Ashworth

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_____________________________________________

BRIAN ASHWORTH,

Plaintiff,

v. 5:26-CV-0370

(MAD/ML)

ONONDAGA COUNTY PROBATION;

PAUL HELFELD; and TODD GUERIN,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

BRIAN ASHWORTH

Plaintiff, Pro Se

8266 Kirkville Road

Kirkville, New York 13082

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Brian Ashworth (“Plaintiff”) commenced this pro se action against Defendants

Onondaga County Probation Department, Paul Helfeld, and Todd Guerin (collectively

“Defendants”) alleging violations of his civil rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff did not pay the filing

fee and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) For the reasons set forth

below, I (1) grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, and (2) recommend that the Complaint be accepted

in part for filing and dismissed in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Construed as liberally1 as possible, the Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s civil

rights by Defendants. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on January 28, 2025, he was sentenced to

probation for a three-year term. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.)

Plaintiff alleges that after he was sentenced to probation, he met with Defendant

Helfeld—a supervisor with Defendant Onondaga County Probation—and Defendant Helfeld

stated that he does not know how Plaintiff was sentenced to probation because Plaintiff is not

probation material. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Helfeld stated that he

would not accept Plaintiff on probation and instead would contact Plaintiff’s attorney and the

court. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Helfeld stated that he remembered Plaintiff from

Plaintiff’s experience on probation 20 years before and Defendant Helfeld “remember[ed] how

that went and [Plaintiff is] still doing the same thing.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was accused of violating probation on the following five bases:

1. Plaintiff left Onondaga County and entered Madison County to pick up a

prescription. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he tried to contact his probation officer but

did not receive a response back. (Id.)

2. Plaintiff was ordered to enter a treatment facility and he voluntarily admitted

himself to Commonwealth Place for two days. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he left

inpatient treatment and entered outpatient treatment on March 13, 2025, at Syracuse Recovery

Services where he was given a sublocade injection. (Id.)

1 The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.

Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790

(2d Cir. 1994)).

3. Plaintiff was ordered not to operate a motor vehicle without permission but his

father needed the driveway cleared of snow after a snowstorm. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he

moved a vehicle 30 feet on his property without entering a public roadway. (Id.)

4. Plaintiff was given a urine drug screen on February 10, 2025, but was unable to

provide the minimum sample size. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff was tested again on March 4,

2025, but again was unable to provide a suitable sample. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked if

he could provide a mouth swab but his request was denied.

5. Plaintiff “had a 20 day stay order and 10 days to have interlock installed” but

asserts that this violation is “null and void.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.)

Plaintiff alleges that he turned himself into the Town of Clay court on a warrant and

provided proof that he was engaged in treatment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on

March 18, 2025, he was released on his own recognizance, the warrant was removed, and he was

ordered to continue engaging with treatment and report to probation. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.)

Plaintiff alleges that on March 25, 2025, he reported to probation and Defendants Guerin and

Helfeld informed Plaintiff that there was a warrant for violation of probation. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff

alleges that he “pleaded with them to verify” the warrant because it was vacated and removed but

he was booked and incarcerated on a vacated warrant. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that on March 25, 2025, Defendants Helfeld and Guerin reported to the

District Attorney that Plaintiff made threats “to the dwi team” but Plaintiff “has foil requested

[his] booking video in which it shows no threat was ever made.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)

The Complaint alleges that on March 26, 2026, at 3 p.m., the judge contacted the jail and

told “them to release Plaintiff” and Plaintiff was directed to report to probation. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that on April 1, 2025, he reported to probation and Defendant Guerin stated “you have

court tonight and good luck [I] got a feeling we won[’]t be seeing each other again.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Guerin and Helfeld then lied to Assistant District Attorney

Pelosi by telling him that Plaintiff threatened them with the goal of revoking Plaintiff’s probation

and remanding him to custody. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the lie told by Defendants Guerin and Helfeld, his

probation was violated and he was incarcerated for 6 months and 22 days. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)

Plaintiff asserts that he pleaded guilty to the probation violation that accused him of leaving the

county when he traveled to pick up a prescription in Madison County. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that

the 6 months and 22 days incarceration combined with the 28 hours that he was incarcerated

between March 25, 2025, and March 26, 2025, resulted in 4,876 hours of incarceration. (Id.)

Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages. (Id. at 6.)

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee,

currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized,

however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee

for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).2 After reviewing Plaintiff’s IFP application

2 The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit

availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the

commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit

that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that

section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing

financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City

of N.Y., 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

(Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard.3 Therefore, Plaintiff’s application

to proceed IFP is granted.4

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the

court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is

frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter

alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief

means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis

added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not

shown–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and

punctuation omitted).

3 Plaintiff is reminded that proceeding IFP is always a privilege, not an unqualified

right. Misuse of the IFP process by a litigant, such as repetitive filing of frivolous lawsuits, may

result in the denial of a request to proceed IFP.

4 Plaintiff is reminded that, although his IFP application has been granted, he is still

required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the

complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Hernandez v.

Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d

66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)

(reading the plaintiff’s pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint

sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua

sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties .

. . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against Defendant Onondaga County Probation

“Although a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to section 1983, see Monell v. Dep't

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal . . . department does not have the capacity

to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located.” White v. Syracuse

Police Dep't, 18-CV-1471, 2019 WL 981850 at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (Peebles, M.J.)

(citing Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Turczyn ex rel.

McGregor v. City of Utica, 13-CV-1357, 2014 WL 6685476, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014)

(Sharpe, C.J.); Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Under

New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality

and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of

Social Services are not amenable to suit and no claims lie directly against the Department.”)),

rep't and rec. adopted, 2019 WL 974824 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.). Hence,

Defendant Onondaga County Probation is not proper party amenable to suit. As a result, I

recommend that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Onondaga County Probation be dismissed.

To the extent that the Complaint is liberally construed as asserting claims against

Onondaga County, I recommend that it be dismissed.

“[T]o hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its

employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or

custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”

Adams v. City of Syracuse, 21-CV-0650, 2025 WL 2772081, at *28 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)

(Nardacci, J.) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297

(2d Cir. 2020)). A plaintiff can establish the existence of an official policy or custom through

“(1) a formal policy endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions directed by the government’s

authorized decisionmakers or those who establish governmental policy; (3) a persistent and

widespread practice that amounts to a custom of which policymakers must have been aware; or

(4) a constitutional violation resulting from policymakers’ failure to train municipal employees.”

Deferio v. City of Syracuse, 770 F. App’x 587, 589-90 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations,

citations, and brackets omitted).

The Complaint here essentially complains of two discrete incidents on March 25, 2025,

and April 1, 2025, during which Plaintiff was allegedly treated improperly by employees of

Onondaga County. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff fails to assert facts plausibly suggesting

a policy or custom, which would support municipal liability based on these facts. See Flagg v.

NYS Division of Parole, 19-CV-0886, 2019 WL 5002215, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019)

(Baxter, M.J.) (citing DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“A single incident,

particularly if it involved individuals below the policy-making level is insufficient to state a

Monell claim.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4963112 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8,

2019) (McAvoy, J.); Wright v. City of Syracuse, 10-CV-0661, 2014 WL 1293527, at *15

(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (Suddaby, J.) (“Isolated acts of municipal employees are typically not

sufficient to establish municipal liability.”). In addition, none of Plaintiff’s allegations reflect a

failure to train or “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons who would come into contact

with employees of Onondaga County.

As a result, I recommend that any claims against Defendant Onondaga County

Probation—or Onondaga County—be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

In addition, to the extent that the Complaint asserts claims against Defendants Helfeld

and Guerin in their official capacities, I recommend that those claims be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Malay v. City of Syracuse, 638 F. Supp. 2d

303, 311 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (McCurn, J.) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)) (holding

that “claims against a government employee in his official capacity are treated as a claim against

the municipality.”).

B. Claims Against Defendants Helfeld and Guerin in Their Individual

Capacities

1. Fourth Amendment Claims

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. By virtue of its incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause, the Fourth Amendment is binding on state and municipal officers such as Defendants

Helfeld and Guerin. See Tsinberg v. City of New York, 20-CV-0749, 2021 WL 1146942, at *10

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010)).

a. False Imprisonment

A claim for false arrest or false imprisonment “rest[s] on the Fourth Amendment right of

an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause.”

Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d

Cir. 1995)); see also, e.g., Kirby v. Abraham, 24-CV-0522, 2024 WL 4906112, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.

Oct. 25, 2024) (Dancks, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4905131

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2024) (Sannes, C.J.). “Such claims are one and the same because ‘[f]alse

arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.’” Kirby, 2024 WL

4906112, at *4 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)) (additional citation

omitted). “A section 1983 claim for false arrest is substantially the same as a claim for false

arrest under New York law.” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing

Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852). Accordingly, to state a claim for false arrest and imprisonment, “a

plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was

conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the

confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir.

2003) (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). “An arrest is privileged

if it is based on probable cause.” Kirby, 2024 WL 4906112, at *5 (citing Jenkins, 478 F.3d at

84).

A claim for false arrest fails so long as “probable cause existed for some offense,”

regardless of “whether probable cause existed with respect to each individual charge, or, indeed,

any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Grytsyk v. Morales,

527 F. Supp. 3d 639, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.

2006)). “[A] conviction of the plaintiff following the arrest is viewed as establishing the

existence of probable cause.” Boykins v. Lopez, 21-CV-2831, 2022 WL 2307684, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2022) (citing Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1986)).

With respect to Plaintiff’s incarceration from April 1, 2025, until on or about October 23,

2025, Plaintiff “fails plausibly to allege,” or otherwise permit an inference of, “the lack of

probable cause necessary to maintain” a false imprisonment claim. Corsini v. Brodsky, 731 F.

App'x 15, 18 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (citing Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 152). The Complaint

appears to allege that Plaintiff was incarcerated beginning on April 1, 2025, after pleading guilty

to a probation violation before Judge Germano. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff’s admission to a

probation violation established the existence of probable cause for his incarceration even if he

was not found guilty of each individual probation violation he was initially charged with. See

Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 154. Probable cause thus defeats Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment

from April 1, 2025, to October 23, 2025.

With respect to Plaintiff’s incarceration from March 25, 2025, until March 26, 2025, I

recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. “When an

officer learns from a computer database . . . that a person is the subject of an outstanding arrest

warrant, probable cause exists to arrest that person.” United States v. Miller, 265 F. App’x 5, 7

(2d Cir. 2008). “Even if the arrest warrant in question later turns out to be invalid, an officer

may still have probable cause to arrest the target of the warrant provided ‘the arresting officers

did not know, and had no reason to know, that the warrant had been vacated’ or was otherwise

invalid.” Morrison v. City of New York, 14-CV-4508, 2019 WL 175121 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,

2019) (quoting United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 1999)). In short, “probable cause

can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted

reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d

98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendants Helfeld and Guerin that the warrant

had been vacated and requested that they verify the warrant with the court before taking him into

custody. Out of an abundance of caution, mindful of the Second Circuit’s instruction that a pro

se plaintiff’s pleadings must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191,

and without expressing an opinion as to whether Plaintiff can withstand a properly filed motion

to dismiss or for summary judgment, I recommend that a response be required to Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim against Defendants Helfeld and Guerin in their

individual capacities related to Plaintiff’s incarceration for “28 hours” beginning on March 25,

2025.

b. Malicious Prosecution

To the extent that the Complaint is construed as alleging a malicious prosecution claim, I

recommend that it be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

“The elements of a [Section] 1983 malicious prosecution claim require that the plaintiff

prove that (1) the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) the defendant lacked

probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed, (3) the defendant acted with malice, (4)

the prosecution was terminated in plaintiff’s favor, and (5) there was a sufficient post-

arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Wagner v.

Hyra, 518 F. Supp. 3d 613, 633 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (Hurd, J.) (quoting Bernshtein v. City of New

York, 496 F. App’x 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)); see also Rohman v. N.Y.C.

Transit Auth. (NYCTA), 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000).

To establish the element of malice, the plaintiff must show “that the defendant . . .

commenced the criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a

desire to see the ends of justice served.” Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 572 (2d

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); accord Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).

Malice may be inferred when probable cause is “totally lacking.” Pacicca v. Stead, 456 F.

App’x 9, 13 (2d Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff alleges that he admitted to a violation of his probation. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) “In

doing so, Plaintiff struck a fatal blow to his malicious prosecution claim.” Young v. Lugo, 18-

CV-4216, 2026 WL 1978864, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026) (citing LaRocco v. Jackson, 10-

CV-1651, 2012 WL 947554, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2022) (noting plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim failed not only because plaintiff failed to show a lack of probable cause for the

commencement of proceedings against him, but also because the guilty plea entered by plaintiff

“preclude[d] a finding of termination of the proceedings in [his] favor.”)), report and

recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part on other grounds, 2026 WL 1662274

(E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2026).

As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. Fifth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff asserts an unspecified claim pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Based on the

allegations contained in the Complaint, the undersigned liberally construes that claim as a due

process clause claim pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment due process clause applies only to the federal government, and not

to state or municipal governments. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002)

(“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of

property without due process of law.”). Here, the Complaint does not allege that any federal

official violated Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment due process rights. As a result, I recommend that

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process claim be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Robinson

v. Wright, 21-CV-1098, 2022 WL 2663369, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 11, 2022) (Lovric, M.J.)

(dismissing the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims because no allegations made against any

federal official), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 4356214 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,

2022) (McAvoy, J.).

3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no state shall “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, entitles a person

to “‘be informed as to what [a law] commands or forbids.’” Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d

61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). The

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects procedural and substantive rights. See,

e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection

of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”).

Upon review, I recommend that Plaintiff’s due process claim be dismissed. Broadly

construed, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims involve a seizure of his person when he was allegedly

unlawfully incarcerated.

Plaintiff’s due process claim is duplicative of his false imprisonment claim. Where a

plaintiff asserts due process and false arrest claims stemming from the same set of facts, the

Second Circuit has held that the two claims “merge,” such that the plaintiff’s due process claim

is subsumed by the “false arrest” claim. See Fernandez-Bravo v. Town of Manchester, 711 F.

App’x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017); Maliha v. Faluotico, 286 F. App’x 742, 744 (2d Cir. 2008); see also

Lozado v. Weilminster, 92 F. Supp. 3d 76, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim merges with his false arrest claim, the constitutional source of

which is the Fourth Amendment).

As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff’s due process claim be dismissed as duplicative

and therefore merged with his false arrest/false imprisonment claim.

V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se

litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint

gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05

(2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when

justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem

with [the plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.”

Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding

L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact

sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated

differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is

not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d

129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).5

5 See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)

(Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171

F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)—that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can

Although this Court has serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can amend the Complaint

to assert actionable claims, given Plaintiff's pro se status and that this is Plaintiff’s first pleading,

out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his

pleading against Onondaga County.

Notwithstanding, I recommend that Plaintiff’s claims (1) against Defendant Onondaga

County Probation Department, (2) asserting a Due Process claim pursuant to the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments related to his alleged unlawful incarceration, and (3) asserting a

malicious prosecution claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, be denied without leave to

amend because a better pleading cannot cure the deficiencies identified herein.

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should note that in any amended

complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates,

times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged

wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific

involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in

sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v.

Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended

complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete

pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document

previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d

Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original

and renders it of no legal effect.”).

rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be

successful in stating a claim”—is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev’d on other grounds, 682 F. App’x 30.

PLAINTIFF IS ADVISED THAT HE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO FILE A MOTION TO

AMEND HIS COMPLAINT UNTIL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE D’AGOSTINO

RULES ON THIS COURT’S RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT. ANY AMENDED COMPLAINT OR MOTION TO AMEND BEFORE JUDGE

D’AGOSTINO’S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THIS COURT’S RECOMMENDATIONS

WILL BE STRICKEN AS PREMATURE AND WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE

COURT. As noted below, however, Plaintiff may file objections to this Court’s

recommendations.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2), is

GRANTED; and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be (1) ACCEPTED FOR

FILING to the extent that it asserts a claim of false imprisonment related to his incarceration for

28 hours beginning on March 25, 2025, against Defendants Helfeld and Guerin in their

individual capacities; and (2) DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND with respect to (a) claims against Defendant Onondaga County

Probation,6 and (b) a denial of due process claim and a malicious prosecution claim against

Defendants Helfeld and Guerin in their individual capacities; and it is further

6 However, I recommend that Plaintiff be permitted to amend his pleading to include

allegations against Onondaga County if he desires.

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order and report-

recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with

the local rules.’

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report.® Such objections shall be filed with the

Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN

DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v.

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).

Dated: September 10, 2026

Binghamton, New York

Miroslav Lovric

U.S. Magistrate Judge

7 The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein

in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

8 If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by

mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have

seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to

serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Ifthe last day of that prescribed period falls on a

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day

that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

17

Fa KeyCite Blue-Striped Flag Presently before the Court” is Defendants’ motion for

Appeal Filedby Adams v. City □□ Syracuse, 2nd Cir, October 17,2025 summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Dkt. No. 77 (“Motion”), Plaintiff's

2025 WL 2772081 opposition, Dkt. No. 85, and Defendants’ reply in further

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. support, Dkt. No. 90. For the reasons set forth below, the

United States District Court, N.D. New York. Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Robert ADAMS, Jr., Plaintiff,

v. II. BACKGROUND °

CITY OF SYRACUSE et al., Defendants. .

A. The Parties

5:21-cv-00650 (AMN/MJK) Plaintiff is a black man who has lived in Syracuse for most of

| his life. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-44 at 16:5-17:4. In May 2019,

Signed September 29, 2025 he was 55 years old, approximately 5’7” in height and 160

pounds in weight, and lived in an apartment building located

Attorneys and Law Firms at 941 James Street. Dkt. No. 90-1 at 9515; Dkt. No. 77-23.

At that time, Plaintiff's medical diagnoses included, inter alia,

A. CABRAL BONNER, ESQ., CHARLES A. BONNER, alcoholism, depression, and schizophrenia. Dkt. No. 77-42 at

ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER, 3060 2-3: Dkt. No. 77-55 at 454.

Kerner Boulevard — Suite A, San Rafael, California 94901,

Attorneys for Plaintiff. Defendant City is a large municipality in New York State with

JESSE P. RYDER, ESQ., RYDER LAW FIRM, 6739 Myers a police department that employs the Individual Defendants.

Road, East Syracuse, New York 13257, Attorneys for As of May 2019, Officer Cecile had been a patrol officer

Plaintiff for approximately two years, Dkt. No. 77-47 at 21:24-22:15;

Officer Russell had been a patrol officer for approximately

DANIELLE R. SMITH, ESQ., TODD M. LONG, ESQ., _ three years, Dkt. No. 77-46 at 9:17-25; Officer Tolone had

CITY OF SYRACUSE, CORPORATION COUNSEL, 233 been a patrol officer for approximately three years, Dkt. No.

East Washington Street, Room 300 City Hall, Syracuse, New —-77-48 at 9:24-10:2; Detective Brimmer had been a detective

York 13202, Attorneys for Defendants. for less than three years, Dkt. No. 77-49 at 12:11-13:8; and

Detective Beauchine had been a detective for approximately

nine years, Dkt. No. 77-51 at 16:21-17:17.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge: B. Relevant Events

I. INTRODUCTION 1. May 1, 2016 .

*1 On June 3, 2021, Robert Adams, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), Shortly after 7:30 p.m. on May 1, 2019, police (apparently

commenced this civil rights action against Police Officers including Officer Russell) and emergency medical services

1 found Plaintiff intoxicated and lying on the side of a road

Joseph Tolone, Aaron Cecile, and Lashonda Russell (the in Syracuse, Dkt, No. 77-42 at 2, 50-51; Dkt. No. 77-46

“Responding Officers”); Detectives Ryan Brimmer and at 104:15-25. Plaintiff was covered in feces and urine and

Jeffrey Beauchine (the “Detectives” and together with the reported drinking six to seven “Na[ttly Daddy beverages,”

Responding Officers, the “Individual Defendants”); the City a brand of malt liquor. Dkt. No. 77-42 at 2, 51: Dkt. No.

of Syracuse (“Defendant City,” and, together with the 77-43 at 49:11-13. Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital

Individual Defendants, “Defendants”); Does 1-100 (the “Doe .

: Oe emergency room for treatment, where his blood alcohol level

Defendants”); and others, alleging violations of federal and □□□

state law arising from his arrest and subsequent monthslong (“BAC”) was measured at 0.422 percent later that night.

detention during a since-dismissed criminal prosecution. Dkt. Dkt. No. 77-55 at | 311; Dkt. No. 77-42 at 25.

No. 1 (“Complaint”).

2. May 6, 2016 When the dispatcher asked for a description of the assailant,

Ms. Bailey said “he was African-American” and she had “just

a. 941 James Street

seen him running off.” Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Ms. Bailey then switched

*2 At around 3:00 p.m. on May 6, 2019, Plaintiff began

to providing a description of Mr. Jones, whom she described

drinking in and in front of his apartment building at 941

as approximately 25 years old and 5’7”. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. When

James Street. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 407, 410. By 4:00 or

the dispatcher clarified that he needed the description of the

5:00 p.m., he had consumed three or four 24-ounce cans of

assailant, Ms. Bailey stated that he was “kind of bigger, he's

Natty Daddy. Id. at ¶ 411. Around that time, a younger man,

gotta be like 6’3”, like medium build[.]” Id. at ¶ 10.

Charles Jones, came over to socialize with Plaintiff. Id. The

two had known each for several years and, while they were

When the dispatcher asked what the assailant was wearing,

not actually related, Plaintiff referred to Mr. Jones as his

Ms. Bailey said “a green lookin’ sweatsuit thing” and then

nephew and Mr. Jones called Plaintiff uncle. Dkt. No. 77-43

explained that “officers [a]re right here on site and I'm just

at 71:8-15; Dkt. No. 77-44 at 59:1-7, 98:16-23. Plaintiff and

gonna tell them what happened.” Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Ms. Bailey

Mr. Jones walked to a store to purchase four of five more 24-

can then be heard saying “he got in a fight with somebody, the

ounce cans of Natty Daddy that they could share. Dkt. No.

other dude ran off but he got knocked out... he was, he was hit

77-55 at ¶¶ 414, 416. Plaintiff paid for the alcohol because

too in the whole altercation, you see that stick he was hit with

Mr. Jones had no money. Id. at ¶ 415. The two returned to

that ... he was.” Id. at ¶ 12; see also Dkt. No. 77-16 at 0:05.

941 James Street, where a woman (Vanessa Goldych) and an

unnamed man were outside the building. Id. at ¶¶ 417, 419,

421-22, 424. Plaintiff continued drinking Natty Daddy and ii. Police response

joined Mr. Jones, Ms. Goldych, and the unnamed man in front Officers Russell, Cecile, and Tolone were the officers

of 941 James Street. Id. at ¶¶ 419-20. At some point, Mr. Jones who initially responded to 941 James Street between

and the unnamed man got into a verbal altercation, which then approximately 7:27 and 7:28 p.m. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. The

turned physical. Id. at ¶¶ 421, 424. 911 call notes indicated “2 PEOPLE FIGHTING – ONE

PERSON NOW UNC[ONSCIOUS] ON THE GROUND –

COMPL[AINANT] SAW A VERY LG STICK.” Dkt. No.

i. 911 call

77-4 at 3; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 16-17. The 911 call notes also

Shortly before 7:30 p.m., a young woman (Arianna Jordan

reported that the assailant was “ ‘a black male,’ 25-35 years

Bailey) was walking down James Street with her siblings. Id.

old, six feet 3 inches, last seen wearing a green sweat[suit].”

at ¶¶ 1, 339. At that time, Ms. Bailey observed the physical

Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 18. Soon after 7:30 p.m., four other officers

altercation between Mr. Jones and the unnamed man. Id. at

arrived at the scene. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-4 at 1-2.

¶ 340. Mr. Jones swung a stick at the unnamed man; that

man grabbed the stick and proceeded to knock Mr. Jones to

After arriving, each of the Responding Officers activated and

the ground. Id. The unnamed man then discarded the stick,

de-activated their body worn cameras (“BWC”) at different

smashed Mr. Jones’ cell phone on the ground, and took off

times. See Dkt. Nos. 77-15, 77-16, 77-17. Officer Russell's

running down the sidewalk. Dkt. No. 85-10 at 4. Mr. Jones

BWC footage initially shows her standing over Mr. Jones,

was not moving and did not get up, and Plaintiff went to check

next to Plaintiff (who is also on the ground) and Ms. Bailey,

on him. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asked Ms. Bailey to call 911. Id. At

as Officer Cecile exits his police vehicle and walks over. Dkt.

approximately 7:25 p.m., Ms. Bailey did so. Dkt. No. 77-55

No. 77-16 at 0:00. Ms. Bailey, who was still on the phone

at ¶ 1.

with 911 at this time, is visible pointing down at Mr. Jones

and saying “he got into a fight with somebody” and “the other

The roughly three and a half minute recording of that 911

dude run off.” Id.; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 21. Plaintiff says words

call reflects that Ms. Bailey informed the dispatcher that two

to the same effect. Dkt. No. 77-16 at 0:00.

people had been fighting; one was unconscious on the ground;

and “a big type log looking thing” had been involved as a

*3 Officer Russell proceeded to ask Plaintiff, who had some

weapon. Id. at ¶¶ 2-4; see also Dkt. No. 77-5. When the

blood on his lip, “what happened to you, why you bleeding?”

dispatcher asked whether the assailant was still there, Ms.

Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 29. Ms. Bailey explained “he was hit too”

Bailey said “no” and explained that “he got up out of here.”

and “you see that stick he was hit with that.” Dkt. No. 77-55 at

Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 5.

to join Officers Russell and Cecile by Mr. Jones. Dkt. No. Officer Tolone responded, “it's the guy we have in the car, I

77-16 at 0:15; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 32. Officer Tolone tended to can almost guarantee it,” Dkt. No. 77-17 at 8:27, and Officer

Mr. Jones, who remained unconscious, with labored, gasping Cecile agreed, saying “it's definitely him.”5 Dkt. No. 77-15

breaths and blood coming from the left side of his head. Dkt. at 1:41.

No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 40-42.

At approximately 7:39 p.m., Officer Tolone asked various

Plaintiff remained near the Responding Officers during this officers “have we started a canvas yet guys?” Dkt. No. 77-17

time. See generally Dkt. Nos. 77-16, 77-17. In response at 9:54. Officer Russell responded “yeah, we'll do that right

to Officer Cecile's question about who had hit Mr. Jones, now. I wish we would have got those people that were ...”

Plaintiff said “some motherfucker.” Dkt. No. 77-16 at 1:10. In and gestured down the sidewalk in the direction Ms. Bailey

response to Officer Russell's question about what that person and her siblings had walked. Dkt. No. 77-16 at 11:27. At

looked like, Plaintiff pointed down James Street and said it approximately 7:40 p.m., the Responding Officers spoke with

was a “black guy” whom he did not know. Dkt. No. 77-16 two non-party officers who arrived after they did. See, e.g.,

at 1:15. Following further questions, Plaintiff stated words to Dkt. No. 77-17 at 10:14. One of the non-party officers asked

the effect of “y'all acting like we did something wrong.” Id. “what's up with the guy with the busted lip,” to which Officer

at 1:58. Officer Russell responded “no, no, we just trying to Tolone responded “yeah, I'm thinking that's gonna, like you

get that information, so that way we can put out a point of said, that's gonna be our guy.” Id.

information regarding the guy who did it.” Id. at 2:03. Officer

Russell again asked about Plaintiff's lip; Plaintiff responded *4 At approximately 7:41 p.m., Officer Cecile called the

that it was “a long story” and unrelated to Mr. Jones. Id. Criminal Investigations Division of the Syracuse Police

at 2:28. In response to Officer Russell's question, Plaintiff Department (“CID”). Dkt. No. 77-15 at 4:55. Officer Cecile

confirmed that he, Mr. Jones, and Ms. Goldych had been reported that “we've got possible suspects, I don't know,

drinking with a fourth person. Id. at 2:54. Plaintiff also stated they're totally drunk, I don't know if someone wants to show

that the fourth person hit Mr. Jones, and that this person's up down here or not.” Id. at 5:35. During the course of this

name was “Pete.” Id. Officer Russell then confirmed this call, Officer Cecile asked Officer Russell for the name of “the

version of events with Ms. Goldych. Id. at 3:00. In response guy, the suspect ... the guy that we got detained right now,”

to further questioning from Officer Russell, Plaintiff provided and then provided Plaintiff's name as “the possible suspect.”

his name, address, and birthdate. Id. at 3:47, 4:10. Plaintiff Id. at 8:19.

again stated words to the effect “y'all acting like we done

something,” to which Officer Russell responded “no, we just At approximately 7:45 p.m., Officer Russell asked Officer

need your info so that way you can help us, that's all.” Id. Soon Tolone, “did anyone contact those people back,” Dkt. No.

after, Officer Russell again asked “were you two fighting each 77-16 at 17:21, presumably again in reference to Ms. Bailey

other,” to which Plaintiff responded “no.” Id. at 5:45. and her siblings, to which Officer Tolone responded that

he tried but they did not want to meet, Dkt. No. 77-17 at

Approximately thirty seconds later, at 7:34 p.m., Officer 15:51. Officers Tolone and Russell then canvased the area for

Tolone directed Plaintiff to stand up and turn around, quickly additional eyewitnesses, without success. See, e.g., Dkt. No.

patted him down, and informed Ms. Goldych “you're gonna 77-55 at ¶ 76; Dkt. No. 77-17 at 18:30.

get detained too dear.” Dkt. No. 77-17 at 4:34. Officer Tolone

then told Plaintiff “you're being detained right now” and At approximately 7:47 p.m., seemingly while on hold with

placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Id. at 4:53. Officer Tolone CID, Officer Cecile stated to other officers on the scene that

walked Plaintiff over to a police vehicle and said “stand right “I'm just going to call back the [911] caller, because they

here; don't move,” before unlocking the vehicle and directing obviously saw it, and see if they want to talk and give us the,

Plaintiff into the backseat. Id. at 5:10. uh, a statement of what happened, once I'm done with CID.”

Dkt. No. 77-15 at 10:57. After the call with CID resumed,

The Responding Officers proceeded to put up police tape Officer Cecile reiterated to the person with whom he was

around the scene. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-16 at 7:43. speaking that “he's totally, he's totally wasted, so how much

At approximately 7:38 p.m., Officer Russell remarked to that would do, I don't know” before saying words to the effect

Officers Tolone and Cecile that “we don't have anything to that he would “try and give the [911 caller] a call” and “see

statement.” Id. at 12:39. “you nervous,” to which he responded “yeah.” Id. at 32:00.

At approximately 7:50 p.m., Officer Cecile again informed

one of the other officers at the scene that he was going to 3. Criminal Investigations Division

contact the 911 caller “to see if they could give us a statement Officers Tolone and Cecile transported Plaintiff and Ms.

since they're all wasted, and then, you know, to [see] who hit Goldych from 941 James Street to CID. Dkt. No. 77-6 at 5.

him with it, because obviously they saw the whole thing.” Id. Officer Tolone placed Plaintiff in a holding room, where he

at 14:16. Officer Cecile then spoke with Ms. Bailey and asked remained detained for several hours. Dkt. No. 77-8 at 3.

if she could provide “an ID of who the suspect is, because

right now all we've got is three people that are intoxicated, At some point during the hours that Plaintiff was detained at

nobody's owning up to hit, hitting this, uh, gentlemen with CID, Detective Brimmer and a non-party detective appear to

a stick.” Id. at 14:50. Officer Cecile went on to ask “do you have traveled to 941 James Street to investigate the scene. See

remember what the, uh, what the guy that hit him with a stick Dkt. Nos. 77-13, 77-19. Detective Brimmer's police report

was wearing,” before repeating “a green shirt.” Id. at 16:01. indicates that he also reviewed the 911 call notes at this

Officer Cecile then clarified “the guy that got knocked out time. Dkt. No. 77-19 at 2. The non-party detective assisting

was, like, in his mid to late 20s, and it was, like, an older Detective Brimmer in canvassing the apartment building

guy, like 35 to 40, that hit him?” Id. at 16:43. After the call documented that one of the witnesses “stated that he did

ended, Officer Cecile shared with other officers on the scene not know the men who drank in the parking lot, but stated

that he had spoken with Ms. Bailey, and said that Mr. Bailey that he observed three men and one woman drinking beer in

had said the assailant “was wearing a green shirt, he's got a the lot this afternoon.” Dkt. No. 77-13 at 2. Once back at

green vest on,” to which another officer responded “yeah, it's CID, Detective Brimmer tried to speak with Ms. Goldych,

this guy,” presumably in reference to Plaintiff. Id. at 17:20. but determined that she “appeared extremely intoxicated” and

Officer Cecile then tried to call Ms. Bailey again, and asked “was unable to speak due to apparent intoxication.”7 Dkt.

if she would come back to identify the person she had seen No. 77-19 at 2. Detective Brimmer's police report states that

fighting with Mr. Jones. Id. at 18:30. Ms. Bailey did not agree “[b]ased on the 911 caller[’]s description of the incident”

to do so, in part because she had just “seen a fight, I don't want and Plaintiff's presence at the crime scene, “he was being

nobody looking for me or anything.” Id. at 18:45. considered a likely suspect.” Id. at 3.

While officers identified numerous video cameras that could Once Detective Brimmer returned to CID, he and Detective

contain footage of the incident, no such footage was retrieved. Beauchine moved Plaintiff into a small interrogation room

See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-16 at 24:15; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 86, at approximately 10:30 p.m. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 141; Dkt.

134, 316, 383-84. No. 77-21 at 0:00. Plaintiff remained in this room until he

was placed back in handcuffs at approximately 1:00 a.m. See

Shortly before 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff was removed from the generally Dkt. No. 77-21. Shortly after 10:30 p.m., Detective

police vehicle to be photographed by a non-party officer. Dkt. Brimmer read Plaintiff his Miranda rights. Dkt. No. 77-55

No. 77-16 at 31:11; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 113. During this at ¶ 154. Plaintiff proceeded to speak with the Detectives.

process, Officer Russell walked over and asked Plaintiff “you In response to Detective Brimmer's initial question about

being good Robert” and “how'd that thing go the other day “[w]hat happened over there, man,” Plaintiff stated “[w]ell,

when you shit your pants?”6 Id. at 31:22. Plaintiff appears what happened -- my nephew got into it with some guy. You

to have mumbled that he “got drunk.” Id. at 31:29. The non- know, and - - you know, they was fighting and stuff, you know.

party officer photographing Plaintiff directed him to ball his And I'm drunk. You know what, hey, here I am. That's what

hands up behind his back. Id. at 31:38. After leaning down happened.” Dkt. No. 77-22 at 6:18-23.

to examine Plaintiff's hands and knuckles—presumably for

blood or injuries—this officer did not photograph them. Id. *6 The parties dispute the extent of Plaintiff's intoxication

during the approximately two and half hours that he remained

*5 Plaintiff then exclaimed “I want to know what I did,” in the interrogation room. Sometime after approximately 1:00

to which Officer Russell responded “we're trying to figure a.m. on May 7, 2019, when Plaintiff's booking process began,

that out too.” Id. at 31:50. As the non-party officer placed his BAC was measured at 0.15 percent, or nearly twice the

supra n.4. According to one of Defendants’ retained experts Det. Brimmer: You were there. You were part of this.

(Robert L. Weisman, D.O.), the physiological effects of such a

Det. Beauchine: Yes.

BAC are that “[m]otor function, speech, and judgment are all

severely affected at this height of blood alcohol. Staggering, Det. Brimmer: So you should --

and slurred speech, may be observed.”8 Dkt. No. 77-52 at 10.

Plaintiff: That's what I'm saying.

Based on Dr. Weisman's review of numerous record materials

Det. Brimmer: -- you should know, then.

and his examination of Plaintiff in June 2024, his expert

psychiatric report contains several other findings that are Plaintiff: Okay. That's what I'm saying. Okay, I'm trying to

relevant for purposes of summary judgment. See generally tell y'all what happened. You telling me I'm lying.

id. First, Dr. Weisman determined that—when sober—“Mr.

Adams has deficits in his Miranda understanding, particularly Det. Beauchine: Well, let me put it to you like this. Okay?

regarding legally acceptable deceptive police practices as

Plaintiff: Oh, man. That --

well as other specific aspects of remaining silent versus

talking to the police.” Id. at 7, 9. Based on certain of Mr. Det. Beauchine: We got several people saying that you, all

Adams’ test scores—again, when sober—Dr. Weisman also right, got into an argument with this guy, and that you

concluded that Plaintiff's “basic understanding of Miranda” hit him with a stick. All right? Just hear me out. Hear me

ranked in the eighteenth percentile of pretrial defendants. Id. out. Okay? And that you hit him with a stick, and that

at 8-9. Defendants take the position in the Motion that “Dr. you hit him so hard that he got knocked out and went to

Weisman's opinions are unrebutted.” Dkt. No. 77-56 at 20. the ground.

Beyond the extent of Plaintiff's intoxication, the parties Plaintiff: No.

also dispute the voluntariness and significance of various

statements Plaintiff made during his interrogation by the Det. Beauchine: And so we're trying to verify whether or

Detectives. In sum, the Detectives refused to accept Plaintiff's not you intentionally hit him --

version of events, and instead told Plaintiff that video

*7 Plaintiff: No. No, no, no, no, no.

evidence, forensic evidence, and numerous witnesses all

established that he had fought Mr. Jones; Plaintiff just needed Det. Beauchine: -- because you're a predatory person who

to provide the details. See generally Dkt. No. 77-22. For wants to go out there and hurt people and do bad things

example: to people, or if this is just a family argument that went

awry and --

Det. Beauchine: Okay. Hit the reset button. All right, okay.

Plaintiff: No.

Det. Brimmer: Why don't we start at the beginning and tell

the truth? Det. Beauchine: Okay.

Plaintiff: That's the truth. Det. Brimmer: He ended up falling and hitting his head or

something.

Det. Brimmer: No.

Det. Beauchine: Right. And that's exact --

Det. Beauchine: No, it's not. Listen, listen. It's not. We can

do this over -- Plaintiff: Oh, no.

Plaintiff: Okay. Then you tell the truth, then. Okay? Det. Beauchine: -- that's (indiscernible).

Det. Beauchine: I don't need to tell the truth. You're the one Plaintiff: No.

that needs to --

Det. Beauchine: Okay. That's what we're facing, so did

Plaintiff: Well, well, I'm telling you what I -- I'm telling you -- was this something where you are a predator? You

what as far as I know.

Plaintiff: No. Plaintiff: I witnessed the thing.

Det. Beauchine: -- or whatever -- whatever you have Det. Brimmer: That story is not going to fly.

available to you? Or is this just something that just --

Det. Beauchine: Right. When people --

Plaintiff: I don't hurt nobody.

Det. Brimmer: It's not going to hold up.

Det. Beauchine: -- listen, listen. Or is this something where

you, a couple guys are having a couple drinks and some Det. Beauchine: -- when people see the video and they talk

shit is said, and it's a family matter and shit went south, to someone --

and it was more of an accident than anything else, or are

....

you intentionally going around doing stuff like this? This

is -- They're going to see you in a certain fashion. And that's

without you saying anything, right? So if you give your

Plaintiff: No.

side of the story, and give your thoughts, and what was

Det. Beauchine: Okay. Which of the -- going through your head at the time, listen, it puts people

in your perspective and in your shoes. Now, it doesn't --

Plaintiff: No. and here's what I would say. It --

Det. Beauchine: -- which of the two is it? Plaintiff: I didn't do nothing.

Plaintiff: Nothing. Not one. Det. Beauchine: Hold on, listen to me. It doesn't always

make it right.

Det. Beauchine: No, no. Which -- no, no, no. I'm --

Plaintiff: I'm telling you. I didn't do this.

Plaintiff: I just happened to be there.

Det. Beauchine: People will understand if you put them in

Det. Beauchine: You didn't just happen to be there. Okay? your shoes, and you can only do that by talking.

Plaintiff: I didn't even hit the guy. Plaintiff: I don't give a --

Det. Beauchine: Not with your hand. Det. Beauchine: By telling us.

Plaintiff: I hit nobody. Plaintiff: Well, I'm telling you.

Det. Beauchine: You say not with your hands, because Det. Beauchine: Yeah.

you're showing us your hands. We know that. All right?

We know that. Plaintiff: I'm telling you how it happened. Okay? I didn't --

Det. Brimmer: Listen, it was a mistake, and you didn't mean Det. Beauchine: Were you shooing him away with the stick,

for him to get hurt like that, that's a big difference than or did you mean to hurt him with the stick?

if you go out there trying to hurt people.

Plaintiff: No. No.

Plaintiff: I ain't hit him.

Det. Beauchine: What were you doing?

Det. Brimmer: It's a huge difference.

*8 Plaintiff: Wait a minute. You put -- you put words --

Plaintiff: I didn't. Man, I swear to God I didn't. I didn't.

Det. Beauchine: No, no, no. I'm asking you. It's a question.

Det. Brimmer: It's a huge difference.

Det. Brimmer: We're trying to get to the --

Plaintiff: I just happened to be there.

Plaintiff: -- you're putting words in my mouth.

Det. Brimmer: -- we're trying to get to the bottom of this. Plaintiff: No, man.

Plaintiff: I'm telling you. Charles was fighting this guy. Det. Beauchine: -- you get -- you had a problem with him

Okay? Next thing I know -- tonight.

Det. Beauchine: We're past that. We're past that. Alright? Plaintiff: No.

We're past that. We know.

Det. Beauchine: Or he had a problem with you, and you

Plaintiff: And -- were defending yourself, tell us.

Det. Beauchine: We're past that. All right? Listen, relax. Plaintiff: No, no, no, no.

Det. Brimmer: Just help us understand. Det. Brimmer: Did he start talking about Vanessa and upset

you?

Det. Beauchine: Help us understand what happened. All

right? Between you and Charles. Plaintiff: No.

Det. Brimmer: I mean, you got a wound on your face. That Det. Brimmer: No?

could be a defensive wound, you know. It could --

Det. Beauchine: You had a problem with him tonight.

Plaintiff: No. I ran into a tree being drunk.

Plaintiff: Me and Vanessa had walked up. They happen to

Det. Beauchine: Okay. So is it safe -- how often do you over sitting -- sitting down, drinking. And still we was

drink? drinking. Okay, next thing I know, they fighting. Really.

Really, man. Period.

Plaintiff: Hmm? Every day.

Det. Beauchine: Was this an accident or did you mean to

Det. Beauchine: Okay. Could this be -- hurt him?

Plaintiff: All day. (laughs) Plaintiff: Man -- I didn't hurt him.

Det. Beauchine: -- could this -- listen, could this be a Det. Beauchine: You meant to hurt him?

mistake between you and Charles --

Plaintiff: I never hurt him at all.

Plaintiff: No.

Det. Beauchine: It was an accident?

Det. Beauchine: -- because you were intoxicated and --

Plaintiff: Why do you -- why are you trying to put words

Plaintiff: No, no, no no. in my mouth? Okay? Huh?

Det. Beauchine: -- he was intoxicated? Det. Brimmer: We're not trying to. We just want to get to

the bottom of this.

Plaintiff: No, no, no, no, no, no, no. No, no, no, no. Really,

me and Charles ain't got no problem at all. Plaintiff: Man, where -- well, where the bottom -- we're at

the bottom of [sic]. I was telling you.

Det. Beauchine: Well, you did tonight.

Det. Brimmer: We're just going in circles.

Plaintiff: No. Hmm-mm.

Plaintiff: I didn't do nothing. I was a witness. That don't --

Det. Beauchine: You did.

this they got --

Plaintiff: No. No. No. Huh-uh.

Det. Brimmer We're just going in circles here....

Det. Beauchine: You might not want to think that you might

Id. at 51:2-59:19.

During the interrogation, Plaintiff's cellular phone rang. The (g) observed the events for which he was being questioned,

Detectives instructed Plaintiff not to answer the phone, to illustrated the ability to recall those same observations,

turn it off, and to place it on the table. Id. at 27:6-20. At and provided answers based upon those observations

approximately 11:14 p.m., just prior to the first break taken and recollections (even if, under certain circumstances,

during the interrogation, Detective Brimmer said that he Plaintiff was deceptive in his response); ....

was going to take Plaintiff's phone outside the room. Id.

(h) [had] the ability (or exhibited the ability) to

at 60:24-25; see also Dkt. No. 77-21b at 13:50. Plaintiff

communicate his answers truthfully, effectively, clearly

responded, “[m]an, give me my phone,” to which Detective

and coherently; ..... and

Brimmer replied “[n]o, it's going to sit out here.” Dkt.

No. 77-22 at 61:1-3. During this break, Plaintiff is visible (i) provided the answers of his own accord.

talking to himself and unsuccessfully trying to open the

interrogation room's door, which appears to have been Id. at 11-12, 12-13. In response to every one of these items,

deadbolted from the outside. Dkt. No. 77-21b at 14:00-17:00. Dr. Weisman concluded:

Plaintiff subsequently informed the Detectives that he was not

currently working because he had a “dual diagnosis” and that

his psychiatrist, counselor, and primary care doctor were all Initially, yes, but towards the latter

at the same local healthcare provider. Id. at 102:16-103:16; part of the ~1.5-hour interview, Mr.

see also United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 951 (11th Cir. Adams being under the combination of

2015) (“[D]ual diagnosis patients are those suffering from duress, fatigue, limitations of his legal

both substance abuse and acute mental disorders.”). knowledge, and some level of alcohol

intoxication, became emotionally and

*9 Plaintiff contends that he denied assaulting Mr. Jones cognitively distressed, resigned, and

nearly 200 times before the Detectives coerced him into compelled to offer the narrative of the

providing a false confession around midnight. Dkt. No. 85-2 crime being demanded of him.

at ¶¶ 570-71. During the subsequent break, Plaintiff can be

heard saying “I'm going to jail for something I didn't do,”9

Dkt. No. 77-21c at 8:49, and further talking to himself, see, Id. at 11-12, 12-13.

e.g., id. at 9:10, 11:23.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's eventual confession was 4. Police Reports

not coerced and not false. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 9, 25.

a. Detective Brimmer

Presumably to support this position, Defendants requested

According to the arrest report prepared by Detective Brimmer,

that Dr. Weisman opine on Plaintiff's capacity during the May

he and Detective Beauchine arrested Plaintiff at 12:00 a.m.

2019 interrogation. Dkt. No. 77-52 at 11, 12. As relevant

on May 7, 2019. Dkt. No. 77-23. The arrest report listed

here, Defendants requested that Dr. Weisman determine

Plaintiff as 55 years old, 5’7” tall, 160 pounds, and described

whether Plaintiff had the “proper requisite intellectual

his apparent condition as “Appeared Normal.” Id. The arrest

capacity and base intelligence level” and the “proper requisite

report included criminal charges against Plaintiff. Id.

psychological state and mental health capacity” to have:

.... Detective Brimmer also prepared a police report regarding

events on May 6 and 7, 2019, including his telephone

(c) understood the significance and context of the questions conversation with Ms. Bailey. Dkt. No. 77-19. The parties

being asked regarding the assault of Charles Jones; ... dispute what was said during this conversation on May 7,

2019.

....

According to Detective Brimmer's report, Ms. Bailey

(f) understood [the] significance and context of his answers

corroborated certain key details of Plaintiff's confession

to those questions with respect to the assault of Charles

during this conversation, including that the day before “she

Jones; ....

was hitting the other with a stick[;]” and “one of the subjects from the victim and then swing the

went down to the ground unresponsive and the other male large stick at [t]he victim's head which

was saying something about his nephew[.]” Id. at 3. Detective connected and knocked him to the

Brimmer also wrote that Ms. Bailey stated that “she called ground.

911 but walked away prior to EMS and Police arrival.” Id.

*10 According to a sworn affidavit provided by Ms. Bailey, Id. As for Plaintiff's appearance, Officer Cecile described him

she never said many of the statements Detective Brimmer as “an older black male in a grayish/teal puffy jacket and green

attributed to her, including that she “never used the word pants[.]” Id.

‘punch’ because I did not see either of the two individuals

punching[;]” “never told Detective Brimmer that the man

helping the victim was the who hit the victim. The person who c. Officer Tolone

hit the victim ran away. The victim was unresponsive and the Officer Tolone's police report, dated May 6, 2019, listed

older man told me the victim was his nephew. The older man Plaintiff as 55 years old, provided no height or weight, and

asked me to call 911[;]” “never told Detective Brimmer that described his apparent condition as “Normal.” Dkt. No. 77-8

the older man was involved in this fight[;]” and “[t]he police at 4.

arrived while I was on the phone with 911 and I spoke to a

lady officer. I did not tell Detective Brimmer that I left before In the narrative portion of his report, Officer Tolone wrote

the police arrived.” Dkt. No. 85-10 at ¶¶ 6-9. Ms. Bailey that “[p]rior to our arrival dispatch advised us that our caller,

further stated that Detective Brimmer's report “contains false Jordan Bailey who refused to speak with us regarding this

statements. I never told him that I witnessed anyone punching. incident, stated to the call taker that she saw two males

I never told him that the older man who called the victim his fighting, one wearing a green jump suit, and then saw

nephew was involved in the fight. I never told him that I left someone get struck with a stick and then saw the man on

before the police arrived.” Id. at ¶ 10. the ground.” Id. at 2. With respect to Plaintiff's detention,

Officer Tolone wrote that “Adams was detained at this time

for suspicion that he was in deed [sic] the suspect in this

b. Officer Cecile incident however, when we initially arrived on scene Adams

Officer Cecile's police report, dated May 6, 2019, listed stated there was another male that started a fight with Jones.”

Plaintiff as 55 years old, 5’7” tall, 160 pounds, and described Id. As for Plaintiff's appearance, Officer Tolone wrote that

his apparent condition as “Impaired Alcohol.” Dkt. No. 77-6 “Adams, at the time contact was made, was wearing green

at 2. pants and a grey / green vest.” Id.

In the narrative portion of his report, Officer Cecile stated that

“while in route, dispatch notes read that there was a fight in d. Other Police Reports

progress between two people with one person [ ] unconscious Officer Russell prepared a short report, also dated May 6,

on the ground, the other person was wearing a green sweat suit 2019, with a brief narrative that does not mention Ms. Bailey

and there is a very large stick involved.” Id. at 5. With respect or Plaintiff, or Officer Russell's interactions with either of

to Plaintiff's detention, Officer Cecile wrote “[b]ased on the them. Dkt. No. 77-7 at 2.

notes from dispatch and lack of cooperation for Goldych and

Adams, both were detained at this time.” Id. As for his call Following Plaintiff's interrogation at CID, a non-party

with Ms. Bailey, Officer Cecile wrote: officer photographed Plaintiff in the interrogation room

and collected his clothing early in the morning of May 7,

2019. Dkt. No. 77-10. This officer catalogued Plaintiff's

Bailey stated that she witnessed the clothing as consisting of a “Black winter coat[,]” “Grey pants

fight between the victim and suspect ... with belt[,]” “Blue/green/white striped shirt[,]” “Blue Puma

Bailey stated that the suspect was an sneakers[,]” and a “Baseball Hat (Grey, green Bird Game

old black male wearing a green jump logo)[.]” Id. at 3.

suit. Bailey stated that she saw the

5. Criminal Prosecution Dkt. No. 77-39 at ¶ 22.

In the weeks after the events of May 6, 2019, Officer Cecile,

Detective Brimmer, and Ms. Bailey testified before a grand Soon after, an investigator from the DA's Office contacted

jury in Onondaga County. Dkt. No. 77-25. The grand jury Ms. Bailey. Dkt. No. 77-34 at 1. On January 16, 2020, Ms.

subsequently indicted Plaintiff10 for (i) assault in the first Bailey provided a voluntary affidavit that stated in relevant

degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10(1); (ii) part:

assault in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law

[Investigator Tim Galanaugh] asked if I would be willing

§ 120.05(2); and (iii) criminal possession of a weapon in the

to come down to his office and meet with Mr. Coolican, the

third degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(1). Dkt.

prosecutor, and see if I would watch some video footage

No. 77-26 at 1. Plaintiff remained detained in jail pending

that they had. He also made me aware that the police had

trial. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 309, 382.

made an arrest of an individual the day of the [May 6, 2019]

incident. I told him that I would be willing to come down

*11 Mr. Jones died in the hospital on August 18, 2019.

and speak to them, and help in any way because I was

Dkt. No. 85-15. A medical examiner ruled Mr. Jones’ death a

unaware that the victim had died.

homicide as a result of complications from being struck in the

head “with a large stick containing imbedded nails.” Id. at 1, Back in May, when everything had happened, I initially

2. After Mr. Jones’ death, it appears that the criminal charges called 911 for a man that was trying to assist the victim.

against Plaintiff could have been increased from assault to That man that I am speaking about was African American

manslaughter.11 Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 372-74. and told me that the victim was his nephew. I stayed on

the scene with my siblings until the police officers arrived.

On August 19 and 20, 2019, ADA Michael Manfredi I gave information to the 911 person telling them that the

offered Plaintiff, through his court-appointed counsel, “a suspect that was responsible had run down James Street

plea to Manslaughter in the first with a sentence of 12 towards downtown. I told the dispatch person that the

years Determinate.” Dkt. No. 77-28 at 2, 1. On October 8, suspect was African American and over 6 foot tall and

2019, ADA Manfredi reiterated to Plaintiff's court-appointed was wearing dark green. As the officers showed up they

counsel that the “[o]ffer remains Man 1st with 12 years started talking to the older guy that was kneeling next to

determinate.” Id. at 1. his nephew. They wanted him to step back from the victim.

I told the female officer that he had nothing to do with it.

On January 9, 2020, Plaintiff's court-appointed counsel made There was a[ ]lot going on at the time and I didn't want to

a bail application on behalf on Plaintiff, in part on the basis get more involved so I walked away with my siblings. At

that: the time, I felt that I had cooperated enough by reporting it

and I didn't want to involve myself or my siblings in what

appeared to me at the time to be a fight between two guys

that ended with one being knocked out with a stick. When

We have had an opportunity to

the police officers contacted me 30 minutes or so later to

review much of the evidence against

see if I would come back to the scene to try to identify

[Plaintiff] and the defense believes

someone, I didn't want to get involved. I was scared that

there is significant evidence that

it would jeopardize my safety and my siblings[’] safety so

the People have the wrong man

I told the police officers that I didn't want to do anymore

in jail. Despite what the People

than what I had done to help already.

have presented as a “confession”, the

defense believes that the evidence *12 ....

will show that it is a psychologically

coerced false confession. There is This is what I remember about the incident today: That I

no indication there are any witnesses had been leaving Bryant and Stratton on James Street and

identifying him at the scene. In fact the observed two African American men that appeared to be

opposite. The People's case is weak. about to fight. Me and my siblings w[ ]ere almost walking

right through where this was occurring. The victim had a

grabs the stick and snatches the stick from the victim. The dismissed until September 15, 2020. Id. at ¶ 404.

suspect then swings the stick at the victim with one hand

towards his upper body. I couldn't tell where it connected

or if he followed up with an elbow. All I seen is the victim a. Plaintiff's Capacity

stumble and drop to the ground. Suspect then tosses the On February 13, 2020, the judge presiding over Plaintiff's

stick. The suspect then goes to the pa[ ]nts pocket of the criminal prosecution ordered Plaintiff's capacity evaluated

victim, takes a cell phone out and smashes it onto the pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 730.

pavement. Then the suspect takes off running down the Dkt. No. 77-35 at 1 (stating that “the Court being of the

sidewalk on James Street towards downtown. opinion that the defendant may be an incapacitated person” an

examination is ordered “to determine whether said defendant,

I didn't see where the suspect had run to because I then as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks capacity to

focused my attention on the victim on the ground. That's understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own

the same time when I noticed the older man get off the defense”).

stones by the Chestnut Apartments sign and walk over to

his nephew to check on him. I remember telling him that he *13 Two physicians subsequently examined Plaintiff and

should help get him up off the ground. The victim wasn't issued their reports on August 27, 2020. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶

moving and looked like he had been knocked out, but after 391-92, 395. As relevant here, the first physician concluded

a few moments of looking at him more closely I told the that “although suffering from Alcohol Use Disorder,”

older man that he, the victim, didn't look so good. That[’]s Plaintiff “at the time of this evaluation, did not as a result of

when the uncle asked me to call 911, so I did. I stayed with mental disease or defect lack the capacity to understand the

the uncle until the police arrived, but like I said, I walked proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.” Id. at

off shortly after with my siblings because we didn't want ¶ 394. The second physician similarly concluded that Plaintiff

to get more involved. “is not currently suffering from a mental illness which would

cause him to lack the capacity to understand the proceedings

Today, at around 1045 AM, I met Mr. Coolican and against him or to assist his counsel in his own defense” and

Investigator Galanaugh at the D.A.’s Office. They had me that Plaintiff, “at the time of this evaluation, did not as a result

watch some video footage from one of the officer's body of mental disease o[r] defect lack the capacity to understand

cameras when they showed up at the scene. In the video the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.”

I saw the victim on the ground and the African American Id. at ¶ 398.

man, who told me the victim was his nephew, kneeling next

to him wearing a gray baseball hat. You can hear me talking

in the video telling the female officer that the victim was 6. Additional Investigation by CID

hit with the stick. On January 29, 2020, prior to Plaintiff's release from jail, two

non-party detectives returned to 941 James Street to obtain

I showed Mr. Coolican w[here] the victim's cell phone can video footage of the incident that had occurred nearly nine

be seen in the video laying on the pavement, smashed. I months earlier. Id. at ¶ 383. Their investigation obtained no

was told by Mr. Coolican and Investigator Galanaugh that such footage, id. at ¶ 384, and determined that none of a dozen

the person that was arrested in this incident, was the man nearby businesses retained such footage for longer than three

that told me that the victim was his nephew. The person that months, Dkt. No. 77-31 at 2. The two detectives also made

the police arrested was not the suspect that I saw fighting efforts at this time to locate individuals previously mentioned

with the victim, and causing the victim to be hurt with the by Plaintiff and Ms. Goldych, including “the ‘Pete’ mentioned

stick. I saw that suspect run from the scene after smashing in BWC [footage from the Responding Officers], but without

the victim's phone on the ground. success.” Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 385-86.

Id. at 1-2; see also Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 380-81.

Forensic evidence recovered from items collected at 941

James Street—apparently including multiple drink containers

Plaintiff was not released from jail until February 12, 2020,

as well as Mr. Jones’ smashed phone—was linked to an

more than nine months after his arrest on May 6, 2019. Dkt.

individual whose first name is Pierre. Dkt. No. 85-1 at ¶ 56;

do have forensic evidence indicating that he may have been D]etectives during that interview were

present at the time of the incident or in the hours preceding lawful and proper.

it.” Dkt. No. 77-50 at 123:24-124:9.

A September 2020 internal memorandum from the Syracuse *14 Id. at 9. The Report ultimately concluded that:

Police Department (“Memo”) states that such evidence

“strongly suggests, at a minimum, Pierre [ ] was onscene

at some point that day [May 6, 2019], and drinking with

Mr. Adams[’] claim that he was

the group” and notes that Pierre “is listed as much bigger

arrested and charge[d] for a crime he

than Adams ([ ] - 6’00”, 220 lbs.), and closer resembles

did not commit is true. However, after

that of the suspect description initially provided to 911 by

reviewing this case and based on the

Jordan Bailey.” Dkt. No. 85-11 at 28. When provided with the

evidence shown, there is no evidence

opportunity to speak with CID, Pierre apparently declined to

to show wrong doing on behalf of

do so. Id. Another internal document from the Syracuse Police any of the Syracuse Police Officers

Department indicates that while Pierre had been identified as involved. The interview conducted

“a person of interest,” “there is no proof beyond a reasonable

by Det. Beauchine and then Det.

doubt suggesting [Pierre] is the primary suspect at this time.” Brimmer was lawful and proper. There

Id. at 7-8. The Memo notes that the investigation of Mr. Jones’ was no violation of any rules and

death “will now be considered ‘unsolved’.” Id. at 30. regulations by Det. Beauchine or Det.

Sgt. Brimmer, or any officer. The basis

for Mr. Adams being charged with this

C. Prior Proceedings

crime was due to his own admission

1. Citizen Review Board and the lack of cooperation from the

In April 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant original eye witness. Therefore, this

City's Citizen Review Board in connection with his arrest and complaint is unsubstantiated.

interrogation. Dkt. No. 85-11 at 14-21. The Syracuse Police

Department's Internal Affairs Division assigned a sergeant to

investigate Plaintiff's complaint and prepare a case report. Id. Id. at 12.

at 1-13 (“Report”). The sergeant's investigation included an

interview with a deputy police chief. Id. at 8-9. The sergeant In the course of reaching these conclusions, the sergeant also

included the following information from that conversation in briefly spoke with the Detectives. Id. at 11-12. According to

the Report: Detective Brimmer, “Mr. Adams did not appear excessively

intoxicated during the interview” that began on May 6, 2019.

Id. at 11. Detective Beauchine similarly “stated [that] he

I addressed the complaints made did not feel Mr. Adams was excessively intoxicated” during

by Mr. Adams of the false arrest the interview. Id. at 12. Detective Brimmer also shared that

as well as being interviewed while “Mr. Adams would not have been under arrest without the

intoxicated. Deputy Chief [ ] was able confession.” Id. at 11.

to explain there is case law which

supports interviewing a person who is The sergeant, the sergeant's supervisor, a bureau chief, the

intoxicated. The only limitation to this first deputy chief, and the chief of police are all listed as

is if the person being interviewed is March 2022 signatories to the Report. Id. at 13.

intoxicated to the point of being in

a manic state. Deputy Chief [ ] also

informed me it is a matter of training 2. New York Court of Claims

that detectives are trained on the Plaintiff previously filed a notice of claim in the New

fact that interviewing an intoxicated York Court of Claims. Dkt. No. 63-1. Defendants examined

require submission to a [factfinder] or whether it is so one-

D. Procedural History sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson

Plaintiff commenced this action in June 2021. Dkt. No. 1. v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in July 2021. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “When analyzing a summary

Dkt. No. 7. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against judgment motion, the court ‘cannot try issues of fact; it can

one individual defendant and otherwise opposed the motion. only determine whether there are issues to be tried.’ ” Galeotti

Dkt. Nos. 9, 16. v. Cianbro Corp., No. 12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 3207312, at *4

(N.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy

In March 2022, United States Senior District Judge Lawrence Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1994)).

E. Kahn partially granted and partially denied Defendants’

motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 19. Judge Kahn observed Defendant, in seeking summary judgment, “bears the burden

that “[i]f the facts alleged by Plaintiff are true, Plaintiff's of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists

detainment amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice.” and that the undisputed facts establish [its] right to judgment

Id. at 1. Judge Kahn dismissed Plaintiff's second, sixth, as a matter of law.” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d

seventh, and ninth claims, as well as another individual 1051, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). To determine

defendant, and denied the balance of Defendants’ motion. Id. whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must

at 1-18. Discovery proceeded, with the parties requesting and resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences

receiving numerous extensions. See generally Docket Sheet. against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

In January 2024, United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); accord Gibbs-Alfano v. Burton, 281

Katz denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint to add F.3d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 2002). A “material” fact is one that

two individual defendants, but granted Plaintiff's request to would “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

dismiss his claims against three other individual defendants. law,” and a dispute about a genuine issue of material fact

Dkt. No. 64. occurs if the evidence is such that “a reasonable [factfinder]

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,

The Motion was fully submitted in April 2025. Dkt. Nos. 77, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; accord R.B. Ventures, Ltd.

85, 90. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court should

“grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is

merely colorable, conclusory, speculative or not significantly

E. Plaintiff's Claims

probative.” Schwimmer v. Kaladjian, 988 F. Supp. 631, 638

Plaintiff's remaining claims,12 see Dkt. No. 19, are as (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

follows: pursuant to Section 1983, (i) false arrest against 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

the Individual Defendants, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 41-47; (ii)

malicious prosecution against Defendants, id. at ¶¶ 63-71; (iii)

fabricated evidence against Defendants, id. at ¶¶ 72-80; (iv) IV. DISCUSSION

a Monell claim against Defendant City, id. at ¶¶ 52-62; and, The Court addresses the parties’ specific arguments with

pursuant to New York law, (v) false arrest against Defendants, respect to the remaining claims below. Given the disputed

id. at ¶¶ 91-93; and (vi) negligent supervision, etc., against factual record as to many aspects of Plaintiff's claims, the

Defendants, id. at ¶¶ 97-100. Court finds it appropriate to reiterate the Second Circuit's

guidance in another case involving Section 1983 claims for

false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabricated evidence, and

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW related Monell liability:

*15 Summary judgment is properly granted only if, upon

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the

We write because the district

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

court improperly granted summary

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

judgment to defendants. The record

322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Richardson v.

before us reveals evidence from

of the individual police officers otherwise privileged.” Id. (quoting Ashley v. City of New York,

prepared a false report and initiated a 992 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021)). “Under both federal and

prosecution of plaintiff[ ] predicated New York state law, probable cause is a complete defense

on this manufactured evidence. We to a false arrest claim.” Carruthers v. Colton, 153 F.4th 169,

also write to emphasize a larger 179 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th

issue raised by this case. Plaintiff[ ] 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2022)); see also Grice v. McVeigh, 873

allege[s] that the defendant police F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff]’s unlawful arrest

officers lied and fabricated evidence. claim fails because his handcuffing was an ‘investigatory

While we do not know whether the detention’ (otherwise known as a ‘Terry stop’) that never

accusations can be sustained, we do ripened into an arrest and was supported by reasonable

know that such accusations must be suspicion.”). “Probable cause to arrest a person exists if

carefully reviewed. Lying is wrong, the law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of

and if the police lie while acting the circumstances, has sufficient knowledge or reasonably

in their official capacity, they also trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable

violate the public trust. Courts must caution in believing that an offense has been or is being

ensure that such serious accusations committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v.

receive appropriate scrutiny lest our Hawkins, 37 F.4th 854, 858 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting United

Court appears to endorse such States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1990)).

official misconduct, which would

weaken the public's respect for the As detailed earlier, after several minutes of questioning by

administration of justice. In making numerous officers, Plaintiff was handcuffed and put into the

these remarks, we emphasize that we back of a police vehicle in front of 941 James Street at

have reached no conclusions about approximately 7:34 p.m. on May 6, 2019. See supra Section

whether the plaintiff[’s] accusations II.B.2. Plaintiff was eventually transported to CID shortly

can be substantiated. It will be for after 8:00 p.m., where he remained detained until his custodial

a jury to determine at trial whether interrogation began at approximately 10:30 p.m. See supra

plaintiff[ ] ha[s] proved [his] very Section II.B.3. Plaintiff was held in the interrogation room

serious charges. until approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 7, 2019, when he was

placed back in handcuffs and his booking process began. Id.

Plaintiff was then detained for more than nine months, until

*16 Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 125 (2d his eventual release on February 12, 2020. See supra Section

Cir. 1997). While the Court addresses the parties’ significant II.B.5.

factual disputes in detail below, it similarly reaches no

conclusions at this stage regarding whether Plaintiff will Plaintiff's opposition to the Motion does not challenge

ultimately be able to prove his surviving claims. his detention and questioning by officers prior to being

handcuffed at approximately 7:34 p.m.13 See, e.g., Dkt.

No. 85 at 10; see also Dkt. No. 77-56 at 12-13. And

A. False Arrest under Section 1983 and New York law Defendants only seek summary judgment on the portions of

“A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Plaintiff's false arrest claims that relate to his “pre-confession

Amendment right of an individual to be free from detainment” and “post-confession arrest,” not his subsequent

unreasonable seizures[,] is substantially the same as a claim months-long detention. Compare Dkt. No. 77-56 at 12, with

for false arrest under New York law.” Alexander v. City of Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 92-93; see also Dkt. No. 7-2 at 13-14;

Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129, 156 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration in Dkt. No. 19 at 9-10. The Court thus focuses its analysis on

original) (quoting Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158 Plaintiff's detention at 941 James Street on May 6, 2019, his

(2d Cir. 2021)). And “[u]nder New York law, to prevail on formal arrest at CID on May 7, 2019, and the five or so hours

a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that (1) the that he remained detained in between.

defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff

was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not

1. Plaintiff's Detention at 941 James Street not handcuffs were used.[’]”) (quoting United States v. Perea,

*17 Defendants first contend that Plaintiff's false 986 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1993)).

arrest claims should fail because—although Plaintiff was

handcuffed, placed in the back of a police vehicle, transported By approximately 7:34 p.m., Plaintiff had already been

from his home to a police station approximately 30 minutes questioned for several minutes by multiple officers at the

later, and detained for hours—he was not actually under scene. See supra Section II.B.2.a.ii. Plaintiff had informed

arrest during this time. Instead, Defendants argue, the officers that he did not assault Mr. Jones (which Ms. Bailey

approximately five-hour seizure of Plaintiff prior to his had also said); that the person who assaulted Mr. Jones had

formal arrest merely constituted an investigative stop and run down James Street (which Ms. Bailey had said as well);

only required reasonable suspicion. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 13, that the assailant was a black man named “Pete” (which

16 (stating that “only reasonable suspicion was required” to Ms. Goldych had also said); and that Plaintiff lived in

detain Plaintiff at 941 Adams Street and Defendants “had one of the apartments at 941 James Street. Id. Defendants

ample reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff”); id. at 17, acknowledge that “the entire interaction was peaceful” prior

18 (stating that “Plaintiff's pre-confession detainment at CID to Plaintiff's handcuffing, Dkt. No. 77-56 at 15, and Officer

was merely a continuation of his on-scene detainment” and Tolone testified that he did not feel his safety was at issue,

“the detainment was supported by reasonable suspicion”); Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 510. Throughout this time, Plaintiff did

Dkt. No. 90 at 6 (stating that, as to Plaintiff's interrogation, not interfere with the investigation, continued answering

“Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was being detained questions from officers, and made no effort to leave the scene.

requiring only reasonable suspicion”). See supra Section II.B.2.a.ii. Indeed, BWC footage shows

Plaintiff sitting down and speaking with Officer Russell

This is a particularly weak argument given applicable law and seconds before Officer Tolone directed him to stand up and

the facts of this case.14 See, e.g., United States v. Lefebvre, turn around. Dkt. No. 77-17 at 4:34. Officer Tolone then

117 F.4th 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2024) (“There were several factors handcuffed Plaintiff and informed Plaintiff that he was being

present during th[is] seizure that, in many situations, this detained. Id. Officer Tolone proceeded to place Plaintiff into

Court would consider to be evidence that a seizure had indeed the back of one of the multiple police vehicles parked in front

become a de facto arrest. [Plaintiff]’s ‘freedom of movement of Plaintiff's home. Id. at 5:08.

was restrained’ and ‘handcuffs were used.’ ... [T]he encounter

lasted roughly 20 minutes.... [Plaintiff]’s transportation to *18 Given this factual record, a reasonable juror could

a police station, instead of some of other reasonable third conclude that Plaintiff was arrested at this time. Grice, 873

location, would in many situations clearly establish that the F.3d at 167. As the authority upon which Defendants rely,

seizure had ripened into a de facto arrest.”) (citations omitted) Dkt. No. 77-56 at 15, makes clear, “[h]andcuffing is ordinarily

(collecting cases). The Court agrees with Plaintiff, Dkt. No. not incident to a Terry stop, and tends to show that a stop

85 at 8-9, that Defendants’ maximalist position regarding has ripened into an arrest,” Grice, 873 F.3d at 167. See

their multi-hour detention of Plaintiff is unsupported by also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir.

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see, e.g., United States 2004) (“Handcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of

v. Candelario, 486 F. App'x 907, 908 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It a formal arrest.”) (collecting cases). Moreover, Defendants

is well established that ‘a police officer may briefly detain have failed to demonstrate the applicability of any of the

an individual for questioning if the officer has a reasonable “certain unusual circumstances” when “handcuffing a suspect

suspicion that the individual is, has been, or is about to be to investigate a reasonable suspicion does not transform a

engaged in criminal activity.’ ”) (emphasis added) (quoting Terry stop into an arrest.” Grice, 873 F.3d at 168 (collecting

United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2008)). cases); see also Dkt. No. 77-56 at 15-16. As just discussed,

See also Grice, 873 F.3d at 167 (“In general, to determine nothing in the record indicates concern about officer safety.

whether a Terry stop is so intrusive as to become an arrest, we The balance of Defendants’ cursory arguments about why

look to: [‘]the amount of force used by police, the need for Plaintiff purportedly needed to be handcuffed and placed in

such force, and the extent to which the individual's freedom the back of a police vehicle are unpersuasive. United States

of movement was restrained, and in particular such factors as v. Fiseku, 915 F.3d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]o satisfy

the number of agents involved, whether the target of the stop the reasonableness standard, officers conducting stops on less

was suspected of being armed, the duration of the stop, and than probable cause must employ the least intrusive means

purposes.”) (quoting Newton, 369 F.3d at 674). individual on scene that matched Ms. Bailey's description.”

Dkt. No. 77-56 at 14. But a reasonable juror could readily

conclude that Plaintiff did not match Ms. Bailey's description.

2. Probable Cause As the parties agree, the 911 call notes described the assailant

Defendants next argue that, regardless of when Plaintiff was as 25 to 35 years old, 6’3” tall, with a “med[ium] build,”

arrested, they had probable cause to arrest him for assault15 and “black male.” Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 77-4

within moments of arriving at 941 James Street. Dkt. No. at 3. At the time, Plaintiff was 55 years old, 5’7” tall, and

77-56 at 12-18. weighed approximately 160 pounds. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 90-1

at ¶ 515. Defendants’ own observations and descriptions of

This argument is also unconvincing, again given applicable Plaintiff are consistent with these attributes. See, e.g., Dkt.

law and the facts of this case. “To assess probable cause, No. 77-6 at 2 (Officer Cecile's police report listing Plaintiff's

a court considers only the facts ‘available to the officer at age as 55, height as 5’7,” and weight as 160); Dkt. No. 77-23

the time of the arrest and immediately before it.’ ” Ashley, (Detective Brimmer's arrest report listing the same); Dkt. No.

992 F.3d at 136 (quoting Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 77-8 at 4 (Officer Tolone's police report listing Plaintiff's

89 (2d Cir. 2013)). The parties largely agree on the basic age as 55); Dkt. No. 77-16 at 4:11 (Officer Russell's BWC

information known to the Responding Officers at the time footage showing her asking Plaintiff for his birthdate, prior

Plaintiff was handcuffed:16 the 911 call notes, Plaintiff's to his arrest, and being told the date in 1964), 18:26 (Officer

presence at the scene, and some blood on Plaintiff's lip. Dkt. Russell's BWC footage showing her providing Plaintiff's

No. 77-56 at 13-14; Dkt. No. 85 at 14-15. The parties dispute birthdate to another officer); Dkt. No. 77-25 at 7:5-11 (Officer

the factual contours of much of that information, however, as Cecile testifying that he thought Plaintiff was in his “[l]ate

well as its legal significance. 50s or early 60s” “just going by looking at [him]”).

Defendants’ arguments regarding probable cause miss the The only portion of Plaintiff's physical attributes that

forest for the trees. When evaluating probable cause, the “matched” Ms. Bailey's description of the suspect is that

Second Circuit has “consistently held, as relevant here, that Plaintiff was also “a black male.” Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 18.

‘an officer may not disregard plainly exculpatory evidence.’ A reasonable juror could conclude that this fails to provide

” Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2022) reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Plaintiff, let alone

(quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g., United States v. Walker,

2006)). Defendants were repeatedly informed that the black 965 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2020) (“As we have repeatedly

man who assaulted Mr. Jones was no longer present at the said, ‘race, when considered by itself and sometimes even

scene. See supra Section II.B.2.a. Ms. Bailey told the 911 in tandem with other factors, does not generate reasonable

dispatcher that this third man had assaulted the victim and suspicion for a stop.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Swindle,

had run off, but that the victim and his uncle were still there. 407 F.3d 562, 569-70 (2d Cir. 2005)); Zuniga-Perez v.

Id. The 911 call notes indicated that the suspect was “last Sessions, 897 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2018) (“As the Supreme

seen wearing” a green sweatsuit. Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 18. Court has made abundantly clear, stopping and interrogating

Ms. Bailey again told Officer Russell—as Officer Russell people based solely on race or ethnicity violates the Fourth

stood next to Plaintiff, possibly within earshot of Officer Amendment.”) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

Cecile as he approached—that the assailant who hit Mr. U.S. 873, 885-86, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975));

Jones was someone other than Plaintiff and had run off. See Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[A]

supra Section II.B.2.a. Plaintiff separately told Responding description of race and gender alone will rarely provide

Officers that the assailant had run off, that his name was reasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure.”)

Pete, and that he was a black man. Id. Ms. Goldych also (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir.

indicated that the man's name was Pete. Id. Defendants simply 2000)); Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 90 (“It has long been established,

ignore the existence of this third man, identified by multiple however, that when that description could have applied to any

eyewitnesses at the scene (and subsequently confirmed by number of persons and does not single out the person arrested,

forensic evidence). See Dkt. No. 77-56 at 12-18; see also Dkt. probable cause does not exist.”) (collecting cases); see also

No. 77-50 at 123:24-124:9; Dkt. No. 85-11 at 28. supra n.13.

description Ms. Bailey had provided, in that “his hat, shirt, reasonable suspicion to detain him, let alone probable cause

and pants all appeared to be different shades of green.” Dkt. to arrest him. See Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338,

No. 77-56 at 13-14. This characterization is unsupported by 350 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Viewing the evidence in the light most

the BWC footage from the Responding Officers, which a favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that

reasonable juror could conclude shows Plaintiff wearing a the police arrested [plaintiff] based on little more than a

grey hat, a white striped shirt, grey pants, and a puffy black witness's statement that he wore a similar shirt to that of one of

patterned jacket, none matching. See generally Dkt. Nos. [the victims’] attackers. Although a jury could also interpret

77-15, 77-16, 77-17. Defendants’ claim is also contradicted the evidence differently, the record presents genuine issues

by the assessment from the non-party officer who cataloged of material fact that preclude the conclusion that there was

Plaintiff's clothing as consisting of a “Baseball Hat (Grey, probable cause as a matter of law and that, instead, require a

green Bird Game logo)[,]” “Blue/green/white striped shirt[,]” trial on the merits.”); see also supra n.13.

“Grey pants with belt[,]” and a “Black winter coat[.]” Dkt.

No. 77-10 at 3. In any event, the varied articles of clothing Defendants’ argument regarding Plaintiff's presence at the

Plaintiff wore on May 6, 2019 are not indisputably a “green scene fares no better. See, e.g., United States v. Delossantos,

sweatsuit,” like Ms. Bailey had described. Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 536 F.3d 155, 160 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] person's presence

18. And Ms. Bailey never described the suspect wearing any at a crime scene or association with criminal suspects do

hat at all, Dkt. No. 77-5, let alone a hat with prominent neon not, without more, amount to probable cause to arrest.”);

lettering, like the one Plaintiff had on his head when Officer Dufort, 874 F.3d at 350 (“Police do not have particularized

Russell arrived, walked over to Plaintiff and Ms. Bailey, and probable cause to make an arrest simply because a suspect

began speaking with them, Dkt. No. 77-16 at 0:00. Given this has suspicious acquaintances, or happens to be at the scene

factual record, Defendants have not established that Plaintiff's of a crime[.]”) (citation omitted); Curry v. City of Syracuse,

clothing “matched” the description of the suspect such that 316 F.3d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n individual's presence

they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is

not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion

*20 At best, Defendants’ argument is that they had probable that the person is committing a crime.”) (quoting Illinois v.

cause to arrest Plaintiff because some of his clothing may have Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d

had some green. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive 570 (2000)). Plaintiff was present in front of the apartment

given the Second Circuit's analysis in Dancy v. McGinley. In building where he lived and, as detailed earlier, Defendants

that Section 1983 case, police officers received a description were repeatedly informed that the assailant was another man

of a robbery suspect as simply “[t]hin black male, brown who had already left the scene. Mitchell v. City of New York,

jacket.” 843 F.3d at 99. Minutes later, officers stopped, and 841 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he failure to make a

ultimately arrested, two teenagers near the crime scene, one further inquiry when a reasonable person would have done so

of whom was wearing a “camouflage-patterned coat, with may be evidence of lack of probable cause.”) (quoting Colon

green, light green, and brown patches.” Id. at 100, 101. As v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455

relevant here, the panel reasoned that there was not even N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (1983)).

reasonable suspicion to stop this teenager, who “was indeed

thin, black, and male. But, unlike the description, he was As to the blood on Plaintiff's lip, in response to Officer

wearing a camouflage-patterned coat.” Id. at 109. The Circuit Russell's question, Ms. Bailey can be heard explaining that

went on to explain that “[w]hile such a discrepancy does not “he was hit too in the whole altercation, you see that stick he

necessarily defeat a finding of reasonable suspicion ... the was hit with that.” Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 12; see also Dkt. No.

remaining description—thin, black, and male—is too vague 77-16 at 0:05.

in the circumstances here to justify a stop of anyone meeting

it[.]” Id. (citations omitted) (collecting cases). In sum, the totality of the circumstances proffered by

Defendants fails to establish an undisputed factual record on

A reasonable juror could reach a similar conclusion here. which to grant summary judgment. Delossantos, 536 F.3d at

Plaintiff's age, height, and build were nothing like the physical 161. A reasonable juror could find that Defendants lacked

description Defendants received for the suspect. Further, probable cause to arrest Plaintiff at approximately 7:34 p.m.

Plaintiff's clothes, in color and type, did not constitute a on May 6, 2019.

undertook various investigative efforts at 941 James Street

3. Subsequent Information after handcuffing Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 15-16. But

Defendants go on to argue that, between handcuffing Plaintiff Defendants identify no relevant additional information from

and formally arresting him approximately five hours later, these efforts. Id. Instead, Defendants take the position that

they obtained additional information that provided them the Responding Officers had “ample” probable cause to arrest

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 15-21. Plaintiff because “[a]t the conclusion of th[eir] investigation,

Because a reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff nothing excluded Plaintiff as the assailant. In other words,

had been arrested at approximately 7:34 p.m., however, this no eye-witness exonerated Plaintiff ... and there was no

subsequent information is not relevant to analyzing probable available surveillance evidence.” Id. at 16. Defendants cite

cause. See, e.g., Carruthers, 153 F.4th at 179 (“To assess no legal authority for the proposition that unless a person

probable cause, a court considers only the facts ‘available to is “exonerated” by an eyewitness or video evidence at the

the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before scene of a crime, there is probable cause to arrest them. Cf.

it.’ ”) (quoting Ashley, 992 F.3d at 136); Gonzalez v. City of Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (“This argument—an ill-conceived

Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The inquiry attempt to erect a legal barricade to shield police officials

is limited to ‘whether the facts known by the arresting officer from liability—is built on the most fragile of foundations; it is

at the time of the arrest objectively provided probable cause based on an incorrect analysis of the law and at the same time

to arrest.’ ”) (quoting Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 153 betrays a grave misunderstanding of those responsibilities

(2d Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, for the avoidance of doubt, a which the police must have toward the citizenry in an open

reasonable juror could conclude that none of the subsequent and free society.”). Defendants identify nothing from these

information identified by Defendants, in combination with the investigative efforts that even suggested that Plaintiff had

earlier information discussed above, provided probable cause committed a crime. Hawkins, 37 F.4th at 858.

to formally arrest Plaintiff at approximately 1:00 a.m. on May

7, 2019. With respect to Detective Brimmer's investigation prior to

Plaintiff's interrogation, Defendants similarly contend that

Detective “Brimmer did not discover any evidence that

a. Plaintiff's Continued Detention Prior to His

suggested Plaintiff was not the assailant.” Dkt. No. 77-56

Interrogation

at 17. More importantly, Defendants again fail to identify

*21 Defendants first argue that the Responding Officers

any additional information developed by Detective Brimmer

“performed many investigative tasks” after handcuffing

that indicated Plaintiff was the assailant. Id. Moreover, a

Plaintiff at approximately 7:34 p.m., and that Detective

reasonable juror could conclude that the factual record belies

Brimmer “performed several investigative tasks” prior to

Defendants’ claim. The results of the canvas conducted by

interrogating Plaintiff at approximately 10:30 p.m. Dkt. No.

Detective Brimmer and his colleague further indicated that

77-56 at 15, 17.

there had been three men drinking at the scene of the assault,

not just Plaintiff and Mr. Jones, and thus further supported the

With respect to the Responding Officers, however, the only

possibility that Plaintiff was not the assailant. Dkt. No. 77-13

additional information Defendants identify is Officer Cecile's

at 2; see also Dkt. No. 77-56 at 12.

subsequent call with Ms. Bailey. Id. at 15-16. During that

call, Ms. Bailey appears to have again stated that the man

who hit Mr. Jones was “wearing a green jump suit,” Dkt. No. b. Plaintiff's Interrogation

77-55 at ¶ 100, and was “like 35 to 40” years old, Dkt. No. Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's statements during his

77-15 at 16:43, not the “[l]ate 50s or early 60s” that Officer interrogation by the Detectives provided probable cause for

Cecile perceived Plaintiff to be, Dkt. No. 77-25 at 7:5-11. his arrest, and that “Plaintiff voluntarily waived his rights

Such information is largely consistent with—and duplicative and was not coerced into a confession.” Dkt. No. 77-56 at

of—the information Responding Officers already had. See 18-21.17

supra Section IV.A.2. Thus, a reasonable juror could conclude

that Plaintiff still did not match the description that Ms. Bailey

*22 “Challenges to the voluntariness of a confession are

provided.

based on two overlapping constitutional provisions: (1)

due process protections under the Fifth (or Fourteenth)

self-incrimination.” United States v. Mendonca, 88 F.4th 144, three hours after the interrogation began, Plaintiff's BAC,

163 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 as measured by Defendants, was still almost twice the legal

U.S. 428, 433, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000)). limit. Dkt. No. 77-24; see also supra n.4. Dr. Weisman opined

“As a general matter, courts’ descriptions of statements that, even at this lower BAC, “[m]otor function, speech, and

as ‘compelled’ (invoking the text of the Self-Incrimination judgment are all severely affected” and that “[s]taggering,

Clause) and/or ‘involuntary’ (invoking, arguably, the Due and slurred speech, may be observed.” Dkt. No. 77-52 at

Process Clause) are often used interchangeably and the words 10. A reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff's body

often treated synonymously.” United States v. Allen, 864 movements, speech, and demeanor during the videotaped

F.3d 63, 82 n.84 (2d Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). As a interrogation demonstrate a significant level of intoxication,

practical matter, courts “look at the totality of circumstances and also that they are consistent with Dr. Weisman's opinion.

surrounding a Miranda waiver and any subsequent statements See generally Dkt. No. 77-21.

to determine knowledge and voluntariness.” United States v.

Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “To Defendants’ suggestion that Plaintiff's mental health during

be effective, a waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights must be the interrogation was not at issue because he did not

both knowing and voluntary.” United States v. LaPorte, 779 share any hallucinations with the Detectives proves too

F. App'x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Plugh, much. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 20 (“[A]t no point during the

648 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011)). In the Miranda context, interview did Plaintiff indicate that he was hearing voices....

“ ‘knowing’ means with full awareness of the nature of the Similarly, at no point during the interview did Plaintiff

right being abandoned and the consequences of abandoning indicate that he could see things that the Defendant Detectives

it, and ‘voluntary’ means by deliberate choice free from could not see.”). Plaintiff's medical diagnoses at the time

intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Taylor, 745 F.3d at included schizophrenia, depression, and alcoholism. Dkt.

23 (quoting Plugh, 648 F.3d at 127). Even if a waiver is No. 77-42 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶ 454. During the

knowing and voluntary, courts “must nonetheless determine interrogation, Plaintiff explained that he was not currently

whether the [subsequent] inculpatory statements themselves working because he had a dual diagnosis and that his primary

were voluntary.” Id. (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444, 120 care doctor, psychiatrist, and counselor were at the same local

S.Ct. 2326). healthcare provider. Dkt. No. 77-22 at 102:16-103:16. As for

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff was determined not to be

Defendants make various factual arguments as to why “there incapacitated more than a year after the interrogation, that

is no evidence that Plaintiff was not of sound mind or so does little to establish the voluntariness of Plaintiff's waiver

intoxicated as to render his confession involuntary.” Dkt. No. on May 6, 2019. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 390-98.

77-56 at 19-20. Given the present factual record, however,

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this *23 Given this record, a reasonable juror could determine

issue. that Plaintiff's Miranda waiver was not voluntary.

As an initial matter, Defendants’ own expert contradicts Even if Defendants had established that Plaintiff's waiver

Defendants’ position. Id. at 20. Dr. Weisman has repeatedly was voluntary, they have not demonstrated that it was

opined that, over the course of the interrogation, “Mr. Adams also knowing. LaPorte, 779 F. App'x at 65. Defendants

being under the combination of duress, fatigue, limitations of do not appear to make any express arguments on this

his legal knowledge, and some level of alcohol intoxication, second requirement for waiver. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-56

became emotionally and cognitively distressed, resigned, and at 18 (“[A]s discussed below, Plaintiff voluntarily waived

compelled to offer the narrative of the crime being demanded his rights and was not coerced into a confession.”); id. at

of him.” Dkt. No. 77-52 at 11-13. 25 (“[F]or the reasons stated above, Plaintiff voluntarily

waived his Miranda rights and his confession was freely

Further, the parties agree that Plaintiff consumed in excess given.”). In any event, Dr. Weisman's opinions also

of one hundred ounces of malt liquor in the hours before include his assessment that—when sober—Plaintiff's “basic

his interrogation. Dkt. No. 77-55 at ¶¶ 410-11, 414, 420. understanding of Miranda” ranks in the eighteenth percentile

Plaintiff stated “I'm drunk” shortly after the interrogation of pretrial defendants and that Plaintiff “has deficits in

began, Dkt. No. 77-22 at 6:22, and repeatedly referenced his Miranda understanding, particularly regarding legally

aspects of remaining silent versus talking to the police.” Dkt. police misrepresented statements that [a witness] had made is,

No. 77-52 at 7, 8-9. Because “knowing” for purposes of while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise

Miranda means “made with a full awareness of both the voluntary confession inadmissible.”)); see also United States

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences v. Caraballo, 282 F. App'x 910, 914 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We have

of the decision to abandon it,” a reasonable juror could find held that ‘[w]hether a confession is a product of coercion

that Plaintiff's waiver was not knowing. United States v. may only be determined after a careful evaluation of the

O'Brien, 926 F.3d 57, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Berghuis totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the

v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 accused's characteristics, the conditions of the interrogation,

L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010)). and the conduct of law enforcement officials.’ ”) (alteration

in original) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96,

A reasonable juror could also find Plaintiff's subsequent 99 (2d Cir. 1991)).

confession, after extensive interrogation by the Detectives,

involuntary for similar reasons. See, e.g., Taylor, 745 F.3d at For all of these reasons,18 the Motion is denied as to

24 (“An individual's mental state should be considered in the Plaintiff's federal and state claims for false arrest following

voluntariness inquiry to the extent it allowed law enforcement his handcuffing at approximately 7:34 p.m. on May 6, 2019.

to coerce the individual.... It is clear, however, that when ‘a

person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity

for conscious choice,’ a confession cannot be voluntary.”) B. Malicious Prosecution under Section 1983

(first citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-65, 107 “To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under New

S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); then citing United States v. York law, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) the commencement

Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); and or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant

then quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224, against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in

93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Again, Defendants’ favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the

expert has repeatedly opined that, during the interrogation, criminal proceeding[,] and (4) actual malice.’ ” Alexander,

“Mr. Adams being under the combination of duress, fatigue, 132 F.4th at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting Kee, 12 F.4th

limitations of his legal knowledge, and some level of alcohol at 161-62). Section 1983 requires these same four elements,

intoxication, became emotionally and cognitively distressed, “but it also imposes an additional one: ‘(5) a sufficient post-

resigned, and compelled to offer the narrative of the crime arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth

being demanded of him.” Dkt. No. 77-52 at 11-13. The Court Amendment rights.’ ” Id. (first quoting Rohman v. N.Y.C.

also notes that, prior to Plaintiff's confession, the Detectives Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000); and then

removed Plaintiff's phone from his person and then from the citing Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 562, 144

room. Dkt. No. 77-22 at 27:6-20, 60:24-61:3. During the S.Ct. 1745, 219 L.Ed.2d 262 (2024)).

subsequent break, and prior to Plaintiff's confession, Plaintiff

is visible in the video talking to himself and trying to open Defendants challenge only the probable cause element of

the locked door keeping him in the interrogation room. Dkt. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

No. 77-21b at 14:00-17:00; cf. Poventud v. City of New York, Defendants argue that this claim fails because (i)

750 F.3d 121, 145 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2014) (Lynch. J., concurring) “the probable cause supporting Plaintiff's arrest was

(“[W]e know that false confessions have been obtained by overwhelming;” (ii) “[t]hat probable cause only increased in

pressures much less imposing than those to which [plaintiff] the day following Plaintiff's arrest;” and (iii) the DA's Office

was subjected.”) (collecting authorities). sought and obtained Plaintiff's indictment. Dkt. No. 77-56 at

21-24.

*24 Because a reasonable juror could determine that

Plaintiff's confession was involuntary, based in part on his Defendants’ first argument is unpersuasive for the reasons

intoxication, capacity, and the length and nature of his detailed previously. See supra Section IV.A. Given the current

detention and interrogation, the Court finds Defendants’ record, a reasonable juror could find that Defendants did not

argument that the Detectives permissibly used “falsehoods” have probable cause to either arrest or prosecute Plaintiff

during the interrogation to be somewhat beside the point. based on the events that transpired between approximately

Dkt. No. 90 at 7 (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 7:30 p.m. on May 6, 2019, and 1:00 a.m. on May 7, 2019.

562 (2d Cir. 2018) (“ ‘Probable cause, in the context of a A reasonable juror could conclude that the current factual

malicious prosecution, has ... been described as such facts record rebuts such a presumption. Not only was the

and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person prosecution against Plaintiff dismissed, senior prosecutors

to believe the plaintiff guilty.’ ... Because a reasonable juror in the DA's Office have indicated that the basis for the

could believe that probable cause did not exist for [plaintiff]’s prosecution was deeply flawed. Dkt. No. 85-7 at 1; Dkt.

arrest, as noted above, we conclude that it follows that No. 85-11 at 9. A reasonable juror could find, for example,

a reasonable juror could also believe that probable cause that Plaintiff's prosecution was initiated by (i) the arrest

did not exist for [plaintiff]’s prosecution.”) (first alteration report charging Plaintiff that Detective Brimmer prepared;

in original) (citing Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 95). Summary (ii) the allegedly false confession obtained by Detectives

judgment is thus not appropriate on this ground. Brimmer and Beauchine, see, e.g., Ekukpe v. Santiago, 823

F. App'x 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A jury ‘may permissibly

*25 Defendants’ second argument relies on disputed facts find that a defendant initiated a prosecution where he filed

that are also not appropriately resolved at summary judgment. the charges or prepared an alleged false confession and

Defendants contend that, later on May 7, 2019, Detective forwarded it to prosecutors.’ ”) (quoting Manganiello v.

Brimmer received additional information from Ms. Bailey City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010));

and Ms. Goldych. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 22-23. But, as detailed Dufort, 874 F.3d at 353 (“The ‘initiation’ requirement is

earlier, the parties dispute what Ms. Bailey actually said to met when the plaintiff can establish that police officers

Detective Brimmer. See supra Section II.B.4.a. Moreover, forwarded statements to a prosecutor without sharing that

Ms. Bailey's sworn statement suggests that she provided the statements were suspect.”) (citing Manganiello, 612 F.3d

significant exculpatory information to Detective Brimmer. at 163); and/or (iii) the purportedly false statements in the

See, e.g., Dkt. No. 85-10 at ¶¶ 7-8, 10; Napolitano, 29 F.4th at police reports prepared by Detective Brimmer, Officer Cecile,

107 (“[W]e have also consistently held, as relevant here, that Officer Tolone, and Officer Russell,19 see, e.g., Cameron v.

‘an officer may not disregard plainly exculpatory evidence.’ City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[G]enerally

”) (quoting Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395). Because there is a in malicious prosecution actions alleging that a police officer

genuine dispute of material fact as to what information Ms. provided false information to a prosecutor, what prosecutors

Bailey provided Detective Brimmer—including whether it do subsequently has no effect whatsoever on the police

was exculpatory—such information is not an appropriate officer's initial, potentially tortious behavior.”) (collecting

basis on which to find the existence of probable cause as cases); Werkheiser, 655 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (“A defendant

a matter of law. Nor is the information that Ms. Goldych could have initiated a prosecution ‘by creating material, false

apparently provided Detective Brimmer on May 7, 2019, information and forwarding that information to a prosecutor

during his third attempt to speak with her. Dkt. No. 77-19 or by withholding material information from a prosecutor.’ ”)

at 2-3. Given Ms. Goldych's intoxication, memory, and the (first quoting Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578,

absence of a written statement from her, the information 605 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); additional citations omitted).

attributed to her does not establish probable cause entitling

Defendants to judgment as a matter of law. See supra n.7. Moreover, Plaintiff is correct that a “jury examining Detective

Brimmer's police report alongside Ms. Bailey's statements

Defendants’ third argument rests on the presumption of could conclude that Det. Brimmer fabricated what [Ms.]

probable cause created by a grand jury indictment. See, e.g., Bailey told him to support, rather than contradict, Mr. Adams’

Werkheiser v. Cnty. of Broome, 655 F. Supp. 3d 88, 103 false confession.” Dkt. No. 85 at 27; see also Manganiello,

(N.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[I]ndictment by a grand jury creates a 612 F.3d at 162 (“Like a prosecutor's knowing use of false

presumption of probable cause that may only be rebutted evidence to obtain a tainted conviction, a police officer's

by evidence that the indictment was procured by ‘fraud, fabrication and forwarding to prosecutors of known false

perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct evidence works an unacceptable ‘corruption of the truth-

undertaken in bad faith.”) (quoting Savino v. City of New York, seeking function of the trial process.”) (quoting Ricciuti, 124

331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003)). The parties agree that such F.3d at 130); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (“A person may

a presumption applies in this case, but dispute whether the not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of

factual record rebuts it. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 23; Dkt. No. 85 at a confession or admission made by him without additional

28-29. proof that the offense charged has been committed.”); N.Y.

sufficient when corroboration required by law is absent.”). from non-party officer listing Plaintiff's items of clothing,

none of which are a vest). Given all this, a reasonable juror

*26 The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that a could find that Officers Cecile and Tolone fabricated portions

reasonable juror could conclude that the police reports from of their reports to align their descriptions of Plaintiff with that

the Responding Officers contained “false or misleading of the suspect.

information that wrongfully inculpated Mr. Adams and failed

to include key exculpatory information.” Dkt. No. 85 at 28; Additionally, Officers Cecile and Russell omitted any

see also Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 162 (“Where there is some mention of the exculpatory facts that Ms. Bailey,20 Ms.

indication in the police records that, as to a fact crucial to Goldych, and Plaintiff all indicated that a third man had

the existence of probable cause, the arresting officers may assaulted Mr. Jones and left the scene. Dkt. Nos. 77-6, 77-7;

have ‘lied in order to secure an indictment’ and ‘a jury could see also Werkheiser, 655 F. Supp. 3d at 103; Napolitano, 29

reasonably find that the indictment was secured through bad F.4th at 107. For his part, Officer Tolone's report states only

faith or perjury,’ the presumption of probable cause created that “when we initially arrived on scene Adams stated there

by the indictment may be overcome.”) (quoting Boyd v. City was another male that started a fight with Jones.” Dkt. No.

of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 2003)); Werkheiser, 77-8 at 2.

655 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (“Alternatively, the presumption ‘can

be overcome by a showing by claimant that the conduct of *27 With respect to each Individual Defendant, then, a

the police deviated so egregiously from acceptable police reasonable juror could find that the indictment “was procured

activity as to demonstrate an intentional or reckless disregard by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police

for proper procedures.’ ”) (quoting Hill v. Melvin, No. 05- conduct undertaken in bad faith,’ ” or “that the conduct of

cv-6645, 2006 WL 1749520, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, the police deviated so egregiously from acceptable police

2006)). activity as to demonstrate an intentional or reckless disregard

for proper procedures,” Werkheiser, 655 F. Supp. 3d at 104

For instance, Officer Cecile's report states that Ms. “Bailey (first quoting Savino, 331 F.3d at 72; and then quoting

stated that the suspect was an old black man.” Dkt. No. 77-6 at Hill, 2006 WL 1749520, at *13). Given the current factual

5. But this assertion is contrary to the actual description of the record, a reasonable juror could find that the presumption

suspect contained in the 911 call notes, Dkt. No. 90-1 at ¶ 18 of probable cause is rebutted. Hicks v. Marchman, 719 F.

(indicating that Ms. Bailey stated the suspect was only 25 to App'x 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he presumption can be

35 years old) and the similar description Ms. Bailey appears rebutted by showing ‘that the police witnesses have not made

to have provided to Officer Cecile during their subsequent a complete and full statement of facts either to the Grand

phone conversation, Dkt. No. 77-15 at 16:43 (Officer Cecile Jury or the District Attorney, that they have misrepresented

clarifying “the guy who got knocked out was, like, in his mid or falsified evidence, that they have withheld evidence or

to late 20s, and it was, like, an older guy, like 35 to 40, that hit otherwise acted in bad faith[.]’ ”) (second alteration in

him?”). Officer Cecile also noted in his report that the suspect original) (quoting Colon, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 N.E.2d

had been described as wearing “a green sweat suit,” while at 1250-51). Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion as

Plaintiff was wearing “a grayish/teal puffy jacket and green to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution

pants[.]” Dkt. No. 77-6 at 5. As detailed earlier, while there against the Individual Defendants.21

is presently a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff's pants

were green, Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff's jacket

was green. See supra Section IV.A.2 (Defendants arguing that C. Fabricated Evidence under Section 1983

Plaintiff's “hat, shirt and pants all appeared to be different In order to prevail on “a Section 1983 fabrication of evidence

shades of green”) (quoting Dkt. No. 77-56 at 14); see also claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘(1) [an] investigating

Dkt. No. 77-10 at 3 (report from non-party officer stating official (2) fabricat[ed] information (3) that is likely to

that Plaintiff had a “Black winter coat”). Similarly, Officer influence a jury's verdict, (4) forward[ed] that information to

Tolone's report states that the suspect was wearing “a green prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffer[ed] a deprivation of

jump suit,” while Plaintiff “was wearing green pants and a life, liberty, or property as a result.” Ortiz v. Stambach, 137

grey / green vest.” Dkt. No. 77-8 at 2. As also detailed earlier, F.4th 48, 67 (2d Cir. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting

Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff was wearing a vest at

Cir. 2016)). mind, such as knowledge and intent, may be influenced

by assessments of credibility and often must be established

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's fabricated evidence by circumstantial evidence.’ ”) (last alteration in original)

claim is limited to his allegedly false confession and should (quoting United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406,

thus be dismissed against the Responding Officers, “who 1410 (1st Cir. 1992)). Moreover, if a jury were to believe Ms.

were not present for Plaintiff's interview and were not Bailey that Detective Brimmer fabricated various statements

involved in his confession.” Dkt. No. 77-56 at 25, Dkt. No. 90 he attributed to her in his police report, they could also

at 8. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this claim is not so conclude that he did so knowingly.

limited, and that “there are disputed issues of fact from which

a reasonable juror could find that” each of the Responding *28 Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion as to

Officers “fabricated inculpatory evidence [or] suppressed Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for fabricated evidence against

exculpatory evidence to implicate [Plaintiff] wrongly.” Dkt. the Individual Defendants.22

No. 85 at 30; see also supra Section IV.B.

As to the confession, Defendants’ renewed argument D. Monell Claim

that Plaintiff voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and Section 1983 “does not impose vicarious liability on a

voluntarily confessed remains unpersuasive for the reasons municipality for the actions of its employees.” Alexander, 132

previously set forth. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 25; see also supra F.4th at 160 (citing Friend v. Gasparino, 61 F.4th 77, 93 (2d

Section IV.A.3.b. Cir. 2023)). Instead, “[t]o hold a [municipality] liable under

§ 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a

Defendants’ final argument that the Detectives did not know plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an

Plaintiff's confession was false is similarly insufficient to official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be

grant summary judgment on this claim. Dkt. No. 77-56 subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente

at 25-26. A reasonable juror could view the videotaped v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020) (second

interrogation of Plaintiff and conclude that the Detectives alteration in original) (first quoting Wray v. City of New York,

knew Plaintiff's eventual confession was false because, for 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007); and then citing Monell v.

example, Plaintiff was visibly intoxicated; Plaintiff denied Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

assaulting Mr. Jones nearly 200 times, Dkt. No. 85-2 at ¶ 570; 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). As to the first

Plaintiff “became emotionally and cognitively distressed, element, a plaintiff can establish the existence of an official

resigned, and compelled to offer the narrative of the crime policy or custom in four ways:

being demanded of him,” as Defendants’ expert opined after

viewing the videotaped interrogation, Dkt. No. 77-52 at

11-13; or, as Detective Brimmer noted in his police report, (1) a formal policy endorsed by the

because Plaintiff “provided several different versions about municipality, ...; (2) actions directed

what occurred,” Dkt. No. 77-19 at 2, some of which were by the government's “authorized

implausible, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 77-22 at 86:22-87:22 (Plaintiff decisionmakers” or “those who

stating that he was able to hit Mr. Jones in the head three establish governmental policy,” ...;

of four times with a stick before Mr. Jones fell down); (3) a persistent and widespread

id. at 100:8-21 (Plaintiff stating that Mr. Jones punched practice that amounts to a custom

him twice over the course of the day, both times on the of which policymakers must have

“same place” on his lip and Detective Brimmer responding been aware, ...; or (4) a

“[y]eah, he knows where to get you, man. He's got aim on “constitutional violation[ ] resulting

that thing, huh”). See also Ortiz, 137 F.4th at 62, 67-68 from [policymakers’] failure to train

(“[T]he law does not require a plaintiff to prove that police municipal employees[.]”

officers fabricated evidence or engaged in bad faith through

any particular type of evidence and, thus, a plaintiff may

do so entirely through circumstantial evidence.... ‘The jury, Deferio v. City of Syracuse, 770 F. App'x 587, 589-90 (2d Cir.

of course, was not required to believe [the defendant's]

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 “A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at

L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); then citing Turpin, 619 F.2d at 199; and its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”

then quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380, 109 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179

S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 822-23, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's Monell claim should (plurality opinion)). The Second Circuit has set forth the

be dismissed because there is no underlying constitutional following requirements before a municipality's failure to train

violation. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 26. Given that Plaintiff's or supervise constitutes deliberate indifference:

constitutional claims survive summary judgment, this

argument is unavailing. See supra Section IV.A-C. “First, the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows

‘to a moral certainty’ that her employees will confront a

Defendants next argue that the purportedly similar arrests given situation.” ... “Second, the plaintiff must show that

referenced in one paragraph of the Complaint do not establish the situation either presents the employee with a difficult

a Monell claim. Dkt. No. 77-56 at 27-28. Those alleged choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less

instances appear to relate to excessive force and racial difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling

profiling claims against non-party officers in the Syracuse the situation.” ... “Finally, the plaintiff must show that

Police Department over a span of some years. Dkt. No. the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently

1 at ¶ 61. In part because Plaintiff has not brought an cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights.” ...

excessive force claim, the Court agrees with Defendants “In addition, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs

that these alleged instances are insufficiently similar to the must ‘identify a specific deficiency in the city's training

constitutional deprivations Plaintiff allegedly suffered. See program and establish that that deficiency is closely related

Campo v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-04364, 2022 WL to the ultimate injury, such that it actually caused the

970730, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“A plaintiff may constitutional deprivation.’ ”

also plead the existence of de facto customs or policies

Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 94 (first quoting Walker v. City of New

‘by citing to complaints in other cases that contain similar

York, 974 F.2d 293, 297, 298 (2d Cir. 1992); and then quoting

allegations.’ ”) (quoting Gaston v. Ruiz, No. 17-cv-1252, 2018

Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 81 (2d Cir. 2006)).

WL 3336448, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2018)). As Defendants

correctly point out in reply, Plaintiff also has not opposed the

Regardless of whether Plaintiff has satisfied the first three

Motion on this narrow issue. Dkt. No. 90 at 8-9; see also

of these requirements, his assertions with respect to the

Jackson, 766 F.3d at 195. Accordingly, any Monell claim

Responding Officers’ training lack the necessary factual

based on these dissimilar cases or racial profiling is dismissed.

detail and are too conclusory. Dkt. No. 85 at 31. He fails to

identify any “specific deficiency in the city's training program

*29 For whatever reason, Defendants do not squarely

and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the

address the core of Plaintiff's Monell claim. Compare

ultimate injury[,]” Green, 465 F.3d at 81. Accordingly, any

Dkt. Nos. 77-56, 90, with Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 52-60

Monell claim based on the training of the Responding Officers

(alleging, inter alia, that Defendant City “has a policy,

is dismissed. For similar reasons, any Monell claim based

custom, practice and pattern of conduct in place that

on training related to fabricated evidence generally is also

enables its agents and employee[ ] police officers to act

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