SIMPSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JAQUATE SIMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25-CV-766-DAB-JEP

DET. MAURICE MCPHATTER, and

CITY OF GREENSBORO,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Jaquate Simpson’s civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Honorable Joi Elizabeth Peake

recommended that the action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge, D.E. 9. Simpson filed four objections to the Recommendation.

Objections to Recommended Ruling, D.E. 11. Simpson concurrently filed an

Amended Complaint against the City of Greensboro and Maurice McPhatter without

asking the Court for leave to amend. Amended Complaint, D.E. 12. Having reviewed

and considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable authority, the Court

finds that Simpson’s objections lack merit. The Court will adopt the magistrate’s

decision and dismiss the action for failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

Any party may object to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations, and the court “shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[A] party must object to the finding or

recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the

district court of the true ground for the objection.” U.S. v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616,

622 (4th Cir. 2007). After reviewing the record, the court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level, thereby nudging the claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Evans v. United States, 105 F.4th 606, 616 (4th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Bazemore v. Best Buy, 957 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2020)). The “court must

accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir.

2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But it “need not accept as true

a complaint’s legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions,

or arguments.” Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts may also consider documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters subject to judicial notice, and

documents “attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the

complaint and authentic.” Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown, 123 F.4th 652, 660 (4th Cir.

2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Pro se pleadings must “be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Liberal construction, however, “does not

mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). Nor does it

“transform the court into an advocate.” United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797

(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A pro se plaintiff

must still “allege sufficient facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

and state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” King, 825 F.3d at 225 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Simpson makes four objections to the Recommendation’s conclusions. He

objects to: (1) the finding that the Complaint fails to state a claim against Detective

McPhatter, (2) the conclusion that his allegations fail to support a plausible inference

of bad faith, (3) the conclusion that Monell liability does not accrue against the City

of Greensboro, and (4) the application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) to

this case.

Simpson’s objections are unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the facts cited by

Simpson in his objections as support for his claim come from the record of his

criminal prosecution. They are not included within the pleadings of this case. When

considering dismissal for failure to state a claim, district courts are limited to

considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the

documents attached or incorporated into the complaint. See Spencer v. Glaser, 185

F.4th 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2026). “Materials ‘beyond the complaint’ and its attachments

are ordinarily off limits.” Id. (quoting Bermeo v. Andis, 163 F.4th 87, 93 (4th Cir.

2025)). Facts found in the record of a separate case, then, cannot be relied upon when

attempting to state a claim.

Even if they were, however, the Recommendation would still correctly assess

that Simpson has failed to state a claim against McPhatter. The Complaint merely

states in conclusory fashion that McPhatter failed to preserve data or caused its

destruction. And even if the Court considered extraneous evidence such as that

presented by Simpson in his Objections, he would still not plead sufficient facts to

plausibly claim that Simpson destroyed the device-location evidence. (D.E. 11).

As for Simpson’s objections to the Recommendation’s determination that he

did not plausibly plead bad faith, the Court finds that the Recommendation correctly

explained the Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), standard and correctly

determined that Simpson did not plausibly plead an inference of bad faith. Moreover,

Simpson’s objection never claims that the facts show bad faith. (D.E. 11 at 4–9). He

admits that the August 2022 discovery that the data was missing does not establish

bad faith and never raises any alternative arguments in favor of bad faith. (Id.).

On Monell liability, Simpson seeks further “factual development concerning

the City’s preservation practices and whether those practices contributed to the loss

of [his] GPS evidence.” (Id. at 10). He does not plead the existence of an official

policy or custom in his complaint, nor does he establish how that policy or custom

proximately caused the deprivation of one of his constitutional rights. See Monell v.

New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). He has not even

articulated a harm. Apparently, he just seeks information. That does not plausibly

plead a claim for relief under Monell.

The Court also reviewed the Recommendation’s application of Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486–87, and found no error.

In light of the foregoing, Simpson’s objections are overruled. As for

Simpson’s attempt to file an amended complaint, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff may amend a complaint once as a matter of

course within 21 days after the earlier of (1) service of a responsive pleading or

(2) service of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed.

R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a). In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with

the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. Id. As such, the Court denies

Simpson leave to file an amended complaint. Simpson may file his amended

complaint as a new case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation,

8/10/2026 Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation, is ADOPTED. This action

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

A Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this Order.

This the 9th day of September, 2026.

/s/ David A. Bragdon

United States District Judge