Brown

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 ALFONSO BROWN, et al., Case No. 25-cv-10817-AMO

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION

9 v. TO DISMISS THE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

10 DOORDASH, INC.,

Re: Dkt. No. 29

Defendant.

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13 This case presents the question of whether Defendant DoorDash, Inc. has misclassified

14 certain workers as independent contractors following the passage of California’s Proposition 22.

15 Plaintiffs bring two claims against DoorDash: 1) civil penalties under the California Private

16 Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) for violations of the California Labor Code; and 2) declaratory

17 relief that the statutory preconditions of Proposition 22 have not been met by DoorDash, and even

18 if they had been, Proposition 22 is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration

19 Authorization Act (“FAAAA”). This case was removed from the Alameda County Superior Court

20 on December 18, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. On January 22, 2026, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed

21 Alfonso Brown’s claims, leaving only Miles Richardson’s. Dkt. No. 18. DoorDash now moves to

22 dismiss Richardson’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

23 Prior to the hearing on DoorDash’s motion, the Court raised the issue of subject-matter

24 jurisdiction sua sponte and requested additional briefing. Dkt. No. 42. Thereafter, the Court

25 heard oral argument on August 20, 2026, on the existence of federal question jurisdiction and the

26 merits of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court

27 REMANDS this case to the Alameda County Superior Court for lack of subject-matter

1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

2 The following comprises the well-pleaded allegations from the Second Amended

3 Complaint, which the Court assumes to be true for purposes of this motion.

4 DoorDash is a company that offers food, grocery, and other property delivery services to

5 customers across the nation. Dkt. No. 33-2 ¶¶ 1, 16. The drivers who provide these delivery

6 services to customers are often referred to as “dashers.” Id. ¶ 18. When a customer places a

7 delivery order, DoorDash assigns the order to a dasher, and then the dasher has a window of time

8 in which to either accept or decline the order. Id. ¶ 23. Declining too many orders can result in

9 consequences, such as loss of incentive pay and ultimate termination. Id.

10 Once a dasher accepts a delivery request, DoorDash directs the dasher’s performance by

11 instructing them to:

12 drive to the assigned business; find a parking spot; notify DoorDash

that they have arrived; pick up the food if it’s ready, or wait to pick it

13 up until the business finishes preparing it; pay for the food using a

special credit card provided by DoorDash (the “Red Card”); notify

14 DoorDash that they have picked up the food; drive to the customer’s

location; find a parking spot; follow any specific delivery instructions

15 provided by DoorDash or the customer; deliver the food to the

customer; and notify DoorDash that the food has been delivered.

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17 Id. ¶ 21. Failure to comply with these directions can result in termination. Id. As for payment,

18 DoorDash determines how much to pay a dasher for each delivery and provides an estimate of the

19 driving distance to complete the order. Id. ¶ 24.

20 Overall, DoorDash monitors the dashers’ performance along four metrics:

21 (1) “On Time” Deliveries— the percentage of orders that were

delivered on or before the delivery time provided to the customer; (2)

22 Average Customer Rating—a rating of the dasher’s performance

from 1 to 5 stars, which customers fill out after receiving their orders;

23 (3) Completion Rate—the percentage of orders that were successfully

delivered; and (4) Acceptance Rate—the percentage of order

24 opportunities that the dasher accepts.

25 Id. ¶ 25. Based on the dasher’s performance in these areas, they may become eligible for certain

26 opportunities—such as providing large catering or grocery deliveries—or may suffer

27 consequences, including termination. Id.

1 they are actually employees. As alleged, Richardson “took no steps to establish or promote an

2 independent delivery business, such as: (1) incorporating a delivery business entity; (2) obtaining

3 any business license for a delivery business entity; (3) advertising to the general public regarding

4 delivery services; and/or (4) making offerings to provide services of the independent business to

5 the public or to a number of potential customers.” Id. ¶ 35. Indeed, Richardson never had any of

6 his own customers or clients for delivery services. Id. Further, in working for DoorDash,

7 Richardson never engaged in activities typical of an independent contractor. For instance,

8 Richardson did not “maintain any separate business structures or facilities,” nor did he “hire

9 assistants or subcontract anyone to provide additional services.” Id. ¶ 36.

10 Based on Richardson’s assertion that he, and other dashers, were legally employees, he

11 alleges DoorDash violated numerous labor codes. See, e.g., id. ¶ 50. In sum, Richardson alleges

12 the dashers do not receive a minimum wage, were not paid for all hours worked, did not receive

13 reimbursements for work-related expenses, did not receive off-duty meal and rest periods, and did

14 not receive timely, accurate wage statements, among other alleged violations. Id. ¶¶ 27-33. Under

15 PAGA, Richardson seeks to represent similarly aggrieved individuals and recover civil penalties

16 on their behalf.

17 Relatedly, Richardson also seeks a declaratory judgment that DoorDash “has not met, and

18 cannot meet, all of the statutory preconditions required under Proposition 22 to invoke its terms,”

19 and “even if DoorDash could demonstrate such compliance, Proposition 22 is preempted by the

20 FAAAA.” Id. ¶ 96. Absent the protections of Proposition 22, Richardson avers DoorDash has

21 willfully and unlawfully misclassified dashers as independent contractors, and thus, has repeatedly

22 violated the California Labor Code. Id. ¶ 97.

23 DISCUSSION

24 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

25 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826

26 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any

27 time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.”). Though the parties did not address

1 briefing on the issue prior to the hearing. See Dkt. No. 42.

2 To begin, “[a] party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the

3 actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th

4 Cir. 1996). Per the notice of removal, DoorDash relies on federal question jurisdiction and

5 supplemental jurisdiction as the bases of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. See Dkt. No. 1 at

6 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367). Through federal question jurisdiction, the Court may

7 “hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal

8 law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal

9 forum offers on federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545

10 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (citation omitted). To identify whether a state-law cause of action turns on

11 “substantial questions of federal law,” the Court must determine whether the claim “necessarily

12 raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may

13 entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial

14 responsibilities.” Id. at 314. DoorDash contends federal question jurisdiction exists in this case

15 because the Court must decide whether the FAAAA preempts California’s Proposition 22. Dkt.

16 No. 1 at 6. The Court disagrees.

17 To establish jurisdiction, the federal issue must be “necessarily raised as ‘an essential

18 element of [the plaintiff’s] [] claim.’” Hornish v. King Cnty., 899 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 2018)

19 (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 314-15). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hornish is instructive on this

20 point. There, The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County had acquired an ownership

21 interest in a railway corridor. Id. at 686. The plaintiffs owned land abutting the corridor and

22 sought a declaration of rights, particularly as to the scope of the Conservancy’s easement and the

23 width of the railroad corridor. Id. In their request for relief, the plaintiffs asserted:

24 . . . the original source conveyance to the railroad was an easement

and other interests acquired by the railroad were prescriptive

25 easements, that the easements were for railroad purposes only, and

that [the plaintiffs] are the fee owners of the railroad right-of-way at

26 issue, and King County only acquired a surface easement for a hiking

and biking trail with the possible reactivation of a railroad pursuant to

27 the Trails Act.

1 [federal] Trails Act creates, supplements, or replaces any previously existing railroad easement,” a

2 federal issue was necessarily raised. Id. at 690. In the instant case, however, Richardson’s claims

3 do not “require” the Court to resolve the federal preemption question.

4 Proposition 22 includes four statutory preconditions to its application. See Cal. Bus. &

5 Prof. Code § 7451 (“[A]n app-based driver is an independent contractor and not an employee or

6 agent with respect to the app-based driver’s relationship with a network company if the following

7 conditions are met . . . .”). Richardson contends DoorDash has failed to meet those preconditions,

8 and therefore the dashers are not classified as independent contractors under the statute. See Dkt.

9 No. 33-2 ¶¶ 86, 96. In the alternative, Richardson avers that even if DoorDash did comply with

10 Proposition 22, the FAAAA preempts the statute. Id. These allegations anticipate DoorDash’s

11 reliance on Proposition 22 and seek to counter that argument through federal preemption. But the

12 Supreme Court has held:

13 It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to

his cause of action, and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some

14 provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such

allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a

15 question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the

suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the

16 Constitution.

17 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Ultimately, there is a

18 threshold factual inquiry the Court—or potentially the jury—must address prior to reaching

19 preemption, namely whether the evidence shows DoorDash complied with Proposition 22’s

20 preconditions. Accordingly, the federal issue is not “an essential element” of Richardson’s claim,

21 since the Court would not address preemption if the evidence established DoorDash failed to

22 comply with Proposition 22. Hornish, 899 F.3d at 689 (citation omitted).

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1 CONCLUSION

2 Absent a federal issue necessarily raised by the Second Amended Complaint, the Court

3 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the case is REMANDED to the Alameda County

4 Superior Court. The Clerk of Court SHALL transmit the file to the Alameda Superior Court and

5 close this case.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

7 || Dated: September 10, 2026

: ob deh

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ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN

10 United States District Judge

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