D'Aquin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

THOMAS L. D’AQUIN * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 26-877

AFTERPAY US SERVICES, LLC * SECTION “I” (2)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Thomas D’Aquin filed a Complaint and an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Proceed

in forma pauperis on April 23, 2026. ECF Nos. 1-2. On April 29, 2026, Chief Magistrate Judge

van Meerveld granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and, consistent with the

duties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (e)(2)(B), ordered summons not be issued until

completion of the statutorily mandated review. ECF No. 4. This Order also required Plaintiff to

file a written response setting forth the specific facts upon which he relies to establish the bases

for his federal claim and jurisdiction for his state law claims in accordance with § 1915(e)(2). Id.

at 5. On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response. ECF No. 5.

The case was later transferred to Judge Africk and the undersigned. ECF No. 11. In

accordance with Local Rule 72.1, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), including frivolousness review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

I. THE COMPLAINT AND RESPONSE

Plaintiff Thomas D’Aquin asserts federal law claims for unspecified violations of the Truth

in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f, as well as state law claims of breach of contract,

detrimental reliance, and unfair trade practices against Defendant Afterpay US Services, LLC.

ECF No. 1. Defendant is a financial technology company that provides “Buy Now, Pay Later”

(“BNPL”) services allowing consumers to purchase products in four interest-free installments,

with a certain amount paid upfront and later fees assessed if scheduled payments are missed. ECF

No. 7 at 1 (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges he paid multiple balances in reliance on Defendant’s

representations, yet Defendant has “failed to restore account access and imposed shifting

conditions.” ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleges Defendant has been “evasive” with its responses

and provided no “meaningful phone support.” Id. He attaches (1) a screenshot entitled “Your

orders” that lists remaining balances of $1,014.13, (2) a screenshot of a text message from

customer service, and (3) a screenshot stating “Pay off active orders to continue” and “the number

of active Afterpay orders you can have at once is currently limited . . . .” ECF No. 1-1.

Plaintiff’s Response1 indicates subject matter jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331

because his claims are based on the TILA. ECF No. 5. He reiterates alleged lack of transparency

and alleges he was informed of a 6-account limit for Defendant’s services, so he reduced his

accounts to 5 “in reliance” on same. Id. at 1. Nonetheless, Defendant restricted his “access to

credit,” denied his transactions without explanation, and failed to provide “clear and accurate

disclosure of credit terms and conditions.” Id.

Plaintiff’s later filings indicate that he created a new account for which Defendant approved

similar transactions, but it lacks access to the same merchants that his original accounts had, which

he asserts reflects Defendant’s inconsistency and lack of transparency. ECF Nos. 8, 10.

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Statutorily Mandated Review

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) grants the court authority to summarily dismiss in forma pauperis

1 Plaintiff was ordered to provide a more definite statement setting forth the facts upon which he relies to support his

causes of action. ECF No. 4 at 5. Because the Response amplifies the original allegations, it is considered part of the

complaint. See Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding in forma pauperis plaintiff’s answers to

court-ordered questionnaire “an integral part of th[e] complaint”).

complaints if the asserted claims are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.2 Indeed, the statute specifically mandates that the court “sua sponte dismiss

[the case] at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.”3

This review mandate applies to both prisoner and non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases.4

A claim is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”5 A claim

“lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if

the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”6 A court may

not dismiss a claim simply because the facts are “unlikely.”7 A factually frivolous claim alleges

only facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise

to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.”8

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual

allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in

the complaint are true, even if doubtful.9 The Supreme Court clarified the standard for a Rule

12(b)(6) motion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to

2 Tam Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4624, 2011 WL 743466, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011), R.&R. adopted sub

nom., Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4264, 2011 WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).

3 Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

4 James v. Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires dismissal of frivolous

IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”); see also Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,

231 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying § 1915(e)(2)(B) to a non-prisoner whose complaint was frivolous).

5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

6 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.

1997)).

7 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)).

8 Id. (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33).

9 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)).

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face (i.e., the factual allegations must “be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).10 If the “facts” alleged are “merely consistent”

with those minimally required to establish liability, the complaint “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility.”11 “Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.”12

Although the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and consider the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”13 The court may consider not only the

allegations but also any documents attached to the complaint, referenced documents that are

central to the claim, and documents that are part of the public record or subject to judicial notice.14

In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule

12(b)(6), the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that a claim that is

dismissed under one rule does not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.15 If an in forma pauperis

complaint lacks even an arguable basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6)

and § 1915(e).16 “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court

ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

12 Roy v. Cobb, No. 20-0167, 2020 WL 2045791, at *2 (W.D. La. April 7, 2020) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

13 Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540,

544 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Lehman Bros. Small

Balance Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, 881 F.3d 933, 943–44 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding

conclusory fraud allegations that the defendant intended plaintiff to act upon representations and plaintiff acted in

reliance on representations insufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) challenge).

14 See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (directing courts to “consider the

complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to

dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

judicial notice.”); Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may rely on the complaint,

its proper attachments, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of judicial notice).

15 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)).

16 Id.

appropriate; however, dismissal under [§ 1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”17

B. Pleading Standard

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint set forth “sufficient

facts from which the court can determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and from

which the defendants can fairly appreciate the claim made against them.”18 While Rule 8’s

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does demand more than an

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”19 And while documents filed

pro se are “liberally construed,”20 even the complaints of pro se litigants must satisfy Rule 8 to

convince the court that plaintiff has a colorable claim.21

C. Availability of Amendment

Claims filed by a pro se litigant that fail to state grounds upon which relief can be granted

should generally be dismissed without prejudice, unless the plaintiff has been given adequate

opportunity to cure the deficiencies or if the pleadings demonstrate the plaintiff has pleaded his

best case:22

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a

pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the

complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory

underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing

the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to

conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action.23

17 Id.

18 Kinchen v. Sharp, No. 11-1040, 2012 WL 700920, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012) (quoting Bremer v. Hous. Auth.

of New Orleans, No. 98-2735, 1999 WL 298795, at *1 (E.D. La. May 12, 1999)), R.&R. adopted, 2012 WL 700265

(E.D. La. Feb. 29, 2012).

19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

20 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 98, 106 (1976)).

21 Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that, although pro se pleadings are treated

more liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to establish a colorable claim; conclusory allegations do not suffice).

22 James v. Smith, 152 F.4th 594, 610 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415,

423 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citations omitted)); Ricks v. Khan, 135 F.4th 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2025).

23 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329-30.

Unless it is clear that a plaintiff is unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid

dismissal, the court errs in not providing a pro se plaintiff with at least one opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies before dismissing.24

When, however, the “complaint alleges the plaintiff’s best case,” a further factual statement

from the plaintiff need not be allowed.25 Further, the district court may deny leave to amend “if

allowing an amendment would be futile.”26 An amendment is futile if it would not survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.27 Similarly, frivolous claims are generally dismissed with prejudice and without

leave to amend because the plaintiff cannot cure the frivolity.28

D. Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)

The TILA is a federal consumer protection statute that provides consumers with a cause of

action against creditors that fail to make required disclosures.29 It serves to “assure a meaningful

disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various

credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer

against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.”30

Section 1638 requires the creditor to make certain disclosures in a consumer credit

transaction at the time the credit contract is executed, including the identity of the creditor; the

amount financed; a statement of the consumer’s right to obtain a written itemization of the amount

24 Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 478 n.44 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned

up); Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020).

25 Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

26 See Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. NCAA, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499,

508 (5th Cir. 2004)); Rivera-Colon v. Parish of St. Bernard, 516 F. Supp. 3d 583, 591 (E.D. La. 2021) (citing United

States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010)).

27 Marucci Sports, 751 F.3d at 378 (citation omitted); see also Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872-73

(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 771 (5th

Cir. 1999); Leffall v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir.1994)).

28 See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

29 Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 (S.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 269 F. App'x 523

(5th Cir. 2008)

30 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).

financed; the finance charge expressed as an “annual percentage rate”; the sum of the amount

financed, the number amount, and due dates of payments; a statement that a security interest has

been taken where the credit is secured; and late payment penalties.31 TILA’s Regulation Z

regulates certain credit card practices and provides a means for resolving credit billing disputes.32

Section 1640(a) authorizes private suits against “any creditor” and allows recovery of

statutory damages to ensure proper disclosure and remedy nondisclosure violations. Under 15

U.S.C. § 1602(g), a creditor primarily is a person

who both (1) regularly extends . . . consumer credit which is payable by agreement

in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or

may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer

credit transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or,

if there is no[ne] . . . , by agreement.

For purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1666 through § 1666j and certain subsections of § 1637,33 TILA

defines a creditor as a “card issuer[ ],” regardless of whether the qualifications of (1) are met, and

card issuers are subject to those sections’ requirements and regulations promulgated by the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).34 A card issuer is a person who issues a “credit

card,” which is defined as “any card, plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the

purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit.”35

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to establish that Defendant meets the primary

definition of a creditor under § 1602(g), and thus, it is not subject to civil liability under § 1640(a).

Defendant offers loans payable in four or fewer installments, and there is no indication that a

31 McLean v. Big Dog Grp., LLC, No. 15-40, 2016 WL 3211514, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar. 11, 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. §

1638); Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 12-2275, 2012 WL 2838689, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) (citing

Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 342 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2003); § 1601(a)).

32 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1(b), 1026.1(b).

33 Specifically, creditors that are card issuers are subject to § 1637(a)(5)-(7) and (b)(1)-(3), (8), and (10). § 1602(g).

34 § 1602(b), (g); see 15 U.S.C. §1604(a) (granting the CFPB the authority to prescribe regulations to carry out the

purposes described in § 1601). There are three other definitions for creditor provided by § 1602(g), but none are

relevant for purposes of this Report and Recommendation considering the loans Defendant offers.

35 § 1602(l), (o).

financial charge is or may be required before credit is extended.36 And while the CFPB issued a

May 31, 2024, interpretive rule characterizing BNPL lenders like Defendant as card issuers by

concluding that “digital user accounts” are “other credit devices,”37 the CFPB withdrew that

interpretative rule on May 12, 2025.38 In the withdrawal notice, the CFPB made clear that any

change to include closed-end BNPL credit within the definition of credit card could only be

adopted after the appropriate notice and comments rulemaking procedures.39 Accordingly, since

Defendant is not a creditor under the TILA, Plaintiff cannot assert a TILA claim against it.

Even if Defendant were considered a § 1602(g) creditor subject to certain subsections of

1637(a)40 and (b),41 Plaintiff does not allege missing items in any statement from Defendant.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant failed to disclose the “criteria governing approval or

denial of transactions.” ECF No. 5 at 1. The criteria governing approval or denial of a transaction,

however, is not one of the required disclosures by a creditor/card issuer under § 1602(g).42 Nor

does any alleged difference in access to merchants between Plaintiff’s new account and former

account appear to violate any provision of § 1666 through § 1666j. As such, Plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible § 1604(a) claim for relief against Defendant even if it were within the definition

36 See How It Works, AFTERPAY, https://www.afterpay.com/en-US/how-it-works (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). A

“finance charge” is “the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended,

and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a). In

other words, finance charges “serve as precursors to extension of credit.” Esquibel v. Chase Manhattan Bank U.S.A.,

N.A., 276 F. App’x 393, 396 n.5 (5th Cir. 2008).

37 See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Use of Digital User Accounts to Access Buy Now, Pay Later Loans, 89 Fed.

Reg. 47068 (May 31, 2024).

38 See Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, and Advisory Opinions; Withdrawal, 90 FR 20084, 20086 (May 12,

2025).

39 See Fin. Tech. Ass’n v. CFPB, No. 24-2966, ECF No. 21 at 1-2 (D.C.C. June 2, 2025).

40 Section 1367(a) describes required disclosures for creditors offering open end consumer credit plans. See § 1602(j)

for the definition of an open end consumer credit plan.

41 Section 1367(b) describes the items required to be set forth in a statement transmitted by the creditor at the end of

each billing cycle.

42 See §§ 1602(g), 1637(a)(5)-(7).

of a § 1602(g) creditor that is a card issuer.43

Further, any action to enforce a TILA violation must be brought within one year after the

date of the violation.44 “The violation ‘occurs’ when the transaction is consummated.

Nondisclosure is not a continuing violation for purposes of the statute of limitations.”45 “The

credit transaction is consummated when ‘a contractual relationship is created between a creditor

and consumer.’”46 Although Plaintiff does not specify when he established a contractual

relationship with Defendant, he does reference an earlier action filed July 12, 2025. ECF No. 5 at

1; see D’Aquin v. Afterpay US, Inc., No. 25-1430, ECF No. 1 (E.D. La. July 12, 2025). That action

was dismissed without prejudice due to service issues. ECF No. 13. Had Plaintiff established a

relationship with Defendant more than one year prior to instituting this case on April 23, 2026,

any TILA claim would also be prescribed.

E. Supplemental Jurisdiction

When the court has jurisdiction over a cause of action, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes the

court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that do not independently fall within

its jurisdiction, but that form part of the same “case or controversy.”47 The supplemental claims

must be “so related” to the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, i.e., both claims

43 See Garcia v. Universal Mortg. Corp., No. 12-2460, 2013 WL 1858195, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2013) (finding

the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under TILA where the court was unable to determine from the plaintiff’s allegations

how the defendant violated TILA and where the plaintiffs provided no details regarding the particular items that were

not disclosed to them or the provision of TILA that the defendant violated); Val-com Acquisitions Tr. v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., No. 10-1965, 2011 WL 2312284, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2011) (finding that plaintiffs have not shown that the

alleged violation gave rise to a viable claim for relief where the plaintiffs failed to identify the provisions of TILA

which were allegedly violated through nondisclosure or procedural failures).

44 § 1640(e).

45 Mallard v. Kia Fin. Am., No. 25-64, 2026 WL 612314, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2026) (quoting Baggiolini v. Ocwen

Fin. Corp., No. 19-156, 2019 WL 8331423, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2019), R.&R. adopted, 2020 WL 813044 (E.D.

Tex. Feb. 19, 2020) (quoting Moor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 632, 633 (5th Cir. 1986))).

46 Id. (citation modified) (citing Bourgeois v. Haynes Constr. Co., 728 F.2d 719, 720 (5th Cir. 1984)).

47 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 458 (2003) (quoting § 1367(a)).

must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”48 The court may, however, decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if, among other things, “the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”49

The court has “wide discretion” to refuse or retain supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent

state law claim.50 In the determination, the court should consider the statutory factors enumerated

in § 1367(c) as well as the common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.51 Generally, however, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining

state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.52

Considering Plaintiff’s failure to state a TILA claim, the early stages of this proceeding

and balancing the relevant factors under § 1367(c) (i.e., judicial economy, convenience, fairness

and comity), the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law

claims. They should be dismissed without prejudice so that he may pursue same in state court.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff cannot state a TILA claim against Defendant because Defendant does not fall

within TILA’s definition of creditor. Even if it did, Defendant’s alleged omissions and failures do

not fall within the ambit of TILA. Because these defects cannot be cured, the TILA claim should

be dismissed with prejudice. In light of that dismissal, the court should decline to exercise

48 S J Associated Pathologists, P.L.L.C. v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 964 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

§ 1367(a); Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).

49 § 1367(c)(3).

50 Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.

1993)).

51 Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011).

52 Watson v. City of Allen, 821 F.3d 635, 642 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prods., 554

F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009)).

supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) over Plaintiff's state law claims, which should be

dismissed without prejudice.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Thomas D’Aquin’s TILA claim against Defendant

Afterpay US Services, LLC be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for being legally frivolous and failure to state a claim.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining state law claims be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

result from a failure to object.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

53 Douglass y. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously

applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended

to extend the period to fourteen days.

1]