Medina

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERT ALEJANDRO )

BETHANCOURTH MEDINA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1415-R

)

FRED FIGUEROA, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

NUNC PRO TUNC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Petitioner Robert Alejandro Bethancourth Medina, a noncitizen

proceeding pro se,2 seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.

1.3 United States District Judge David L. Russell referred the matter to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §

1 This Nunc Pro Tunc Report and Recommendation is issued to correct a

clerical error in the Report and Recommendation entered on September 3,

2026, Doc. 20, which incorrectly identified the first Respondent. The deadline

for filing objections remains as set forth in the original R&R.

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). This Court construes “[a] pro se

litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,

1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 7. Respondents filed a response4, Doc. 15, and the time

for Petitioner to reply has lapsed.5 See Doc. 10, at 1. So the matter is at issue.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief in part and order

Respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing within ten

days or release Petitioner from custody.

I. Factual background and procedural history.6

4 Fred Figueroa, Warden of the Diamondback Correctional Facility is not

a federal official and the Government did not file its response on his behalf.

Doc. 15, at 1 n.1.

5 Petitioner has, however, filed several other motions. With his petition,

Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Immediate Release, Doc. 2; an

Emergency Motion to Expedite, Doc. 3; an Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Doc. 4; and an Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc.

5. Petitioner later filed a Notice of Change in Detention Location that also

seeks leave to file supplemental authority, Doc. 13; an Emergency Notice of

Repeated Transfers that also seeks enforcement of the Court’s Order for

Response, Doc. 16; and a Renewed Emergency Motion to Expedite and Request

for Prompt Ruling, Doc. 19. The undersigned has considered the authority

Petitioner identifies in Doc. 13. See id. at 2-3. (citing Santillan Quiroz v.

Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026)). Given the expedited nature of these

proceedings and the disposition recommended below, the undersigned

recommends the Court deny the motions to expedite, Docs. 3, 19, and the

remaining requests in Docs. 13 and 16 as moot. The undersigned addresses

Docs. 2, 4, and 5 below.

6 Respondents have not provided any documentation of Petitioner’s

immigration history, such as the Notice to Appear (NTA), a form I-213, or any

other documents detailing Petitioner’s initial entry into the United States or

the circumstances of his November 2025 detention. See Doc. 15. The factual

background accordingly reflects Petitioner’s account, drawn from his verified

filings.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. Doc. 1, Ex. 1, at 1.

Petitioner claims that he was paroled into the United States on or about

August 15, 2018. Doc. 1, at 9, 11; id., Ex. 3, at 1. Petitioner was later granted

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and employment authorization. Doc. 1, Ex.

1, at 1, 4, 5. On November 14, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) detained Petitioner when he appeared for a scheduled reporting

appointment. Doc. 1, at 9, 11-12.

On April 28, 2026, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner

removed to Venezuela. Doc. 13, Ex. 3, at 2-3. Petitioner’s appeal to the Board

of Immigration Appeals remains pending. Id. See also

https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (noting a case appeal was

received on June 24, 2026) (last visited Sep. 1, 2026). Petitioner’s removal order

is not administratively final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a).

Petitioner filed this action on June 15, 2026, while detained at the

Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Doc. 1, at 10, 18.

The Court entered an Order for Response on July 2, 2026. Doc. 10. Among other

things, the Order directed Respondents to advise the Court if they intended to

transfer Petitioner to another district, and to file that notice at least 72 hours

prior to any transfer. Id. at 2. On July 10, 2026, Respondents notified the Court

that Petitioner had been previously transferred to Camp East Montana in El

Paso, Texas, on June 26, 2026, and that Petitioner was “manifested to return

to [the] Dallas [a]rea of responsibility on July 11, 2026.” Doc. 12, at 2-3; id., Ex.

1, at 1.

On July 17, 2026, Petitioner notified the Court of his transfer from the

El Paso facility to the Prairieland Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas. Doc.

16, at 2-3. Petitioner is currently detained at the Prairieland Detention

Center.7

II. Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner raises six grounds8 for relief: (1) prolonged detention without

an individualized custody redetermination hearing in violation of due process;

(2) punitive detention in violation of due process; (3) medical neglect and

inadequate medical care; (4) unsafe housing with dangerous detainees; (5)

retaliation and interference with access to the courts; and (6) risk of removal

or third-country transfer pending review. See Doc. 1, at 14-16.

Petitioner seeks his immediate release under an appropriate order of

supervision, or, in the alternative, he requests a prompt bond hearing where

Respondents bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

7 See ICE Detainee Locator, locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Sep.

1, 2026).

8 Petitioner’s filing consists of a form petition, Doc. 1, at 1-8, and a typed

verified petition, id. at 9-18. The form petition lists four grounds, id. at 6-7,

which substantially overlap with the six claims in the verified petition, id. at

14-16. The undersigned addresses the claims as stated in the verified petition.

he is a flight risk or danger to the community. Doc. 1, at 17. Petitioner also

requests various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief, including a

declaration that his continued detention violates due process, an order

prohibiting his transfer outside this District without prior notice,9 an order

prohibiting retaliation, a stay of removal or third-country transfer while this

action is pending, an order requiring his return at Government expense if he

is removed, and an order requiring Respondents to preserve records related to

his detention. Id.

III. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

9 The Court addressed this issue in part in its Order for Response, Doc.

10, at 2. This request is now moot given Petitioner’s transfer.

IV. Discussion.10

A. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b).

Petitioner asserts in part that the Government’s continued detention of

him without an individualized custody determination violates his due process

rights. Doc. 1, at 6, 14. Respondents “contend that Petitioner is held pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is not entitled to a bond hearing,” but they

acknowledge that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz,180 F.4th

1226, “compels a different outcome.” Doc. 15, at 2. The undersigned agrees.

“[T]his Court has previously construed 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as

unambiguously requiring that an ‘applicant for admission’ also be ‘seeking

admission’ for the section to control.” Munoz v. Grant, No. CIV-26-544-D, 2026

WL 1078862, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 20, 2026). “This conclusion is in accord

with Santillan Quiroz [], in which the Tenth Circuit held that ‘§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

application is limited to the border.’” Ramos Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-721-D,

2026 WL 2033144, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2026) (quoting Santillan Quiroz,

10 Petitioner filed this Petition while detained in this District. Doc. 1, at 10.

Respondents thereafter transferred him to Texas. Doc. 12, Ex. 1, at 1; Doc. 16,

Ex. 3, at 2. The transfer does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. “It is well

established that jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus

relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the

accompanying custodial change.” Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d

887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441

(2004).

180 F.4th at 1240); see Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1237 (“[N]oncitizens who

entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the

country are usually subject to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not §

1225(b)(2)(A).”).

Petitioner claims the Government paroled him into the country in 2018.

Doc. 1, at 9, 11. Respondents neither confirm nor dispute that account, and

nothing in the record documents the circumstances of Petitioner’s entry. See

Doc. 15. The Court need not resolve the point. Whether or not Petitioner was

paroled, the record shows that he resided in the interior of the country for

roughly seven years, that the Government granted him TPS and employment

authorization during that period, and that ICE detained him in Texas when he

appeared for a scheduled reporting appointment. Doc. 1, at 9, 11-12; id., Ex. 1,

at 1, 4, 5; id., Ex. 3, at 1. Petitioner was not “seeking admission” at the border

when ICE detained him. So he “does not fall into the mandatory detention

provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Ramos Perez, 2026 WL 2033144, at *2. Instead, §

1226(a) controls his detention and entitles him to a bond hearing. Id. (citing

Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1251 n.13); see also Zhakhonov v. Grant, No.

CIV-26-350-J, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 2026) (concluding

that detention of a noncitizen who had resided in the interior for years before

ICE detained him “is more naturally characterized as detention ‘pending a

decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States’ within

the meaning of § 1226(a)”).

B. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Respondents assert that any relief the Court grants should be “limited

to ordering the Respondents to provide a bond hearing within seven days.” Doc.

15, at 2. Petitioner requests a bond hearing in the alternative to his immediate

release. Doc. 1, at 7, 17. Because Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), the

undersigned concludes a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy. See, e.g.,

Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1247 (explaining that noncitizens subject to

§ 1226(a) are “eligible for bond”).

“Unlike § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(a) contemplates individualized custody

determinations and authorizes release on bond or conditional parole pending

completion of removal proceedings.” Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3.

Here, the Government has not provided Petitioner with an individualized

custody determination since his detention in November 2025. Doc. 1, at 6, 10;

see, e.g., Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3 (“[T]he process afforded by §

1226(a) itself serves as the mechanism through which a detainee’s liberty

interest is protected.”). Because this is “the very process Congress prescribed

for detainees held pursuant to § 1226(a),” the Court should order Respondents

to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a). Zhakhonov, 2026

WL 1865418, at *3; see also Navarrete v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-224-SLP, 2026

WL 2323345, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2026) (finding the petitioner had a

“protected liberty interest arising from her release on her own recognizance”

and that the level of process owed to her was “for Respondents to provide [her]

with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226”); Todyrenchuk v. Warden of

Diamondback Corr. Facility, No. CIV-26-1243-J, 2026 WL 2186977, at *3

(W.D. Okla. July 29, 2026) (“[T]he Court concludes the proper remedy in this

case is not immediate release, but an individualized bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge exercising jurisdiction under § 1226(a).”).

The Court should thus grant the petition in part and order Respondents

to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days or

else release Petitioner. See, e.g., Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1251 n.13

(directing district court to order the government to provide the petitioner a

bond hearing within seven days “[b]ecause [the petitioner] can properly be

subject to detention under § 1226(a).”); see also Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-

D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Petitioner has not

received a bond hearing and Respondents raise no objection challenging their

obligations to provide bond hearings for noncitizens that are detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a).”).11

11 Petitioner requests the Court place the burden on the Government at a

bond hearing to prove he is not a danger to the community or flight risk by

clear and convincing evidence. Doc. 1, at 7, 17. But the Court has previously

declined to order burden shifting. See, e.g., Zhang v. U.S. District Court, No.

C. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining

claims.12

Given the undersigned’s recommendation to grant Petitioner a bond

hearing, the Court should decline to address the merits of Petitioner’s

remaining claims for relief.13 The Court can grant him relief under § 1226(a).

See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 n.3 (“Because the Court grants the relief

the Petitioner requests based on the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the

Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim.”); see also

CIV-26-1022-D, 2026 WL 2323190, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2026) (“[T]he

Court declines to place the burden on the Government to justify Petitioner’s

detention pending removal proceedings, at this time.”); Rangel v. Mullin, No.

CIV-26-568-D, 2026 WL 1625653, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. June 5, 2026) (“At this

time, the Court declines to place the burden on the government to justify

Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings.”). So the undersigned does

not recommend it in this case.

12 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s challenges to the conditions of his

confinement are not cognizable in habeas and must instead be raise through a

civil rights action. Doc. 15, at 2-3; see Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031,

1035 (10th Cir. 2012).

13 Three of Petitioner's emergency motions remain. The Emergency Motion

for Immediate Release, Doc. 2, seeks only his release under conditions of

supervision and does not request a bond hearing in the alternative. Because

the undersigned recommends a bond hearing rather than release, the Court

should deny that motion. Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Doc. 4, and Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc. 5,

seek relief tied to the claims the undersigned recommends the Court decline to

reach. The undersigned accordingly recommends the Court deny those motions

without prejudice.

Zhang, 2026 WL 2323190, at *2 n.1 (“Given this determination, the Court

declines to address Petitioner’s remaining claims at this time.”).

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas petition part and order Respondents to

provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in front of a

neutral IJ within ten days or else release Petitioner. The undersigned

also recommends that the Court order Respondents to certify their compliance

with the Court’s order by filing a status report within ten business days of the

Court’s order, and to promptly provide a copy of this order to counsel for the

Warden of the Prairieland Detention Center.

The undersigned further recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s

Emergency Motion for Immediate Release, Doc. 2, and deny without

prejudice Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,

Doc. 4, and Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc. 5. See supra n. 12.

Finally, the undersigned recommends the Court deny as moot Petitioner’s

Emergency Motion to Expedite, Doc. 3, his Renewed Emergency Motion to

Expedite and Request for Prompt Ruling, Doc. 19, and the remaining requests

in his notices, Docs. 13, 16. See supra n. 4.

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by September

14, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72.!4 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to

make timely objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right

to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore

v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and

Recommendation disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge in the captioned matter.

ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2026.

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that

rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus

petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x

227, 231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be

applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they

need not be in every instance — particularly where strict application would

undermine the habeas review process’).

12