

constitutional harm. Perry, 892 F.3d at 1121–22. The Court considers the

“conditions of confinement as a whole” in determining whether the facts

alleged present a reasonable inference that a defendant-supervisor was

personally involved in failing to enforce policies in a way that allowed for a

constitutional violation. See Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 840, 846–47 (considering

“the evidence as a whole” and concluding a reasonable jury could infer

defendant warden was personally involved by failing to enforce policies in a

way that allowed sexual misconduct to occur within the prison); see also

Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 920 (recognizing several failures by the defendant sheriff

but finding “perhaps most troubling” his failure to implement an adequate

grievance procedure including “serious investigation and response”). Here,

Plaintiffs allege facts leading to a reasonable inference of Judge Gray’s

personal involvement.

Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege causation, which requires a plaintiff to

show “the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew

or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff

of her constitutional rights.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 768 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] supervising official’s management

actions may be sufficient to establish causation.” Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 847.

Plaintiffs allege that deficient customs and policies led to the constitutional

violations set out in the complaint, which include allegations of sexual

assault and rape in 2023. [ECF No. 176 at ¶¶ 135, 293, 317]. “[A]cts or

deficiencies that result in a jail atmosphere in which discipline and

supervision is entirely lacking, may be sufficiently related to a particular

instance of assault that a jury is permitted to conclude that the conditions

proximately caused the assault.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 922.

Finally, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Judge Gray acted with deliberate

indifference. To establish the requisite state of mind, “[t]he official’s

knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a

particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular manner in which injury

might occur.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916 (emphasis in original). “The standard is

subjective, requiring that the official actually be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 848. (cleaned

up).

In some cases, inaction can be enough—“[a] local government policymaker

is deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously fails to act

when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which will

almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by

the plaintiff.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769 (cleaned up). In identifying the risk,

the focus is not “on the risk to a specific inmate by a specific employee[.]”

Keith (II), 843 F.3d at 848. Rather, courts “analyze whether the combined

circumstances created a risk for inmates in the plaintiff’s situation.” Id.

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes

from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a

prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or

because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.”).

Here, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts showing Judge Gray knew certain

plaintiffs were sexually assaulted and raped in 2023 and 2024 and did not

take immediate steps to remediate that conduct, despite his policy-making

authority. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege Judge Gray was “aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exist[ed]”; (2) that he actually drew that inference; and (3) that he was

“aware of and fail[ed] to take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Keith

(II), 843 F.3d at 848 (quoting Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916). Because Plaintiffs

state a plausible § 1983 supervisory liability claim against Judge Gray, his

motion to dismiss is denied.

Edwards, Williams, Currington, Tunley

Edwards, Williams, Currington, and Tunley also move to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ supervisory claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 221

at 5–17]. These defendants argue that many individual plaintiffs fail to

assert a constitutional violation, and that plaintiffs who do assert such a

violation fail to allege facts sufficient to give rise to § 1983 supervisory

liability. [Id. at 5]. Specifically, these defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail

to allege a causal connection between them and specific claims of abuse, and

further fail “to specify what knowledge, if any, Defendants had at the time of

such violations.” [Id. at 8–9, 16].

Plaintiffs respond that these defendants failed to implement and enforce

policies that would have protected them at the JDC and that their inactions

make them accountable for the deprivations Plaintiffs suffered. [ECF No. 265

at 7]. Plaintiffs maintain that the OJA informed these defendants for years

about unlawful practices within the JDC that were out of compliance with

JDC policies and procedures. [Id. at 28].

The Court finds that Plaintiffs state plausible § 1983 supervisory liability

claims against Edwards, Williams, Currington, and Tunley for substantially

the same reasons they sufficiently state a supervisory liability claim against

Judge Gray. Plaintiffs allege that OJA inspectors identified recurring issues

with the JDC, including room confinement and

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.