The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
SHAQUON RASHAWN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:24-cv-439-BJD-SJH
S. TOLLICK, et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, Shaquon RaShawn Johnson, an inmate of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDC), is proceeding pro se on an Amended
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 11; Am.
Compl.), with an attachment in which he sets forth his factual allegations,
claims for relief, and relief sought (Doc. 11-1; Attach.). Plaintiff names five
Defendants for the alleged deprivation of property and interference with his
religious practice. See Attach. at 1, 3.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wynn, the Senior Chaplain at Florida
State Prison (FSP) approved his request to possess a religious talisman to “aid
in his spiritual growth on the path of Buddhism.” Id. at 4, 6. He ordered the
talisman through a private company, but when it arrived, Defendant Tollick
confiscated it as “contraband” because it was connected to a string rather than
a “jewelry type chain.” Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff submitted grievances to Defendants
Wynn, McClellan (Assistant Warden of Programs), Defendant Bowden (the
FDC Secretary’s representative), and Defendant Bass (the FDC Secretary’s
representative), and all were denied. Id. at 5–6.
Plaintiff asserts all Defendants violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) by depriving him of his personal property, denying him
a religious accommodation, interfering with his religious practice, and by
discriminating against him. Id. at 5–7. As relief, he seeks damages (nominal,
compensatory, and punitive) and an injunction (1) directing Defendants (all
but Wynn) to explain how a talisman connected to a string poses a security
threat and (2) directing Defendant Tollick to ensure that each inmate is
provided a “confiscation slip for any of their religious property that is
confiscated.” Id. at 9.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28;
Def. Mot.) and Plaintiff’s Response in opposition (Doc. 31; Pl. Resp.). Also
before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 32; Pl. Mot.) to which
Defendants have not responded. The Court will quickly dispose of the Motion
for Sanctions. In that Motion, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ attorney should be
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sanctioned because, in the Amended Motion to Dismiss, counsel “false[ly]”
stated that Plaintiff filed only informal grievances about Defendant Wynn,
when in fact he also filed a formal grievance and an appeal. See Pl. Mot. at 1–
2. Plaintiff’s Motion is not supported by a memorandum of law showing that
he is entitled to the relief he seeks. See M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(b). Regardless,
Defendants have provided numerous grievance records and grievance logs with
their Amended Motion to Dismiss, and those records speak for themselves.
Even if Plaintiff believes counsel’s statement in the Motion can be interpreted
as conflicting with the supporting records, there is no evidence of an intention
to mislead the Court. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions will be denied.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff’s “failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as
true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not
accept as true legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8(a) demands “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A
plaintiff should allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that
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discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
III. Arguments & Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims or requests for relief on the
following grounds: Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) with respect to the claims
against Defendants Wynn, McClellan, Bowden, and Bass (Supervisory
Defendants); Plaintiff is not entitled to prospective injunctive relief because he
is no longer housed at FSP; and Plaintiff fails to state a plausible RLUIPA
claim. See Def. Mot. at 1, 13, 17. They also invoke qualified immunity. Id. at 1,
18. In support of their Motion, Defendants provide grievance records, grievance
logs, and associated declarations (by a grievance-reviewer and a custodian of
records) (Docs. 28-1, 28-2; Def. Exs. 1, 2.). Plaintiff provides his own grievance
records with his Response (Doc. 31-1; Pl. Ex.).
A. Exhaustion
Defendants concede Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as
to any claims against Defendant Tollick, see id. at 13, who is the Defendant
Plaintiff alleges confiscated his talisman, see Attach. at 5. But Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to his
claims against the Supervisory Defendants. See Def. Mot. at 13–14.
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Defendants’ argument is misplaced. Plaintiff’s purported claims against the
Supervisory Defendants are based solely on their handling of and responses to
his grievances complaining about the alleged underlying violation (the
confiscation of his talisman). Such claims are not cognizable under § 1983. As
such, engaging in an exhaustion analysis is unnecessary.
B. Claims Against Supervisory Defendants for Handling or
Responding to Grievances
As mentioned, Plaintiff’s claims against the Supervisory Defendants
relate solely to their handling of and responses to his grievances. The law is
well established that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior
or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir.
2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory conduct, a plaintiff must
show “that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional
conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and
the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034,
1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).
Causation “may be established and supervisory liability
imposed where the supervisor’s improper custom or policy results
in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” “A plaintiff can
also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation of
constitutional rights.” “Either way, though, to prove that a policy
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or its absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must point
to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior misconduct by a
particular employee.” And allegations of a single incident of
unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for supervisory
liability, even when the conduct involves several subordinates.
Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal citations
omitted).
The requisite causal connection is not established merely by filing a
grievance with a supervisory official. See Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-Ftm-
29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (citing Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“[F]iling a grievance with a
supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even
when the grievance is denied.”); see also Newbold v. Santana, No. 4:19CV26-
WS/CAS, 2020 WL 853910, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 838295 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020) (“Merely
signing or denying a grievance does not create liability where the signer had
no personal involvement in the alleged violations.”).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege the Supervisory Defendants personally
participated in confiscating his religious talisman, nor does he allege that any
of them prohibited him from possessing an approved religious item. See Attach.
at 5–6. On the contrary, he concedes that Defendant Wynn, in his role as
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Chaplain, approved his request to possess a religious talisman. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff’s sole complaint against Defendant Wynn is that Wynn “failed to
accommodate his religious needs by denying his [grievances]” in which he
requested the confiscation of his talisman be “investigate[d]” because he did
not believe that his talisman (on a string) posed a security threat. Id.; see also
Pl. Ex. at 27–28. Plaintiff makes the same allegations against Defendants
McClellan, Bowden, and Bass: they “failed to accommodate his religious needs
by denying his grievance without ever addressing the fact that the Warden [to
whom Plaintiff initially submitted a grievance] never reviewed his religious
talisman and deemed it a security threat.” See Attach. at 5–6.
According to grievance records, Plaintiff was not authorized to wear or
carry the talisman he ordered because it did not comply with the relevant
provision of the Florida Administrative Code (FAC). See Pl. Ex. at 7; see also
Def. Ex. 1 at 27–28, 32, 41.1 That provision provides, “[a] religious symbol or
1 Generally, when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
should not consider extrinsic evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56.”). However, a court may consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion if a document incorporated by reference in the complaint “is (1)
central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.” Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2005) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)). See
also Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.
1997) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those
documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the
documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”). Given the
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medallion, such as a . . . talisman . . . . shall not be more than 2 inches in length
or diameter, and symbols worn about the neck shall be worn under the shirt
on a jewelry-type chain.” See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-601.201(16)(c)1.i.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the talisman he ordered was not on a
jewelry-type chain. Rather, he merely disagrees with Defendants’ application
of the FAC provision in his circumstance, contending they failed to
“investigate” whether his specific talisman posed a security threat despite that
it was not on a jewelry-type chain. See Attach. at 5–9; see also Pl. Resp. at 6–
7.
To the extent Plaintiff believes that a prison supervisor’s failure to
investigate an issue brought to light by an inmate’s grievance amounts to a
constitutional violation, see Pl. Resp. at 6–7, he is incorrect. Inmates have “no
constitutionally protected liberty interest in access to the prison’s grievance
procedure,” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x 656, 659 (11th Cir. 2014); see
also Charriez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 596 F. App’x 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015)
(finding the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendants “had violated his constitutional due-process rights by failing to take
corrective action during the appeal of the suspension of his visitation privileges
grievance records are incorporated by reference in the Amended Complaint, are
central to Plaintiff’s claims, and are undisputed, the Court will consider them in
making its ruling.
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[b]ecause the prison grievance procedure does not create a protected liberty
interest”); Mathews v. Moss, 506 F. App’x 981, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the
plaintiff failed to state a claim because he merely “alleged that his prison
grievances were either ignored or wrongly decided or that prison officials did
not properly follow the prison’s own grievance procedures”).
To the extent Plaintiff complains that the Supervisory Defendants
misapplied or violated the relevant provision of the FAC, such conduct is not a
constitutional violation through which Plaintiff may seek redress under § 1983.
See Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (“While the
violation of state law may (or may not) give rise to a state tort claim, it is not
enough by itself to support a claim under [§] 1983.”). Finally, to the extent
Plaintiff’s allegations can be liberally construed to suggest the provision of the
FAC violates his right to practice his religion, the Court will address that
contention below.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims against the Supervisory Defendants are
premised solely on their roles as grievance responders, his claims are not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and due to be dismissed.
C. Remaining Claims
Plaintiff asserts his claims against Defendants arise under RLUIPA and
the First Amendment (interference with religious practice) and the Fourteenth
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Amendment (deprivation of personal property and discrimination). Defendants
invoke qualified immunity as to the RLUIPA claim. See Def. Mot. at 1, 15, 18.2
Prison officials sued in their individual capacities are “entitled to
qualified immunity for [their] discretionary actions unless [they] violated
‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir.
2016) (quoting Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Qualified immunity allows government employees to exercise their official
duties without fear of facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944,
951 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. If a prison
official makes a decision that is later found to be constitutionally deficient, the
official is entitled to qualified immunity if the decision was based on a
reasonable misapprehension of the law. Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020)
(citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).
Upon invoking qualified immunity, a defendant bears the initial burden
to demonstrate he was performing discretionary duties at the relevant times.
2 Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s assertions that they violated his rights
under the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment (for property deprivation
and discrimination). See generally Def. Mot. For the sake of judicial economy, the
Court invokes its authority under the PLRA to address those claims as well.
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Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were acting
within the scope of their discretionary duties at the relevant times. See Pl.
Resp. at 9–12. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff, who must point to facts
that, accepted as true, demonstrate Defendants violated a constitutional right.
This he has not done.
i. RLUIPA and First Amendment Claims
Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
from them in their individual capacities, he does not assert a plausible
RLUIPA claim. See Def. Mot. at 15. They are correct. The Eleventh Circuit has
held that “section 3 of RLUIPA—a provision that derives from Congress’
Spending Power—cannot be construed as creating a private action against
individual defendants for monetary damages.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255,
1275 (11th Cir. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds by Hoever v. Marks,
993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021), and abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon
v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their individual
capacities. See Am. Compl. at 2–3. As such, his RLUIPA claims are due to be
dismissed to the extent he seeks damages.
Assuming Plaintiff intended to name Defendants in their official
capacities, his RLUIPA claims still fail. RLUIPA provides the following:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
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institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “To establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that his engagement in religious exercise was
substantially burdened by the law, regulation, or practice he challenges.”
Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2017). Generally, a prison rule
that merely inconveniences an inmate does not substantially burden the
inmate’s sincerely held religious beliefs. See Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th
1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] substantial burden is ‘more than an
inconvenience’ and is ‘akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly[.]’”).
Accepting that Plaintiff has a sincerely held religious belief, he does not
plausibly allege that the FAC policy prevented him from practicing his religion
or coerced him to conform his behavior. At most, he alleges that he was
inconvenienced because he did not know before he ordered the talisman that it
could not be on a string. See Am. Compl. at 4–7. Although Plaintiff states in a
conclusory manner that he was “prohibited from exercising his religious
practice freely,” id. at 8, his own allegations suggest the opposite because he
contends that had he known of the jewelry-chain restriction, “he would have
never ordered the talisman to begin with,” id. at 5. Moreover, according to
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grievances Plaintiff submitted, his primary complaint was that Defendant
Tollick did not provide him with a confiscation slip, contrary to policy, and he
wanted to be reimbursed for the cost of the talisman. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 1 at 30,
33–34, 37, 45.
Finally, it bears repeating that Plaintiff was not prohibited from having
an authorized talisman. Defendant Wynn approved Plaintiff’s request, and the
one he ordered was not compliant with the relevant provision of the FAC.
Plaintiff was informed that his talisman had been confiscated as contraband
and had over thirty days in which to return the talisman so he could order one
that complied with the FAC, but he “took no further action.” See Def. Ex. 1 at
39. Instead of returning the talisman in exchange for one that complied with
prison rules, Plaintiff opted to file grievances challenging the rule or seeking
an exception. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible RLUIPA claim
against Defendants, and they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Defendants do not directly address Plaintiff’s purported First
Amendment claims. See generally Def. Mot. However, RLUIPA “provides
greater religious protection than the First Amendment,” Dorman, 36 F.4th at
1313, so if a plaintiff does not allege a violation under RLUIPA, he does not do
so under the First Amendment. See id. (“Because . . . [the plaintiff’s] free
exercise claim fails under the more protective framework of the RLUIPA, we
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need not separately discuss the First Amendment.”). As such, because Plaintiff
does not state a plausible RLUIPA claim, he does not state a plausible First
Amendment claim.
ii. Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Defendant
Tollick
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tollick “deprived him of the liberty to possess
his religious talisman by confiscating it” without having provided him a
“confiscation slip . . . per policy” and disposed of it prematurely, while his
grievance appeal was pending, also in violation of policy. See Attach. at 4–6.
First, as previously noted, a prison official’s failure to follow policies or
procedures, is not a constitutional violation. See Knight, 300 F.3d at 1276; see
also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995) (noting that prison
regulations do not confer rights or benefits on inmates but guide prison
officials); Wilson v. Bussey, No. CV 113-054, 2014 WL 2040109, *5 (S.D. Ga.
May 12, 2014) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481–82) (“[A]n allegation of non-
compliance with a prison regulation by prison officials is not, in itself, sufficient
to give rise to a claim upon which relief may be granted.”).
Second, an intentional or negligent deprivation of personal property does
not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation “if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533 (1984); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Plaintiff
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has an adequate postdeprivation remedy available to him under state law. See
Case, 555 F.3d at 1331 (recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action for conversion
provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy when law enforcement officers
seize or retain personal property). As such, any claim for the deprivation of
personal property is due to be dismissed.
iii. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff also contends Defendants discriminated against him. See
Attach. at 6. “To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must
demonstrate that (1) “he is similarly situated with other prisoners who
received” more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was
based on some constitutionally protected interest such as race.” Jones v. Ray,
279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001). A prisoner also must show the
decisionmaker “acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the FDC “allows Catholic inmates to possess
[religious items] connected by a string in a similar manner that a talisman is
connected to a string.” See Attach. at 6–7. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation is
not supported by any well-pled facts that would permit the reasonable
inference he was discriminated against. For instance, he does not identify a
specific instance in which a prison official treated him—a Buddhist inmate—
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less favorably than a similarly situated Catholic inmate vis-à-vis a request to
carry a talisman or religious symbol by a string in contravention of the relevant
FAC provision. See generally id.
Additionally, even if his allegations can be liberally construed to have
met the first element of a discrimination claim, he does not allege facts
permitting the reasonable inference that the decision regarding his talisman
was made with a discriminatory purpose. See Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F.
App’x 892, 899 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendants where the plaintiff did not “establish that the prison’s decision to
serve kosher meals [to Jewish inmates] but not halal meals [to Muslim
inmates] was the product of intentional discrimination”). Plaintiff’s vague,
conclusory, and seemingly speculative contention that the FAC provision has
been unfairly applied to him is insufficient to state a plausible claim under the
Equal Protection clause.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) is GRANTED,
and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 32) is DENIED.
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3. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants, terminate
any pending motions as moot, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 9th day of
September 2026.
BRIAN/, DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6
Shaquon Rashawn Johnson
Counsel of Record
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