Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 LUIS ARTURO AMAYA MERINO, Case No. 2:26-cv-01834-DAD-CSK (PS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS &

RECOMMENDATIONS

14 PARTNERSHIP HEALTH PLAN OF

CALIFORNIA, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 22)

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Defendants.

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18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Luis Arturo Amaya Merino’s application to

19 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order

20 (“TRO”).1 (ECF Nos. 2, 22.) Plaintiff is appearing without counsel. Pursuant to Local

21 Rule 230(g), the Court submits the motions upon the record and briefs on file.

22 For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application to proceed

23 IFP. Further, the Court recommends (1) DISMISSING Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1)

24 with leave to amend certain claims as set forth below; and (2) DENYING Plaintiff's

25 motion for a TRO.

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR IFP

2 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.)

3 Plaintiff's application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing.

4 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP request.

5 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

7 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

8 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

10 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

11 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

12 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

13 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

14 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490

15 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960

16 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

18 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal).

19 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

21 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

22 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

24 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

25 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

26 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

27 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

1 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

2 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

3 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

4 III. THE COMPLAINT

5 The Complaint identifies the following defendants: Partnership Health Plan of

6 California; County of Placer Adult System of Care (“ASOC”); Matthew Morris, in his

7 official capacity as Regional Medical Director and in his individual capacity; and Amy

8 Ellis, in her official capacity as Placer ASOC Director and in her individual capacity.

9 Compl. ¶¶ 4-6 (ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges Plaintiff is a disabled Medi-Cal

10 beneficiary who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, PTSD (post-traumatic stress

11 disorder), bipolar disorder, TBI (traumatic brain injury), ADHD (attention deficit

12 hyperactivity disorder), and OSA (obstructive sleep apnea). Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff owns two

13 emotional support dogs. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges he is the tenant of an apartment in El

14 Sobrante, California that is owned by his former employer but that “was placed in

15 Plaintiff’s name through his parents’ real estate fraud and identity theft.” Id. ¶ 8. Due to

16 an ongoing National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) retaliation lawsuit against Plaintiff’s

17 former employer, Plaintiff alleges his current living situation in the apartment is

18 dangerous and he plans to vacate the apartment as soon as possible. Id.

19 Plaintiff alleges he requires a “detached single-family home with four bedrooms”

20 to accommodate his disabilities and emotional support animals. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges

21 Defendants have failed to grant Plaintiff “mandatory CalAIM Community Supports,”

22 including the four-bedroom detached single-family home. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff asserts three

23 causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state-created danger and deliberate

24 indifference; (2) “ADA Title II & FEHA Reasonable Accommodation Denial,” and

25 (3) violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Compl. ¶¶ 15-

26 17.

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1 IV. DISCUSSION

2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

3 The Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required

4 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the

5 grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

6 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.

7 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals it

8 consists of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of his causes of action and fails to

9 state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

10 In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against all Defendants pursuant to

11 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et

12 seq. (“ADA”), the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and the Unruh

13 Act. Compl. at 2-3. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims in turn.

14 1. Section 1983 Claims

15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

16 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

17 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks

18 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a

19 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

20 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable

21 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution

22 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

23 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v.

24 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual

25 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's

26 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between

27 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen

28 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th

1 Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable

2 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

3 a. State-Created Danger Doctrine

4 “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause . . . does not confer any

5 affirmative right to governmental aid” and “typically does not impose a duty on the state

6 to protect individuals from third parties.” Henry A. v. Wilden, 678 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir.

7 2012) (citation modified). An exception to this rule is the state-created danger exception,

8 where “the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate

9 indifference to a known and obvious danger.” Id. (citation modified). To determine

10 whether an official affirmatively placed an individual in danger, the court must determine

11 “(1) whether any affirmative actions of the official placed the individual in danger he

12 otherwise would not have faced; (2) whether the danger was known or obvious; and

13 (3) whether the officer acted with deliberate indifference to that danger.” Id. at 1002. To

14 show deliberate indifference, the Ninth Circuit requires the actor “must recognize an

15 unreasonable risk and actually intend to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard

16 to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Patel v. Kent School District, 648 F.3d 965, 974

17 (9th Cir. 2011).

18 Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim for state-created danger. The Complaint

19 alleges that, “[b]y approving the [Inter-County Transfer] and coverage, then refusing

20 mandatory supports while Plaintiff remains in a dangerous retaliatory living situation,

21 Defendants created a foreseeable danger to a disabled individual in violation of the 14th

22 Amendment.” Compl. ¶ 15. This vague and conclusory allegation fails to give

23 Defendants notice of the claims and grounds on which they rest, and it fails to allege

24 their acts with some degree of particularity. See Kimes, 84 F.3d, at 1129. For example,

25 the Complaint groups all Defendants together without providing who did what. The

26 Complaint is also unclear with respect to what the “Inter-County Transfer” and

27 “coverage” for Plaintiff consisted of, or what “mandatory supports” were refused to

28 Plaintiff. The Complaint’s references to “mandatory CalAIM Community Supports” do not

1 provide clarity in this respect because Plaintiff only provides what appear to be the

2 names and codes of certain benefits, but not what they do and how they work. See

3 Compl. ¶ 13. Even assuming that “mandatory supports” include the four-bedroom single-

4 family home Plaintiff allegedly requires to accommodate his disabilities, the Complaint

5 fails to explain when, where, or how Defendants denied this to Plaintiff, how any

6 Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff’s “dangerous retaliatory living situation,” or how the

7 approval of an “Inter-County Transfer” and “coverage” created Plaintiff’s dangerous living

8 situation. Accordingly, because Plaintiff makes conclusory and vague allegations that fail

9 to describe who the actors are and what conduct was directed at Plaintiff, Plaintiff has

10 failed to sufficiently plead a state-created danger claim. Because Plaintiff is proceeding

11 pro se, these claims are dismissed with leave to amend to provide Plaintiff with another

12 opportunity to attempt to plead a state-created danger claim.

13 b. Monell Liability

14 It also appears that Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for municipal liability against

15 Defendant County of Placer Adult System of Care pursuant to § 1983. “In order to

16 establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’

17 led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th

18 Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

19 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) he

20 was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy

21 amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is

22 the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063,

23 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)). The

24 complaint must identify the particular policy that plaintiff alleges caused his constitutional

25 injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

26 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local governments are

27 responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose liability on a local

28 government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy”

1 caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must be the result of a

2 decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or policymaking

3 authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link between the policy

4 or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that his injury

5 resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070.

6 Here, the Complaint does not allege any facts that could support a Monell claim.

7 For this additional reason, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant County of Placer

8 Adult System of Care is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff will be provided an

9 opportunity to amend his Complaint but must allege specific facts demonstrating

10 Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations resulted from Defendant County of Placer Adult

11 System of Care’s “execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at

12 694.

13 2. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims

14 Plaintiff asserts a claim under Title II of the ADA against all Defendants. Compl.

15 ¶ 16. Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified

16 individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. However, only a “public entity” can

17 be sued under Title II for ADA violations. See Burgess v. Carmichael, 37 F. App'x 288,

18 292 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, County of Placer Adult System of Care is a public entity. See

19 Serris v. Chastaine, 2022 WL 2133900, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (citing Duvall v.

20 Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131

21 (public entity is defined as “any State or Local Government” and “any department,

22 agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local

23 government”). It is unclear whether Partnership Health Plan of California is a public

24 entity. Accordingly, the Court recommends (1) dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claims against

25 Defendant Partnership Health Plan of California with leave to amend to the extent

26 Plaintiff can allege facts showing Partnership Health Plan of California is a public entity;

27 and (2) dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Defendants Matthew Morris and Amy

28 Ellis without leave to amend because they are individuals, not public entities. The Court

1 will proceed to address Plaintiff’s ADA claim as it pertains to Defendant County of Placer

2 Adult System of Care.

3 A person alleging a Title II violation must show (1) they are a qualified individual

4 with a disability; (2) they were excluded from participation in or denied the benefit of a

5 public entity's services, programs, or activities, or the public entity otherwise

6 discriminated against them; and (3) the exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by

7 reason of their disability. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135. To recover damages under Title II of

8 the ADA, Plaintiff “must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.”

9 Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138 (citation modified). The Ninth Circuit further held that deliberate

10 indifference is the applicable standard to determine whether there was intentional

11 discrimination by a defendant. Id.

12 Here, the Complaint provides only vague, conclusory allegations in support of

13 Plaintiff’s ADA claim. First, the Complaint fails to identify what services, programs, or

14 activities are offered specifically by Defendant Placer County Adult System of Care.

15 Second, although the Complaint alleges Plaintiff “requires a detached single-family

16 home with four bedrooms,” the Complaint fails to allege facts showing the necessity of

17 these accommodations or how they formed part of a public entity’s services, programs,

18 or activities. Third, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show deliberate

19 indifference because it does not allege that Placer County Adult System of Care was

20 aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities or denied benefits to Plaintiff by reason of his disabilities.

21 Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he was intentionally

22 discriminated against due to his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

23 under Title II of the ADA against Defendant Placer County Adult System of Care.

24 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend to the

25 extent Plaintiff can allege sufficient facts to state a claim under Title II of the ADA.

26 3. State Law Claims

27 Plaintiff also seeks to bring claims pursuant to FEHA and the Unruh Act. Compl.

28 ¶¶ 16, 17. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under federal law.

1 Accordingly, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under Plaintiff's state

2 law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association,

3 535 F. Supp. 3d 913, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2021); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971

4 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992).

5 B. Leave to Amend

6 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se

7 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and

8 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In

9 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could

10 allege additional facts to state claims under § 1983 and the ADA, the Court finds it

11 appropriate to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint. See Lopez, 203

12 F.3d at 1130-31 (indicating that prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of

13 deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure – if it appears at all

14 possible the defects can be corrected).

15 Plaintiff is instructed not to file any amended complaint until the district

16 judge rules on these findings and recommendations. If Plaintiff elects to file an

17 amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts establishing the existence of

18 federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain statement of Plaintiff's claim. The

19 allegations of the complaint must be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs, with

20 each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each paragraph having

21 its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint.

22 Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. See

23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the

24 proper way. They are available at the Clerk's Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200),

25 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.

26 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendants to guess

27 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

28 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally

1 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain

2 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the Court to spend its time

3 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id.

4 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the Court and defendants to prepare

5 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179.

6 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in

7 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an

8 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a

9 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the

10 amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any

11 function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

12 C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

13 On June 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for a TRO seeking relief in the

14 form of “FSP, ECM, Transitional Rent, and the related Community Supports housing trio:

15 Housing Transition Navigation, Housing Deposits, and Housing Tenancy and Sustaining

16 Servies.” (ECF No. 22 at 2.) Plaintiff previously filed similar motions for a TRO on May

17 14, 2026 and June 23, 2026. (ECF Nos. 3, 17.) The Court denied both previous motions

18 on June 26, 2026. 6/26/2026 Order (ECF No. 21).

19 Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it

20 has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.

21 See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting

22 that one “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only

23 upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within

24 which the party served must appear to defend”). Thus, until defendants have been

25 served with process, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, and may not grant

26 the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Murphy Bros, Inc., 526

27 U.S. at 350.

28 Further, because the Court recommends dismissing the Complaint with leave to

1 amend, there is presently no operative complaint to this action. Accordingly, the Court

2 recommends Plaintiff’s TRO be denied without prejudice. See Carnero v. Elk Grove

3 Financial, 2017 WL 1315575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (denying a TRO where there

4 was no operative complaint).

5 The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for expedited consideration of his motion

6 for a TRO (ECF No. 25) as moot.

7 V. CONCLUSION

8 In conclusion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

9 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

10 and

11 2. Plaintiff’s request for expedited consideration (ECF No. 25) is DENIED as

12 moot.

13 Further, based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

14 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED with leave to amend as

15 follows:

16 a. Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed with leave to

17 amend as to all Defendants;

18 b. Plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the ADA are dismissed with leave

19 to amend as to Defendants Partnership Health Plan of California

20 and Placer County Adult System of Care, and dismissed without

21 leave to amend as to Defendants Matthew Morris and Amy Ellis;

22 and

23 c. Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA and the Unruh Act are dismissed with

24 leave to amend.

25 2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of any order by the district judge

26 ruling on these findings and recommendations to file an amended

27 complaint that complies with the instructions provided. If Plaintiff fails to

28 timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that this

1 action be dismissed. Plaintiff is instructed not to file any amended

2 complaint until the district judge rules on these findings and

3 recommendations; and

4 3. Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 22) be

5 DENIED.

6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

7 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

8 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

9 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should

10 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any

11 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

12 || days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

13 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

14 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

15 In light of these recommendations, IT |S ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that all

16 | pleading, discovery, and motion practice in this action are STAYED pending resolution of

17 || the findings and recommendations. With the exception of objections to the findings and

18 | recommendations and any non-frivolous motions for emergency relief, the court will not

19 | entertain or respond to any motions and other filings until the findings and

20 || recommendations are resolved.

21

22 || Dated: August 13, 2026 4 4

23 (im Spo \

CHI S00 KIM

24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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