Haywood

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

FREDERICK HAYWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:26-cv-01119-JEH

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Second Amended Complaint1 under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was a federal

detainee at the Livingston County Jail (“Jail”). (Doc. 21). This case is before the

Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I

In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual

allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour,

729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does

not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x

588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

1 Before the Court could conduct a merit review of Plaintiff’s original Complaint and his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court’s merit review is of Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint.

II

Plaintiff files suit against the U.S. Marshals Service Northern District of

Illinois, Livingston County, Jail Superintendent Lisa Draper, Assistant

Superintendent Sherry Martin, Lieutenant Scott Harmon, Dr. Lochart,

Charge Nurse Susanna Legner, and Turn Key Medical.

Plaintiff did not name the Jail as a Defendant in his Second Amended

Complaint. In any event, the Jail is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 2001). The Jail is dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges he suffers from several chronic health problems and has a

pacemaker. On an unspecified date, Plaintiff arrived at the Jail wearing a life vest

and had a three-month supply of his heart medication, which a cardiac doctor

prescribed. After Plaintiff arrived at the Jail, Plaintiff did not see Defendant Dr.

Lochart for thirty days.

On an unspecified date, Defendant Dr. Lochart changed Plaintiff’s heart

medication, causing a tear in his stomach. On April 7, 2026, Plaintiff was taken to

the emergency room due to severe pain. At the emergency room, Plaintiff was

prescribed medication to be taken every six hours. However, medical staff at the

Jail allegedly refuse to give Plaintiff the medication as prescribed.

Plaintiff alleges medical staff at the Jail were unable to balance his INR level

because the Jail does not have the proper machine. (Doc. 21 at p. 2). Instead,

Plaintiff was required to do weekly blood draws. To date, Plaintiff’s INR level is

still not balanced. Plaintiff claims outside doctors have indicated the imbalance

was caused by medication changes.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “Turn Key Medical is responsible for the policy

for care of the inmates at the Jail.” (Doc. 21 at p. 3). Plaintiff states Defendants Dr.

Lochart and Charge Nurse Legner are responsible for the direct care of inmates at

the Jail. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Superintendent Draper, Assistant

Superintendent Martin, and Lieutenant Harmon were made aware of the problem

through his grievances. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Livingston County is

responsible for the Jail, and he made the County aware of the problem. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant U.S. Marshals Service is responsible because they were made

aware of the problem through a letter he sent.

III

During the relevant period, Plaintiff alleges he was a federal detainee at the

Jail. As such, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (holding that a

detainee’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).

“[M]edical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth

Amendment are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry identified

in Kingsley.” Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). “[T]he denial of medical care for an objectively serious

medical condition violates a pretrial detainee’s due process rights if it is

‘objectively unreasonable’ in the totality of the facts and circumstances, and if jail

personnel act ‘purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they

consider[] the consequences of their handling of [the detainee’s] case.” Gunter v.

United States Marshals Serv., No. 21-4065-CSB, 2023 WL 12047205, at *2 (C.D. Ill.

Sept. 15, 2023) (quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353-54).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Lochart did not examine him until thirty

days after he arrived at the Jail and then changed the medication a cardiac doctor

had prescribed for his heart condition, leading to unbalanced INR levels, a tear in

Plaintiff’s stomach, severe pain, and a trip to the emergency room on April 7, 2026.

Plaintiff alleges he did not receive the medication the emergency room physician

prescribed. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on

a medical care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

against Defendant Dr. Lochart.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated how Defendants Charge Nurse Legner,

Superintendent Draper, Assistant Superintendent Martin, and Lieutenant

Harmon were personally involved in any constitutional deprivation. See Vance v.

Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based

on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach

unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.”). “Simply receiving correspondence from a prisoner” does not make

a prison official liable for the alleged infraction. Norington v. Daniels, No. 11- 282,

2011 WL 5101943, at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2011); Diaz v. McBride, No. 3:93-CV-

176RM, 1994 WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (a plaintiff cannot establish

personal involvement and subject a prison official to liability under § 1983, merely

by sending the official various letters or grievances complaining about the actions

or conduct of subordinates).

It also appears Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendants Legner, Draper,

Martin, and Harmon liable based solely on their supervisory roles. There is no

respondeat superior under § 1983. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir.

2019). Officials are accountable for their own acts; they are not vicariously liable

for the conduct of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Vance

v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). If Jail officials are named,

they must be named in their individual capacities, and Plaintiff must allege that

the official personally participated in the deprivation or was deliberately reckless

as to the misconduct of subordinates or was aware and condoned, acquiesced, or

turned a blind eye to it. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants Legner, Draper, Martin, and Harmon are dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint also does not state a claim against

the U.S. Marshals Service, Turn Key Medical, or Livingston County. The Marshals

Service is an agency of the United States Government. As such, the Marshals

Service is immune from this suit. Turner v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 05 C 2890, 2005 WL

3299822, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2005) (citing cases). The U.S. Marshals Service is

dismissed with prejudice.

As for Turn Key Medical, a private company performing a public function

can be sued under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978), but only if the “unconstitutional acts of their employees . . . were

carried out pursuant to an official custom or policy.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538

F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The purpose of this requirement is

to “distinguish between the isolated wrongdoing of one or a few rogue employees

and other, more widespread practices.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021).

In order to allege a viable Monell policy claim, the plaintiff must identify an

official policy that caused him injury. Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 771. Alternatively, a

plaintiff pursuing an official custom or practice theory “must allege facts that

permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread so as to

constitute a governmental custom.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th

Cir. 2017). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a Monell

claim. In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff simply alleges that Turn Key Medical is

“responsible for the policy of care of the inmates at the Jail.” (Doc. 21 at p. 3).

Plaintiff alleges Livingston County is responsible for the Livingston County

Jail. (Doc. 21 at p. 4). Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations are insufficient to state a

Monell claim against the County. Accordingly, Turn Key Medical and Livingston

County are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Pursuant to its merit review of the Second Amended Complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint states a medical care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause against Defendant Dr. Lochart. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party

for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Dr. Lochart as a Defendant.

3) Defendants Livingston County, Lisa Draper, Sherry Martin, Scott

Harmon, Susanna Legner, and Turn Key Medical are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Defendants Livingston County Jail and United

States Marshall [sic] Service are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is

directed to TERMINATE Defendants Livingston County, Livington County Jail,

United States Marshall [sic] Service, and Draper.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff

to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give

Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of

service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

6) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer

should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In

general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s position. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no

response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not

filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this

Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant

has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed

with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly

to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be

returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and

the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

9) Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Counsel for Defendant shall arrange the time for

the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

12) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to

release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization

to defense counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective

order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: September 10, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge