Keithley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

MICHAEL KEITHLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-1509

)

VILLAGE OF SOUTH )

JACKSONVILLE and )

STEVEN HELMICH, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER AND OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Keithley’s Rule 702

Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Witness

Mark S. Lamb (d/e 41), to which Defendants Village of South

Jacksonville and Steven Helmich filed a Response (d/e 43). Plaintiff

filed a Reply in Support of his Rule 702 Motion to Bar Mr. Lamb

(d/e 50) with leave of Court and over Defendants’ objection.

Because Mr. Lamb did not identify and apply a reliable methodology

and because his testimony is unlikely to meaningfully assist the

jury, Plaintiff’s Motion (d/e 41) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Defendants pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing claims of excessive force, false arrest,

and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment,

together with accompanying state law claims.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on July 13, 2024, Defendant

Steven Helmich, a police officer employed by Defendant Village of

South Jacksonville, arrested Plaintiff solely because he refused to

produce identification when Defendant Helmich responded to a

disturbance in the lobby of a hotel where Plaintiff was a guest.

During the arrest by Defendant Helmich, Plaintiff alleges that he

suffered injuries including cuts to his wrists and tears to the tissue

in his left shoulder and arm. Further, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Helmich charged him with four offenses for which

probable cause was lacking: disorderly conduct, obstructing a peace

officer, resisting a peace officer, and aggravated battery to a police

officer.

B. Expert Report of Mark S. Lamb

Defendants produced expert disclosures (d/e 41-1) to Plaintiff

on January 30, 2026. Defendants’ Expert Disclosure listed Mark S.

Lamb as a retained expert witness pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

According to Defendants’ disclosure, Mr. Lamb does not have

a list of publications and has never previously served as an expert

witness. Defendants listed the following materials reviewed by Mr.

Lamb in the preparation of his report: Defendants’ First Amended

Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint (d/e 21);

police reports by Defendant Helmich and by non-party Sergeant

Wilson from July 13, 2024; body cam videos of Defendant Helmich

from July 13, 2024; photographs taken at the jail on July 13, 2024;

audio of the 911 call placed by hotel manager Amy Bates on July

13, 2024; interrogatory answers by Defendants in this case; and

relevant statutes.

In Defendants’ disclosures, they expressly reserved the right to

supplement Mr. Lamb’s report.

Mr. Lamb’s report (d/e 41-2) is approximately six single-

spaced pages. He begins with a brief description of his 27 years of

experience working for the Peoria Police Department, in which he

“worked in various capacities”—including “regularly work[ing] as a

patrol officer” and “regularly be[ing] involved in the training of new

hires[.]” Mr. Lamb then lists the materials he reviewed before

preparing his report and opinions in this matter. Those materials

are consistent with those identified by counsel in Defendants’

Expert Disclosures, listed above.

In the report, Mr. Lamb also indicates the following basis for

his opinions: “My experience in three decades of police work for the

City of Peoria allows me [to] render these opinions based upon my

training, experience and my review of all of the materials described

above.”

The remainder of the report consists of a narrative description

of Mr. Lamb’s understanding of the events that occurred on July

13, 2024, about which he expressed the following principal

opinions.

First, as to the investigatory steps taken by Defendant

Helmich and his request for identification from Plaintiff, Mr. Lamb

opined as follows:

• “Upon arrival at the hotel, Officer Helmich took appropriate

steps to investigate the call that had been placed to Morgan

County Dispatch by the hotel manager[.]”

• “[I]t was appropriate for Officer Helmich to seek out

information from the hotel staff and then obtain information

from Michael Keithley as to his involvement in the disturbance

that prompted the call.”

• “Officer Helmich had ample reason to seek Michael Keithley’s

name, identifying information or an identification card, as

both the manager and the front desk clerk had identified

Keithley as someone who had caused a problem or

disturbance in the hotel. The demeanor of the front desk clerk

being visibly upset and crying gave Officer Helmich an obvious

reason to believe that Michael Keithley had caused a problem

or disturbance at the hotel prior to Officer Helmich’s arrival.

