Opinion

Tucker

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 9, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HASSAN A. TUCKER, :

Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-631

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN E. WETZEL, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case that is scheduled for a jury trial on

September 28, 2026. Before the court are two motions in limine filed by

defendants. For the reason that follow, both motions will be denied without

prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Hassan A. Tucker, has been incarcerated in State

Correctional Institutions in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at all

relevant times. He filed this case on April 29, 2020. (Doc. 1). The case was

initially assigned to United States District Judge Christopher C. Conner.

Although the complaint initially contained several claims, following Judge

Conner’s summary judgment ruling on July 15, 2024, the sole claim

remaining in the case is Tucker’s Eighth Amendment claim against Wetzel

and Little. (Docs. 49-50). The case is scheduled for trial on September 28,

2026.1 In preparation for trial, the parties have filed cross motions in limine.

This opinion addresses defendants’ motions in limine.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion in limine seeks a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of

evidence in order to narrow the evidentiary issues during trial and prevent

the jury from seeing improper evidence. Onderko v. LM Gen. Ins. Co., 567

F. Supp. 3d 495, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2021). Evidence is generally admissible if it

is relevant, meaning “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of

consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Evidence may

be precluded from trial if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by

a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly

presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Excluding evidence as

being more prejudicial than probative at the pretrial stage is an extreme

measure that is rarely necessary, because no harm is done by admitting it at

that stage.” In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990).

1 The case was reassigned to the undersigned on January 21, 2025,

following Judge Conner’s retirement from the court.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Evidence on Conditions and Expert Testimony

Defendants’ first motion seeks to preclude from trial any testimony or

evidence relating to the conditions of Tucker’s confinement and any expert

testimony from Tucker’s expert witness, Lauren Elizabeth Kois, Ph.D. (Doc.

101). Defendants’ motion is based on Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.,

117 F.4th 503 (3d Cir. 2024), which defendants argue establishes a four-

element test for the claim at issue in this case, including serious mental

illness, prolonged solitary confinement, no penological justification, and the

defendants’ subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. (Doc. 102 at 2).

Defendants argue that the only one of these “elements” that is at issue is

whether there was a penological justification for Tucker’s prolonged solitary

confinement. (Id.) Defendants therefore argue that evidence and testimony

of the conditions of Tucker’s confinement is irrelevant, and, similarly, that

testimony from Tucker’s expert is irrelevant, because both would pertain to

“elements” that are not at issue—namely, Tucker’s mental illness, whether

he was subjected to prolonged solitary confinement, and whether the solitary

confinement caused harm to his mental health. (Id. at 4-8).

In Williams, the court considered in the context of a qualified immunity

analysis “whether the right of a death row prisoner, with a known preexisting

serious mental illness not to be placed and held in prolonged solitary

confinement—without penological justification—was clearly established at

the relevant time.” Williams, 117 F.4th at 517. The court found that this right

was clearly established by both Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent.

Id. Among other decisions, the court noted that its earlier decision in Clark v.

Coupe, 55 F.4th 167 (3d Cir. 2022) held “that someone with a known

preexisting serious mental illness has a clearly established right since at

least 2016 not to be held in prolonged solitary confinement.” Williams, F.4th

at 518 (citing Clark, 55 F.4th 179, 181-82, 184-85). The Williams court noted

that based on Clark and other earlier precedents, it was compelled to

conclude that the right at issue in Williams was clearly established at the

relevant time. The court went on to note that under established precedent,

“the ‘touchstone of an Eighth Amendment analysis has long been, and

remains, the health of the inmate,” and that prolonged solitary confinement

can harm the health of an inmate with a preexisting mental illness. Id. at 522

(cleaned up) (quoting Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992)).

The court finally noted that its holding clearly followed from its holding in

Clark and “merely clarifie[d] that the clearly established right in Clark extends

to individuals on death row.” Williams, 117 F.4th at 524-25.

The defendants argue that rather than extending the holding of Clark,

Williams “clarifie[s]”—and thus narrows—it. (Doc. 102 at 2). According to

defendants, Williams narrows the relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry

established by Clark and other earlier controlling precedents to a four-

element test, in which the inmate must establish that he had a known history

of mental illness, that he was subjected to prolonged solitary confinement,

that there was no penological justification for the solitary confinement, and

that the defendants were aware of the inmate’s mental illness. (Id.)

Defendants’ argument is a clear misreading of Williams. Although the

court in Williams considered the fact that there was no penological

justification for the plaintiff’s prolonged solitary confinement in that case, this

was for good reason: it was a relevant fact in the qualified immunity analysis

the court was conducting. Indeed, the court clarified that its holding was

“limited to the specific allegations of this appeal from the grant of summary

judgment.” Williams, 117 F.4th at 524. The court did not limit—or intend to

limit—Clark’s holding to cases where there was no penological justification

for the prolonged solitary confinement. To the contrary, the court expressly

said that the case was an extension of Clark’s holding that there is a clearly

established “right of a prisoner known to be seriously mentally ill to not be

placed in solitary confinement for an extended period of time by prison

officials who were aware of, but disregarded, the risk of lasting harm posed

by such conditions.” Id. (quoting Clark, 55 F.4th at 182). Williams cannot be

read to limit Clark to cases where there was no penological justification for

prolonged solitary confinement any more than it can be read to limit Clark to

cases where the plaintiff was on death row: both of those facts were simply

relevant facts bearing on the qualified immunity analysis in Williams and not

new elements on the analysis.

Thus, defendants are simply incorrect that Williams makes the

presence or absence of penological justification an “element” of the Eighth

Amendment analysis governing Tucker’s claim. The “touchstone” of the

Eighth Amendment analysis remains the inmate’s health. Williams, 117 F.4th

at 225. Because evidence regarding the conditions of Tucker’s confinement

and testimony from Tucker’s expert are plainly relevant to this analysis, the

court will deny defendants’ first motion in limine.2

2 Defendants also briefly argue that even if evidence of Tucker’s

conditions of confinement is relevant, it should be excluded from trial as

unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court will defer

ruling on this argument because it simply cannot determine whether

admission of the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859

(“[P]retrial Rule 403 exclusions should rarely be granted. . . . [A] court cannot

fairly ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes

until it has a full record relevant to the putatively objectionable evidence.”

(internal emphasis omitted)).

B. Punitive and Compensatory Damages

Defendants’ second motion in limine argues that Tucker should be

barred from recovering punitive damages because he failed to include a

request for punitive damages in his complaint and that he should be barred

from recovering compensatory damages because he did not suffer any

physical injuries. (Doc. 103-04). Defendants also argue that even if Tucker

is allowed to seek compensatory damages, his damages should be limited

to $75,000, because that was the amount he requested in his complaint. (Id.)

With respect to the pleading of punitive damages, defendants are

incorrect. Although defendants accurately note that in the prayer for relief

section of the complaint, Tucker only specifically sought punitive damages

from defendants Kimberly, Fisher, and Reese, and did not seek punitive

damages from defendants Wetzel and Little, (see Doc. 1 at 26), as plaintiff

correctly notes, (see Doc. 120 at 4), a different section of the complaint

sought “compensatory, injunctive, declaratory, and punitive judgment

against the defendants for damages and violations of rights asserted herein,”

(Doc. 1 at 7). Liberally construing the complaint, as the court must because

plaintiff filed it pro se, the court finds that this is sufficient to plead a request

for punitive damages from all defendants.

With respect to compensatory damages, defendants argue that Tucker

should be barred from recovering more than $75,000 in compensatory

damages because that is the amount he sought from Wetzel and Little. (Doc.

104 at 6). This is plainly untrue. In the relevant portion of the complaint,

Tucker sought compensatory damages “in excess of” $75,000 from Wetzel

and Little. (Doc. 1 at 25 (emphasis added)). Thus, the argument is meritless.

The remainer of defendants’ arguments argue that there is no factual

basis for Tucker to be awarded compensatory or punitive damages. (See

Doc. 103). These arguments were squarely addressed and rejected by

Judge Conner at the summary judgment stage. (See Doc. 49 at 15-17). The

court considers Judge Conner’s ruling law of the case and will not revisit it

on the eve of trial.3

3 Defendants note that they “respectfully disagree” with portions of

Judge Conner’s ruling, (see Doc. 104 at 4), but the proper way to assert a

disagreement with the ruling was to file a motion for reconsideration of the

summary judgment ruling, which defendants did not do. This court will not

allow defendants to belatedly seek reconsideration of the summary judgment

ruling through a motion in limine.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions in limine are denied

without prejudice. An appropriate order follows.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

Malachy E. Mannion

United States District Judge

Dated: September 9, 2026

22-631-02

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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