Agarkova

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

ANATASIIA AGARKOVA CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-1626

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

MICHA NEAL, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Anatasiia Agarkova,1 a detainee in the custody of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2 Respondents oppose the petition. [doc. #

15]. For reasons below, the Court should deny the petition.

Background

Petitioner is a citizen of Russia. ICE detained her on approximately June 19, 2024. [doc.

# 1, p. 2]. She has now been detained over two years. Id.

On October 22, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Russia.

Petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); her appeal

is pending.

1 Petitioner’s “A Number” is 249-381-589.

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under

28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

Petitioner filed this proceeding on approximately May 18, 2026. [doc. # 1]. She claims

that her continued detention without a bond hearing and bond violates her right to due process.

[doc. #s 1, pp. 3-4; 5, pp. 6-7]. She argues that “the length of [her] detention is extreme” and that

“there is on clear end in sight.” [doc. # 1, p. 4]. She states that ICE further delayed her detention

by preventing her from attending a scheduled biometrics appointment on April 2, 2026. [doc. #

5, p. 6]. She also argues that her “detention no longer reasonably serves any legitimate

governmental purpose.” [doc. # 1, p. 5]. She maintains that she is not a danger to the

community, that she is not a flight risk, and that she has a legitimate path to lawful status via

derivative asylum based on her husband’s asylum grant. Id.

Respondents opposed the petition on July 25, 2026. [doc. # 15].

Law and Analysis

I. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 versus 8 U.S.C. § 1226

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that aliens who have not been admitted may be

detained without bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) even when they have been

present in the United States for many years. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F. 4th 494, 502 (5th Cir.

2026). In reaching its conclusion, the court analyzed the meaning of “seeking admission” and

“applicants for admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Id. The court concluded that “applicants for

admission,” which includes all aliens who have not previously been admitted to the United

States, are necessarily “seeking admission” and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Id.

Here, Buenrostro-Mendez governs Petitioner’s detention status: she is detained under

Section 1225. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added), “If the officer determines at

the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of

clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.”

Under Section 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added), “Any alien subject to the procedures

under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution

and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Under section 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis

added), “Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title.”

Plainly, Section 1225 does not authorize release on bond. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.

Ct. 830 (2018). Petitioner is, therefore, not statutorily entitled to bond or a bond hearing. The

Court should dismiss her statutory claim accordingly.

II. Due Process

Petitioner primarily claims that the Due Process Clause entitles her to a bond hearing. In

Dzheison Ford v. Timothy Ducote, et al., 3:20-cv-1170, Doc. 19, (W.D. La. Nov. 2, 2020), the

district judge opined in pertinent part:

In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.Ct. 1959 (2020),

a Sri Lankan national was stopped 25 yards after crossing the southern border

of the United States. He was detained for expedited removal. An asylum officer

rejected his credible fear claim. Thuraissigiam then filed a federal habeas corpus

petition in which he, for the first time, asserted a fear of persecution and

requested a new opportunity to apply for asylum. In reversing the appellate

court, the Supreme Court found the detention did not violate the Due Process

Clause. Although not a case of unreasonable detention, the case is important as

to Due Process rights for illegal aliens. Citing Nishimare Ekin v. United States,

142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), the Court held that with regard to foreigners who have

never been naturalized or acquired any domicile or residence in the United

States, “‘the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within

powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.’” 140 S. Ct.

at 1977.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), Kim had entered the United States

lawfully and had resided in this country for over 10 years before committing a

crime, which made him deportable. Like Ford, Kim argued his mandatory

detention violated due process when no determination had been made whether

he posed a danger to society or a flight risk. Also, like Ford, Kim asked for an

individualized bond hearing which was not authorized under the statute. Both

the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the

detention without a bond hearing violated Kim’s due process rights. In reversing

the District Court and Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held detention during

these proceedings did not violate Kim’s due process rights.

Also, like Ford, Kim relied on the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

(2001). In Zadvydas, two aliens were held pending removal after final order of

deportation. However, no country would take them, so their detention continued

for years beyond the 90–day removal period of 8 U.S.C. §1231(a). The Supreme

Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued

detention is not authorized by the statute.” Id. at 699. The Supreme Court

concluded that six months was a presumptively reasonable period of detention,

beyond the removal period, to remove aliens ordered deported. Id. at 702.

The Kim Court held that Zadvydas was materially different because the detention

of the aliens in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially permanent.”

Therefore, the correct standard to apply is to determine whether Ford’s detention

is “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.”

Ford’s detention is not “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.” Ford’s detention

ends when the removal proceedings end. Ford’s focus on “unreasonable

detention” is incorrect. As long as Ford’s detention is not “indefinite” nor

“potentially permanent,” Ford’s due process rights are not violated. See also

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018).

Here, Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. See Demore, 538 U.S.

at 531 (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that

process.”).3 As in Ford, Petitioner’s detention is not indefinite or potentially permanent. On

October 22, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Russia. Petitioner

appealed the removal order to the BIA; her appeal is pending.

3 See also Romero v. Tate, 2026 WL 1067566, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2026); Bekboev v.

Vergara, 2026 WL 1011244, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2026); Mlaih v. Noem, 2026 WL 787536,

at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2026).

Petitioner’s appeal will likely extend her detention until the BIA decides her appeal.

Petitioner’s detention will likely end (i) when her order of removal becomes final (if the BIA

affirms the order of removal or dismisses Petitioner’s appeal) and the Government removes her

or (ii) if the BIA rules in Petitioner’s favor. Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner’s

claim. Petitioner may of course re-file her claim if her detention becomes indefinite or

potentially permanent.

Recommendation

For reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Anatasiia Agarkova’s

petition be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation

to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or

response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See

Douglass vy. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5" Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 11" day of August, 2026.

Kayla Dye Mélusky

United States Magistrate Judge