Officer Helmich gave Michael Keithley more than ample

opportunity to provide his name, identification card or other

identifying information, but Keithley plainly refused to

cooperate with Officer Helmich’s efforts to investigate the

situation[.]”

• “Michael Keithley was uncooperative, refusing to provide his

name or identification to Officer Helmich, and Officer Helmich

was required to obtain Keithley’s name and identification for

purposes of investigating the complaint that had been made

by the hotel manager.”

• “It is my opinion that Officer Helmich had more than ample or

sufficient probable cause to investigate Michael Keithley,

based upon the information that was available to Officer

Helmich regarding the call to Morgan County Dispatch from

the hotel manager…and based upon my review of the body

camera video and audio.”

Second, Mr. Lamb reported the following opinions regarding

the basis for the arrest of Plaintiff by Defendant Helmich:

• “It was appropriate for Officer Helmich to place Michael

Keithley under arrest after Keithley declined repeated requests

by Officer Helmich for his identification, given that Keithley

was identified as the cause of the disturbance at the hotel,

which prompted the call for assistance from the hotel

manager.”

• “Officer Helmich appropriately exercised his discretion, based

upon the clear probable cause, arrested Michael Keithley after

he was not cooperative, which is often the occurrence when an

individual has consumed notable amounts of alcohol.”

• “It is also my opinion that the citations issued to Keithley

(disorderly conduct, resisting a peace officer, obstructing a

peace officer, and aggravated battery to a peace officer) were

appropriately issued based upon my review of the body camera

video footage and the totality of the circumstances.”

As for claims of excessive force and any resulting injuries, Mr.

Lamb opined:

• “I do not believe, based upon my years of experience and

training as a police officer, having taken hundreds of arrestees

into custody, that Officer Helmich exercised or utilized any

‘excessive force’ upon Michael Keithley.”

• “It is possible that Officer Helmich may have applied the

handcuffs tighter on the left wrist on Michael Keithley, but

that would have been due to Keithley resisting Officer

Helmich’s efforts to place Keithley under arrest. It is also

possible that since Officer Helmich did not improperly over-

tighten the handcuffs on Michael Keithley before the transport

that the cuffs were somewhat loose and being double-locked,

would move up and down Keithley’s lower forearm and

potentially scrape him because they are a metal cuff. This

cannot be avoided with metal cuffs, if the suspect is moving

around.”

• “Based upon my observation of the body camera video, I do

not find that the handcuffs were applied improperly or too

tight by Officer Helmich. Officer Helmich was able to place his

thumb between the handcuff and the right wrist, which

indicates that the handcuff is not too tight. Due to Michael

Keithley resisting Officer Helmich’s efforts to apply the

handcuff to the left wrist, Officer Helmich was forced to

struggle with Keithley to get his left wrist cuffed.”

• “I expect that there may have been scrapes or limited cuts to

the wrist or lower forearm of Michael Keithley because of how

he was seated and leaning against his arms in the back of the

police truck, being driven by Officer Helmich. Keithley did not

raise any such positioning regarding the handcuffs, which

based upon his demeanor previously and interactions with

Keithley, I would expect Officer Helmich would have addressed

in that he treated Keithley in a professional manner beginning

with his arrival at the hotel.”

• “The photograph does show a mark on Officer Helmich’s arm

from where the arm was pinned by Keithley against the police

truck, before Keithley was placed in the truck by Officer

Helmich. Certainly, it is plausible that Michael Keithley

developed a scrape or indentation on one arm after hip-

checking Officer Helmich’s arm while Officer Helmich was

searching his pocket.”

Finally, Mr. Lamb offered the following general opinions:

• “[I]t is my view from the interaction between Helmich and

Keithley that Officer Helmich was sufficiently professional and

acted appropriately in his interactions with Keithley[.]”

• “Given the totality of the circumstances, based upon my

review of all of the above materials, including the body camera

video of their interactions, i.e., between Officer Helmich and

Michael Keithley, including the interaction with the front desk

clerk upon Officer Helmich’s arrival, it is my opinion that

Officer Helmich acted in a reasonable fashion.”

• “It is my opinion that Officer Helmich acted appropriately, and

consistently with applicable laws and statutes.”

C. Daubert Motion

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Exclude Testimony of

Defendants’ Expert Witness Mark S. Lamb (d/e 41) less than one

week after receiving Defendants’ Expert Disclosures. In Plaintiff’s

Motion, he raises the following objections to Mr. Lamb’s report.

First, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Lamb identified no objective,

reliable principles or methodology that he applied in this case.

Second, Plaintiff maintains that Mr. Lamb improperly speculates on

disputed facts and credibility issues, and without having reviewed

all relevant materials. Third, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Lamb’s

opinions are impermissible legal conclusions that tell the jury how

to decide the case. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Lamb is not

qualified to offer medical or injury causation opinions.

In Defendants’ Response, they maintain that the following “key

opinions” by Mr. Lamb are relevant and should be presented to the

jury:

(1) the investigation conducted by Officer Helmich into the

hotel disturbance was professional and reasonable; (2) Officer

Helmich’s questioning of Plaintiff Keithley was appropriate; (3)

Officer Helmich properly applied the correct handcuffs during

the arrest and ensured they were fitted comfortably; and (4)

after Plaintiff Keithley resisted being handcuffed, Officer

Helmich used a reasonable amount of force to secure

compliance.

(d/e 43, at 4-5). Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of

Mr. Lamb’s opinions as relying on speculative or disputed facts, not

being grounded in reliable principles or methods, and constituting

impermissible legal conclusions. However, Defendants concede that

Mr. Lamb is not qualified to render medical opinions and will not

testify about the cause of any injuries in this case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), govern the admissibility

of expert opinions. Golpalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d

771, 778 (7th Cir. 2017). Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the

court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the

principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

Under Daubert, the district court has a “gatekeeping

obligation” under Rule 702 and “must engage in a three-step

analysis before admitting expert testimony.” Golpalratnam, 877

F.3d at 779. As gatekeeper, the Court must determine whether: (1)

the expert is qualified; (2) the expert’s methodology is reliable; and

(3) the expert’s testimony is relevant, i.e., will help the jury

understand or decide the case. Id., at 778–79. The expert’s

proponent bears the burden of demonstrating that the testimony

would satisfy the Daubert standard by a preponderance of the

evidence. Id. at 782.

“District judges have wide discretion over decisions to admit or

exclude evidence[.]” United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536

(7th Cir. 2017). However, as the gatekeeper the district court

cannot cross the line into the jury’s province. “If the proposed

expert testimony meets the Daubert threshold of relevance and

reliability, the accuracy of the actual evidence is to be tested before

the jury with the familiar tools of ‘vigorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the

burden of proof.’” Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir.

2012), quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. In other words, “the key

to the gate is not the ultimate correctness of the expert’s

conclusions but rather the soundness and care with which the

expert arrived at her opinion.” Burton v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., Inc., 994 F.3d 791, 826 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Expert Qualifications

An expert may be qualified under Rule 702 based solely on

their experience. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000

Amendment) (“Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest

that experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other

knowledge, skill, training or education—may not provide a sufficient

foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule

702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the

basis of experience.”); see also United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752,

758 (7th Cir. 2005) (“While extensive academic and practical

expertise in an area is certainly sufficient to qualify a potential

witness as an expert, Rule 702 specifically contemplates the

admission of testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on

experience.” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.

2000)), citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156

(1999).

The Court concludes—and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise—

that Mr. Lamb’s 27 years of experience working for the Peoria Police

Department, including regular work as a patrol officer, constitutes

sufficient experience to satisfy the first consideration under Rule

702 and Golpalratnam.

B. Reliability of Methodology

However, “[i]f the witness is relying solely or primarily on

experience, then the witness must explain how that experience

leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient

basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to

the facts.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000

Amendment).

As applied to proposed expert testimony by law enforcement

officers, district courts within the Seventh Circuit have explained

that a reliable methodology requires that the proposed expert

“explain how he reaches his conclusions—either by linking them to

generally accepted standards in the field or by citing information

within his own practical experience.” Blackmon v. City of Chicago,

2022 WL 21296465, *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2022) (collecting cases).

Examples of such explanations that have been found by other

district courts to demonstrate a reliable methodology based upon

law enforcement experience include “analyz[ing] the actions of

officers involved in th[e] case by comparing them with best practices

gleaned through [the expert’s] years of experience,” id., “compar[ing]

the officers’…procedures with nationally accepted standards in the

field as issued by the United States Department of Justice's

National Institute of Justice[,]” id., and “compar[ing] the facts of

each case with the standards of training and practice…including

Supreme Court cases, departmental policies and procedures,

applicable statewide police training programs, and model policies,

training, and research from various institutions.” Hurt v. Vantlin,

2019 WL 8267074, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2019).

In Hurt, the district court favorably outlined the process by

which a proposed law enforcement expert applied a reliable

methodology by proceeding through the following steps: “(1)

developing an understanding of the facts; (2) analyzing the actions

of the officers; (3) comparing what the officers did and why with the

standards of training and practice; and (4) defining and explaining

consistencies and/or inconsistencies with applicable standards of

training and practice.” Id. at *7. Having applied that methodology,

the court permitted the proposed law enforcement expert to testify

(for example) “regarding the standards for evaluating whether

probable cause exists and whether he believes Defendants followed

those standards.” Id. at *10, citing Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732

F.3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court's decision to

allow expert to testify regarding “the steps a reasonable police

investigator would have taken to solve the ... murder, as well as the

information that a reasonable police investigator would have taken

into account as the investigation progressed,” and the “ways in

which evidence from other witnesses indicated that [defendants]

departed from reasonable investigation methods”).

This Court holds that Mr. Lamb’s report does not evince the

use or application of a reliable methodology. Although Mr. Lamb

prefaces his opinions with a one-paragraph description of his

experience and qualifications, he does not explain how he applied

that experience to the facts of this case or why his experience is a

sufficient basis for his opinions, nor does he link his opinions to

generally accepted standards in law enforcement or from his own

experience in the field.

As one representative example, in Mr. Lamb’s report, he

summarily opines that “[u]pon arrival at the hotel, Officer Helmich

took appropriate steps to investigate the call that had been placed

to Morgan County Dispatch by the hotel manager”—without setting

out any relevant standards for what constitute “appropriate steps”

in responding to a dispatch call of that nature and then explaining

any consistencies (or inconsistences) between Defendant Helmich’s

investigatory steps in this case and the general standards

understood by Mr. Lamb based upon his own training and

experience.

When Mr. Lamb does identify any specific basis for his opinion

that particular actions by Defendant Helmich were “appropriate,”

“reasonable,” or supported by “ample” reasons, he regularly bases

those opinions solely on the materials he reviewed (typically citing

only “the body camera video and audio”) without drawing any

connection to his own qualifications, experience, training, or

understanding of any relevant standards. At other times, Mr. Lamb

opines that “Officer Helmich acted appropriately, and consistently

with applicable laws and statutes” without identifying any

applicable laws or statutes whatsoever.

Even when Mr. Lamb does refer to his own experience as the

basis for an opinion—for example, “I do not believe, based upon my

years of experience and training as a police officer, having taken

hundreds of arrestees into custody, that Officer Helmich exercised

or utilized any ‘excessive force’ upon Michael Keithley”—he does not

elaborate on that training, experience, or the process of taking

arrestees into custody in any manner that would assist the jury or

that would constitute a reliable methodology. “When an officer is

accused of using excessive force, the decisive question is whether

the officer's conduct meets the Fourth Amendment's objective

standard of reasonableness.” Brown, 871 F.3d at 536. “Even

though jurors can understand the concept of reasonableness, in

some cases they may not fully grasp particular techniques or

equipment used by police officers in the field.” Id. at 537.

In those instances an expert’s specialized knowledge can “help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue,” as Rule 702 requires. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).

Expert testimony of this type may be relevant in cases where

specialized knowledge of law-enforcement custom or training

would assist the jury in understanding the facts or resolving

the contested issue. For example, if it's standard practice

across the country to train officers to handle a given situation

in a particular way, expert testimony about that training might

aid a jury tasked with evaluating the conduct of an officer in

that specific situation. The legal standard contemplates a

reasonable officer, not a reasonable person, so it may be

useful in a particular case to know how officers typically act in

like cases.

Id. (emphasis in original).

Mr. Lamb’s reference to his “years of experience and training,”

without further elaboration, does not assist the jury by providing

any type of specialized knowledge such as standard practices or a

description of the typical law enforcement response to a specific

situation. Again, therefore, Mr. Lamb’s report fails to make a

connection between his qualifications (i.e., his experience in law

enforcement) and how he arrived at his opinions in this case via a

reliable methodology.

Mr. Lamb’s opinions regarding the handcuffing of Plaintiff

could, conceivably, incorporate specialized knowledge regarding

“particular techniques or equipment used by police officers in the

field” that would not be known to a juror. Id. However, while Mr.

Lamb’s opinions on that topic do refer to law enforcement practices

such as handcuffs being “double-locked” and an officer “plac[ing]

his thumb between the handcuffs and the [arrestee’s] right wrist,”

Mr. Lamb’s report does not actually explain or elaborate upon these

practices in any manner that would inform a jury as to whether

these are standard practices, what the basis for those practices is,

and whether Defendant Helmich’s actions where consistent or

inconsistent with any standard practices for handcuffing. Cf.

McCloughan v. City of Springfield, 208 F.R.D. 236, 239 (C.D. Ill.

2002) (allowing an expert “to offer testimony regarding the proper

procedures to be used by law enforcement officials when restraining

arrestees who resist arrest”).

“Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement” is designed “to make

certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional

studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same

level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert

in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co., 562 U.S. at 152. In short,

“[t]he trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply

‘taking the expert's word for it.’” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory

committee’s note (2000 Amendment), quoting Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995). In

reviewing Mr. Lamb’s expert report, and based upon the

representative opinions discussed above, the Court cannot find that

Mr. Lamb has employed “the same level of intellectual rigor” that is

required of an expert; rather, Mr. Lamb’s approach to this case

largely asks that the Court and the jury simply “tak[e] [his] word for

it” without showing his work through a reliable methodology.

Kumho Tire Co., 562 U.S. at 152; Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion (d/e 41) is GRANTED.

C. Relevance of Testimony

As indicated above in Section II., in order for expert testimony

to be relevant it must help the jury understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue. Golpalratnam at 778–79; FED. R. EVID.

702(a). Even if Mr. Lamb had applied a reliable methodology in his

report, the Court finds that his proposed testimony would not meet

“the Daubert threshold of relevance” and would therefore be

inadmissible on that basis as well. Lapsley, 689 F.3d at 805.

First, the Seventh Circuit has held that an expert opinion as to

an ultimate legal conclusion—for example, if an act is reasonable or

constitutional—is often inadmissible. See, e.g. Good Shepherd

Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 564 (7th

Cir. 2003) (“[E]xpert testimony as to legal conclusions that will

determine the outcome of the case is inadmissible”). Because these

ultimate legal conclusions must be determined by the jury, id.,

“[o]pinions that amount to legal conclusions do not assist the trier

of fact.” Client Funding Solutions Corp. v. Crim, 943 F.Supp.2d

849, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

As summarized at length above, Mr. Lamb’s report is replete

with opinions as to ultimate legal conclusions: for example, that

Defendant Helmich “acted in a reasonable fashion,” “acted

appropriately, and consistently with applicable laws and statutes,”

and “had more than ample or sufficient probable cause.” In

Defendants Response (d/e 43), they agree that his proposed expert

testimony will include the following “key opinions”: that Defendant

Helmich’s investigation “was professional and reasonable,” his

“questioning of Keithley was appropriate,” and he “used a

reasonable amount of force.”

However, the Seventh Circuit has also recognized that “[e]xpert

opinions on ultimate issues are not categorically impermissible”

under the Rules of Evidence. Brown, 871 F.3d at 539 (emphasis

added), citing FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (“An opinion is not

objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.”). Still,

Rules 403, 702, and 704(b) operate (if in different ways) to

prohibit expert opinions that would “merely tell the jury what

result to reach.” United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 497 (7th

Cir. 2009)…. [A]n expert's role is to “help the trier of fact to

understand the evidence,” FED. R. EVID. 702(a), not to draw

conclusions for the fact finder when no help is needed.

Brown, 871 F.3d at 539.

In other words, expert testimony is more likely to satisfy

Federal Rule of Evidence 702's requirement that it assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in

issue when something peculiar about law enforcement (e.g.,

the tools they use or the circumstances they face) informs the

issues to be decided by the finder of fact.

Florek v. Village of Mundelein, Illinois, 649 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir.

2011) (internal quotations omitted).

Therefore, “when the testimony is about a matter of everyday

experience, expert testimony is less likely to be admissible.” Id. at

602-03; see also Brown, 871 F.3d at 538 (“The level of factual

complexity in the case may also bear on the relevance of expert

testimony about police practices or protocols. In many cases

evaluating an officer’s conduct will draw primarily on the jury's

collective common sense. The everyday experience of lay jurors

fully equips them to answer the reasonableness question when a

case involves facts that people of common understanding can easily

comprehend. (Internal quotations omitted)).

As Defendants correctly characterize this matter in their

Response, “[t]his is a relatively straightforward action,” involving “a

bread and butter police investigation” and “basic concepts of police

conduct.” In short, by the Defendants’ own characterization this is

not a case involving “factual complexity”; rather, it is one of the

“many cases [in which] evaluating an officer’s conduct will primarily

draw on the jury’s collective common sense.” Brown, 871 F.3d at

538.

As an example, the jury could easily use their common sense

to conclude, as Mr. Lamb did in his report, that there was an

“obvious reason to believe that Michael Keithley had caused a

problem or disturbance at the hotel” because “both the manager

and the front desk clerk had identified Keithley as someone who

had caused a problem or disturbance in the hotel” and due to the

“demeanor of the front desk clerk being visibly upset and crying[.]”

Likewise, Defendants admit in their Response that Plaintiff’s

“claim of excessive force does not involve the use of a firearm, Taser,

or any takedown maneuver.” Again, the jury could use their

common sense in making the same observations and drawing the

same inferences as did Mr. Lamb when considering Plaintiff’s

allegations that the handcuffs were applied too tightly. For

example, Mr. Lamb reported that he “did not hear or observe any

complaints from Michael Keithley regarding the tightness or manner

in which the cuffs had been applied to him by Officer Keithley in the

body camera video or in the audio of the transport to the Morgan

County Jail,” and Mr. Lamb opined that “based upon his demeanor

previously and interactions with Keithley, I would expect Officer

Helmich would have addressed [any such complaints] in that he

treated Keithley in a professional manner beginning with his arrival

at the hotel.”

In sum, Mr. Lamb’s opinion would not be relevant where his

testimony would principally be “regarding facts that people of

common understanding can easily comprehend.” United States v.

Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1987).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of

demonstrating that Mr. Lamb’s testimony would satisfy the Daubert

standard by a preponderance of the evidence. Golpalratnam, 877

F.3d at 782. Specifically, Mr. Lamb has not demonstrated the

application of a reliable methodology by explaining how his

experience was “reliably applied to the facts” and actually led to his

conclusions. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000

Amendment). Further, Mr. Lamb’s testimony would not aid the jury

as the ultimate finder of fact where much of his testimony consists

of legal conclusions, Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, 323 F.3d

at 564, and when the jury could primarily draw on common sense

to make the same factual observations and reach their own

conclusions. Brown, 871 F.3d at 538.

For these reasons, Plaintiff Michael Keithley’s Rule 702 Motion

to Exclude the Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Witness Mark S.

Lamb (d/e 41) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 9, 2026.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE