The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARIANO DIONEL MORENO No. 1:26-cv-03715 DC AC
RODRIGUEZ
12 (A-234-995-315),
13 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 v.
15 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY
IMMIGRATION PROCESSING
16 CENTER,
17 Respondent.
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19 Petitioner, an immigration detainee, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Also pending before the court are respondent’s motion to dismiss
21 and petitioner’s emergency motion to expedite ruling. ECF Nos. 6, 11.
22 For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends petitioner’s petition be
23 granted, respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied, petitioner be immediately released, respondent
24 be enjoined from unlawfully re-arresting or re-detaining petitioner, and petitioner’s motion to
25 expedite be denied as moot in light of this recommendation.
26 ////
27 ////
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1 I. Factual Background1
2 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection on an
3 unknown date. ECF No. 6-1 at 6. He was granted employment authorization on December 20,
4 2024. Id. at 8; ECF No. 9 at 8. On February 19, 2026, Border Patrol agents conducting a roving
5 patrol operation in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, ran a records check on petitioner’s vehicle, which
6 showed the registered owner did not possess valid immigration documentation. ECF No. 6-1 at 7.
7 The agents conducted a stop, and petitioner was arrested without incident and charged as
8 removable under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); 8 U.S.C. 1229a.
9 Id.
10 Petitioner’s application to adjust status (Form I-485) was denied on March 11, 2025. Id.
11 at 2-4. An immigration judge issued a decision on May 20, 2026, ordering removal, which
12 petitioner has appealed. ECF. No. 8. His appeal is currently pending before the Board of
13 Immigrations Appeals (“BIA”).2 Petitioner has remained in immigration detention without an
14 individualized bond hearing since his arrest. ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 6 at 1.
15 II. Procedural History
16 On May 14, 2026, the court received petitioner’s pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
17 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which challenges the lawfulness of his detention. ECF No. 1. By
18 Minute Order dated May 18, 2026, respondent was directed to respond to the petition. ECF No.
19 4. On June 1, 2026, respondent filed a response, styled as a motion to dismiss the petition. ECF.
20 No. 6.3 Petitioner filed a reply and has since filed a motion for expedited ruling. ECF Nos. 9, 11.
21 1 In response to the petition, respondent did not deny petitioner’s factual allegations.
Accordingly, the facts contained in the petition are deemed admitted and will be relied upon
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unless the record reflects contrary facts. See ECF No. 6; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An
23 allegation . . . is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”).
2 The court takes judicial notice of the information provided on the Executive Office for
24 Immigration Review’s (“EOIR”) Automated Case Information webpage, available
at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2026). See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may
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take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy
26 cannot reasonably be questioned); see also City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2
(9th Cir. 2004) (“We may take judicial notice of a record of a state agency not subject to
27 reasonable dispute.”).
3 Although styled as a motion to dismiss, respondent requests that the court deny the petition for
28 writ of habeas corpus on the merits and does not present any grounds for dismissal. ECF No. 6.
1 III. Legal Standard
2 A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to anyone who is held in custody in violation of
3 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Magana-Pizano
4 v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly permits the federal
5 courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those aliens are ‘in custody in violation of
6 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” (citations omitted)). In federal habeas
7 proceedings, the petitioner is required to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
8 Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).
9 “District courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges
10 to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order[.]”
11 Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Zadvydas, 533
12 U.S. at 688 (“We conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for
13 statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”).
14 IV. Discussion
15 A. Overview
16 Petitioner asserts that his continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful and a
17 violation of the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. By way of relief, petitioner requests that
18 the court issue a writ of habeas corpus; order his release, under reasonable conditions of
19 supervision, if appropriate; order respondent to provide “an immediate and meaningful bond
20 hearing before an immigration judge”; and grant such additional relief that it deems just and
21 proper. Id. at 2.
22 In response, respondent contends that petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” subject to
23 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).4 ECF No. 6 at 1-2 (citing, inter alia, Avila v.
24 Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cit.
25 2026)). Respondent asserts that petitioner “does not possess a right to freedom from immigration
26 detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress.” Id. at 2 (citing, inter alia, DHS
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28 4 It is undisputed that there is no final order of removal for petitioner. See ECF Nos. 1, 6, 8, 9.
1 v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020)). Accordingly, respondent contends that the petition
2 should be denied because petitioner does not have a liberty interest, and his detention is mandated
3 by statute. Id. Respondent requests in the alternative that the court hold this matter in abeyance
4 pending the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-
5 6842. For the reasons discussed below, respondent’s arguments are without merit.
6 B. Detention Authority
7 As an initial matter, after this case was fully briefed, the Ninth Circuit held that
8 noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States
9 are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not mandatory detention under
10 § 1225(b)(2)(A), and are eligible for release on bond pending removal proceedings. Rodriguez
11 Vazquez, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 2196424, at *10, 26 (affirming the district court’s decision on the
12 basis of longstanding statutory interpretation principles, agency practice, and legislative history).
13 This ruling is consistent with this court’s prior decisions. See Sharma v. Warden of Golden State
14 Annex, No. 1:25-cv-1861 AC, 2026 WL 1162718, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026) (explaining
15 that “courts, including this court, have . . . repeatedly and overwhelmingly concluded that when a
16 noncitizen is detained within the interior of the United States, the appropriate detention statute is
17 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)” and collecting cases).
18 Here, it is undisputed that petitioner entered the United States without inspection at an
19 unknown place and time and resided within the interior of the United States until he was detained
20 on February 19, 2026. ECF No. 6; ECF No. 6-1 at 6-8. While the record is sparse, the submitted
21 documents support that petitioner has resided in the United States since at least 2024. ECF No. 6-
22 1 at 8; ECF No. 9 at 3-5.5 Accordingly, the undersigned rejects respondent’s argument that
23 petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and finds petitioner’s detention is governed by §
24 1226(a).
25 ////
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5 The Form I-230 submitted by respondent also reflects that petitioner was arrested for a
27 nonmoving traffic violation (operating a motor vehicle without a valid license) in an adjacent
Florida county in 2011, so petitioner may have resided within the United States for longer. See
28 ECF No. 6-1 at 8.
1 C. Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause Claim
2 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from
3 being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
4 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
5 whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
6 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted). These due process rights extend to immigration
7 proceedings, including detention and deportation proceedings. Id. at 693-94; see also Demore v.
8 Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
9 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first is to determine
10 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second is to
11 examine the procedures necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest
12 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
13 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
14 i. Liberty Interest
15 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
16 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
17 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or
18 over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
19 liberty.” Yovani M.D. v. Warden of the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
20 05648 TLN AC, 2026 WL 2168402, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2026) (quoting Pinchi v. Noem,
21 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025)).
22 Respondent does not dispute that petitioner has been living within the United States for
23 years, was granted authorization to work lawfully in this country, and has family and employment
24 ties to the community. ECF No. 6-1 at 8-9; see also ECF Nos. 1, 6, 9. Petitioner therefore has a
25 clear liberty interest in his continued freedom from detention that is protected by the Due Process
26 Clause.
27 Petitioner’s liberty interest is not defeated by respondent’s assertion that he is an
28 “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 6 at 1-2.
1 As set forth above, petitioner’s detention is governed by the discretionary detention scheme under
2 § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). Rodriguez Vazquez, 2026 WL 2196424, at *10, 26. His detention is
3 therefore not mandatory.
4 Moreover, petitioner’s liberty interest is not defeated by respondent’s misplaced reliance
5 on Thuraissigiam. See ECF No. 6 at 2. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a
6 noncitizen who enters or attempts to enter the country illegally “has only those rights regarding
7 admission that Congress has provided by statute.” 591 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added). As this
8 court has previously explained, Thuraissigiam’s holding is inapplicable in the instant § 2241
9 habeas petition because petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of his detention pending the
10 conclusion of his removal proceedings, not his admissibility into this country. Gholami v.
11 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1644 DAD DMC, 2025 WL 3640675, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025);
12 Kandola v. Warden of California City Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-2714 DAD SCR, 2026 WL
13 1243464, at *2 n. 2 (E.D. Cal. May. 6, 2026)). Further, Thuraissigiam addressed an individual
14 who was arrested mere yards from the border shortly after entering the United States without
15 inspection, not an individual like petitioner who has established meaningful ties to the United
16 States. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“Respondent attempted to enter the country illegally
17 and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border”).
18 ii. Procedures Required
19 Having determined that a liberty interest exists, the court must now examine what process
20 is due. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs., 490 U.S. at 460 (the court “first asks whether there exists a
21 liberty or property interest which has been interfered with” and then “examines whether the
22 procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient”). To determine what
23 process is due, the court considers three factors:
24 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
25 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
26 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
27 requirement would entail.
28 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process rights in the immigration context
1 “must account for the government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.”
2 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022).
