The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY STOKES, : Civ. No. 1:25-CV-1917
:
Plaintiff, :
: (Judge Wilson)
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
ELIZABETH JUDD, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Gregory Stokes is an angry man.
Stokes’ ire is focused upon his ex-wife Marcia Stokes and those that he sees
as aligned with his former spouse. This unrelenting anger manifests itself in a
number of ways which touch upon the courts.
In many instances Stokes’ rage has led him to become a criminal defendant.
Indeed, Stokes has been convicted on numerous occasions of criminal conduct
targeting his estranged spouse. Initially a protection from abuse order was entered
against the plaintiff on April 29, 2024, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County. In short order, Stokes violated this order on three occasions, pleading guilty
or nolo contendere to Indirect Criminal Contempt on June 11, 2024, August 6, 2024,
and September 10, 2024. See Commonwealth v. Gregory Stokes, CP-21-MD-
0000380-2024; Commonwealth v. Gregory Stokes, CP-21-MD-0000484-2024;
Commonwealth v. Gregory Stokes, CP-21-MD-0000663-2024. (Docs. 55-1 through
55-3).
Despite these three contempt citations, Stokes continued to target his ex-wife.
In July of 2024, Stokes was charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County with stalking and harassment. On November 5, 2025, Stokes pled nolo
contendere to one count of felony stalking and one count of misdemeanor
harassment for this criminal misconduct directed at his ex-wife. Commonwealth v.
Gregory Stokes, CP-22-CR-0002897-2024. (Doc. 55-4). Stokes also turned to
various forms of civil lawfare aimed at his ex-wife and those he perceived as
supporting her. Stokes has sued his estranged former spouse multiple times in state
and federal court. These efforts to use civil litigation to punish his ex-wife have, for
the most part, been unavailing1
1 For example, Stokes filed a complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
against his ex-wife on November 10, 2025. Stokes v. Stokes, Civil No. 1:25-CV-
2121. This complaint was dismissed on April 10, 2026. Stokes also sued his wife’s
divorce attorney in federal court but abandoned this case after it was recommended
that the complaint be dismissed. Stokes v. Cognetti, Civil No.1:25-CVC-1428. In
addition, Stokes, acting on behalf of himself or his mother, Janet Stokes, filed two
actions against Dr. Stokes: one in Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas,
Docket No. 2026-04311, and in Indiana County Court of Common Pleas, Docket
No. 1548-CD-2025-1.The Indiana County matter was discontinued on April 9, 2026.
(Docs. 55-4 through 55-7).
It is against this backdrop of focused fury targeting his ex-wife that the instant
case comes before us for consideration of various motions to dismiss. (Docs. 8, 30,
41, 55). Gregory Stokes’ pro se complaint in this case arises out of his state court
guilty and nolo plea contempt convictions in Cumberland County following his
violations of the protection from abuse (PFA) order entered by that court. In his
complaint, Stokes sues his ex-wife, Marcia Stokes, for reporting his contumacious
behavior to polices. Stokes then sues the police officer who arrested him and the
assistant district attorney who convicted him of these criminal contempts. Stokes
also sues the magisterial district judge who presided over aspects of his contempt
cases for his judicial acts. Finally, Stokes names his wife’s employer, the Harrisburg
School District, as a defendant, apparently based upon the notion that the school
district should have established policies that would have prevented his wife from
reporting his criminal conduct to the police. (Doc. 1).
Ignoring his own nolo and guilty plea convictions, Stokes insists that these
defendants conspired together to violate his rights by retaliating against him, falsely
arresting him, and maliciously prosecuting him. (Id.) Stokes’ complaint also brings
companion state law malicious prosecution, false arrest, defamation, fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the defendants. (Id.) On
the basis of these allegations, Stokes demands compensatory damages of
$1,000,000, punitive damages and sweeping injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id.)
The defendants have moved to dismiss this complaint, citing numerous flaws
in this pleading. (Docs. 8, 30, 41, 55). These motions are now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motions to dismiss
be granted and the amended complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss—Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for
the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for
legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal
court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has
advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic
document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,
“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be
considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary
judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in
determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended
complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is against these legal guideposts that we assess the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s claims.
B. The Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted
In this case, Stokes’ complaint is profoundly flawed in multiple respects. The
fatal deficiencies in this pleading, which compel dismissal of the complaint, are
addressed separately below.
1. Stokes’ Nolo and Guilty Plea Convictions Checkmate His
Claims Arising Out of These State Prosecutions
a. Stokes May Not Collaterally Challenge his State Criminal
Convictions
At the outset, the stubborn fact that Stokes stands convicted of these contempt
citations based upon his nolo contendere and guilty pleas defeats the plaintiff’s
Constitutional claims. Under controlling Supreme Court holdings, Stokes’ current
civil false arrest and malicious prosecution claims necessarily imply the invalidity
of these nolo and guilty plea convictions. This he may not do.
As the Third Circuit has explained:
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court announced that a plaintiff
cannot attack the validity of his conviction or sentence in a § 1983
damages action without proving that the conviction or sentence has
been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Heck
determined that this requirement emanated from § 1983 itself.
Recognizing that § 1983 creates a particular kind of liability for
constitutional torts, the Court turned to common-law tort principles to
inform its interpretation of the federal civil rights statute. It first
concluded that the common-law tort of malicious prosecution “provides
the closest analogy” to § 1983 claims for damages predicated on the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or sentence. Id. at 484, 114 S.Ct.
2364. That being so, § 1983 claims of this sort, like the common-law
cause of action for malicious prosecution, require a showing that the
prior criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor.
Deemer v. Beard, 557 F. App'x 162, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2014)
Thus, the Third Circuit has affirmed dismissal of false arrest and false
imprisonment claims under Heck where success on those claims would conflict with
the prior judicial resolution of the criminal proceedings. See Bressi v. Brennen, 823
F. App'x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause [the plaintiff's] claims amount to
challenges to the validity of his convictions, and because those convictions do not
appear to have been invalidated, the claims are barred by Heck). In particular, under
Heck a plaintiff’s prior guilty plea is sufficient to bar a subsequent false arrest or
malicious prosecution claim. See e.g., Ferris v. Borough of Baldwin, 247 F. Supp.
3d 671, 681 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp.
3d 631, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 n. 8 (3d
Cir.2005)); Walthour v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Moreover,
under Heck, “the fact that his conviction came about as a result of a nolo contendere
plea, as opposed to a guilty plea or a jury verdict, is of no moment.” Moser v.
Bascelli, 879 F. Supp. 489, 493 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1256 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Olsen v. Correiro, No. 92–10961, 1994 WL 548111, at *4, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
13803, at *12 (D.Mass. Sept. 26, 1994) (“It makes no difference that the criminal
judgment here was rendered pursuant to a nolo plea; its effect is the same as if
[plaintiff] had pled guilty.”)). As the Third Circuit has observed:
[U]nder Pennsylvania law, [a nolo contendere] plea must be treated the
same as a conviction under Heck. See United States v. Poellnitz, 372
F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] nolo plea is indisputably tantamount
to a conviction....”). Even though Pennsylvania law does not treat a nolo
contendere as an admission of guilt, it is “equivalent to a plea of guilty”
and the defendant “consents to being punished as if he were guilty.” Id.
at 568 (citing Commonwealth v. Gunter, 565 Pa. 79, 771 A.2d 767, 773
(2001) (quotation marks omitted)). A nolo contendere plea “ ‘cannot be
used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit for the same
act,’ ” but the judgment of conviction still follows from it, just like a
plea of guilty. Id. (quoting Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, 512 Pa. 181,
516 A.2d 333, 335 (1986)).
Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2016).
In this case, Stokes pleaded guilty or entered a nolo contendere plea to the
contempt charges which he now seeks to undermine in this civil case. On these facts,
Stokes’ false arrest and malicious prosecution claims rule afoul of Heck’s favorable
termination rule. Since Stokes has not attained a favorable termination of these
criminal charges but rather stands convicted on his own plea in each of these cases,
these civil claims which challenge the validity of his prior state convictions are
barred.
b. Probable Cause Existed to Arrest Stokes
In addition, any false arrest claim fails because it is clear that the police had
probable cause to arrest Stokes. In order to make out a false arrest claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that police lacked probable cause to arrest. Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, proof that probable cause was
lacking is essential to any § 1983 claim arising out of the arrest or detention of an
individual. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest exists
“whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police
officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v.
Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). An arrest by a police officer without a warrant “is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense
has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should
consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge
and information which the officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the
factual occurrences immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs,
281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002).
Although “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), all interpretations
of probable cause require “a belief of guilt that is reasonable as opposed to certain.”
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). Probable cause “does not require the same
type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to
support a conviction.” Wright, 409 F.3d at 602 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 149 (1972)). Accordingly, the evidentiary standard for probable cause is
significantly lower than that required for conviction. Id. (citing Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a
person committed the relevant crime). Because an arrest is made with probable cause
if at the moment it was made the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge “were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect]
had committed or was committing an offense,” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964),
the constitutional validity of an arrest does not turn on whether the suspect actually
committed any crime. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003).
In this case, the affidavit submitted by police, (Doc. 32-1 at 58), reveals that
Stokes twice admitted to officers that he had engaged in conduct which violated the
protection from abuse order. These admissions were plainly sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that Stokes was in contempt and police, prosecutors and
the court justifiably relied upon these admissions when making probable case
determinations in Stokes’ state cases.
c. The Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Further, given the fact that probable cause existed to arrest Stokes, and his
subsequent nolo and guilty pleas confirmed his contumacious conduct that probable
cause existed, it appears the defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity on
these claims. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 664 (2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two questions: whether the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
735 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to decide which question to analyze
first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Supreme Court has
cautioned courts to “think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to
resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that
will have no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see
also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
An official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, “at the time of the
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every
‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that
right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). The Supreme Court has stated that this standard does not require a case
directly on point, but requires that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. “When properly
applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
The dispositive question that the court must ask is “whether the violative
nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
305, 308 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). The inquiry “must be undertaken
in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.;
see also Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017).
This “clearly established” standard ensures that an official can reasonably anticipate
when his or her conduct may give rise to liability, and “protects the balance between
vindication of constitutional rights and government officials’ effective performance
of their duties.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664.
For claims of false arrest, “the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity .
. . if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest
[the plaintiff] in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting]
officers possessed.” Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting Hunter v. Bryan, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991) (internal quotations
omitted). Here it is evident that the defendants could have reasonably concluded that
probable cause existed to charge and arrest Stokes for violating a state court PFA
order. Indeed, at one time Stokes conceded these violations in the course of his nolo
and guilty pleas. Given these stubborn facts, the defendants are, at a minimum,
entitled to qualified immunity and Stokes’ claims should be dismissed.
2. Stokes May Not Sue the Complaining Witness in His State Case
for Civil Rights Violations.
Viewed in its proper factual context, Stokes’ civil rights claims against his ex-
wife, Marcia Stokes, have an astonishing element of hubris and unwonted
entitlement. Stokes was charged with contumacious harassment of his former
spouse. He entered guilty and nolo contendere pleas to these charges acknowledging
his criminal conduct. Thus, Marcia Stokes’ role in this matter was that of a
complaining witness, who reported crimes to police that her ex-husband Gregory
Stokes later acknowledged committing.
Now, Gregory Stokes seeks to sue this complaining witness for reporting his
admitted criminal conduct to the police. This he may not do. To the extent that Stokes
is attempting to sue his ex-wife because she provided information to the police and
was a putative witness in Stokes’ state criminal case, this claim fails for a simple
reason: witnesses enjoy immunity from liability under the federal civil rights
statutes. As the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any claim
based on the witness' testimony. When a witness is sued because of his
testimony, . . . , “ ‘the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates
of public policy.’ ” Without absolute immunity for witnesses, . . ., the
truth-seeking process at trial would be impaired. Witnesses “might be
reluctant to come forward to testify,” and even if a witness took the
stand, the witness “might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of
the potential plaintiff” for “fear of subsequent liability.”
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Therefore, any federal civil rights claims premised upon Marcia Stokes’ alleged
status as a complaining witness in Gregry stokes’ state criminal case also fail as a
matter of law and should be dismissed.
3. The Judge Named in the Complaint is Immune from Liability.
Additionally, in this complaint Stokes attempts to sue a magisterial district
judge for judicial acts undertaken by the judge in his PFA case. To the extent that
the plaintiff seeks in this complaint to hold this judge personally liable for civil rights
violations, based upon an alleged failure to act favorably in ruling upon a prior
criminal case, it is well settled that the judge is individually cloaked with immunity
from liability.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials
performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial
system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for
acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection
from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427
(1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20
(grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir.1986) (parole board
adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take
in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities apply here and prevent Stokes
from maintaining this civil action against the judge named in this complaint since
the judge is entitled to judicial immunity for his actions in these prior proceedings
and is absolutely immune from personal liability for any judicial acts. See,
e.g., Arsad v. Means, 365 F. App’x 327 (3d Cir.2010); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208
F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). As we have explained when rejecting similar efforts to
impose personal civil rights liability on a judge, this immunity is both broad and
absolute:
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune
from a suit for money damages.’ ” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d
435, 440 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112
S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and citing Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868)). “The
doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge,
in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his
or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for
his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is
flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors,” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978),
and “[j]udicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice” Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694, 703
(W.D.Pa.2007). Such immunity can be overcome only where a judge's
acts are nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in
nature, are “taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
Catanzaro v. Collins, CIV. A. 09–922, 2010 WL 1754765 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27,
2010), aff'd, 447 F. App’x 397 (3d Cir. 2011). As the Third Circuit has further
explained:
A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute
immunity from suit. Simply put, “[a] judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject
to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’”
Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (citations omitted)).
This judicial immunity applies to Section 1983 civil rights actions like the
lawsuit brought here, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66
L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), and embraces both requests for damages, as well as costs and
attorney's fees. See Corliss v. O'Brien, No. 3:05–CV–0347, 2005 WL 2334792
(M.D. Pa. 2005), aff'd, 200 F.App'x. 80 (3d Cir. 2006). This judicial immunity also
expressly extends to Pennsylvania magisterial district court judges. Indeed, as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed, there is no
distinction “between judges of courts of limited and general jurisdiction” when
applying the judicial immunity doctrine, Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441
(3d Cir. 2000), and “[t]he doctrine of judicial immunity applies equally to courts of
limited jurisdiction, such as district justices, as to courts of general
jurisdiction.” Martin v. Bicking, 30 F.Supp.2d 511, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see
also Schuler v. City of Chambersburg, 641 F.Supp. 657, 659 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Horne
v. Farrell, 560 F.Supp. 219, 222–23 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Moreover, this
judicial immunity specifically applies to judicial actions ruling on bail requests,
making probable cause determinations, and presiding over preliminary hearings in
state criminal cases. See, e.g., Williams v. McCleaf, No. 1:19-CV-85, 2019 WL
472311, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:19-CV-0085, 2019 WL 462128 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2019); Pokrandt v. Shields, 773
F.Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Fox v. Castle, 771 F.Supp. 411 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
In the instant case, it is evident that Stokes is endeavoring to sue the judge for
what the plaintiff perceives to be wrongful judicial actions, but the fact remains that
the conduct alleged by Stokes consisted of judicial actions that lay within the court’s
jurisdiction. Therefore, this conduct is cloaked in judicial immunity, and the
magisterial district judge should be dismissed as a defendant.
4. Stokes Has Failed to State any Monell Liability Claims Against
the Harrisburg School District
Stokes’ complaint also names his ex-wife’s employer, the Harrisburg School
District, as a defendant and grounds this institutional liability claim on a single,
peculiar factual averment. As we understand it, Stokes believes that the school
district is somehow liable for his arrest and convictions because it did not have
policies in place that would have prevented Marcia Stokes from reporting his
misconduct to law enforcement. This frivolous averment lays bare Stokes’ attempt
to impute liability upon the school district simply by virtue of the actions of his
former spouse.
This he may not do. In fact, it is well settled that local governmental entities
may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of others under a theory
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; see also Colburn
v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991). Instead, such an agency
may only be held liable “when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Thus, to sustain a claim against this institutional defendant, a plaintiff must
“identify a . . . policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quotations omitted).
A plaintiff can adequately allege a policy or custom establishing institutional
liability for the acts committed by its employees by showing a formal policy, a
specific injury-causing action taken by a government official, a practice so
widespread it had become a custom, or a widespread failure to train or supervise
subordinates. See Ashley v. Kosehba, No. 1:22-CV-00982, 2023 WL 6200805, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2023). Once this policy or custom has been established, the
plaintiff must also allege “that it was the proximate cause of his injuries by
demonstrating a plausible nexus or affirmative link between the municipality's
policy or custom and the specific harm sustained.” Hargrove v. City of Philadelphia,
No. CV 21-4082, 2023 WL 3229927, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2023) (citing Bielevicz
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990); Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)) (quotations omitted).
Stokes’ complaint plainly does not meet this standard of pleading necessary
for institutional civil rights liability. There is no causal relationship between the
district and Stokes’ criminal cases; in fact, beyond his fevered speculation there is
no indication that the school district had any involvement whatsoever in these
criminal cases. Therefore, any institutional liability claims also fail.
5. Stokes Has Failed to Properly Serve Defendant Judd.
Stokes commenced this case in October of 2025. (Doc. 1). While Stokes
sought entry of a default judgement against Defendant Judd on November 24, 2025,
(Doc. 13), Judd resisted this motion by noting that Stokes never made service upon
her. (Doc. 16). On December 12, 2025, the Court agreed that service had not been
made upon Judd and ordered Stokes to make proper service by February 3, 2026,
while admonishing Stokes that the failure to make timely service could lead to the
dismissal of this complaint. (Doc. 24). Despite the admonition, there is no record of
proper service upon Defendant Judd and the time for service of the complaint has
now passed.
On these facts dismissal of this pleading with respect to Defendant Judd is
now warranted. Simply put, the failure to properly serve this filing now compels this
outcome under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, this result is
mandated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the
method by which service can be made and describes how a party must demonstrate
proof of service on the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(l). Rule 4 also sets time
limits for service and prescribes the sanction of dismissal for the failure to make
proper and timely service, stating as follows:
(m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90
days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own
after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice
against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court
must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
The language of Rule 4(m) is both clear and mandatory. Where there is an
unjustified and unexcused failure to timely serve a complaint, the court “must
dismiss the action.” Id. As a general rule, “the party asserting the validity of service
bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star
Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright
and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1987)). When the
plaintiff fails to carry this burden of proof on the issue of proper and timely service,
consistent with Rule 4(m)’s mandate that the “court—on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action,” dismissal of the case is entirely
appropriate. Indeed, when a plaintiff does not show good cause for a failure to serve,
Beckerman v. Susquehanna Township Police, 254 F. App’x 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2007),
or fails to make service, despite warnings and requests by the court to address service
issues, Foster v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 157 F. App’x 488, 490
(3d Cir. 2005), courts have frequently dismissed actions for failure to make service.
These principles control here and call for dismissal of this action with respect
to Defendant Judd for failure to make timely and proper service. In this case, in
December of 2025, the Court gave Stokes specific and explicit instructions regarding
the need to make service by February of 2026 while warning him that dismissal
would be the sanction for failing to serve the complaint. Nonetheless, the plaintiff
has not complied with this order, has provided no proof of proper service, and more
than 90 days have passed since the entry of this order. Given this cascading array of
failures, dismissal is appropriate here. Beckerman, 254 F. App’x at 154 (affirming
dismissal for failure to serve two days after service deadline elapsed where no good
cause shown).
We also note that Stokes’ complaint names Assistant District Attorney Judd
and appears to sue Judd simply because she prosecuted him for the crimes he
acknowledged committing. This claim fails on its merits since it is well-settled that
a criminal defendant may not sue a prosecutor for the act of filing charges against
him since such conduct is cloaked in immunity from civil liability. The immunity
conferred upon prosecutors for the quasi-judicial act of filing and bringing criminal
charges is also broad and sweeping:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that state prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-
judicial role. This immunity extends to acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such as
“initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case.” [The] Court
has noted numerous public policy considerations underlying its
extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors: [S]uits against
prosecutors for initiating and conducting prosecutions “could be
expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his
resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and
malicious actions to the State's advocate”; lawsuits would divert
prosecutors’ attention and energy away from their important duty of
enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would have more difficulty
than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity; and
potential liability “would prevent the vigorous and fearless
performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.” ... [T]here are other checks
on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and
professional discipline.
Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Thus, to the extent that the complaint seeks to hold this prosecutor personally liable
for bringing a criminal case against Stokes, Defendant Judd is immune from
personal, individual liability and these claims should be dismissed.
6. Stokes’ Section 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim Fails
In an attempt to stitch the disparate threads of his complaint into a coherent
whole Stokes also alleges that all of the defendants conspired to deprive him of his
civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
This claim fails. On this score 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides that:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; ..., the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
The reach of § 1985(3) has also been carefully defined by the courts. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed, “in Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) . . ., the Supreme Court clarified that the reach
of section 1985(3) is limited to private conspiracies predicated on ‘racial, or perhaps
otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’ Id. at 102.” Lake v.
Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1997). Thus:
Section 1985(3) permits an action to be brought by one injured by a
conspiracy formed “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3). In a line of cases ..., the Supreme Court has made clear what
a plaintiff must allege to state a claim under § 1985(3): “(1) a
conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in
his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen
of the United States.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 828–29,(1983) (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03).
Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d. Cir. 2006); See Lake v.
Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1997). “[B]ecause § 1985(3) requires the ‘intent
to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,’ a claimant must
allege ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators’ action’ in order to state a claim.” Farber, 440 F.3d at
135 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
In this case, Stokes’ complaint is devoid of any well-pleaded facts which
would support a claim of a collective racial or class-based invidious discriminatory
animus by the curious array of defendants named by Stokes in his complaint. Quite
the contrary, the well-pleaded facts seem to show nothing more than the prosecution
of Stokes for contumacious acts which he concedes he committed. Since Stokes’ §
1985(3) conspiracy claim fails to allege facts which satisfy the elements of the statute
this claim also fails and should be dismissed.
7. Any Supplemental State Law Claims Should Be Dismissed.
The dismissal of these federal claims dictates the appropriate course we
should follow in addressing the ancillary state law claims that the plaintiff may wish
to pursue. In a case such as this, where the jurisdiction of the federal court was
premised on alleged federal claims which are found to be subject to dismissal at the
outset of litigation, the proper course generally is for “the court [to] decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims.” Bronson v.
White, No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865, *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007) (Caputo, J.)
(adopting report and recommendation dismissing ancillary malpractice claim against
dentist) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that when federal causes of
action are dismissed, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state
claims)). See also Ham v. Greer, 269 F. App'x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United
Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726; Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196
(3d Cir. 1976)) (“Because the District Court appropriately dismissed [the inmate's]
Bivens claims, no independent basis for federal jurisdiction remains”). As the
Supreme Court has aptly observed:
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.
United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 (footnotes omitted).
Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, we should decline to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over potential ancillary state law claims in this case where
all potential federal claims brought before us fail as a matter of law. See Payne v.
Doe #1, No. 1:22-CV-1876, 2023 WL 3493315, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-1876, 2023 WL 3480895 (M.D.
Pa. May 16, 2023).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
1. The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, (Docs. 8, 30, 41, 55), should be
GRANTED;
2. Defendant Judd should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and
3. This case should be CLOSED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
Submitted this 11th day of August 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge