Lollis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ALAN C. LOLLIS, CASE NO. 3:25 CV 207

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

LT. OFFICER G. ROBERTS, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court in this § 1983 civil rights action is Defendants

Correction Lt. Geoffrey Roberts, Correction Lt. Joshua Mulinix, and Institutional Inspector

Michael Jenkins’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 12). Pro se Plaintiff Alan C. Lollis

opposes. (Doc. 15). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons below,

Defendants’ Motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a prisoner at Toledo Correctional Institution, brings this suit based on a use of

force incident on April 3, 2024.

Pursuant to a shakedown on the date in question, Plaintiff was found in possession of

various suspected drugs and tobacco. (Doc. 12-3, at 3). Officers took Plaintiff to a “strip out cell”

because he was suspected of concealing additional contraband, specifically a mini cell phone, in

his anal cavity. Id. Plaintiff was directed by staff to submit to a visual body cavity search. Id.

This process “involves bending at the waist and separating [one’s] buttocks to allow staff to

visually inspect the rectal area and anal cavity for contraband.” Id. This method replaced a prior

method of search called “squat and cough.” Id.

The entire interaction is depicted on body camera videos from various correctional

officers.1 The shift captain, Major Wines was contacted; he authorized use of force procedures if

Plaintiff refused to cooperate. (Doc. 12-3, at 3).2 Crisis Intervention Team Negotiator Peppers

attempted to deescalate the situation and convince Plaintiff to comply. Id.

Plaintiff refused to comply with the officers’ specific instructions; he was both physically

and verbally noncompliant, stating repeatedly that he would not show officers his anal cavity as

they requested. See id.; see also generally Exhibit 6 (body camera videos). Plaintiff also stated he

was suicidal, should be put on suicide watch, asked for clothing, and said he wanted to see

someone from mental health. He repeatedly stated he would not comply with the officers’

direction to spread his buttocks. He repeatedly insisted he would “squat and cough” or “bend

forward”, while making those motions quickly and repeatedly. He argued over officers’ attempts

to explain to him what he needed to do to complete the visual cavity inspection. See Ex. 6,

Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, at 0:00-4:42.

1. Defendants’ Exhibit 6 consists of body camera videos depicting the incident. As relevant here,

in (overlapping) chronological order, these are: Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4 (covering

timestamps 20:03:56-20:16:48), Lollis,_Alan-630979.mp4 (covering timestamps 20:03:55 to

20:16:40); Lollis,_Alan-630679-2.mp4 (covering timestamps 20:16:48-20:25:58); Lollis,_Alan-

630679.mp4 (covering timestamps 20:27:08-20:35-25); Lollis,_Alan-630679-4.mp4 (covering

timestamps 20:18:01-20:50:51).

2. ODRC has policies regarding Behavioral Intervention/Use of Force and use of a Crisis

Intervention Team before any use of force when possible. See Doc. 12-3, at 1-5; Doc. 12-7

(ODRC Policy 63-UOF-01, Behavioral Intervention/Use of Force); Doc. 12-6 (ODRC Policy 71-

SOC-11, Crisis Intervention Team). Generally, these policies direct staff to “first seek to gain

compliance with staff directives by first utilizing interpersonal skills and effective behavioral

intervention techniques to de-escalate situations when possible and safe to do so”, employ crisis

intervention team members or others to help resolve the situation, and warn the prisoner that

planned force may have to be used and allow the prisoner “a final opportunity to comply with the

order.” (Doc. 12-3, at 1-2).

Roberts, after giving Plaintiff further warning, deployed a short burst of oleoresin

capsicum (“OC”) spray into the cell in an attempt to gain compliance. (Doc. 12-3, at 3); 3 Ex. 6,

Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, at 4:43. Plaintiff’s back was turned toward the spray. See id. Per

Roberts, “as a result, it had little to no effect.” (Doc. 12-3, at 3). Still, the video depicts Plaintiff

coughing in response; he stated he had asthma and bronchitis and needed to see a doctor. (Ex. 6,

Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, at 4:49-5:15). In any event, he continued to verbally engage with

the officers.

Following the use of the OC spray, officers continued to try to gain Plaintiff’s

compliance through verbal negotiation but remained unsuccessful. See id. at 4:45-6:18. During

this time, Plaintiff continued to state he would not comply with the direction to spread his

buttocks and argued with the correctional officers about what constituted compliance. Roberts

then authorized Mulinix to use a Tactical Compact Pistol, or pepper ball gun, to launch OC

powder at Plaintiff’s legs. (Doc. 12-3, at 3).4 Just before doing so, Roberts gave Plaintiff a final

directive to comply. (Ex. 6, Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, at 6:14-:15). Mulinix launched the OC

powder three times, with a pause between each deployment, while officers continued to direct

Plaintiff to comply and Plaintiff continued to loudly argue and refuse. (Doc. 12-3, at 3); (Ex. 6,

Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, at 6:18-8:00). Roberts then deployed a second burst of OC spray to

Plaintiff’s face after giving another final warning to comply. (Ex. 6, Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4,

at 7:54-8:00).

3. Roberts asserts this was authorized by ODRC policy 63-UOF-01, regarding use of force. (Doc.

12-3, at 3).

4. Roberts explains that OC spray is typically effective only at close range, whereas a Tactical

Compact Pistol “can accurately deliver OC powder from a further and safer distance” and

provides less risk of blowback or unintended exposure. (Doc. 12-3, at 2).

A second negotiator, Shift Responder Officer Renwand was contacted and attempted to

deescalate and gain Plaintiff’s compliance. (Doc. 12-3, at 3). Despite attempts over more than

seven minutes, officers remained unsuccessful in gaining Plaintiff’s compliance with their

directives. See generally Ex. 6 (body camera videos).

Given Plaintiff’s agitated state and failure to comply, officers determined that the use of a

body scanner tool would “create a high risk of injury to staff, require the utilization of significant

staff resources, and increase[] the risk of damage to the equipment.” (Doc. 12-3, at 4). Officers

were concerned about the risks of Plaintiff being unrestrained. Id. Roberts specifically noted he

was familiar with Plaintiff’s previous involvement in assaults on staff and other inmates. Id.

Major Wines subsequently authorized Plaintiff’s removal from the strip out cell and into

a dry cell where he could be monitored “for the expulsion of contraband.” Id.; see also Ex. 6,

Lollis,_Alan-630679.mp4, at 5:15-:20 (informing Plaintiff he was being placed “on dry cell per

Captain”). Prior to being placed in the dry cell, Plaintiff was taken to medical and assessed by a

nurse. (Doc. 12-3, at 4). Plaintiff refused to have his vitals taken and “voiced no statement or

concern.” (Doc. 12-4, at 18). The nurse noted circular wounds on Plaintiff’s left leg and right

buttock, which were cleaned, treated with triple antibiotic ointment, and covered with band aids.

Id. Because Plaintiff had stated he was suicidal, he was then placed on constant watch. (Doc. 12-

3, at 4).

Roberts and Mulinix (among others) completed Use of Force Reports. See Doc. 12-4, at

2-11; Doc. 12-3, at 4 (“All staff involved in the UOF incident wrote UOF reports.”). Plaintiff

completed an Inmate Use of Force Statement, on which he wrote “I’m suicidal, this is

harassment.” (Doc. 12-4, at 12). Someone wrote “Constant Watch” at the bottom of this form. Id.

Peppers and Renwand also completed Intervention Reports. Id. at 18-20.

Plaintiff was issued a conduct report for disobedience of a direct order based on his

failure to follow the strip out procedures. (Doc. 12-5, at 5). The conduct report was ultimately

withdrawn due to a Rules Infraction Board hearing not being held within the time frame set by

policy. (Doc. 12-3, at 5); (Doc. 12-5, at 7).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When

considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences from the record

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine

the truth of any factual matter in dispute; the Court determines only whether the case contains

sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). This burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court

– that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. The

nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Further,

the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court’s attention to those specific

portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. See

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (noting the court “need consider only the cited materials”).

DISCUSSION

Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges Lieutenants Roberts and Joshua Mulinix used excessive force in

violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they used OC spray and the

pepper ball gun against him. See Doc. 1, at 6, 8-9.5 Roberts and Mulinix move for summary

judgment on this claim, asserting they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff cannot

establish a constitutional violation, much less a clearly established constitutional violation. (Doc.

12, at 23, 24-29). As explained below the Court agrees.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify the violation of a right

secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed

by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983

“is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Plaintiff

brings his claims under the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The

Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth

Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” against the States. See Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). The Court has also long held this ban does not just

cover the formal “punishment” that a state court metes out to criminal defendants. The ban also

applies to informal harms that prison officials inflict on convicted prisoners during their terms of

5. Plaintiff also alleges the use of force violated his Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 8). Because the claim more properly sounds in excessive force, the

Court addresses it as such.

incarceration. The Eighth Amendment thus regulates, inter alia, the force that prison guards use

on prisoners. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). The ban on cruel and unusual

punishments prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319); see also Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). “The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth

Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’

against the States.” Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,

463, (1947) (plurality opinion)).

The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” requirement “has objective and

subjective components, both of which follow from the Eighth Amendment’s text.” Id.

Objectively, harm to a prisoner must rise to a sufficiently serious level because

the Eighth Amendment prohibits only “cruel and unusual” deprivations, not just

uncomfortable or “even harsh” ones. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392; see

Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534. Subjectively, harm to a prisoner must result from a

prison official’s sufficiently volitional actions because the Eighth Amendment

bars only willful conduct that “inflict[s]” “punishment,” not accidental conduct

that causes injury. See Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)).

Id.

“As a subjective matter . . . prisoners who challenge a correctional officer’s use of force

must prove more than that the officer acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to whether the force

was necessary (the type of intent that prisoners must prove to challenge their conditions of

confinement or medical care).” Id. at 616 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-6). “The Court has

instead described the ‘core judicial inquiry’ in this use-of-force context as distinguishing

between force used in a ‘good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and force used

‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

(2010)); see also Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[I]n the prison

context, good faith use of physical force may be necessary to maintain prison security and

discipline[.]”). “Only the latter kind of force—force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict

pain—violates the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616. “So even if an officer uses

force because of an ‘unreasonable’ belief that it is necessary to restrain a prisoner, the officer

does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324). The Eighth

Amendment “necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

force” so long as the use of force is not the type of force that would be “repugnant to the

conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). “The

negligent use of force—even the reckless use of force—does not establish an Eighth Amendment

claim; [Plaintiff] must prove the malicious use of force for the exclusive purpose to inflict pain.”

Johnson, 79 F.4th at 621.

To decide whether a jury could find that an officer acted with this malicious

intent, the Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider: What was the

extent of the prisoner’s injury? What was the nature of the threat that justified the

use of force? Was the amount of force proportional to the threat? And did the

officer take any actions designed to reduce the required amount of force?

Id. at 618. Courts also approach such claims with deference to avoid “unreasonable post hoc

judicial second-guessing” of officers’ conduct. Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir.

2008); see also Johnson, 79 F.4th at 618 (“[W]hile judges may review an encounter by slowing

down, pausing, and replaying a video, officers have no such luxury. They must make quick

decisions in the heat of the moment.”).

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense; once a defendant raises it, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to demonstrate (1) the defendant’s acts violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at

issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. T.S. v. Doe, 742

F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014). A “clearly established right” for the purpose of determining

whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity “is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ ”

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012)). “A defendant bears the initial burden of putting forth facts that suggest that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705

F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). Once a defendant has done so, “[t]he burden of convincing a court

that the law was clearly established rests squarely with the plaintiff.” Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d

996, 1000 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation omitted); Bell v. City of Southfield, 37

F.4th 362, 368 (6th Cir. 2022) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right was

clearly established” and, to meet such a burden, “must provide on-point caselaw that would bind

a panel of [the Sixth Circuit].”); see also, e.g., Campbell v. Hines, 2013 WL 7899224, at *4 (6th

Cir.) (“[T]he district court properly declined to address the merits of Campbell’s equal protection

claim, because he failed to respond to the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to

qualified immunity.”).

Upon review, in accordance with the law as set forth above, the Court finds Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Plaintiff has not

established a dispute of fact regarding the subjective component of such a claim. The nature of

the threat at issue here was the introduction of potential contraband into a prison. The videos

reflect the officers made numerous efforts to deescalate and gain Plaintiff’s compliance without

the use of force and provided him repeated opportunities to comply. See Jennings v. Mitchell, 93

F. App’x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment granted where videotape demonstrates

that inmate disobeyed repeated direct orders before the use of pepper spray). The force used was

minimal, proportional to the threat at issue, and designed to gain compliance (two short bursts of

OC spray at separate times and three pepper balls). See Johnson, 79 F.4th at 620 (“[W]e have

repeatedly described the use of a taser or pepper spray as a proportional level of force in

response to a prisoner’s refusal to follow orders, including an order to accompany an officer.”).

Further, Plaintiff’s injuries were minor, requiring only antibiotic ointment and band aids. See,

e.g., Yettaw v. Morgan, 2025 WL 1805287, at *4 (W.D. Mich.) (finding “minor injuries” from a

pepper ball launcher including small bruises and a small amount of bleeding requiring band aids

“undercuts any suggestion that [the officer] acted with malevolent intent.”).6

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff seemingly argues that he did comply with the officers’

directives. See Doc. 15. But “even if an officer uses force because of an ‘unreasonable’ belief

that it is necessary to restrain a prisoner, the officer does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”

Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324). Roberts’s Declaration demonstrates

he subjectively believed Plaintiff had not complied. (Doc. 12-3, at 3-4). The body camera

footage confirms this. And the evidence Plaintiff cites does not create a question of fact

regarding his compliance with the officers’ orders or officers’ subjective beliefs.

6. Plaintiff does not – in his Complaint or his opposition brief – assert any other injury (such as

breathing difficulty) as a result of the use of chemical agents. See Docs. 1, 15. Moreover, as

Defendants point out, courts have found the temporary discomfort associated with the use of

chemical agents to not amount to a serious injury. See, e.g., Jennings, 93 F. App’x at 725

(finding use of OC spray where individual was not “in respiratory distress of any sort; he merely

was uncomfortable in the ordinary fashion of persons exposed to pepper spray” supported

conclusion that no Eighth Amendment violation occurred).

First, to the extent Plaintiff points to video evidence of his purported compliance after the

OC spray or pepper ball gun was used, such evidence is not relevant to whether the force was

reasonable at the time it occurred. See Doc. 15, at 2 (citing Ex. 6, Lollis,_Alan-630679-2.mp4, at

1:31, 3:27, and 5:45).

Second, to the extent Plaintiff argues the videos depict that he bent forward, or “squatted

and coughed,” this does not create a question of fact regarding his compliance with the officer’s

directives, which were (consistent with their policy) for him to bend forward and then spread his

buttocks. See, e.g., Doc. 15, at 3 (noting that in Lollis,_Alan-630979.mp4 at 3:11 and 4:39 and in

Lollis,_Alan-630679-2.mp4 at 1:31, Plaintiff can be seen squatting and coughing); id. at 2

(“Thru out [sic] the whole incident you can clearly see me squat and cough and plead with the

officers that I don’t have anything on me or in me.”); id. at 3 (stating that at 2:00, 3:21, and 4:18,

in Lollis,_Alan-630679-3.mp4, Plaintiff can be seen squatting and coughing or bending over).

Defendants submit evidence that the visual body cavity search policy required an inmate to

“bend[] at the waist and separate[e] [one’s] buttocks to allow staff to visually inspect the rectal

area and anal cavity for contraband.” (Doc. 12-3, at 3). Plaintiff presents no evidence to the

contrary. And the video depicts Plaintiff did not comply with this procedure before officers’ use

of OC spray and pepper balls.

Further, in his opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that “[t]o avoid it all, all they had to do

was what they did in the end. Body scanner and dry cell.” (Doc. 15, at 3). But even if other

alternatives were available, the applicable standard is “whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson,

503 U.S. at 6–7. As explained above, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the force used here falls into the former category. The availability of other force

alternatives is irrelevant to the analysis. See Jones v. Slater, 2024 WL 4485575, at *5 (E.D.

Mich.) (“The standard is not whether any less force could have accomplished defendants’

legitimate goals.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4349176.

The force used here was simply not the sort of force “repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). Nor could any

reasonable jury conclude Defendants used force maliciously and “for the exclusive purpose to

inflict pain.” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 621; Jennings, 93 F. App’x at 725 (finding “corrections

officers did not violate [the plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights because the force used was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, not to maliciously cause pain. The

videotape squarely demonstrates that [the plaintiff] disobeyed repeated direct orders prior to the

use of pepper spray.”) (citation omitted); Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014)

(“We found no Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner was sprayed with pepper spray

after repeatedly disobeying orders to exit the shower. Indeed, in numerous other cases we have

likewise concluded that the use of chemical agents against recalcitrant prisoners did not violate

the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation modified).

Finally, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden, to overcome qualified immunity, of

“showing that the right [at issue] was clearly established” by “provid[ing] on-point caselaw that

would bind a panel of [the Sixth Circuit].” Bell, 37 F.4th at 368.

The Court therefore finds Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment / Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim.7

7. Defendants also contend that to the extent Plaintiff brings any claim regarding Defendants’

decision to place him in a dry cell, he similarly has not established an Eighth Amendment

violation relative thereto. (Doc. 12, at 23). The Court finds Plaintiff did not bring any such claim

here. See Doc. 1, at 1 (describing being “moved to segregation” following the incident) and Doc.

1, at 6-9 (claims for relief not mentioning dry cell or segregation, but focusing on alleged

Due Process / Equal Protection

Plaintiff further brings Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based on

alleged violations of institutional policies. He alleges all Defendants failed to comply with Ohio

Administrative Code § 5120-9-03 and 5120-9-01 and Inspector Jenkins failed to conduct a use of

force investigation. (Doc. 1, at 6-9). Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot establish a due process

claim based on a violation of policy. (Doc. 12, at 23-24). In response, Plaintiff simply restates his

allegation that Jenkins “violated [his] Fifth Amendment [sic] when he failed to investigate this

use of force, file his use of force (Warden) Report to the Warden that would have organized a

use of force hearing as set forth in administrative rules.” (Doc. 15, at 4).

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause says that States may not

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This text requires plaintiffs to establish several

things to make out a due-process violation. They must identify a “life, liberty, or

property” interest that falls within the clause’s reach. Id. They must show that

state actors have “deprive[d]” them of this interest. Id. And they must prove that

these actors did not provide the “process” that was “due” for this deprivation. Id.

McClendon El v. Washington, 144 F.4th 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2025).

excessive force and failure to follow use of force procedures and investigation). Indeed, in his

opposition brief, Plaintiff states: “To avoid it all, all they had to do was what they did in the end.

Body scanner and dry cell” and states he “begged to be placed on dry cell”” (Doc 15, at 3)

(capitalization altered). To the extent Plaintiff brought such a claim, Defendants are correct that

he has not established a claim based on cell conditions. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

828-29 (1994) (to state a claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment under §

1983, an inmate must show prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate's

health or safety). To establish such deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show he was

deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981). Conditions that are restrictive or even harsh, but are not cruel and unusual

under contemporary standards, are not unconstitutional. Id.; see also Agramonte v. Shartle, 491

F. App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Harsh and uncomfortable prison conditions do not

automatically create an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Plaintiff has presented no evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude he was deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities” by being placed in the dry cell. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivation of rights secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924

(1982). Thus, allegations such as Plaintiff’s which hinge solely on violations of ODRC policies

and procedures fail to state a due process claim under § 1983. See Alexander v. Vittitow, 2017

WL 7050641, at *2 (6th Cir) (finding allegations of violations of Michigan Department of

Corrections policies “fail to state a due process claim under § 1983”) (citing Swarthout v. Cooke,

562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) (“[W]e have long recognized that a mere error of state law is not a

denial of due process.”)); see also Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)

(“Allegations of state law or state constitutional violations will not support a § 1983 claim.

Similarly, a § 1983 claim may not be based upon a violation of state procedure that does not

violate federal law.”) (internal citations omitted); McVeigh v. Bartlett, 1995 WL 236687, at *1

(6th Cir.) (failure to follow policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation

because policy directive does not create a protectible liberty interest).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a failure-to-investigate claim, the Sixth Circuit

has held there is no constitutionally protected due process right to effective prison grievance

procedures. Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v.

Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467

(1983)).

Official Capacity Claims

Defendants also contend that any official capacity claims against them for monetary

damages are barred by Eleventh Amendment/sovereign immunity. (Doc. 12, at 30). Plaintiff

presents no argument in opposition, and the Court agrees Defendants are correct on this point

and Defendants are immune from such official capacity claims. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bd. of Prof.

Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tenn., 63 F.4th 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (“Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity generally shields states from individuals suing them in federal court unless

states waive their immunity or Congress removes it by statute.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 8, 2026