Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND BROWN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01662

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

ROBERT BAKER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Raymond Brown, a prisoner at SCI-Dallas proceeding , has

filed a fee-paid complaint1 (Doc. 1) against Robert Baker, a unit manager

at the prison. Brown, who alleges that he was housed in the prison’s

Veterans Service Unit, will proceed on a First Amendment claim based

on allegations that Baker transferred him to another unit in retaliation

for filing grievances. However, Brown’s other claims against Baker will

be dismissed, and his request for a court order directing the preservation

1 Brown initially sought leave to proceed . He

acknowledged that he “has 3 strike[s]” under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, which generally precludes a prisoner from proceeding

. (Doc. 5), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). However, he

subsequently paid the full filing fee, and the PLRA’s three strikes

provision does not prevent a prisoner from filing a fee-paid complaint.

, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001).

of evidence will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Brown’s complaint primarily concerns his placement in the

Veterans Service Unit (“VSU”) at SCI-Dallas. The VSU offers

programming and services for certain veterans who are nearing release.

(Doc. 1-1) (excerpt of DOC Policy Statement 7.3.1).

The complaint alleges as follows: Brown, who identifies himself as

an African American male and a disabled veteran, was housed in the

VSU at SCI-Dallas in February 2026. He suffers from PTSD and other

mental health issues. Defendant Baker, the VSU unit manager, allegedly

made a series of “rac[i]al comments and statements to Brown.” On one

occasion, after Brown received “a misconduct for sexual harassment of a

black female at SCI Phoenix,” Baker allegedly told Brown that he “can

be housed on the VSU [because] there are no sister[s] working on the

area.” Further, Baker allegedly “refused to provide Brown with

employment on the VSU and submit Brown’s VSU programming[ ] for

parole,” which Brown believes was “due to [Brown’s] race and age.”

At some unspecified time, Brown “filed grievances on Baker about

the living conditions on the VSU related to the clean indoor air act, [noise]

level in the dayroom, spiders, and the fact that an inmate was being

pa[id] by the VSU to aid[ ] other[s] with their VA claims.” Baker allegedly

told Brown that his grievances would “go nowhere . . . [A]lways with the

black lives matter sh[*]t.” Brown filed another grievance against Brown

for the “black lives matter” comment. Baker allegedly responded by

“stating ‘you will fall in line[, or I] will put [you] with [your] hood boys.’”

On June 5, 2026, Brown made what he describes as “proposals for

Juneteenth,” but Baker allegedly “informed Brown that it is not a real

holiday,” and told Brown to “do the Juneteenth with his brother from the

hood.” An argument ensued, and Baker “removed Brown from the VSU

and place[d] him” on the top level of another unit. This move required

Brown to push a cart and carry 20 pounds of his own property to the top

level. Brown alleges that he sustained “pain and injuries” and required

unspecified medical treatment from this move. Brown also contends that

he has “been suffering mental health issues . . . and is at risk [of] a mental

health break down, due to Baker’s actions.”

Brown asserts a First Amendment claim premised on Baker’s

alleged “discrimination and retaliation,” and Eighth Amendment claims

against Baker based on “poor and unsafe living condition [and] denial

and delay of serious medical/mental health treatments” and “intentional

and reckless infliction of emotional distress.”

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil

complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a);

, 230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The

Court must dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The

Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions concerning prison

conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1);

, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing

screening procedures and standards).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under § 1915A(b)(1) or § 1997e(c) is the same as that for dismissing

a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. , 481 Fed. App’x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012)

(per curiam); , 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010);

, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss

may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”

, 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding

the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the

complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by

reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”

, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although

the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is

not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted

inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).

Brown is pursuing constitutional claims that would fall under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the

plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). To avoid dismissal

for failure to state a claim, a civil rights complaint must state the

conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged violations.

, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Further, “[c]ivil rights

claims cannot be premised on a theory of . Rather,

each named defendant must be shown . . . to have been personally

involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.”

, 8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

As explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . . [P]ersonal

involvement can be shown through allegations of

personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual

knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made

with appropriate particularity.

, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

Brown’s complaint suggests a plausible First Amendment claim

based on his allegations of retaliatory removal from the VSU. For a

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was engaged in

constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an “adverse action”

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First

Amendment rights; and (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a

“substantial or motivating factor” in the prison official’s decision to take

the adverse action. , 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)

(citations and quotations omitted).

Filing a prison grievance about an officer’s alleged verbal abuse is

constitutionally protected conduct. , , , 204 F.

App’x 155, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2006). In this case, Brown alleges that Baker

responded to his grievance about the “black lives matter” comment by

warning Brown to “fall in line” or be placed with his “hood boys.” Baker

subsequently removed Brown from the VSU and placed him in another

unit.2 Although Brown’s timeline of events is not entirely clear, the

complaint supports a plausible inference that his grievance was a

2 The complaint plausibly suggests that the comments about

Brown’s “brothers from the hood” and “hood boys” referred to his

imminent transfer to a unit that had a greater proportion of Black or

African American inmates than the VSU.

“substantial and motivating factor” in his removal from the VSU.

Further, the removal from the VSU may have been an “adverse action,”

given that it deprived Brown of programming and services that were not

otherwise available to him.3

However, Brown’s various Eighth Amendment theories are not

viable as pled.4 Brown asserts a claim of “denial and delay of serious

3 , No. 3:17-CV-01631, 2018 WL 4537404, at

*12 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) (a prison transfer can constitute an adverse

action) (listing cases); , No. 1:15-CV-974, 2018 WL

1518565, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018) (whether the consequences of a

cell transfer are sufficiently adverse “will depend on the facts of the

particular case”). Because the complaint states a viable claim on that

basis, we need not consider whether other alleged actions by Baker —

such as “refus[ing] to provide Brown with employment” — could

constitute adverse actions.

4 While the racial remarks Brown attributes to Baker are

deplorable, verbal abuse does not itself violate the Eighth Amendment,

and Brown does not assert a claim on that basis. , ,

, No. 1:24-CV-00190, 2025 WL 976701, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31,

2025); , No. 3:14-CV-1897, 2017 WL 3433690,

at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2017); , No.

1:12-CV-0341, 2013 WL 521957, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2013).

Brown’s Eighth Amendment claims of “intentional and reckless

infliction of emotional distress” may have been intended as state law tort

claims. However, the conduct ascribed to Baker is not the kind for which

Pennsylvania courts recognize tort liability premised on emotional

distress. , , , No. 1:21-CV-00187-RAL, 2022 WL

2791186, at *9-10 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2022) (in the prison context, verbal

threats and taunts, and an allegedly retaliatory segregation, did not state

(continued on next page)

medical/mental health treatments,” but the complaint does not explain

how Baker was involved in or responsible for Brown’s medical care, or

what treatments Brown was denied.

Brown also asserts a claim of deliberate indifference to his “poor

and unsafe living conditions.” For this kind of claim, the plaintiff must

allege facts suggesting deliberate indifference to “a substantial risk of

serious harm” or the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” , 934 F.3d 368, 372-

73 (3d Cir. 2019). Brown’s bare allegations of noise in the dayroom and

spiders in the unit do not, by themselves, suggest a constitutional

violation. To the extent this claim related to Brown having to move to the

top level of another unit, he has not explained how Baker was aware of a

“substantial risk” from this move. Although he claims that Baker was

aware of his “medical restriction[s] and Veteran’s disabilities,” the only

disabilities Brown describes pertain to his mental health. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

8, 20). Brown does not explain why his disabilities made it unsafe for him

an “IIED” claim); , 209 A.3d 380,

383-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (the occasional use of racial epithets was not

“outrageous conduct” for IIED purposes).

to move to another unit, nor identify any previously imposed

“restrictions” that would have made Baker aware of that risk.

Accordingly, the case will proceed only on his First Amendment

retaliation claim.

IV. MOTION TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE

Brown also requests that the Court enter an order to preserve video

from the VSU on the morning of June 5, 2026, as well as the “log[ ] book

on the VSU . . . from February 2026 to June 5, 2026.” (Doc. 8). A party

has a duty to preserve evidence “when the party in possession of the

evidence knows that litigation . . . is pending or probable . . . [and] can

foresee the harm or prejudice that would be caused to the party seeking

the evidence if the evidence were to be discarded.”

, 227 F. Supp.3d 361, 380 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quotation omitted).

In this case, Brown offers no evidence demonstrating that the video or

log book will be unlawfully lost or destroyed. Therefore, we will not enter

an order specifically directing their preservation.5 Nonetheless, service

5 , No. 2:09-CV-1127, 2009 WL

10687675, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009) (party seeking a preservation

order must “demonstrate” a “threat to the continuing integrity or

existence of the evidence”) (citation omitted);

(continued on next page)

of the complaint on Baker will itself establish that litigation is pending

and thereby affirms Baker’s obligation to preserve relevant evidence.6

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Brown will be permitted to proceed on

his First Amendment retaliation claim, but all other claims will be

dismissed without prejudice, and his motion to preserve evidence will be

denied. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 9, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

, 350 F.R.D. 481, 495 (D.V.I. 2025);

No. 21-CV-1133, 2021 WL 5770214, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Dec. 6, 2021).

6 Even if other DOC personnel, rather than Baker himself, are the

custodians of such evidence, the duty may be imputed to Baker in

appropriate circumstances. , , No. 1:24-CV-

0192, 2026 WL 828746, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2026); ,

No. 2:22-CV-1182, 2025 WL 1361284, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2025).