Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DARLENE BROWN,1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00066

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

FRANK BISIGNANO, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Darlene Brown filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review

of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act. Currently pending is Brown’s Motion for Judgement [sic]

on the Administrative Record (“Motion for Judgment”) (Doc. No. 9), filed along with a supporting

Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 10). The Commissioner of Social Security filed a complete copy

of the underlying Administrative Record (“AR”) (Doc. No. 6) and a Response to the Motion for

Judgment (Doc. No. 14). The plaintiff filed a Reply in further support thereof. (Doc. No. 15.) The

Magistrate Judge to whom this matter was referred has issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) (Doc. No. 19), recommending that Brown’s motion be denied. Brown filed a timely

Objection (Doc. No. 20), to which the Commissioner has responded (Doc. No. 21).

For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s Objection will be overruled, and her motion

will be denied.

1 The Magistrate Judge granted the plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Substitute Party,

substituting Darlene Brown’s husband, Rojelio Garcia, Jr., as the plaintiff in this matter, following

Darlene Brown’s death. (See Doc. Nos. 16, 17.) Following the parties’ and the Magistrate Judge’s

convention, the court has not modified the case caption to reflect this change.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive

pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and

recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001); Massey v. City of

Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993). In conducting its review of the objections, the district

court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

In the context of a case seeking social security benefits, the court must “uphold the ALJ’s

decision unless the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard or made findings that are

unsupported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Moats v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558, 561 (6th Cir.

2022), cert. denied sub nom. Moats v. Kijakazi, 143 S. Ct. 785 (2023); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).

“‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a term of art, . . . [a]nd it is not [a] high threshold.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to

an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support

the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (quoting

Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This standard requires ‘“more than a

mere scintilla’” but less than a preponderance; substantial evidence is such ‘relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Miller v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.

2001)); see also Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. The court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence or

revisit questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Similarly,

the court will not reverse findings of an ALJ merely because the record contains evidence—even

substantial evidence—to support a different conclusion. Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d

387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004).

II. BACKGROUND

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge sets forth in detail the ALJ’s findings as to the plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the parties’ positions, and the applicable legal standards, and

he addresses the sole issue raised in the plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment—namely, that the “ALJ’s

RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ used her own lay

medical opinion to interpret raw medical data and failed to build a logical bridge between the

evidence and the RFC.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.) The R&R finds that the record in this case is

replete with doctors’ evaluations, medical assessments, test results, and the like, all

of which were properly considered by the ALJ, and all of which constitute

substantial evidence. Additionally, the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that [s]he

carefully considered the testimony of both Plaintiff and the VE. While it is true that

some of the testimony and evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegations of disability, it

is also true that much of the evidence supports the ALJ’s determination [of the

plaintiff’s RFC].

(Doc. No. 19 at 9.) On this basis, the R&R rejects the plaintiff’s claim for relief and recommends

that her Motion for Judgment be denied.

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff objects to the R&R, arguing that “the Magistrate Judge’s finding is not well-

explained, relied on post hoc rationalizations, and failed to actually address the crux of Plaintiff’s

arguments.” (Doc. No. 20 at 1.) The “crux” of the plaintiff’s argument in her Motion for Judgment

is that the ALJ did not adequately explain her determination that the plaintiff needed to be able to

alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes. (See Doc. No. 10 at 7 (“Here, in

pertinent part, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with an RFC for a range of light work with a sit/stand

option every thirty minutes. However, this RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence because

the ALJ used her own lay medical opinion to evaluate Plaintiff’s need for a sit/stand limitation and

failed to provide any evidentiary support for the limitation she included in the RFC.” (citing AR

20)).) The plaintiff maintains that “the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the ALJ’s RFC

assessment is not evidence from the decision” and that “[t]his is error.” (Id. at 8.)

On de novo review of this issue, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was adequately

explained and is supported by substantial evidence. At step four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ

made the following RFC finding:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) except lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,

can stand and walk with normal breaks for 6 out of 8 hour[s per] day, can sit with

normal breaks for 6 hours out of an 8 hour day, can occasionally climb stairs and

ramps, never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, frequently balance, occasionally

stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold and

extreme heat, occasional exposure to vibrations, no exposure to hazardous

machinery or unprotected heights, limited to office level noise, alternate sit and

stand every thirty minutes.

(AR 20.) To explain this finding, the ALJ’s opinion includes a comprehensive review of the

plaintiff’s treatment records and subjective complaints. The ALJ specifically considered the

plaintiff’s testimony that she had “stop[ped] working because of her chronic lower back pain which

prevents her from sitting or standing for longer than 10 minutes” but also found that the plaintiff’s

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id. at 21.) The

ALJ identified this evidence as including the plaintiff’s reported activities as well as treatment

notes showing that the plaintiff reported that medication helped keep her pain under control and

repeated findings that she had a normal gait and 5/5 strength. (Id. at 21–22.)

In addition, while the record in this case does not include a treating physician’s assessment

of the plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities, it does contain the opinions of two State

Agency medical consultants, both of whom assessed the plaintiff as able to lift or carry 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and as able to stand/walk and sit (with normal breaks)

about 6 hours each in an 8-hour workday, with some postural and environmental limitations. (See

AR 58–59, 68–69.) The ALJ relied on these opinions too—in addition to the medical records, the

plaintiff’s reported activities, and her subjective complaints—to reach the RFC, which she

explained as follows:

Considering the above evidence, I find that the claimant is capable of lifting and

carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. Throughout the record,

the claimant was found to have normal strength (Exhibits 1F/39, 7F/90, 6F/18,

7F/38, 46). The claimant is also able to stand and walk with normal breaks for 6

out of 8 hour[s per] day and can sit with normal breaks for 6 hours out of an 8 hour

day. The claimant reported pain, but was consistently treated with medication and

it was noted that she received relief from medication and was stable (Exhibits

1F/11, 7F/74, 70, 52, 18F/39). The claimant reports stiffness and pain and thus is

limited to occasionally climbing stairs and ramps, never climbing ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, frequently balancing, occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling. While the examinations often showed normal strength, gait and range of

motion, the claimant presented with tenderness and reports of widespread pain

which reasonably results in her reduced ability to perform the postural movements

noted (Exhibits 4F/4, 7F). I have also considered the claimant’s testimony regarding

intolerance to temperature changes and need to change position and thus find that

the claimant can tolerate only occasional exposure to extreme cold and extreme

heat, occasional exposure to vibrations, no exposure to hazardous machinery or

unprotected heights, limited to office level noise, and needs to alternate sit and stand

every thirty minutes. In assessing this residual functional capacity, I have

considered the longitudinal record in accordance with SSR 12-2p as the symptoms

of fibromyalgia can wax and wane. The records show that the claimant has treated

this condition effectively with consistent medication such that she is capable of the

range of light work assessed above, including the ability to sit and stand every thirty

minutes.

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of her symptoms, they are not fully consistent with the allegations as the

records reflect that the claimant has had improvement with treatment (Exhibits 1F,

7F, 18F). Additionally, the claimant has not taken additional steps in pain relief

other than medication. While the claimant reported that she could not afford any

other . . . interventions such as injections or ablation, there is also no evidence that

the claimant needed emergency care for severe pain or pursued alternative methods

for treatment. However, this lack of additional care is generally consistent with the

records that show that the medication helped to manage her pain (Exhibit 7F).

. . . . I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical

findings as follows:

The findings of the State Agency medical consultants are somewhat persuasive

(Exhibits 2A, 4A). Thomas Thrush, M.D., and Gurcharan Singh, M.D., found that

the claimant can perform a range of light work, and this is supported by their review

of the evidence. The consultants reviewed the evidence, and they are well-qualified

by reason of training and experience in reviewing a record and formulating an

opinion as to limitations. The consultants’ assessments are consistent with and well

supported by the evidence of the record as a whole. As discussed above, the

claimant conservatively treated her pain with medication which was noted to

provide some improvement and she often had normal findings on examinations

with some decreased range of motion and tenderness (Exhibits 1F/11, 7F/74, 70,

52, 18F/39, 1F/39, 7F/90, 6F/18, 7F/38, 46). The claimant was also able to perform

a range of activities such as managing her medications and finances, preparing

simple meals, driving a few times a month, manage her hygiene and perform some

chores depending on her pain (Exhibit 14F, 4E). Dr. Singh’s findings concerning

the claimant’s environmental limitations are more persuasive as he had the

opportunity to review additional records and these environmental limitations are

consistent with the claimant’s testimony. However, it is found that the claimant also

requires a sit and stand option as set forth in the above residual functional capacity

based on her testimony that she has to change positions to help relieve pain. She

also reported this to her providers, and it is consistent with her reports of pain and

objective findings on tenderness that would require this movement.

(AR 23–24.)

The ALJ, that is, was presented with conflicting evidence. And, in evaluating the plaintiff’s

RFC, the ALJ properly considered all of that evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). It is the ALJ’s

function to weigh the evidence and reach a conclusion as to a claimant’s RFC. See Coldiron v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“This court has recognized that,

under [the applicable] regulations, ‘the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the

medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of [the claimant’s] residual

functional capacity.’ An ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by weighing

the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering an RFC finding.” (quoting Webb v.

Comm of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004)). Here, as the ALJ explained, she partially

accepted the plaintiffs testimony that she needed to alternate between sitting and standing but did

not find that the record fully supported the plaintiff's claim that she needed to alternate between

sitting and standing every ten minutes. And the ALJ found the medical consultants’ opinions

partially persuasive, but they did not take into account the plaintiff’s claim that she needed to

alternate between sitting and standing. The ALJ adequately explained her determination that the

plaintiff’s RFC included a need to alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes, and

that determination is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not “use[] her own lay

medical opinion to interpret raw medical data,” nor did she “fail[] to build a logical bridge between

the evidence and the RFC.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.) The plaintiff's Objection, therefore, is without

merit.

IV. CONCLUSION

As set forth herein, the plaintiff's Objection (Doc. No. 20) will be overruled. The court will

accept and adopt the R&R (Doc. No. 19) and deny the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment (Doc. No.

9). An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

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United States District Judge