Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RAUL GUTIERREZ SANTA CRUZ, No. 1:26-cv-04250-KES-EGC (HC)

A-Number: 208-447-986,

12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN

13 PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

v. CORPUS

14

WARDEN MESA VERDE ICE (Doc. 1)

15 PROCESSING CENTER,

[14-DAY DEADLINE]

16 Respondents.

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18 I. INTRODUCTION

19 Petitioner Raul Gutierrez Santa Cruz is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a

20 petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner has been detained

21 in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since February 10, 2026,

22 without any individualized custody determination by a neutral decisionmaker. For the reasons set

23 forth below, the undersigned recommends that the petition (Doc. 1) be GRANTED IN PART, that

24 Respondent be directed to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

25 judge, and that the petition be DENIED to the extent it seeks immediate release from custody.

26 II. BACKGROUND

27 A. Petitioner’s Immigration History and Detention

28 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Doc. 8-1 at 1). He entered the United States at

1 or near Hidalgo, Texas, on or about September 13, 2015, and his status was adjusted to that of a

2 lawful permanent resident in 2019. (Id. at 1-2).

3 On June 11, 2024, Petitioner was convicted in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court, Sarasota

4 County, Florida, of unlawful conveyance of fuel, use of non-approved fuel containers, and

5 possession of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statutes sections 316.80(1) and 893.13(6)(a). (Id. at

6 2). He was sentenced to a three-year term of probation. (Id.).

7 On February 10, 2026, ICE officers encountered Petitioner at a state probation office in

8 Naples, Florida, and took him into custody. (Id.). That same day, the Department of Homeland

9 Security (“DHS”) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under

10 section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), based on his controlled-

11 substance conviction. (Id.; Doc. 1 at 13-14). The Notice to Appear directed Petitioner to appear

12 before an immigration judge at the Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami, Florida, on

13 March 11, 2026. (Doc. 1 at 13). The I-213 states no valid travel document is in the file. (Doc. 8-

14 1 at 3).

15 Petitioner is now detained at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield,

16 California, approximately 2,500 miles from the immigration court to which he was originally

17 summoned and from the community in which he resided. The record does not disclose when or

18 why Petitioner was transferred, whether venue in the removal proceedings was changed, or what

19 has occurred in those proceedings since February 2026.

20 B. This Action

21 Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 3, 2026 and raises three grounds, all sounding in

22 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment: (1) that Petitioner’s detention has become

23 unreasonably prolonged and no longer serves a civil immigration purpose; (2) that Petitioner has

24 been denied a meaningful individualized custody review before a neutral decisionmaker at which

25 the Government bears the burden of proof; and (3) that continued physical detention is excessive

26 because less restrictive alternatives would adequately protect the Government’s interests. (See Doc.

27 1). Petitioner asks the Court to declare his detention unlawful and order his immediate release or,

28 in the alternative, to order a prompt bond hearing. (Id. at 7).

1 Petitioner attaches to his petition, among other exhibits, letters of support from his spouse,

2 an uncle and aunt, and a longtime friend; medical records documenting his spouse’s serious and

3 ongoing endocrine condition and course of treatment; a Florida marriage record reflecting

4 Petitioner’s 2023 marriage; and a letter from Petitioner's former employer describing his

5 employment from April 2024 through February 2026. (Id. at 15-35).

6 On July 2, 2026, the undersigned ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should

7 not be granted. (Doc. 4). On July 31, 2026, Respondent filed an opposition, accompanied by a

8 Form I-213 and a criminal-history record.1 (Docs. 8, 8-1, 8-2). Respondent’s submission does not

9 include a declaration from a deportation officer, any record of proceedings before the immigration

10 court, or any information concerning the current posture of Petitioner’s removal proceedings.

11 Petitioner’s traverse is not due until August 31, 2026, and none has been filed thus far. (See Doc.

12 4). Nonetheless, the undersigned finds the matter suitable for resolution on the present record.

13 Petitioner is not prejudiced as these findings and recommendations recommend granting the relief

14 Petitioner principally seeks, and Petitioner retains the opportunity to be heard through objections.

15 To the extent Petitioner timely files a traverse, the undersigned will consider it and may amend

16 these findings and recommendations as necessary.

17 III. DISCUSSION

18 A. Jurisdiction

19 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in

20 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

21 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to

22 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez-

23 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court has confirmed that

24 federal courts have jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a noncitizen’s detention. See

25 1 Respondent’s opposition is captioned “Warden, California City Detention Center” and its

introduction refers to an “Application” and, in the accompanying certificate of service, to an “EX

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PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.” (Doc. 8 at 1, 7). No

27 such application has been filed in this matter, and Petitioner is detained at Mesa Verde, not

California City. The undersigned construes Doc. 8 as Respondent’s response to the July 2, 2026

28 order to show cause.

1 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). Petitioner is detained at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing

2 Center in Bakersfield, California, within this judicial district, and he challenges the constitutionality

3 of his detention. Jurisdiction is therefore proper.

4 Further, the Supreme Court in Demore did not foreclose a Due Process Clause challenge

5 where detention extends well beyond the period the Court contemplated. See Demore at 532-33

6 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (a detainee “could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his

7 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified”).

8 Petitioner asks the Court whether the Due Process Clause entitles him to a hearing, and that question

9 remains within the Court’s jurisdiction.

10 B. Respondent’s Exhaustion Argument Does Not Reach Petitioner’s Claim

11 Respondent contends that any challenge to Petitioner’s classification as subject to

12 mandatory detention must be raised through a “Joseph Hearing” before the immigration judge, and

13 that Petitioner has failed to exhaust that remedy. (Doc. 8 at 3 (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N.

14 Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)). That argument is misdirected. A Joseph Hearing addresses only whether a

15 detainee is properly included within a mandatory-detention category or whether the government is

16 substantially likely to establish the mandatory-detention grounds. It does not provide any

17 individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness, and it affords no bond determination.

18 Petitioner does not appear to contest that his conviction is a proper predicate for detention

19 under section 1226(c). Instead, Petitioner argues that the duration of his detention without any

20 individualized bond determination now offends due process. That claim does not depend on the

21 classification question a Joseph Hearing resolves, and exhaustion of that administrative remedy is

22 therefore not required. For purposes of these findings, the undersigned assumes that Petitioner is

23 properly detained under section 1226(c), and does not reach whether his conviction is a proper

24 predicate.

25 C. Petitioner’s Detention Is Governed by Section 1226(c)

26 The parties agree that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Doc. 8 at 1).

27 Petitioner has been charged as removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) based on a post-admission

28 controlled-substance conviction, an offense covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B). No final order

1 of removal has been entered on this record, so detention is not governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The

2 undersigned therefore proceeds on the understanding that section 1226(c) supplies the statutory

3 authority for Petitioner’s detention.

4 D. Petitioner’s Continued Detention Without a Bond Hearing Violates Due Process

5 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be “deprived of

6 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth

7 Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law” in removal proceedings, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

8 292, 306 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

9 constitutional problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). At the same time,

10 “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”

11 Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.

12 In Demore, the Supreme Court sustained such detention under section 1226(c) on the

13 understanding that it lasts only “for the brief period necessary for [the noncitizen’s] removal

14 proceedings,” relying on data reflecting detention averaging approximately a month and a half, and

15 approximately four months in the minority of cases involving an appeal to the Board of Immigration

16 Appeals. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529-31. As discussed above, Demore does not, however,

17 foreclose a Due Process Clause challenge where detention extends well beyond the period the Court

18 contemplated. See id. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (a detainee “could be entitled to an

19 individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention

20 became unreasonable or unjustified”).

21 Under section 1226(c), there is no bright-line rule fixing the point at which detention

22 becomes unreasonable. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297-303 (2018); see also

23 Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019).

24 Where a Due Process Clause challenge is presented, courts evaluate the claim under the balancing

25 framework of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), weighing the private interest at stake,

26 the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the Government’s interest. See Rodriguez

27 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022); Diep v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-01238-

28 SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025). Applying that framework to immigration

1 detention, the Ninth Circuit has identified as relevant the duration of detention to date, the

2 anticipated duration of future detention, delays attributable to either party, and the likelihood that

3 the proceedings will result in a final removal order. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207-08.

4 The end of Petitioner’s detention is not reasonably foreseeable. Civil immigration detention

5 is nonpunitive and is ordinarily justified only by the twin purposes of preventing flight and

6 protecting the community pending removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Detention that is not

7 reasonably related to those purposes, including detention that has become prolonged and lacks a

8 determinable end, raises serious constitutional concerns. Id. at 690-91. Respondent correctly

9 observes that detention under section 1226(c) “has a definite termination point: the conclusion of

10 removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304 (quotation marks omitted). But that endpoint is

11 not near or reasonably foreseeable. Having been detained since February 10, 2026, Petitioner’s

12 immigration case remains pending. Notwithstanding any future appeal considerations, there is no

13 determinable end to Petitioner’s detention. In accordance with Jennings, the undersigned does not

14 treat any fixed period of detention under section 1226(c) as a bright line. Nonetheless, in light of

15 the more than six months of detention here with no reasonably foreseeable endpoint, the Mathews

16 balancing test now favors an individualized hearing.

17 i. Private Interest.

18 Petitioner’s interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably

19 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner has been in ICE

20 custody since February 10, 2026—more than six months—without any bond hearing or

21 individualized custody determination. This detention period exceeds the four-month figure the

22 Supreme Court described in Demore as the outer range for a section 1226(c) detainee who pursues

23 an appeal. 538 U.S. at 529–30. This factor weighs substantially in Petitioner’s favor.

24 Additionally, as discussed above, the record establishes no anticipated endpoint. After more

25 than six months of detention, Petitioner remains pending. Furthermore, there is no record of any

26 delay or dilatory conduct that is attributable to Petitioner. Here, Petitioner’s interest is not merely

27 in release, but in the far more modest procedural protection of an individualized bond hearing. The

28 record supplies specific content to that interest. Petitioner’s spouse has documented a serious,

1 chronic endocrine condition requiring ongoing specialist management, and describes her

2 dependence on Petitioner for practical, financial, and emotional support. (Doc. 1 at 16, 25-31).

3 Petitioner maintained continuous employment for nearly two years preceding his detention. (Id. at

4 35). Family members and a longtime friend attest to his community ties. (Id. at 18-23). And

5 without explanation from Respondent, Petitioner is detained approximately 2,500 miles from that

6 family and community. This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.

7 ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation.

8 “[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner’s] interest is high” where he “has

9 not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-

10 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020). Petitioner has received no individualized

11 bond hearing before an immigration judge. The very premise of an individualized bond hearing is

12 that assertions of dangerousness and flight risk are tested before a neutral adjudicator rather than

13 presumed from the face of a charging document. Whatever the outcome of a bond hearing, where

14 the Government may carry its burden, the probable value of subjecting its allegations to

15 individualized scrutiny after more than six months of detention is substantial, and the risk of

16 erroneous deprivation in the continued absence of any hearing is likewise high. This factor favors

17 Petitioner.

18 Respondent’s contention that the process due is a determination whether Petitioner is

19 “properly included” in a mandatory detention category does not alter this conclusion. (Doc. 8 at

20 3). As discussed above, a Joseph hearing tests whether a detainee is properly included within

21 section 1226(c), meaning whether the government is substantially unlikely to prevail on the charge

22 that triggers mandatory detention. See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). It reaches

23 neither dangerousness nor flight risk, and it does not address Petitioner’s constitutional claim.

24 iii. Government’s Interest.

25 The Government’s interest “[includes] the function involved and the fiscal and

26 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424

27 U.S. at 335. The Government has a strong interest in effectuating removal. Demore, 538 U.S. at

28 531. In addition, the Government has a strong interest in protecting the public. But the key

1 Government interest at stake here “is not the continued detention of Petitioner, but the

2 government’s ability to detain him without a bond hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Office

3 Dir., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020). Providing a single

4 individualized hearing imposes minimal fiscal and administrative burden, and it does not compel

5 Petitioner’s release. If the Government establishes that Petitioner is a danger or a flight risk, his

6 detention will continue. The Government’s interest in avoiding that limited process does not

7 outweigh Petitioner’s substantial liberty interest after more than six months without review. The

8 question of whether continued detention is warranted is committed to the immigration judge.

9 Weighing the Mathews factors, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s continued

10 detention under section 1226(c), without any individualized bond hearing, has become

11 unreasonably prolonged, and that due process now requires an individualized bond hearing.

12 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

13 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

14 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED IN PART;

15 2. Within ten (10) days of any order adopting these findings and recommendations,

16 Respondent be ORDERED to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing

17 before an immigration judge. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 882 (E.D.

18 Cal. 2022) (identifying a bond hearing as the appropriate remedy, rather than

19 release). At the hearing, the Government must establish “by clear and convincing

20 evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial

21 of bond.” Id. (citations omitted). If Respondent fails to provide Petitioner with a

22 bond hearing as required by the Court’s order, Petitioner should be immediately

23 released from detention;

24 3. The petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED to the extent Petitioner’s immediate release is

25 sought.

26 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Court

27 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304

28 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

1 | Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a

2 | party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Jd. The document

3 | should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall

4 | not exceed fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not

5 | consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s),

6 | the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number,

7 | when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the

8 | fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings

9 | and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

10 | to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson

11 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is

12 | immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to

13 | Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

14 | Court’s judgment.

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16 IT IS SO ORDERED. .

17 | Dated: _ August 18, 2026 Cu iy du

UNITED STATES MWGISTRATE JUDGE

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