3 With respect to the first Mathews factor, petitioner has a strong private interest in
4 remaining free from detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment—
5 from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
6 liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). Petitioner has lived within the United States for
7 multiple years prior to his detention, during which time he has obtained gainful employment,
8 developed family ties, and provided financial and domestic support to his family residing in the
9 United States. ECF Nos. 1, 6-1, 9. Accordingly, this factor weighs in petitioner’s favor.
10 Considering the following—that petitioner has been detained for six months without a
11 hearing before a neutral adjudicator to determine whether civil detention is justifiable, petitioner
12 is not subject to a final order of removal, and respondent has not asserted that petitioner presents a
13 risk of flight or danger to the community, nor has a neutral arbiter made such a determination—
14 the second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation, is high. Yovani M.D., 2026 WL 2168402, at *4
15 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (“Because civil immigration detention is ‘nonpunitive in
16 purpose and effect,’ a ‘special justification’ must outweigh [p]etitioner’s protected liberty interest
17 in order for detention to comport with due process.”); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
18 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that “the government has no legitimate interest in detaining
19 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose
20 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or
21 alternative conditions”); R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141 KES SKO, 2025 WL
22 2617255, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in
23 purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the
24 community.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Accordingly, this factor also weighs in
25 petitioner’s favor.
26 Finally, while the government has an interest in enforcing its immigration laws, the
27 government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is low, and the effort and cost
28 required to provide petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews,
1 No. 2:25-cv-01884 TLN SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Notice and
2 custody determination hearings are routine procedures that are required under § 1226(a), which,
3 as set forth above, governs petitioner’s detention. See Rodriguez Vazquez, 2026 WL 2196424, at
4 *5, 10, 26. Any burden associated with providing these processes is minimal and does not
5 outweigh petitioner’s substantial liberty interest or the high risk of the erroneous deprivation of
6 liberty.
7 For the foregoing reasons, to justify petitioner’s civil detention, at a minimum, due
8 process required petitioner receive notice and a hearing before a neutral adjudicator.
9 D. Remedy
10 Because petitioner has been detained for six months without a bond hearing and
11 respondent has not asserted an alternative lawful basis for petitioner’s detention or extenuating
12 circumstances that would warrant petitioner’s continued unlawful detention pending a bond
13 hearing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied, the petition
14 be granted, and that petitioner be released from custody. See Avila v. Warden of the Golden
15 State Annex Detention Facility, No. 1:26-cv-04006 DC AC, 2026 WL 1846724, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
16 June 26, 2026) (granting immediate release for noncitizen who was detained after entering the
17 United States on an unspecified date and living within the interior for an extended period of
18 time); Yovani M.D., 2026 WL 2168402, at *4 (same as to noncitizen who was living in the
19 United States for an unknown period of time); Alvarez Maciel v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-01318 DC
20 CKD, 2026 WL 496948 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2026) (granting injunctive relief of immediate release
21 for noncitizen who was detained by U.S. immigration authorities after living in the United States
22 for over twenty years); Ortiz v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01167 DC SCR, 2026 WL 508419 (E.D.
23 Cal. Feb. 24, 2026) (same as to noncitizen who had lived in United States for over 30 years). The
24 undersigned further recommends that, in light of Rodriguez Vazquez, respondent’s request to
25 hold this matter in abeyance be denied as moot.
26 CONCLUSION
27 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
28 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED as follows:
1 a. Respondent shall IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioner MARIANO DIONEL
2 MORENO RODRIGUEZ, A-234-995-315. At the time of release, respondent
3 must return all of petitioner’s documents and possessions.
4 b. Respondent shall not impose any additional restriction on petitioner unless it is
5 determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
6 c. Respondent is ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner
7 unless respondent provides at least 7 days’ written notice to petitioner and holds a
8 pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decision maker, at which hearing
9 respondent will bear the burden of demonstrating that petitioner is a flight risk or
10 danger to the community and petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered.
11 2. The order does not address the circumstances in which respondent may detain
12 petitioner in the event petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and
13 petitioner receives notice of that final order of removal.
14 3. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) be DENIED.
15 4. Petitioner’s motion to expedite ruling (ECF No. 11) be DENIED as moot.
16 5. Within three days of an order adopting these findings and recommendations,
17 respondent be required to file a notice of compliance confirming petitioner’s release from
18 custody.
19 6. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for petitioner and close this case.
20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
21 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). The undersigned finds
22 that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as
23 well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written
24 briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that
25 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local
26 Rule 304(b). Within three days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any
27 party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The parties are
28 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
1 || District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
2 | DATED: August 18, 2026 ~
ALLISON CLAIRE
4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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