Fairchild

UNITED STATES DISTICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MARISSA FAIRCHILD )

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 1:23-CV-467-HAB

)

ASHELY-HUDSON )

POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises from a police chase resulting in the death of a fourteen-year-old boy, Jaden

Donovan James Bowman (“Jaden”). Plaintiff—Jaden’s mother, Marissa Fairchild—has filed suit

against Defendants Officer Shane Richards, the Ashley-Hudson Police Department, and the Town

of Ashley (the “Ashley Defendants”), as well as Officer Chase Pfefferkorn and the Steuben County

Sheriff’s Department (the “Steuben Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts Constitutional claims pursuant

to 42 U.S.C § 1983 as well as a state-law claim brought under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Ind.

Code § 34-13-3-1, et seq.

Before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment, one filed by the Ashley

Defendants (ECF No. 49) and one filed by the Steuben Defendants (ECF No. 55). The motions are

fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 50-51, 56-57, 59-60, 69-74).

I. BACKGROUND1

This lawsuit arises out of a series of events that unfolded on April 19, 2023. Ashley Defs.

SOMF ¶¶ 1-3 (ECF No. 51). That morning, police contacted the Plaintiff and asked her to bring

Jaden into the Waterloo Police Department to discuss footage the police had of Jaden—who was

on probation after a prior incident—trespassing inside a body shop with his friends the week

before. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9. When Jaden and his mother went to the police station, an officer told Jaden

they would be reporting his trespassing to the probation department. Id. ¶ 9.

Later that evening, after his mother had gone to bed, Jaden left the house. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. At

some point after leaving the house, Jaden began operating a stolen van—a van that had been left

by the side of its owner’s house with the keys inside. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17-18. Jaden’s operation of the

stolen vehicle coincided with Defendant Officer Richards’s shift. Id. ¶ 21. Richards is a police

officer who has been employed by the Ashley-Hudson Police Department since 2014. Id. ¶ 19.

According to Richards’s deposition testimony, during his shift, he observed the van parked

partially in the grass on the side of the road in front of a business, the owner of which had asked

the police to keep an eye on the store, as it had been robbed before.2 Richards Dep. at 131 (ECF

No. 51 at 115-160). As he watched the store, the van began moving. Id. at 132. When he noticed

1 Citations for the facts in this section are primarily from the Statements of Material Facts filed by both sets

of Defendants. Where any facts are disputed, the Court notes the dispute.

2 In her response to the Ashley Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff acknowledges that

Richards made these statements in his deposition, but states that there is no evidence to confirm that the

van was in front of a business that had been robbed before. (ECF No. 60 at 5). The Court notes—as do the

Ashley Defendants in their response to Plaintiff’s objections—that sworn deposition testimony from a party

is admissible, and absent any evidence to the contrary, should be treated as uncontradicted. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). In other words, Plaintiff may not effectively dispute statements made by a Defendant simply by

stating there is no corroborating evidence—she must instead provide contradicting evidence of her own.

the vehicle “going left of center” and running a stop sign, Richards turned on his emergency lights

and attempted to perform a traffic stop.3 Id. at 132-33; Ashley Defs. SOMF ¶ 31.

The driver did not stop, instead accelerating through another stop sign. Ashley Defs. SOMF

¶ 31. In response, Richards turned his siren on and began pursuing the van. Id. ¶ 32. The driver

continued to accelerate, speeding east out of town. Id. ¶ 33. As he continued to pursue the van,

Richards radioed the situation to the Steuben County Dispatch and notified the Ashley Town

Marshal. Id. ¶ 34. Defendant Deputy Chase Pfefferkorn, an officer with the Steuben County

Sheriff’s Department, heard Richards’s call regarding the pursuit. Steuben Def. SOMF ¶ 41. He

proceeded to Richards’s location to assist. Id. ¶ 42.

At one point during the pursuit, the van entered the Hamilton Fish and Game Club, stopping

briefly in the parking lot. Ashley Defs. SOMF ¶ 39. Richards testified that he assumed the driver

was stopping. Id. ¶ 41. Instead, the driver backed up and exited the Club, driving past Richards as

he did so. Id. ¶ 42. The driver then continued westward at speeds of up to 90 miles per hour.

Id. ¶ 44.

3 In addition to the traffic infractions, Richards testified in his deposition that he decided to attempt a traffic

stop of the vehicle because he thought—because of the location and type of vehicle—that the driver of the

van could be a man named Tyson Mcilvain, who was the subject of an outstanding warrant for parole

violation. Ashley Def. SOMF ¶¶ 26-30.

In her response to the Ashley Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff acknowledges that Richards

stated during his deposition that he had previously seen Mcilvain in this kind of van and that the pursuit

began near Mcilvain’s home, but objected on the grounds that Richards also testified that the only reasons

he attempted a traffic stop were that the van drove “left of center” and rolled through a stop sign. (ECF No.

60 at 6). During Richards’s deposition, in a discussion on the “left of center and then disregarding the stop

sign” observations, Richards was asked whether there were “any other reasons why [he] felt like there was

an immediate need for apprehension.” Richards Dep. at 141 (ECF No. 60-2). He responded: “I think those

cover it right now.” Id. However, Richards testified during that same discussion that there was also a need

for immediate apprehension because the driver “might be ... the parole absconder, Tyson.” Id. at 139. This

leads the court to conclude that Richards intended to testify that both the driving infractions and the

possibility that the driver was Tyson Mcilvain contributed to his assessment that there was an immediate

need for apprehension.

Pfefferkorn heard Richards radio that they had turned around at the Fish and Game Club

and were headed back westbound on 800 South. Id. ¶ 45. Pfefferkorn testified that he decided to

put out “Stop Sticks,” a tire deflation device, in an attempt to slow the driver down. Id. ¶ 46;

Pfefferkorn Dep. at 39. He testified that he found what he believed was a safe spot to deploy them.

Id. After Pfefferkorn radioed to dispatch that he would try to deploy stop sticks, Richards asked

whether anyone was in the area who could deploy stop sticks.4 Ashley Defs. SOMF ¶ 47.

Richards radioed a description of the van. Stueben Defs. SOMF ¶ 52. When Pfefferkorn

saw the van approaching, with Richards’s lights following behind and no other vehicles around,

he pulled the stop sticks into the westbound lane and positioned himself behind his vehicle.

Id. ¶¶ 53-56. Pfefferkorn testified that the van approached the stop sticks and went partially off the

north side of the road—maybe in attempt to avoid the sticks—but that he heard a noise and saw

the sticks move, leading him to believe the sticks had punctured a tire. Id. ¶¶ 57-59. Pfefferkorn

radioed dispatch that he got a “good stick.” Id. ¶ 61.

The pursuit continued. Id. ¶ 62; Ashley Defs. SOMF ¶ 53. About two miles from where

the stop sticks were deployed, the vehicle left the roadway, turning north into a field, where it

eventually struck a tree. Stueben Defs. SOMF ¶ 63. Jaden died in the resulting explosion. Id. ¶ 64.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its

motion and identifying those portions of designated evidence that demonstrate the absence of a

4 As Plaintiff points out, it is unclear whether Pfefferkorn decided to set up the tire-deflation device before

or after hearing Richards request that assistance. See ECF 74 at 2. The Court finds the answer to this

question to be immaterial.

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After “a

properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.242,

250 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A factual issue is material only if resolving the factual issue might change the outcome of

the case under the governing law. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). A

factual issue is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict

in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In

deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court “may not ‘assess the credibility of witnesses,

choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting

evidence.’” Bassett v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 803, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Stokes

v.Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010)). Instead, it must view all the

evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual

disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings both federal and state claims. The Court will address her federal claims first

before turning to the state claims.

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiff brings her federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action

against “[e]very person who, under color of [law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” She alleges that Defendants

violated Jaden’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth

Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the states not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

1. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff brings Fourth Amendment claims against Richards, the Ashley-Hudson Police

Department, and Pfefferkorn. She brings her Fourteenth Amendment claims against Richards and

the Ashley-Hudson Police Department only.5 The Court will first consider the claims against the

individual defendants before turning to the claims against the Ashley-Hudson Police Department.

a. Individual Defendants

As an initial matter, as government officials, Richards and Pfefferkorn assert that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Doe v. Gray,

75 F.4th 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2017)).

Courts assess claims of qualified immunity under a two-part test. Kemp, 877 F.3d at 350. The

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that (1) a statutory or constitutional right was violated, and

(2) that right was clearly established at the time of the relevant conduct. Id. While qualified

immunity is a question of law for the court, see Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 734 (7th Cir. 2021),

the facts at this stage must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Leiser v. Kloth,

5 In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists Richards, the Ashley-Hudson Police Department, the

Town of Ashley, Pfefferkorn, and the Steuben County Sheriff’s Office as Defendants to Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 27). In her response brief to the Steuben Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Pfefferkorn, and voluntarily dismisses both her Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment claims against the

Steuben County Sheriff’s Office. (ECF No. 69 at 2).

933 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2019) (considering whether “the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the non-moving party”).

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The threshold consideration in a Fourth Amendment inquiry is

whether the governmental conduct in question constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning

of the amendment’s text.” Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509 (7th Cir. 2003). If the Court determines

a seizure did occur, it must then consider whether that seizure was “reasonable” under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 510-11.

Because both sets of Defendants argue that no seizure occurred, the Court will first consider

that question before addressing whether that seizure was reasonable.

i. Seizure

The Supreme Court has explained that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “only when

there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally

applied.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis in original). Where there is solely “a governmentally caused termination of an

individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent passerby) [or] . . . a governmentally caused and

governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon),”

there is no seizure. Id. (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit, in interpreting Lewis, has

“emphasized the distinction between ‘an accidental or tortious act which happens to be committed

by a governmental official and an intentional detention that gives rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.’” Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Campbell v. White, 916

F.2d 421, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1990)).

Both sets of Defendants begin their motions by arguing that no seizure occurred here. The

Ashley Defendants rely heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017

(7th Cir. 2007), which addressed Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims brought after a police

chase resulted in a motorcyclist’s death. In affirming the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, the court explained that because, “[i]n the context of a

police pursuit, a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur unless an officer intentionally and

forcibly halts the fleeing suspect,” the plaintiff needed to demonstrate both “that the officer

forcibly stopped the vehicle and that the contact was intentional” in order to survive summary

judgment. Id. at 1021-22. Because the plaintiff failed to bring forth evidence that there was any

contact between the motorcycle and the police car, the Steen plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a

seizure had occurred.

The Ashley Defendants argue that, pursuant to Steen, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden

of proof on her Fourth Amendment claim, as she has not demonstrated that Richards forcibly

stopped the vehicle, let alone that any forcible stop was intentional. (ECF No. 50 at 6-8). According

to the dash cam video, Richards made no contact with Jaden or the van. (Id. at 8).

In response, Plaintiff argues that, because Richards was “the lead officer” on the pursuit

and “clearly and repeatedly radioed for other police officers to put out Stop Sticks”—a call which

resulted in Pfefferkorn’s ultimate deployment of the stop sticks—he “seized” Jaden for Fourth

Amendment purposes. (ECF No. 59 at 13-14). Plaintiff adds that Richards’s failure to “blockade

the one-lane bridge at the conservation club or pin the white van in the parking lot” also contributed

to his role in seizing Jaden. (Id. at 14). “But for” Richards’s actions, Plaintiff argues, Jaden’s tires

would not have deflated, and he would not have hit the tree. (Id.).

There are two problems with Plaintiff’s argument. The first is that—as the Ashley

Defendants point out—Plaintiff “cites no legal authority for the proposition that an officer can be

held constitutionally liable for the actions of another officer from a different police department

over whom he had no authority or control.” (ECF No. 71 at 4). Plaintiff has not established that

Richards had any supervisory control over Pfefferkorn—they do not even belong to the same law

enforcement units—and even if she had, she has cited no cases stating that the primary officer on

a pursuit is responsible for the actions of other officers in connection with that pursuit.

The second problem is that Plaintiff offers no legal authority to support the theory that the

fact that Jaden’s seizure may not have occurred “but for” Officer Richards’s actions means he

should be held responsible for that ultimate seizure. She cites the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in

Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson and Company, 211 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) for the proposition

that “[w]hether the breach of a duty proximately caused an injury is a question of fact for a jury.”

(ECF No. 59 at 14). But she fails to connect the question of proximate cause with a determination

of whether a seizure has occurred under the Fourth Amendment. The Court, therefore, finds that

Plaintiff has not established that Richards “seized” Jaden under the Fourth Amendment.

Further, even if there had been a seizure, Richards would be protected by qualified

immunity which, as explained above, “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

While a case directly on point is not required for a Court to find a right to be clearly established,

“existing precedent must have place the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the right claimed to have been violated was

clearly established. See Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2021). She has not

provided any case law to indicate that a police officer involved in a pursuit who radios a message

asking others to deploy stop sticks but does not deploy stop sticks or otherwise come into contact

with the plaintiff has violated a clearly established right.

In arguing that Pfefferkorn, too, did not seize Jaden, the Steuben Defendants cite Marion

v. City of Corydon, 2008 WL 763211 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2008), in which a different District Court

in this Circuit granted summary judgment on a Fourth Amendment claim premised on an injury

caused during a police chase. See ECF No. 56 at 10. In Marion, while the pursuing officers used

stop sticks in the course of the pursuit, the plaintiff did not “acquiesce or submit to police powers”

until he was shot and immobilized later in the chase. 2008 WL 763211, at *6. In other words,

because the stop sticks failed to actually stop the plaintiff, their use did not amount to a seizure.

Id. The Steuben Defendants argue that the situation before us is analogous, as Jaden continued to

travel for over two miles after the stop sticks were deployed and did not stop until he lost control

of the vehicle. (ECF No. 56 at 10-11).

The Court does not find this argument persuasive. In Marion, the deployment of the stop

sticks was not ultimately effective—which led the court to find no seizure occurred. The Court

finds the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2003), more

instructive here. In Bublitz, an officer deployed a tire spike system against one car, which had the

ultimate consequence of stopping a different car—belonging to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued

that this was a seizure of their car, but the Seventh Circuit disagreed, explaining that, because

plaintiffs’ family was “simply not the intended object of the defendant officers’ attempts to seize

the fleeing” vehicle, there was no seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reads

Bublitz to mean that a spike system that stops its intended target can be considered a seizure.

The stop sticks deployed by Pfefferkorn punctured at least one of the tires on the van Jaden

was driving, which was one of the two main causes of the crash, according to the Indiana State

Police accident reconstructionist and Plaintiff’s expert. See ISP Report at 37-38 (ECF No 51 at

102-03); Wilcox Report at 4, 6, 18 (ECF No. 60-7). That the tire deflation took two miles to result

in Jaden’s stop makes no difference to the Court’s finding that there was “governmental

termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” See Lewis, 523 U.S.

at 844. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has demonstrated that a seizure existed.

ii. Reasonable

Because the Court has established that Jaden was seized, it must now determine whether

that seizure was reasonable. See Bublitz, 327 F.3d at 488 (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits the

governmental seizure of a person unless that seizure is reasonable.”). “The reasonableness standard

is objective, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court can consider “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989). The analysis must be conducted in consideration of the fact that officers often

need to make “split-second judgments based on rapidly developing events.” Howell v. Smith, 853

F.3d 892, 989 (7th Cir. 2017).

The question of reasonableness must also be considered in the context of the qualified

immunity analysis, which the Court has explained above. The relevant inquiry when evaluating a

claim of qualified immunity is into “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established.,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. “Specificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to

determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Both Plaintiff and the Steuben Defendants discuss the Supreme Court’s opinion in Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), which addressed Fourth Amendment claims brought by a plaintiff

who had incurred serious injury after a police officer terminated a high-speed pursuit of the

plaintiff’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing the plaintiff to lose

control of the vehicle and crash. Id. at 375. The Supreme Court held that the officer’s actions were

reasonable, and that he was therefore entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 385-36. In so ruling,

the Court noted the relative culpability of the plaintiff, who had intentionally engaged in a high-

speed flight for over 10 miles, ignoring police warnings to stop. The Court also provided the

following guidance regarding Fourth Amendment claims arising out of police pursuits:

[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to

get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in

danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing

motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90

miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red

lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-

earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police

officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the

lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it

places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

Id. at 385-86.

