Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JOSEPH MARIO TEJADA )

BARRIOS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

) Case No. CIV-26-1239-D

FRED FIGUEROA, WARDEN )

OF THE DIAMONDBACK )

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, )

et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Joseph Mario Tejada Barrios, a noncitizen proceeding pro se,1

seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 6.2 United States

District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred the matter to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C).

1 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). This Court construes “[a] pro se

litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,

1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

2 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

Doc. 4.3 Respondents filed a response, Doc. 144, and the time for Petitioner to

reply has lapsed.5 See Doc. 11, at 1. So the matter is at issue.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s request for habeas relief in part and order Respondents to

provide him with an individualized bond hearing within ten days or otherwise

Petitioner from custody.

3 Petitioner filed this action on May 28, 2026, Doc. 1, and filed the

operative Amended Petition on June 24, 2026, Doc. 6.

4 The Court directed the Clerk to send copies of the Amended Petition and

supporting memorandum to the United States Attorney for this District “on

Respondent’s behalf.” Doc. 11, at 1-2. The U.S. Attorney entered an appearance

on behalf of Mr. Robert Cerna, the Acting Director of the Dallas Field Office of

ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, but not on behalf of Respondent

Fred Figueroa, Warden of the Diamondback Correctional Facility, who is not

a federal official. Doc. 13; Doc. 14, at 1 n.1. Mr. Figueroa is Petitioner’s

immediate custodian and remains a proper Respondent. See Rumsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The undersigned therefore adds Robert

Cerna as a Respondent and references to “Respondents” in this Report and

Recommendation include both Mr. Figueroa and Mr. Cerna. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2243 (writ “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person

detained”).

5 Petitioner has filed several other submissions, including: a letter

concerning an alleged June 12, 2026, assault at the Diamondback Correctional

Facility, Doc. 8; a Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc. 9; a letter requesting

immediate release and humanitarian parole, Doc. 12; and a Motion to Appoint

Counsel, Doc. 15. Given the disposition recommended below, the undersigned

recommends the Court deny the Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. 15, as moot.

The undersigned addresses Docs. 8, 9, and 12 below.

I. Factual background and procedural history.6

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Peru.7 Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) took Petitioner into custody on September 5, 2025,

following an arrest the previous day after a traffic stop in Secaucus, New

Jersey. Doc. 6, at 2. Respondents apparently initiated removal proceedings

against him, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner removed on

December 3, 2025. Id. Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals

is pending, and the removal order is not administratively final. Id.8 See 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). On February 7, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the

Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma, where he remains.

Doc. 6, at 2.9

6 Respondents have not provided any documentation of Petitioner’s

immigration history, such as the Notice to Appear, a form I-213, or any

documents detailing Petitioner’s initial entry into the United States or the

circumstances of his September 2025 detention. See Doc. 14. The factual

background accordingly reflects Petitioner’s account, drawn from his verified

filings.

7 The Petition does not state Petitioner’s nationality; however, it includes

Petitioner’s “Alien Registration Number,” which allowed the undersigned to

determine his nationality through online immigration records. See Doc. 6, at 1.

8 See EOIR Automated Case Information System,

acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Sep. 4, 2026).

9 See ICE Detainee Locator, locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Sep.

4, 2026).

II. Petitioner’s claims.

At bottom, Petitioner asserts his detention without an individualized

custody hearing violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Doc. 6, at

3. Petitioner seeks immediate release or a “[p]rompt individualized bond

hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof.” Id. at 5.

Although not specifically invoked, the undersigned liberally construes

the Amended Petition to include a claim that Petitioner is detained under the

discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is statutorily entitled to a

bond hearing before an IJ. Respondents have adopted the same construction.

See Doc. 14, at 2.

III. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

IV. Discussion.

A. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b).

Petitioner asserts in part that the Government’s continued detention of

him without an individualized custody determination is unlawful. Doc. 6, at 3-

5. Respondents “contend[] that Petitioner is held pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and is not entitled to a bond hearing,” but they acknowledge

that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226

(10th Cir. 2026), “compels a different outcome.” Doc. 14, at 2. The undersigned

agrees.

“[T]his Court has previously construed 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as

unambiguously requiring that an ‘applicant for admission’ also be ‘seeking

admission’ for the section to control.” Munoz v. Grant, No. CIV-26-544-D, 2026

WL 1078862, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 20, 2026). “This conclusion is in accord

with Santillan Quiroz [], in which the Tenth Circuit held that ‘§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

application is limited to the border.’” Ramos Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-721-D,

2026 WL 2033144, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2026) (quoting Santillan Quiroz,

180 F.4th at 1240); see Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1237 (“[N]oncitizens who

entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the

country are usually subject to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).”).

Nothing in the record documents the circumstances of Petitioner’s entry

into the United States. The record does show, however, that ICE detained

Petitioner in the interior of the country following a traffic stop in Secaucus,

New Jersey, where he had been residing and working. See Doc. 6, at 2.

Petitioner was not “seeking admission” at the border when ICE detained him.

So he “does not fall into the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).”

Ramos Perez, 2026 WL 2033144, at *2. Instead, § 1226(a) controls his detention

and entitles him to a bond hearing. Id. (citing Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at

1251 n.13); see also Zhakhonov v. Grant, No. CIV-26-350-J, 2026 WL 1865418,

at *3 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 2026) (concluding that detention of a noncitizen who

had resided in the interior for years before ICE detained him “is more naturally

characterized as detention ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States’ within the meaning of § 1226(a)”).

The Court should thus conclude that Petitioner’s present detention is

governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b).

B. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Because Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), the undersigned

concludes a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy. “Unlike § 1225(b)(1),

§ 1226(a) contemplates individualized custody determinations and authorizes

release on bond or conditional parole pending completion of removal

proceedings.” Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3; see, e.g., Santillan Quiroz,

180 F.4th at 1247 (explaining that noncitizens subject to § 1226(a) are “eligible

for bond”).

According to Petitioner, the Government has not provided him with an

individualized custody determination since his detention in September 2025.

Doc. 6, at 2; see, e.g., Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3 (“[T]he process

afforded by § 1226(a) itself serves as the mechanism through which a

detainee’s liberty interest is protected.”). Because this is “the very process

Congress prescribed for detainees held pursuant to § 1226(a),” the Court

should order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under

§ 1226(a). Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3; see also Navarrete v. Mullin,

No. CIV-26-224-SLP, 2026 WL 2323345, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2026)

(finding the petitioner had a “protected liberty interest arising from her release

on her own recognizance” and that the level of process owed to her was “for

Respondents to provide [her] with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226”); Todyrenchuk v. Warden of Diamondback Corr. Facility, No. CIV-26-

1243-J, 2026 WL 2186977, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2026) (“[T]he Court

concludes the proper remedy in this case is not immediate release, but an

individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge exercising

jurisdiction under § 1226(a).”).

The Court should thus grant the petition in part and order Respondents

to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days or

otherwise release Petitioner. See Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1251 n.13

(directing district court to order the government to provide the petitioner a

bond hearing within seven days “[b]ecause [the petitioner] can properly be

subject to detention under § 1226(a).”); see also Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-

D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Petitioner has not

received a bond hearing and Respondents raise no objection challenging their

obligations to provide bond hearings for noncitizens that are detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a).”).10

C. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining

claims.

Given the undersigned’s recommendation to grant Petitioner a bond

hearing, the Court should decline to address the merits of Petitioner’s

remaining constitutional claims. See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 n.3

(“Because the Court grants the relief the Petitioner requests based on the

applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court declines to decide the merits of

10 Petitioner requests the Court place the burden on the Government at a

bond hearing to prove he is not a danger to the community or flight risk by

clear and convincing evidence. Doc. 6, at 5. But the Court has previously

declined to order burden shifting. See, e.g., Zhang v. U.S. District Court, No.

CIV-26-1022-D, 2026 WL 2323190, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2026) (“[T]he

Court declines to place the burden on the Government to justify Petitioner’s

detention pending removal proceedings, at this time.”); Rangel v. Mullin, No.

CIV-26-568-D, 2026 WL 1625653, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. June 5, 2026) (“At this

time, the Court declines to place the burden on the government to justify

Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings.”). So the undersigned does

not recommend it in this case.

Petitioner’s due process claim.”); see also Ramos Perez, 2026 WL 2033144, at

*2 n.2 (declining to address the petitioner’s remaining claims after ordering a

bond hearing). The Court should also deny or dismiss Petitioner’s remaining

requests for relief.11

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order Respondents to

provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before a

neutral Immigration Judge within ten days or otherwise release

Petitioner from custody. The undersigned also recommends that the Court

order Respondents to certify their compliance with the Court’s order by filing

11 Because the undersigned recommends a bond hearing rather than

release, the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for immediate release. Doc.

12, at 1; see Todyrenchuk, 2026 WL 2186977, at *3. The Court should dismiss

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc. 9, for lack of jurisdiction, see 8

U.S.C. § 1252(g); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,

482 (1999), and should likewise dismiss without prejudice Petitioner’s requests

for humanitarian parole, Doc. 12, at 2, and U-visa guidance, Doc. 8, at 2, which

rest in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the exclusive

jurisdiction of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1). Lastly,

Petitioner’s requests arising from the alleged June 12, 2026 assault at the

detention facility, Doc. 8, challenge the conditions of his confinement rather

than the fact or duration of his custody, are not cognizable in habeas, and

should be dismissed without prejudice to any available administrative remedy

or civil rights action. See Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th

Cir. 2012).

a status report within ten business days of the Court’s order and promptly

providing a copy of this order to counsel for the Warden of the Diamondback

Correctional Facility.

The undersigned further recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s

request for immediate release, Doc. 12; dismiss without prejudice for lack

of jurisdiction Petitioner’s Motion for Stay of Removal, Doc. 9, and his requests

for humanitarian parole and U-visa relief, Docs. 8, 12; and dismiss without

prejudice Petitioner’s conditions-of-confinement requests, Doc. 8. See supra

n.11. Finally, the undersigned recommends the Court deny as moot

Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. 15. See supra n.5.

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by September

14th, 2026,12 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72. The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to

12 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that

rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus

petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x

227, 231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be

applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they

need not be in every instance – particularly where strict application would

undermine the habeas review process.”).

make timely objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right

to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore

v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and

Recommendation disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge in the captioned matter.

ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2026.

ga > _

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1]