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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 DUNIER RODRIGUEZ, (A 094-928-995), No. 1:26-CV-04004-DAD-CKD

12 Petitioner,

13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT,

15 Respondent.

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17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant

18 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

20 I. Factual and Procedural History

21 Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in

22 2007. ECF No. 7-1 at 5. In 2016, Petitioner was convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) and

23 (c)(1)(A)(i) for possessing counterfeit access devices with intent to defraud. Id. See also ECF No.

24 9-1 at 2. On January 27, 2026, when Petitioner returned to the United States after a trip to Cuba,

25 U.S. immigration officials detained him, charged him administratively under 8 U.S.C. §

26 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and initiated

27 removal proceedings against him. ECF No. 9-2. He is currently detained at the California City

28 Immigration Processing Center. ECF No. 1.

1 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 26, 2026, arguing that

2 detention places his health at risk and is unnecessarily harsh when alternatives to detention are

3 available. ECF No. 1. An amended petition filed June 29, 2026, claims that Petitioner’s

4 prolonged and indeterminate detention without bond violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No.

5 7. In its answer, Respondent asserted that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. §

6 1225(b)(2), which does not permit release on bond. ECF No. 9. Petitioner countered that the

7 procedures available under the statute do not satisfy the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 10.

8 II. Statutory Immigration Framework

9 Noncitizens who are seeking admission to the United States are subject to mandatory

10 detention if an examining immigration officer determines that the noncitizen is not entitled to

11 admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). A lawful permanent resident returning to the United States

12 after travel is considered to be seeking admission if they have committed an offense identified in

13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), including a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(c); 8

14 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The parties do not dispute that Petitioner has been convicted of a

15 crime involving moral turpitude – an offense identified under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) – and that §

16 1225(b)(2) governs his detention.

17 III. Due Process

18 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

19 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

20 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in

21 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s

22 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

23 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing

24 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been

25 strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

26 Petitioner raises an as-applied procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality of

27 his prolonged mandatory detention. At this point, Petitioner has been detained for over six

28 months.

1 The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention1 in

2 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 at 531 (2003). However, the Supreme Court did so with the

3 understanding that detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and “lasts roughly a month and a

4 half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in which the

5 alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full but

6 wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the viability of as-applied challenges under the majority’s

7 framework: “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful

8 permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his

9 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.”

10 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Later, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392

11 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the right to bring such as-applied challenges: “Our

12 decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] does not foreclose

13 as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have

14 now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420.

15 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due

16 process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th

17 Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit

18 has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without

19 any process is constitutional.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). Other

20 Circuit Courts of Appeal have concluded that Demore does not foreclose as-applied challenges to

21 mandatory, but prolonged, detention. Recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Constitution

22 does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged period under

23 section 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural protections—like a

24 bond hearing—become necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2024). The

25 undersigned finds this authority persuasive and agrees that Demore does not bar an as-applied

26 challenge to prolonged detention without an appropriate hearing to determine whether such

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1 Though Demore v. Kim examined the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), its reasoning

28 also applies to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).

1 detention is justified. The next step is to determine the appropriate framework in which to

2 analyze Petitioner’s procedural due process argument.

3 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first step is determining

4 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step

5 examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest

6 accord with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

7 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due

8 process applies, the question remains what process is due.”).

9 The undersigned has considered the various tests developed by district courts within the

10 Ninth Circuit, and finds that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the appropriate

11 test for due process challenges to prolonged mandatory detention. The undersigned is particularly

12 persuaded by the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Black, 103 F.4th at 145-49, that the Mathews test

13 is flexible enough to account for the factors identified by federal courts when deciding whether

14 detention has become unreasonably prolonged. Under Mathews, the court considers three factors:

15 (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3)

16 the government’s interest involved including any fiscal or administrative burden that additional

17 procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

18 A. Private interest

19 An individual’s private interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably

20 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts of Appeal have

21 generally declined to adopt a specific threshold for when detention becomes prolonged. See

22 German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 3d Cir. 2020);

23 Black, 103 F.4th at 150; Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7–9 (1st Cir. 2021). While the Ninth

24 Circuit has not addressed this question, it has previously referred to detentions longer than six

25 months as prolonged “in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond hearings had

26 taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53

27 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted). Indeed, other courts within this Circuit have found due process

28 violations where the length of mandatory detention without bond was similar to the length of

1 detention at issue here. See, e.g., Chen v. Aitken, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2013)

2 (holding petitioner’s seven-month detention under § 1225(b) was “prolonged” because it “has

3 lasted well beyond the typical period described in Demore” and “neither release nor removal are

4 imminent”).

5 Moreover, courts hearing as-applied challenges to mandatory detention have also

6 considered the likely duration of future detention. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870,

7 880-81 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding administrative appeals and likely appeal to the Ninth Circuit

8 weighed toward granting request for bond hearing). Petitioner’s individual hearing in

9 Immigration Court has been scheduled for August 14, 2026. EOIR Automated Case Information,

10 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. A hearing before an Immigration Judge is not the

11 end of Petitioner’s removal proceedings. Either party may then choose to appeal the IJ’s decision

12 to the Board of Immigration Appeals and Petitioner could ultimately seek review by the Ninth

13 Circuit Court of Appeals. Based on its duration to date and the likelihood of continued

14 mandatory detention during all phases of removal proceedings, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s

15 detention is sufficiently “prolonged” and confers a substantial private interest.

16 B. Risk of erroneous deprivation

17 The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s]

18 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

19 procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor favors Petitioner. “[T]he risk of

20 an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is

21 substantial.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other

22 grounds). Indeed, “[i]n the absence of any meaningful initial procedural safeguards, it appears to

23 us that almost any additional procedural safeguards at some point in the detention would add

24 value.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original); see also Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-7996

25 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (finding “high” risk of an erroneous

26 deprivation where petitioner had not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during

27 his one-year detention under § 1226(c)). Additional procedures are likely to be particularly

28 meaningful. Petitioner’s convictions stem from a non-violent crime committed nearly a decade

1 ago. As a longtime lawful permanent resident, Petitioner has a strong interest in pursuing a

2 defense against removal, thereby making his risk of flight low. Accordingly, the second Mathews

3 factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor.

4 C. Government Interest

5 Under this factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function

6 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement

7 would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Higher courts have repeatedly recognized that, “[t]he

8 government has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous criminal

9 [noncitizens].’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 515). Courts

10 have also recognized that the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings can serve the

11 legitimate government purpose of preventing flight. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053,

12 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 528). Thus, in some general way, the

13 government has an interest in the detention of non-citizens held under § 1226(c). However, “the

14 additional procedural safeguards we would allow here under Mathews do nothing to undercut

15 those interests. At any ordered bond hearing, the IJ would assess on an individualized basis

16 whether the noncitizen presents a flight risk or a danger to the community, as IJs routinely do for

17 other noncitizen detainees.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153–54; see also Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at

18 *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting

19 removal. After all, the purpose of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a

20 flight risk or danger to the community.”) (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). In

21 Petitioner’s case, the government’s interest in further detaining him without a hearing to

22 determine whether such detention is justified is minimal. Administrative burden is a legally

23 cognizable interest under Mathews, but Respondent’s interest is diminished by the low fiscal and

24 administrative burdens associated with a bond hearing. See D. L.C. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 25511,

25 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (“Custody hearings in immigration court are routine and impose a

26 ‘minimal’ cost on the government.” (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D.

27 Cal. 2025)).

28 / / /

1 IV. Remedy

2 For reasons explained above in the Mathews analysis, the undersigned finds a bond

3 hearing to be the appropriate relief in this case. At the bond hearing, the government should bear

4 the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of

5 flight or danger. See Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-0940 DC DMC (HC), 2026 WL 392169, at

6 *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026) (collecting cases); Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00127 DC SCR

7 (HC), 2026 WL 766567 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2026) (adopting Findings and Recommendations

8 and granting a bond hearing). This is the appropriate burden given the liberty interests at stake.

9 See Black, 103 F.4th at 157 (“[O]nce detention under section 1226(c) has become so prolonged

10 that due process warrants a bond hearing . . . the government must justify continued detention at

11 such a hearing . . .by clear and convincing evidence.”).

12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

13 1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED.

14 2. Respondent be ordered to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond

15 hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying

16 Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, within fourteen (14) days of

17 any order resolving the § 2241 petition.

18 3. Respondent be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the above

19 provision within seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing.

20 4. If Petitioner is granted release on bond, Respondent shall return all of Petitioner’s

21 documents and possessions at the time of release.

22 5. Any order not address the circumstances in which Respondent may detain Petitioner in

23 the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and Petitioner

24 receives notice of the final order of removal.

25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after

27 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

28 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period

1 | is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties

2 || have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v.

3 || Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets

4 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties

5 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

6 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

7 | Dated: August 12, 2026 □□ I / dip Ze

9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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