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the situation at hand from that in Scott, arguing that here

“there was no imminent danger to the public” and characterizing the pursuit as “a lonely chase on

a straight rural road with almost no other civilians nearby.” (ECF No. 59 at 15-16). She adds that

“no known crime . . . occurred prior to the chase” and that the deployment of stop sticks was

“contraindicated by weather, speed and terrain.” (Id.)

The Steuben Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Jaden did pose an “actual and

imminent threat to public safety.” (ECF No. 56 at 12). Similar to the plaintiff in Scott, Jaden was

resisting arrest by fleeing from the officers at high speeds—at some times traveling in excess of

90 m.p.h.—and had continued flight for eleven minutes with no indication that he might stop. The

Steuben Defendants argue that the deployment of stop sticks represented a “measured” response

to the threat, as compared to other potential tactics sometimes used to bring fleeing cars to a stop,

such as ramming the vehicle, as happened in Scott. (Id. at 13).

The Court agrees with the Steuben Defendants that Scott counsels toward a finding that

Pfefferkorn’s decision to deploy the stop sticks was reasonable. The speed at which Jaden was

traveling, combined with the length of the pursuit and his failure to stop for stop signs, leads the

Court to find that there was an actual and imminent threat to public safety. The fact that the pursuit

occurred on a “straight rural road with almost no other civilians nearby” does not negate the danger

it posed to anyone who may have been driving that rural road. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 15 (finding

that qualified immunity protected an officer who used deadly force from a Fourth Amendment

claim while noting that traffic was “light” on the road used for the pursuit—and specifically stating

that the plaintiff did not pass as many cars as had the drivers in Scott).

Plaintiff, in additional support for her contention that the use of stop sticks here was

unreasonable, notes that “expert testimony, ILEA training materials6, and the “‘Stop Sticks’

6 Plaintiff includes a discussion of a Law Enforcement Training Board Policy on vehicle pursuits in the

section of her brief dedicated to why the Court should find Pfefferkorn violated the Fourth Amendment,

contending that Pfefferkorn violated various Policy “factors.” See ECF No. 69 at 9-10. But Plaintiff fails to

explain how these policies are relevant to the question of whether Defendants have an effective qualified

immunity defense against her Constitutional Claims. Plaintiff herself cites the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in

United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2017) for its statement that, “if compliance with

product manual itself, warn that tire deflation makes it hard to control a vehicle at high speeds.”

(ECF No. 59 at 14). “This danger is compounded by uneven pavement, loose gravel, and wet

conditions, all of which existed the night of Richards’ pursuit.” (Id.). She argues that the Court

should not grant summary judgment here because expert testimony regarding techniques used by

police officers in the field would help the jury to determine whether Pfefferkorn’s decision to

deploy the stop sticks was reasonable, in light of the circumstances that existed during the pursuit.

Plaintiff cites the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532 (2017)

to support this argument. In Brown, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony

concerning police policy, explaining that such testimony is only relevant to the Fourth Amendment

objective reasonableness inquiry under special circumstances, such as when “something peculiar

about law enforcement (e.g., the tools they use or the circumstances they face) informs the issues

to be decided by the finder of fact.” Id. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff argues

that such testimony is necessary here.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s citation to Brown unpersuasive, as it concludes that Pfefferkorn

is protected from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity, and “[e]ven if an officer acts

contrary to [his]training . . . that does not itself negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise

be warranted.” City & Cnty. Of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616-17 (2015) (explaining

that, “so long as a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was justified, a plaintiff

cannot avoid summary judgment by simply producing an expert’s report that an officer’s conduct

leading up to a deadly confrontation was imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless”) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

departmental policy were the applicable legal standard, the police department itself would become the

arbiter of Fourth Amendment reasonableness—a prospect that would have horrified those responsible for

the Amendment’s ratification.” See ECF 69 at 16.

The “relevant inquiry” when determining whether qualified immunity applies is “whether

existing precedent placed the conclusion that [Pfefferkorn] acted unreasonably in these

circumstances ‘beyond debate.’” Mullenix 577 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

The situation Pfefferkorn faced here is similar to the situation faced by the police officer in Scott,

who the Supreme Court found to be behaving reasonably. In Mullenix, another case involving a

Fourth Amendment claim brought after an officer used deadly force during a high-speed pursuit,

the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he Court has . . . never found the use of deadly force in connection

with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis for denying

qualified immunity.” Id. at 14. Considering the precedent set by Scott and Mullenix—and

Plaintiff’s failure to either point to a closely analogous case finding the alleged violation

unlawful—the Court cannot say that existing precedent has placed the conclusion that Pfefferkorn

acted unreasonably in these circumstances “beyond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13-14.

The Court finds that Pfefferkorn is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment Claim. The Court, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of Richards and

Pfefferkorn on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

b. Municipal Defendants

In Count II of her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names Richards, the Town of

Ashley7, and the Ashley-Hudson Police Department as Defendants to her Fourth Amendment

claim. As an initial matter, Indiana’s statutory scheme does not confer on municipal police

departments the capacity to sue or be sued. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300

7 The Second Amended Complaint lists “Town of Hudson” instead of “Town of Ashley” under Count II.

(ECF No. 27 at 4). Because “Town of Hudson” appears nowhere else in the Complaint, in the case caption,

or in the briefs filed in response to either of the relevant Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court assumes

that “Hudson” was written instead of “Ashley” in error.

(7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, all claims against the Ashley-Hudson Police Department are

dismissed.

This leaves Plaintiff’s claims against the Town of Ashley. The Town of Ashley may be

held liable under Section 1983 only as outlined in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

In her response to the Ashley Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff appears to abandon her Fourth

Amendment claim against any municipal defendants, claiming only that the Ashley-Hudson Police

Department “violated Jaden’s substantive due process rights by failing to properly train Richards

prior to the pursuit of April 19, 2023.” (ECF No. 59 at 18).

Regardless, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Town of Ashley on

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim. Because Plaintiff failed to establish that Richards “seized”

Jaden within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, she failed to establish that he violated the

Fourth Amendment. And because Richards did not violate Jaden’s Fourth Amendment Rights,

there can be no liability under § 1983 for Ashley on a failure to train theory under Monell. See

Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T[here can be no liability under Monell

for failure to train when there has been no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).

2. Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the states not “deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As the Seventh Circuit

explained in Steen, “the sine qua non [for Fourteenth Amendment liability] . . . is a purpose to

cause harm.” 486 F.3d at 1023. In the context of police pursuits, the Supreme Court has held “that

high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not

give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressable by an action under § 1983.”

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. A plaintiff has a “heavy burden . . . to bear when making a § 1983 claim

based on the Fourteenth Amendment”—namely, to demonstrate that the conduct in question

“rise[s] to the level of shocking the conscience.” Steen, 486 F.3d at 1022.

Plaintiff brings Fourteenth Amendment claims against both Richards and the Town of

Ashley. Regarding Richards, Plaintiff argues that his decisions to continue pursuing Jaden for

eleven minutes and six seconds—including at very high speeds, at some points—, and to call for

the deployment of stop sticks, rise to the level of “conscience-shocking” behavior that violates the

Fourteenth Amendment.

In support of this argument, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish a set of cases in which courts

in this Circuit found that a police pursuit did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. (See ECF No.

59 at 17-18). In each of those cases, the pursuit was shorter than the one at issue here, and the court

found no Fourteenth Amendment violation.8 She argues that the length of the pursuit is a “crucial

element” in a court’s determination of whether a substantive due process claim may be allowed,

and notes that Richards pursued Jaden for eleven minutes and six seconds, at various speeds—

“double or more the length of the longest pursuits” in the cases she distinguishes. Her theory is

that this “extensive amount of time gave Richards ample opportunity to consider his options,” and

that he should have terminated the pursuit instead of continuing and requesting stop sticks. (ECF

No. 59 at 18). The “length of the chase,” she argues, “tells us that Richards intended to catch the

suspect at any cost, even if that meant harming him.” Plaintiff contends that there must be some

8 In Steen, the Seventh Circuit found no Fourteenth Amendment violation where the chase was six minutes,

with no contact. See 486 F.3d at 1019-20. In Lewis, the Supreme Court found no violation where the chase

lasted only 75 seconds. 523 U.S. at 837. In Winston v. City of Chicago, the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois found no violation where the chase covered only two blocks at a speed of 50-

70 m.p.h. 130 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (N.D. Ill. 2015). And in Smith v. Ciesielski, the U.S. District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana found no violation where the chase was only three minutes, at speeds of 80

m.p.h. 975 F. Supp. 2d 930 (S.D. Ind. 2013).

maximum amount of time after which a pursuit “shocks the conscience”—and that the

determination as to what that length of time might be should be left to a jury. (Id. at 18).

The Court disagrees. As the Seventh Circuit concluded in Steen, “[t]he Supreme Court has

set the bar awfully high in pursuing a Fourteenth Amendment claim that arises out of a police

chase.” 486 F.3d at 1025. The Court agrees with the reasoning the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania applied when it rejected a similar argument and reasoned that

“Lewis did not indicate that in a high speed pursuit case to meet the ‘shocks the conscience’

standard the degree of culpability would be determined on a case by case basis by clocking the

minutes of the pursuit and might at times require only deliberate indifference or reckless disregard

on the part of the pursuing officer or others involved in pursuit decision-making.” Koreny v. Smith,

2018 WL 1141513, at *6 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 2, 2018).

The question is not how long the pursuit lasted, but rather whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated the defendant’s intent to harm. The Court finds that the eleven-minute length of this

chase is insufficient to rise to that “awfully high bar,” set by the Supreme Court in Lewis, absent

additional evidence that Richards intended to harm Jaden—additional evidence that the Court does

not find in this record. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s view of the significance of the length of the

pursuit is the correct one, and that Richards had adequate time to deliberate on the use of stop

sticks, the Court cannot find that his decision to radio for stop sticks “shocks the conscience.”

During that chase, Richards had to weigh the risks posed to Jaden of stop stick deployment against

the risks posed to the public of a continued, high-speed chase. Radioing for stop sticks during an

eleven-minute pursuit of a fleeing target who is driving at high speeds and not observing traffic

signs such as stop signs cannot be considered “conscience-shocking” behavior.

There is no doubt that the result of this police pursuit was tragic—and it is possible that

there may have been other, better, courses of action that Richards could have taken that would

have avoided this tragedy. “But mistakes of judgment, even those that result in tragedy, do not

give rise to liability under § 1983.” Winston, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 1225. At most, Plaintiff raises

questions as to whether Richards was reckless—or even deliberately indifferent—in his decision

to radio for stop stick deployment. But questions as to whether Richards was “negligent, reckless,

or even deliberately indifferent” do not factor into the Court’s evaluation of a Fourteenth

Amendment claim but are rather “reserved to the state courts and the law of tort.” Steen, 486 F.3d

at 1025. Under the correct standard, which “requires conscience-shocking behavior and an intent

to cause harm unrelated to a legitimate government interest,” id., the Court finds that Richards did

not violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding the municipal Defendants, Plaintiff argues that “the Ashley-Hudson Police

Department violated Jaden’s substantive due process rights by failing to properly train Richards

prior to the pursuit.”9 (ECF No. 59 at 18). But, as explained above, “there can be no liability under

Monell for failure to train when there has been no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007). Because the Court finds no Fourteenth

Amendment violation, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Town of Ashley on this

claim as well.

B. State Claims

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ summary judgment motions as

to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because that disposition results in the dismissal of all claims

over which the Court has original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court must address

9 Because the Ashley-Hudson Police Department is not a proper defendant, see supra Section III.A.1.b, the

Court construes this argument as applying to Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the Town of Ashley.

whether to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims for battery and negligent supervision and

rule on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

As the Seventh Circuit consistently has stated, “it is the well-established law of this circuit

that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all

federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th

Cir. 1999); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007) (“As a general matter,

when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish

jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims”); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d

1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before

trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims rather than

resolving them on the merits.”).

Because the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to all of

Plaintiff’s federal claims, it dismisses Plaintiff’s state-law claims without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 49, 55)

are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of all Defendants

on the claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

Defendants’ Motions are denied as to Plaintiff’s state law claims; those claims are dismissed

without prejudice to refiling in state court.

SO ORDERED on September 10, 2026.

s/ Holly A. Brady

CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT