Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

COURTNEY WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

No. 24 CV 5241

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Courtney Wright is an inmate at the Lawrence Correctional Center.

Before he was housed at Lawrence, he was an inmate at the Sheridan Correctional

Center. Beginning in fall 2022, he experienced a swollen jaw and sharp pains when

he opened and closed his mouth. But he did not receive needed dental surgeries to

address what turned out to be two impacted teeth and a dentigerous cyst until May

and October 2024. Defendant Lorie Cunningham was a Medical Administrator at

Lawrence Correctional Center, responsible for transportation of inmates to medical

appointments and payment for medical services. Defendant Candice Daniels was the

warden at Sheridan Correctional Center and defendant Jeremiah Brown was the

warden at Lawrence Correctional Center. Wright alleges that these defendants knew

he suffered from significant dental issues and deliberately and intentionally failed to

treat those issues in violation of the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Cunningham, Daniels, and Brown move to dismiss Wright’s complaint. For the

reasons discussed below, the motion is granted as to Cunningham and Daniels and

denied as to Brown.

I. Legal Standards

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

677–78 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege

facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007). At this stage, I accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,

disregarding legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals” supported by only

“conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. Facts

Plaintiff Courtney Wright is currently serving a 75-year sentence at Lawrence

Correctional Center, where he has been since August 2023. [49] ¶¶ 19, 46.1 In fall

2022, Wright was housed at the Sheridan Correctional Center when his dental issues

began. Id. ¶ 20.

Beginning in September or October of 2022, Wright submitted “sick call

passes,” for a dentist and was seen by C. Okezie for a dental exam. Id. ¶¶ 20–22.

During the exam, Wright told Okezie that his jaw was swollen and that he felt sharp

pain when he opened and closed his mouth. Id. ¶ 22. Okezie told Wright that he

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. The facts are taken from

plaintiff’s second amended complaint, [49].

needed new fillings but that the facility had no tools and no dental hygienist. Id. ¶ 23.

Wright followed up with Warden Miles about his dental issues, and nothing was done

in response. Id. ¶ 24.

In January 2023, Wright asked to see a dentist other than Okezie and made

repeated requests for mouth pain relief. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Within a month, Wright saw

Okezie again. Id. ¶ 27. During that visit, Okezie observed fluid and infected tissue in

Wright’s mouth but told Wright there was nothing wrong and that he just needed

new fillings. Id. ¶ 27. Wright declined Okezie’s offer of new fillings and asked to see

a different dentist. Id. ¶ 28. His request was denied and his dental issues got worse.

Id. ¶ 28.

Throughout the spring of 2023, Wright saw several providers at Sheridan and

spoke with them about his swollen jaw, tooth pain, and other symptoms including

puss coming from his ears, headaches, and watery red eyes. Id. ¶¶ 29–32. These

providers advised Wright that he should request a dentist and Wright, at some point,

saw Okezie again. Id. ¶¶ 29–33.

Wright’s pain got worse during the summer of 2023. Id. ¶ 34. Wright spoke to

Daniels three times between June and August 2023 about his need for medical

attention during her walk throughs at the facility. Id. ¶ 35. Each time, Daniels told

Wright to write to the dentist. Id. Wright also experienced mental health issues due

to his mouth pain during July and August that culminated in an attempt to hang

himself. Id. ¶ 42. He was on suicide watch for about six days, and then he was

transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center. Id. ¶¶ 43–46.

Wright’s dental problems continued at Lawrence. In October 2023, Wright saw

Dr. Quang Tran who determined that two of Wright’s teeth were horizontally

impacted and that one had a dentigerous cyst eroding the root of another tooth. Id.

¶ 47. Tran ordered emergency surgery. Id. Nearly a month after Tran ordered the

surgery, Wright submitted an emergency grievance and, a week later, saw an outside

dentist who could not treat him because his contract with Lawrence ended. Id. ¶¶ 48–

49.

From January 2024 until May 2024—when Wright finally received his first

surgery—Wright spoke and wrote to Brown about his dental condition. Id. ¶ 50. First,

Wright told Brown that his tooth was causing him excruciating pain and that he had

filed an emergency grievance. Id. ¶ 51. Brown told Wright that there was nothing he

could do and he should write to medical. Id. A month later, Wright filed another

grievance. Id. ¶ 52. Brown deemed the grievance a non-emergency and, again,

informed Wright there was nothing he could do. Id. Another time, Wright asked

Brown for a special diet with only soft foods and Brown instructed Wright to write to

the Chaplain. Id. ¶ 54.

In March 2024, Tran referred Wright to an outside dentist who prescribed him

pain medication. Id. ¶ 56. In the months following, Wright asked Brown twice for the

pain medication that was prescribed. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. In May 2024, Wright and another

inmate spoke with Brown during a walk through and showed Brown the X-rays of

Wright’s mouth. Id. ¶ 59. Brown told Wright that he could not do anything about it

and that he would not be able to get the pain medications he was prescribed. Id. ¶ 59.

The next day, Wright’s wisdom tooth and the underlying cyst were extracted. Id. ¶ 60.

In October 2024, Wright’s second tooth was extracted. Id. ¶ 62.

Wright filed this lawsuit against various medical and non-medical officials

from Sheridan and Lawrence, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a

failure to provide medical care. [1]; [32]; [49]. Only defendants Cunningham, Daniels,

and Brown move to dismiss.

III. Analysis

A. Deliberate Indifference and Personal Involvement

Wright’s claim against these defendants arises under the Eighth Amendment

prohibition of prison conditions that (1) pose a substantial risk of serious harm and

(2) are the result of a sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely the defendants’

deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994).

Defendants do not dispute that Wright’s dental issues posed a substantial risk

of serious harm. And tooth decay can be an objectively serious medical condition.

Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010). Wright alleges that he was in

enormous pain because two of his teeth were impacted and that one of the impacted

teeth had a cyst eroding the root of a third tooth. [49] ¶¶ 47, 51. I accept, for the

purposes of defendants’ motion to dismiss, that Wright’s alleged dental issues were

sufficiently serious.

Defendants challenge the second part of the framework: that they were

deliberately indifferent to Wright’s dental needs. Officials are deliberately indifferent

if they “acted or failed to act despite [their] knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Deliberate indifference can include a delay in

necessary medical care “if the delay exacerbated injury or prolonged an inmate’s

pain.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011).

To state a § 1983 claim, Wright must also allege that each defendant had some

personal involvement. Defendants are correct that officials cannot be held liable

under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior—an official must have had some

“personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Williams v. Shah,

927 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). Personal involvement requires that the official

must “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind

eye.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jones v. City of

Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)) (citation modified). In other words, a “causal

connection or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official

sued is necessary.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 757.

Non-medical officials like Cunningham, Brown, and Daniels may rely on the

judgment of medical staff. Id. at 755. But non-medical officials cannot stand back and

ignore a suffering inmate. Id. Once a non-medical official has knowledge of or a reason

to believe that the medical staff’s care puts an inmate at risk, the “refusal or

declination to exercise the authority of his or her office may reflect deliberate

disregard.” Id. at 756 (quoting Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Although defendants lump Daniels and Brown together as “the wardens,”

deliberate indifference and personal involvement depend on each individual

defendant’s conduct and the actions (or inactions) they took towards Wright’s dental

plight. I consider each defendant separately.

1. Cunningham

Defendants argue that Wright fails to state a claim as to Cunningham because

he fails to allege any facts relating to Cunningham’s personal involvement in his

complaint. [57] at 4–5. I agree. Wright’s complaint says very little about

Cunningham. Wright only says that she was employed as a medical administrator at

Lawrence and was responsible for the transportation of prisoners to medical

appointments and payment for those services. [49] ¶ 12. However, in his response to

the motion to dismiss, Wright provides additional details about Cunningham’s

involvement. [61] at 6–7. Wright alleges that Cunningham’s “decision not to arrange

for the timely transport and allocation of money to pay for Mr. Wright’s emergency

surgery deliberately delayed Mr. Wright’s treatment.” [61] at 7. In an opposition brief,

“a plaintiff may ‘supplement’ the complaint with ‘extra assertions’” if they are

consistent with the complaint. Knox v. Curtis, 771 Fed. App’x 656, 658 n.2 (7th Cir.

2019) (quoting Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith

v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 2015).

Even with this added detail, Wright fails to state a claim against Cunningham.

Wright must allege that each defendant was personally involved in his alleged

constitutional deprivation including that they knew about the conduct and facilitated,

condoned, approved, or turned a blind eye towards it. Gentry, 65 F.3d at 561 (quoting

Jones, 856 F.2d at 992). Wright fails to suggest that Cunningham knew about

Wright’s underlying dental condition and the nature of the needed surgery. Wright

does not assert that he had personal contact with Cunningham, that she reviewed his

grievances, or that she denied him the opportunity to get surgery after she knew

about his needs. Denying transport and payment, without knowing that those

decisions caused or exacerbated a serious medical condition, is not enough for

Cunningham to have participated in a constitutional violation.

2. Daniels

As the warden, Daniels could “rely on the expertise of medical personnel.”

Arnett, 658 F.3d at 755. Part of this reliance includes directing inmates to the

appropriate medical personnel. Id. In Arnett, the plaintiff alleged that he went to the

warden two to three times per week with his medical complaint and the warden told

him to “[g]o talk to [the doctor].” Id.

Wright alleges even less than the plaintiff in Arnett. Wright claims that he

spoke to Daniels about his dental issues three times over the course of summer 2023.

[49] ¶ 35. Although he states in his complaint that Daniels took no action, he admits

that each time he spoke with her, Daniels told Wright to “write to the dentist.” Id.

This is insufficient to state a claim that Daniels was deliberately indifferent to

Wright’s medical needs. By telling Wright to contact the dentist—who had already

seen Wright multiple times for his complaints—Daniels was relying on the expertise

of medical personnel. And Wright does not allege that Daniels knew about his

dissatisfaction with the prison’s dentist or that the dentist’s treatment of him had

been inadequate. Without a suggestion that Daniels knew or had reason to believe

that the dentist’s treatment was inadequate, Daniels was “able to relegate to the

prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 756;

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).

3. Brown

Brown is differently situated than Daniels. Once a prison official knows about

an excessive risk to an inmate’s health, “refusal or declination to exercise the

authority of his or her office may reflect deliberate disregard.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792

F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Vance, 97 F.3d at 993). “In other words,

prisoner requests for relief that fall on ‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate

indifference.” Id. (quoting Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Brown was made aware of Wright’s complaints through in-person interactions

and written grievances and he failed to act in response. First, after emergency

surgery had been ordered, Wright repeatedly complained to Brown and Brown told

him more than once that there was “nothing he could do.” [49] ¶¶ 50–52, 59. Second,

after Wright was prescribed pain medication by an outside dentist, Brown told

Wright that he would not be able to get the medications while he was at Lawrence.

Id. ¶ 59. Finally, the day before his first surgery, Wright showed Brown the X-ray of

his mouth, Brown’s assistant said it looked serious, and Brown told him again there

was nothing he could do. Id. ¶ 59.

Wright’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Brown. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Wright’s favor, his allegations suggest that Brown knew

about an excessive risk to his health and, in telling Wright there was nothing he could

do, declined or refused to exercise some authority that he may have had. Perez, 792

F.3d at 782. Unlike Daniels, Brown had more information about Wright’s condition

and did not relegate Wright’s care to the medical staff at Lawrence. Brown saw

Wright’s x-ray, knew that medical staff had ordered surgery and prescribed pain

medication, and knew that Wright had not received the surgery or the medication.

[49] ¶¶ 51–52, 59. Further discovery will shed light on what steps, if any, Brown took

or could have taken from his position as warden. On a motion to dismiss, Wright’s

complaint has sufficiently alleged that Brown was deliberately indifferent to his

serious dental issues.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that Brown should be protected by qualified immunity.

[57] at 7-10. “Qualified immunity is a defense protecting government officials from

both liability and suit.” Roldan v. Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 338 (7th Cir. 2022). A

qualified immunity analysis involves two questions. First, whether a constitutional

right was violated, and second, whether the right was clearly established at the time

of the violation. Id. For a right to be clearly established, the law must have been

“‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand what he is doing’

is unlawful.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 536

U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable

official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”

Id. Wright points to Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 896 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015),

as precedent clearly establishing his right to “adequate and timely provision of

medical care.” [61] at 10. In Dobbey, the Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary

judgment for a prison guard who was aware of an inmate’s tooth pain from an abscess

and failed to report the complaint to dental staff. Dobbey, 896 F.3d at 941.

Defendants are correct that qualified immunity can be decided on a motion to

dismiss and that a plaintiff can “plead himself out of court on qualified immunity

grounds.” Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025). But the “motion-to-

dismiss stage is rarely ‘the most suitable procedural setting to determine whether an

official is qualifiedly immune.’” Roldan, 52 F.4th at 339 (quoting Hanson v. LeVan,

967 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2020)). Whether qualified immunity applies often turns

on “the particular facts of a given case.” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d

758, 765 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Here, discovery is needed to determine whether Brown is qualifiedly immune.

More information is needed on what actions Brown took in response to Wright’s

grievances, why he denied certain emergency grievances, whether he communicated

with prison medical staff on the matter, and the reasons for and consequences of the

months-long delay in Wright’s surgery. It may well be the case that Brown was not

clearly on notice that his conduct violated the Constitution, but the issue will be more

appropriately decided with the benefit of additional discovery.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [57], is granted in part and denied in part.

Wright's claim against Cunningham and Daniels is dismissed without prejudice.?

Wright’s claim against Brown remains pending.

ENTER:

bad S. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: September 9, 2026

2 A plaintiff who has claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily given at least one

opportunity to amend his complaint. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater

Chicago and Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d, 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015); Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25

F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022).

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