The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH PINCKNEY, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:25-cv-714
:
vs. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
:
R. KEENY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation issued by
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz on July 7, 2026. Doc. 24. In the Report and
Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Litkovitz recommends that this Court grant in part and
deny in part the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 11, (the “Motion”) filed under Rule 12(b)(6) by
Defendants R. Keeney and N. Spradlin. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends that
the Motion be granted as to Plaintiff Joseph Pinckney’s official-capacity claims for monetary
damages and denied in all other respects. Doc. 24. Defendants have filed objections, see Doc.
26, and Plaintiff has responded to those objections, see Doc. 28. For the reasons explained
below, Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joseph Pinckney (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is an inmate at the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility. Compl., Doc. 5, PageID 24. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Southern Ohio Correctional Facility correctional officers R. Keeney
(“Keeney”) and N. Spradlin (“Spradlin”) (collectively, “Defendants”) in both their official
and individual capacities. Id. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when Spradlin and Keeney used excessive force
against him on August 15, 2025, and inflicted serious harm on him while he was restrained
and compliant. Id. at PageID 27–28. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Spradlin sprayed him
in the face with an “overwhelming” amount of oleoresin capsicum (“OC spray”) and that
Keeney forcefully bent his wrists to the point “the handcuffs lacerated his skin.” Id. at PageID
24–26. In response to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss seeking
dismissal of all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Doc. 11. Following a thorough recitation of
Plaintiff’s factual allegations and analysis based on applicable law, the Magistrate Judge has
recommended that Defendants’ Motion be granted as to Plaintiff’s official-capacity damages
claims but denied as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force. Doc. 24.
Defendants have filed objections, to which Plaintiff has responded. Docs. 26, 28.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. § 636(b)(1).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ Motion be granted as to
Plaintiff’s request for an award of damages for alleged injuries caused in Defendants’ official-
capacity but denied as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for alleged use of excessive
force. Defendants object to the Report and Recommendation for three reasons: (1) the
Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Spradlin, (2) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Spradlin
is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage, and (3) the Magistrate Judge erred in
declining to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Keeney for failure to exhaust. Doc. 26. Plaintiff
asks the Court to overrule Defendants’ objections. Doc. 28.
A. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claims
As a preliminary matter, Magistrate Judge Litkovitz recommends dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Doc.
24, PageID 147. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants object to that recommendation. See Doc.
26. Having carefully reviewed this portion of the Report and Recommendation and finding
no clear error, the Court adopts it.
B. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim Against Spradlin
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Defendant Spradlin based on
Spradlin’s use of OC spray. Doc. 26, PageID 175–79. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has
not alleged facts showing either that Spradlin acted maliciously and sadistically or that
Plaintiff suffered an objectively serious injury. Id. The Court disagrees.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’”
upon a convicted prisoner. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)). In the excessive-force context, the “core judicial inquiry”
is whether the force was applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). This
inquiry has both subjective and objective components. The subjective component examines
the officer’s state of mind, i.e., whether he acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,
while the objective component considers whether the pain inflicted was sufficiently serious.
Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2023); Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573,
580 (6th Cir. 2014). In considering the officer’s intent, courts examine the need for force, the
relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived
by the officer, efforts made to temper the forceful response, and the extent of the injury.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Johnson, 79 F.4th at 618.
Defendants’ argument relies on their characterization of the incident as an active
inmate-on-inmate fight that required Spradlin to deploy OC spray to regain control and
restore order. Doc. 26, PageID 178–79. At this stage, however, the Court must accept
Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff alleges that another incarcerated person assaulted him; that he
briefly raised his hands only to protect himself; that he immediately placed his hands at his
sides to show he was not the aggressor and did not intend to fight; and that he attempted to
move away from the altercation. Compl., Doc. 5, PageID 24. Plaintiff further alleges that he
heard someone yell “hey,” prompting him to turn around, and Spradlin then sprayed him
directly in the face with OC spray. Id. Therefore, these allegations plausibly support an
inference that the force was unnecessary, disproportionate to any threat then perceived, and
used for the purpose of causing harm rather than restoring order. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–
7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
Defendants may ultimately be able to prove at a later stage in these proceedings,
through video footage, officer and inmate testimony, incident reports, or other admissible
evidence, that Plaintiff remained an active combatant, appeared to pose a continuing threat,
disobeyed commands, or otherwise created a legitimate need for chemical force. Those
matters bear directly on the factors presented in Hudson and may support summary judgment
after the factual record has developed. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. But the Court may not resolve
that factual dispute or credit Defendants’ account over Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations on
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Defendants’ injury argument likewise does not warrant dismissal. The extent of injury
is relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, but a prisoner alleging
excessive force need not demonstrate a significant injury if he plausibly alleges force
maliciously and sadistically applied to cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38
(2010) (per curiam); Cordell, 759 F.3d at 581. “When prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated”
even if significant injury is not evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. The Sixth Circuit has recently
reiterated that, in the excessive-force context, an inmate subjected to gratuitous force need not
show serious injury merely because he “has the good fortune” to avoid such injury. McNair v.
Pratt, No. 24-1362, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 23014, at *24 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2025). Accordingly,
accepting the Complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and drawing reasonable
inferences in his favor as we must at this stage, the Magistrate Judge did not err in finding
that Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Spradlin deployed OC spray not in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also contend that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Spradlin is not
entitled to qualified immunity. At this early stage in the litigation, the Court disagrees.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability unless the
plaintiff plausibly alleges that the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32
(2009).
As discussed above, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Spradlin violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from applying force
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21. Under Plaintiff’s
alleged facts, a reasonable correctional officer would have understood that deploying OC
spray against a prisoner who had stopped defending himself, placed his hands at his sides,
and was attempting to disengage from an altercation—rather than fighting, resisting, or
presenting an immediate threat—was not a good-faith means of maintaining or restoring
discipline and could violate the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants’ contrary account—that Spradlin reasonably perceived Plaintiff as an
active participant in an ongoing physical altercation and deployed OC spray to restore order—
depends on factual inferences that contradict the Complaint’s allegations. At this stage, the
Court must accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and may not resolve competing
factual accounts, assess the credibility of the parties’ versions of events, or determine whether
Spradlin in fact perceived a continuing threat. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court therefore
cannot conclude that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding Spradlin is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to Defendant Keeney
Finally, Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court
deny Defendant Keeney’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim for failure to
exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
Doc. 26, PageID 169–75. Defendants contend that Plaintiff filed only an informal complaint
concerning Keeney’s alleged use of force and did not proceed through the remaining steps of
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s grievance procedure. Id.
However, as the Magistrate Judge notes, Keeney did not raise non-exhaustion in
Defendants’ opening Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 24, PageID 150; Doc. 11. Defendants first
advanced this defense in their reply memorandum. See Doc. 20, PageID 131–32. A reply
memorandum is ordinarily not the proper vehicle for a new dispositive argument because it
deprives the opposing party of an opportunity to respond. See Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554,
579 (6th Cir. 2010) (“It is well established that ‘arguments made to [the court] for the first
time in a reply brief are waived’”); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir.
2008). Though Defendants suggest that Plaintiff opened the door by raising the issue in his
response to their Motion, Plaintiff only alluded to the issue of exhaustion and did not
substantively develop any argument in this regard. So, when Defendants raised exhaustion
on reply, Plaintiff was deprived of an opportunity to respond. Thus, the Magistrate Judge did
not err in recommending that Defendants’ Motion be denied on the basis of exhaustion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 26) are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 24) in its entirety. Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's
claims for monetary damages against Defendants Keeney and Spradlin in their official
capacities are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's individual-capacity Eighth Amendment excessive-
force claims against Defendants Keeney and Spradlin remain pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 10, 2026 □□ | Llalessa
effety @. Bopkins
United States District Judge