Swann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

BLAKE O’BRYAN SWANN, )

) Case No. 1:26-cv-168

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger

JOHNSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

OFFICE, BIT BROWN, J. SHAWN )

BROWN, and BRADLEY SEXTON, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, an inmate in the Johnson County Jail, filed a complaint for violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 2), two motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 1, 8), and a

document that the Court construes as a motion to supplement the complaint to add claims and

Defendants (Doc. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion to

supplement the complaint (id.). Also, while Magistrate Judge Steger previously granted Plaintiff

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (see Doc. 11), the Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed

as a pauper in this action, and the Court will therefore AMEND Judge Steger’s order allowing

Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (id.) to state that Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (Docs. 1, 8) are DENIED, and this action will be DISMISSED without

prejudice to Plaintiff prepaying the filing fee.

I. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT

The Court will first summarize Plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. 2) and Plaintiff’s

proposed supplement to his complaint (Doc. 9) before analyzing the motion to supplement (id.).

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to supplement (id.) will be DENIED.

A. Original Complaint

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s original complaint in his favor, he alleges that an

individual named Kenneth Gilley “set [Plaintiff] up” in a criminal case, and that he therefore

wanted to press charges against Mr. Gilley and spoke to Defendant Sexton about this. (Doc. 2, at

3–4, 7.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bit Brown at one point approached Plaintiff’s cell

“in an aggressive manner saying ‘[S]o you[’]r[e] going to slap me then slap me.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff responded by stating that he was going to “slap” Defendant Bit Brown with a lawsuit for

not allowing Plaintiff to press charges, presumably against Mr. Gilley, and for not providing him

with various documents, after which Defendant Bit Brown obtained the requested documents for

Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff then makes various allegations regarding documents in this case before:

(1) claiming that Mr. Gilley conspired with a police department, which the Court liberally

construes as a reference to Defendant Johnson County Sheriff’s Office, to set him up and (2)

making conclusory statements that criminal attorneys, including “J[ulie] Canter,” “are bad for

not representing the[ir] clients to the[ir] fullest ability.” (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff does not make any factual allegations against Defendant J. Shawn Brown in his

complaint. (See id. at 1–5.) But documents attached to the complaint demonstrate that

Defendant J. Shawn Brown investigated Plaintiff’s allegations that Mr. Gilley stole a vehicle

from Plaintiff. (See Doc. 2-1, at 5, 9.)

Additionally, a document attached to Plaintiff’s complaint regarding Plaintiff’s allegation

that Mr. Gilley stole his vehicle lists Defendant Sexton as the “Primary Officer” and also lists

“Residential Status, Assault Assault/Homicide Circumstances 1, Assault Assault/Homicide

Circumstances 2, [and] Justifiable Homicide Circumstances” in the portion of the form

designated for “Additional Details.” (Doc. 2, at 8.) In the copy of this form filed with the

complaint, Plaintiff circles the “Additional Details” portion of the form, indicates that he is not

charged with these crimes, and categorizes the inclusion of these crimes as “Defamation of

character.” (Id.)

In his original complaint, Plaintiff sues the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office, Bit Brown,

J. Shane Brown, and Bradley Sexton. (See Doc. 2, at 1, 4.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages and for Defendant Bit Brown to be kept away from him based on his assertion that this

Defendant is “a very dangerous man and known to get inmates harmed in this county jail.” (Id.

at 6.)

B. Motion to Supplement

In his motion to supplement his complaint, Plaintiff first sets forth allegations regarding

events in two cases in which Julie Canter represents him, including a criminal case pending

before “Judge Street” and a post-conviction case, as well as allegations regarding his attempt to

hold Mr. Gilley liable for theft of his vehicle. (Doc. 9, at 1–3.)

Also in his motion to supplement his complaint, Plaintiff claims that nurses have failed to

provide him adequate medical care. (See id. at 3.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff states

that one nurse took him off medications he usually takes, and that when he saw another nurse

about this issue, she only provided him “Ciprexsa” for two weeks. (Id.)

Plaintiff additionally alleges that he has a condition that he treats with Benadryl while not

incarcerated, but when he saw an unknown nurse for this issue in the jail a week after he had

requested sick call, she provided him steroid cream and steroids, but those “had zero effect” on

his symptoms. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also claims that unspecified nurses have misdiagnosed his

medical condition as “Erythema[ ]multiforme,” and that the condition he has is similar to that

condition but has “more everlasting and frequent” effects. (Id.)

Based on the allegations in this filing, Plaintiff seeks to add Julie Canter, Judge Stacy

Street, the Johnson County Courthouse, and “T.K. Health” as Defendants herein. (See id. at 1,

4.)

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s attempt to supplement his complaint violates this Court’s prior order and Local

Rule, as well as Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the Court

previously entered an order that notified Plaintiff as follows:

Any proposed amended complaint is subject to screening by the Court as set forth

above and will have no effect in this lawsuit until the Court has completed that

screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). To seek permission to amend your

complaint, you must file a motion and attach a complete proposed amended

complaint to the motion. E.D. Tenn. L.R.15.1. Failure to comply with these

directives may result in your filing(s) being STRICKEN from the record without

further notice and/or sanctions, including the dismissal of this suit for failure to

comply with the Court's orders, if appropriate.

(Doc. 4, at 2.) In complete disregard of this notification, Plaintiff filed his motion to supplement

the complaint (see Doc. 9) without filing a complete proposed amended complaint in violation of

both the Court’s prior order (Doc. 4) and the Court’s Local Rule. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 15.1

(“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend,

shall, except by leave of Court, reproduce the entire pleading as amended and may not

incorporate any prior pleading by reference. A failure to comply with this rule may be grounds

for denial of the motion.”).

The Court additionally notes that the claims Plaintiff seeks to add against Julie Canter,

Stacy Street, the Johnson County Courthouse, and “T.K. Health” in his motion to supplement his

complaint are substantively unrelated to and against different Defendants than the claims he set

forth in his original complaint against the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office, Bit Brown, J. Shane

Brown, and Bradley Sexton. (Compare Doc. 2 with Doc. 9.) As such, these claims are not

properly joined herein.

Specifically, while Rule 18(a) allows a plaintiff to join as many claims as he has against

an opposing party, Rule 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants only where:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common

to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Thus, Rule 20 does not permit plaintiffs to join unrelated claims against

different defendants in one lawsuit. See, e.g., George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)

(“A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit complaining

that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E

infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—should be rejected if filed by a prisoner.”);

see also Smith v. Lavender, No. 2:22-CV-1875, 2022 WL 4121929, at *6 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 9,

2022) (severing unrelated claims a prisoner plaintiff filed in a complaint against different

defendants) (citations omitted); White v. Newcomb, No. 2:21-CV-249, 2022 WL 2763305, at *4–

5 (W.D. Mich. July 15, 2022) (providing that a plaintiff cannot join claims against multiple

defendants in one lawsuit “unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally

related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact”

(quoting Proctor v Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009) and collecting cases

standing for the proposition that prisoners cannot join unrelated claims against different

defendants in a single lawsuit)).

For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his complaint (Doc. 9) is

DENIED.

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “THREE STRIKES”

The “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), provides that an inmate may not proceed in forma pauperis in a civil action if, as a

prisoner, he has filed three or more cases that a court dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless “[he] is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.”

As a prisoner, Plaintiff has filed at least three cases that a Court dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Swann v. Goodwin, No. 3:23-CV-59-DCLC-

DCP, 2023 WL 2762020, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2023) (noting that “[t]his Court has

previously denied Plaintiff’s request to in forma pauperis in civil actions due to his accumulation

of ‘strikes’ under § 1915(g).”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff has accumulated at

least three strikes under the PLRA and cannot file the instant suit, or any future suit, as a pauper

unless he demonstrates that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).

III. IMMINENT-DANGER EXCEPTION

The three strikes provision of the PLRA has an exception which allows a prisoner with

three or more “strikes” to proceed in forma pauperis if his complaint contains “a plausible

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of

filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). This imminent-danger

exception “is essentially a pleading requirement subject to the ordinary principles of notice

pleading.” Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). The exception applies where a court, informed by its “‘judicial experience and

common sense,’ could ‘draw the reasonable inference’” that a plaintiff faced an existing danger

when he filed the pleading. Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2012)).

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s original complaint makes various allegations about his

attempts to hold Mr. Gilley liable for theft of his vehicle, as well as the criminal charges against

him. (See Doc. 2, at 3–5.) It also makes a conclusory allegation that Defendant Bit Brown

should not be allowed to be around Plaintiff because he is “a very dangerous man and known to

get inmates harmed in this county jail.” (Id. at 6.)

These allegations do not allow the Court to reasonably infer that Plaintiff faced

“imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he filed his original complaint. See

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055. While Plaintiff makes a conclusory assertion that Defendant Bit

Brown is “very dangerous” and has harmed other inmates, he provides no facts to support this

statement, nor does he provide any facts to support his implied assertion that Defendant Bit

Brown poses a danger to him. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.”). And no other allegations of the complaint allow the Court to infer Plaintiff faces any

imminent danger of harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not proceed as a pauper in these

proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Judge Steger’s order allowing Plaintiff to proceed in

forma pauperis (Doc. 11) is AMENDED to state that Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (Doc. 1, 8) are DENIED, and the instant action will be DISMISSED without

prejudice to Plaintiff paying the filing fee in full. See In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 381 (6th Cir.

2002) (noting that prisoner’s obligation to pay filing fee arises when complaint delivered to

district court clerk). Accordingly, this case will be CLOSED.

Also, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this decision would not be taken in

good faith and would be totally frivolous, such that any request for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis on any subsequent appeal will be DENIED.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE