The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MELISSA BATIE-SMOOSE, Case No. 26-cv-01876-NW
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
9 v. DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
10 THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE Re: ECF No. 83
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
11
Defendant.
12
13 Plaintiff Melissa Batie-Smoose alleges that her former employer, San Jose State University
14 (“SJSU”), represented in this action by Defendant The Board of Trustees of the California State
15 University (“Board of Trustees”), discriminated and retaliated against her after she raised concerns
16 about the inclusion of a transgender athlete on the SJSU women’s volleyball team. Second
17 Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 60 ¶¶ 8–20.
18 The Board of Trustees now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC, arguing that Plaintiff fails to
19 state claims for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and Title IX. ECF No. 83.
20 The motion is fully briefed, and the Court heard oral argument on August 21, 2026. ECF Nos. 94,
21 97. For the reasons laid out below, the Court GRANTS the motion with leave to amend.1
22
23
24
1 Six days after the hearing on Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff moved the Court for leave to
25 file a third amended complaint to eliminate her sex discrimination claims under Title VII and Title
IX, Counts I and III, respectively. ECF No. 99. Defendant opposes on grounds that the proposed
26 amendment would add no new facts or legal theories, and would require the parties to re-brief, and
the Court to re-hear, the same motion to dismiss that is currently ripe for the Court’s review. ECF
27 No. 101. The Court agrees and terminates as moot Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. ECF
1 I. BACKGROUND2
2 In January 2023, Plaintiff Batie-Smoose accepted an offer of employment as the Associate
3 Head Coach for the women’s volleyball team at SJSU, under Head Coach Todd Kress. At the
4 time, Plaintiff had eighteen years of experience coaching volleyball at the collegiate level.
5 While coaching in January 2023, Plaintiff noticed that one SJSU player stood out as
6 athletically superior to others on the team. In discussing the player’s abilities with Coach Kress,
7 Plaintiff learned that the player identifies as a transgender woman.3
8 Through “further inquiry,” Plaintiff learned that the athlete had been recruited to play on
9 the SJSU women’s volleyball team. SAC ¶ 34. Plaintiff alleges that Coach Kress gave
10 preferential treatment to the player by extending her special privileges not offered to other players
11 and tolerating violations of team conduct rules.
12 During the 2023-2024 school year, SJSU administrators instructed Plaintiff and other staff
13 to keep the player’s transgender identity confidential.
14 SJSU renewed Plaintiff’s employment contract for the Associate Head Coach position on
15 March 1, 2024. The 2024 contract required that Plaintiff “provide full support and abide by the
16 CSU and SJSU commitment to gender equity in education, including athletics, and its full
17 compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. ¶ 25.
18 Plaintiff alleges she understood the term “gender equity” to mean “sex as set forth in Title IX.” Id.
19 ¶ 26.
20 In 2024, after several websites published articles reporting that a transgender athlete was
21 playing for SJSU’s women’s volleyball team, SJSU administrators and Coach Kress informed the
22 women’s volleyball team of the athlete’s transgender identity. Players on the team were told that
23 discussing the transgender player’s participation on the team may violate Title IX and school
24 policy, and that such a violation could jeopardize their scholarships and the team’s status.
25 As awareness of the transgender athlete’s identity grew, some universities refused to
26
27
2 The factual background is drawn from Plaintiffs’ SAC. See ECF No. 60.
1 compete against the SJSU women’s volleyball team, citing concerns about fairness and players’
2 safety. The SJSU women’s volleyball team co-captain and other players on the team began to
3 voice concerns about the fairness, equal access to activities, and safety of including a transgender
4 player on the women’s volleyball team.
5 In October 2024, Plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint with SJSU raising concerns about the
6 participation of a transgender athlete on the SJSU women’s volleyball team and alleging
7 discrimination towards female athletes. Plaintiff then shared her Title IX complaint with the
8 media. Shortly after, Defendant suspended Plaintiff from her position as Associate Head Coach of
9 the SJSU women’s volleyball team, on the basis that she had “violated [the player’s] private
10 information” and “disclos[ed] student information to the media” by sharing her Title IX complaint
11 publicly. Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
12 Around January 31, 2025, Defendant declined to renew Plaintiff’s SJSU employment
13 contract. Defendant stated or implied that the nonrenewal of Plaintiff’s contract was motivated by
14 the contents of her personnel file, which included her opposition to the inclusion of a transgender
15 player on the women’s volleyball team and her Title IX complaint. Plaintiff does not believe the
16 decision not to renew her contract was related to her job performance, because her performance
17 was evaluated as adequate overall in the 2024-2025 school year.
18 Plaintiff is not aware of any investigation by the SJSU administration into the allegations
19 of misconduct towards the female players who objected to the transgender player’s membership
20 on the women’s volleyball team, or Coach Kress’s actions in failing to address the reported
21 misconduct towards other players and preferencing the transgender player.
22 II. LEGAL STANDARD
23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint
24 if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
25 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
26 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard
27 requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
1 “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to
2 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. There is similarly no
3 heightened pleading standard for Title VII and Title IX claims; the pleading must meet the
4 ordinary Rule 8 standard by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim[s] showing that
5 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); Austin
6 v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
7 In deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court
8 must assume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in her
9 favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). But the court is not
10 required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
11 or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
12 III. DISCUSSION
13 Plaintiff brings claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII (Counts I and
14 II) and for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX (Counts III and IV). The basic facts
15 underlying all four claims are the same. See SAC ¶¶ 62–95. Plaintiff’s complaint spends
16 significant pages detailing alleged misconduct by individuals not involved in this lawsuit,
17 including Coach Kress and SJSU volleyball players. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 40–43. The actions of those
18 individuals are not before the Court. The Court focuses its analysis on the allegations relevant to
19 Plaintiff’s claims, namely, the conduct of Plaintiff herself and SJSU and its employees’ responses
20 to that conduct. For ease of discussing the statutes involved, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Title
21 VII claims together, and Plaintiff’s Title IX claims together, and concludes that Plaintiff’s Second
22 Amended Complaint does not plausibly state claims for sex discrimination or retaliation under
23 either Title VII or under Title IX.
24 A. Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
25 1. Plaintiff’s Title VII Sex Discrimination Claim (Count I)
26 As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her Title VII
27 administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC before bringing her Title VII sex
1 EEOC charge did not explicitly state that she was complaining of sex discrimination or so indicate
2 in the narrative portion of the charge (instead, it references only a claim of retaliation). Id.
3 Plaintiff responds that her EEOC charge, if appropriately liberally construed, gave notice of a sex
4 discrimination claim, so her administrative remedies have been exhausted. ECF No. 84, at 16–17;
5 see SAC ¶ 4 (“Plaintiff’s EEOC charges specifically and expressly identified and described
6 Defendant’s discriminatory and retaliatory actions based on Plaintiff’s sex and her opposition to
7 sex discrimination and advocacy for female athletes.”). The Court need not reach the issue,
8 however, because even assuming Plaintiff did exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII,
9 as she alleges, she fails to state a claim for sex discrimination under that provision.
10 Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge any
11 individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
12 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
13 sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “[A]n unlawful employment practice is
14 established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
15 origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
16 motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m). To state a claim for discrimination based on sex,
17 Plaintiff therefore must allege that she was suspended or terminated, at least in part, because of her
18 sex. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 659 (2020). “[P]ut differently, if changing
19 [Plaintiff’s] sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has
20 occurred.” Bostock, 590 U.S. at 659–60.
21 It is undisputed that SJSU was Plaintiff’s “employer,” and that Plaintiff was SJSU’s
22 “employee,” at the relevant time, under the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
23 (“Title VII”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (f).; see SAC at ¶¶ 6–7, 64–65; Motion to Dismiss Second
24 Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”), ECF No. 83 at 5.4 SJSU is thus required to comply
25
26
4 Under Title VII, “‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
27
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person [excluding U.S.
1 with Title VII.
2 Here, Plaintiff alleges SJSU violated Title VII by suspending and terminating Plaintiff for
3 opposing the inclusion of a transgender player on the women’s volleyball team and for opposing
4 “the silencing of female players who disagreed” with the decision to include and to preference that
5 player. SAC at ¶ 71. Plaintiff alleges that SJSU treated her differently than Coach Kress, a man,
6 who was neither suspended nor terminated for his support of the transgender athlete’s inclusion on
7 the women’s volleyball team, and his failure to advocate for female athletes who spoke out against
8 that inclusion of the transgender player. Id. at ¶ 70.
9 The allegations in the SAC do not support the inference that Plaintiff would not have been
10 suspended or terminated by SJSU if her sex were different. See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 659–60.
11 While Plaintiff states that “Defendant’s actions in suspending and terminating Plaintiff were
12 motivated by her opposition to sex discrimination and her protected advocacy for the statutory
13 rights of female athletes,” she does not establish that her termination had anything to do with her
14 sex. SAC ¶ 60. “A recitation of facts without plausible connection to gender is not cured by
15 labels and conclusory statements about sex discrimination.” Austin, 925 F.3d at 1138; see also
16 Malloy v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. 19-CV-07995 SBA, 2021 WL 4269365, at *13
17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss Title IX sex discrimination claim under
18 Title VII framework where plaintiff alleged “no facts suggesting that he was treated less favorably
19 than female coworkers because he is male.”); Mayes v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 917 F. Supp. 2d
20 1074, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing Title VII discrimination claims where plaintiff
21 “provide[d] no meaningful detail suggesting the termination was because of his race or sex”).
22 Instead, the SAC makes clear that SJSU’s decisions to suspend Plaintiff and not renew her
23 employment contract were rooted in her open violation of SJSU’s instructions, not because of her
24 sex. As Plaintiff’s own pleading states, she was suspended for “‘disclosing student information to
25 the media’ by sharing her Title IX complaint” in violation of SJSU administrators’ instruction to
26 Plaintiff and other staff to keep the player’s transgender identity confidential. SAC ¶¶ 44, 56.
27 Plaintiff claims that the disparate treatment of Coach Kress shows she was discriminated against
1 disclose a student’s information to the media and was thus not disciplined. SAC ¶¶ 15, 27, 70; c.f.
2 Defrancesco v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 21-16530, 2023 WL 313209, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Jan. 19,
3 2023) (affirming dismissal of a Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by a homosexual
4 employee of a university who was passed over for a promotion in favor of a heterosexual
5 employee, where the “allegations g[a]ve rise to an inference that the Defendants promoted the
6 more experienced employee”). Whether Coach Kress, or any other SJSU employees or students,
7 engaged in other misconduct and should have been disciplined is not before the Court.
8 Moreover, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in accordance with the terms of her
9 contract on the date her contract was set to expire. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff’s 2024 employment contract,
10 an exhibit to the SAC, states that Plaintiff’s employment was “subject to the statutes, collective
11 bargaining agreements, policies, and procedures of SJSU, including, but not limited to, the right of
12 SJSU to transfer, assign, reassign, layoff, and discipline,” and set to expire on January 31, 2025 –
13 the date on which she was terminated. ECF No. 60-1 at ¶ 5–6; SAC ¶ 52. Plaintiff violated
14 SJSU’s confidentiality policy, which was conveyed to her directly by SJSU administrators, by
15 disclosing a student’s information to the media. SAC ¶¶ 44, 56. There is no indication that
16 Plaintiff’s suspension or termination were motivated by her sex, but rather by her actions.
17 Plaintiff “fail[s] to plead facts that ‘permit [the Court] to infer more than the mere
18 possibility of misconduct’ under Title VII.” Defrancesco, 2023 WL 313209, at *2 (quoting
19 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679). Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that she was suspended
20 or terminated because of her sex, she fails to state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.
21 Accordingly, Plaintiffs Title VII sex discrimination claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
22 2. Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim (Count II)
23 To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII where, as here, there is no direct evidence of
24 retaliation, a plaintiff must allege (1) that she engaged in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered
25 an adverse employment action, and (3) that the protected activity and the adverse employment
26 action were causally linked. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008);
27 Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 673 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012), as amended, 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.
1 retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the
2 lessened causation test” applicable to sex discrimination claims under Title VII, which asks
3 whether “a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
4 though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. at 360; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In
5 other words, to establish causation for Title VII retaliation, Plaintiff must allege “that engaging in
6 [a] protected activity was one of the reasons for [her] firing and that but for such activity [she]
7 would not have been fired.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064–65 (9th Cir.
8 2002).
9 An employee engages in a protected activity under Title VII where the employee “has
10 made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
11 hearing” under Title VII, or where the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
12 employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In the latter case, “[i]t is
13 unnecessary that the employment practice actually be unlawful; opposition thereto is protected
14 when it is ‘based on a reasonable belief that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment
15 practice.” Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Moyo
16 v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis original, citations omitted)).
17 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged she “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
18 any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII, or that she “has opposed
19 any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. Though she alleges she
20 “engaged in protected activity by opposing and reporting what she reasonably believed to be sex-
21 based discrimination in the administration and operation of the women’s volleyball team at
22 SJSU,” the only employment discrimination she alleges is her suspension and termination. SAC
23 ¶¶ 51–52. And as above, she does not adequately allege that she was suspended or terminated
24 based on her sex, as required under Title VII. See Section II.A.1.
25 Because Plaintiff has not alleged that she engaged in a protected activity under Title VII,
26 she has not alleged a claim for retaliation under Title VII. Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim
27 therefore is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
1 B. Title IX Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
2 Plaintiff also brings sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title IX of the
3 Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) in addition to her Title VII claims. SAC ¶¶ 80–95
4 (Counts III and IV). Title IX prohibits recipients of federal education funding from intentionally
5 “subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
6 Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (“No person in the United States shall, on the
7 basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
8 discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,
9 [subject to exceptions not applicable here].”). Defendant does not dispute that Title IX applies to
10 SJSU because it receives federal education funding. SAC ¶ 82; ECF No. 83 at 11.
11 1. Plaintiff’s Title IX Sex Discrimination Claim (Count III)
12 Protections against discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX are consistent with
13 protections against discrimination “because of” sex under Title VII. Doe v. Snyder, 28 F.4th 103,
14 114 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Emeldi, 673 F.3d at 1224 (“[T]he Supreme Court has often looked to
15 its Title VII interpretations of discrimination in illuminating Title IX.”)); see also Malloy, 2021
16 WL 4269365, at *12 (“For employment discrimination claims under Title IX, courts generally
17 employ the Title VII framework.”); Thomas v. Regents of Univ. of California, No. 19-cv-06463-
18 SI, 2020 WL 1139595, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020) (collecting cases). Thus, the Court relies on
19 its analysis of Plaintiff’s parallel sex discrimination claim under Title VII to address Plaintiff’s
20 claim under Title IX.
21 The allegations on which Plaintiff relies in her Title IX sex discrimination claim are
22 essentially the same as those forming the basis of her Title VII sex discrimination claim. See ECF
23 No. 60 ¶¶ 62–71; 80–87. In both counts, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected “to adverse
24 employment actions, including suspension and termination, on the basis of her sex and/or because
25 she opposed practices that she reasonably and in good faith believed constituted sex-based
26 discrimination.” Id. at ¶¶ 66, 84. Her Title IX sex discrimination claim adds, “Plaintiff’s
27 advocacy for the statutory rights of female athletes and the integrity of women’s sports was in
1 educational athletics.” Id. at ¶ 84.
2 Just as required for her sex discrimination claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must prove that
3 she was suspended or terminated, at least in part, because of her sex to state a claim for sex
4 discrimination under Title IX.5 Bostock, 590 U.S. at 659. As discussed above, she has not done
5 so. See supra Section III.A.1. Although Plaintiff states that her advocacy for female athletes was
6 “in furtherance of Title IX’s core purpose,” this does not establish that she faced adverse
7 employment actions because of her sex. Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that she was
8 suspended or terminated because of her sex under Title IX, her claim for sex discrimination under
9 Title IX is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
10 2. Plaintiff’s Title IX Retaliation Claim (Count IV)
11 Retaliation “is a form of ‘discrimination’ because the complainant is subjected to
12 differential treatment.” Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174. Retaliation because someone has complained
13 of sex discrimination “constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of
14 Title IX.” Id. “In retaliation claims under Title IX, we apply the familiar framework used to
15 decide retaliation claims under Title VII.” MacIntyre v. Carroll Coll., 48 F.4th 950, 954 (9th Cir.
16 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 867
17 (9th Cir. 2014); Emeldi, 698 F.3d at 724–25.
18 Unlike Title VII, Title IX “is broadly worded,” and “does not require that the victim of the
19 retaliation also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.
20 Where the retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimination, the
21 statute’s ‘on the basis of sex’ requirement is satisfied.” Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179; compare 42
22 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–3 (making unlawful certain actions by an employer against an employee), with
23 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (prohibiting “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
24 assistance” from discriminating against any “person in the United States,” with enumerated
25
26
5 Plaintiff’s Title IX sex discrimination claim centers on allegations that she was subjected to
adverse employment actions on the basis of her sex. ECF No. 60 ¶ 84. To the extent Plaintiff
27
alleges she was discriminated against on the basis of others’ sex (i.e., for her opposition to sex
1 exceptions).
2 Here, unlike Plaintiff’s retaliation claim brought under Title VII, which requires her to
3 allege discrimination against her, Plaintiff’s allegation that she was suspended and terminated
4 because she opposed discrimination against others—here, female athletes on the SJSU volleyball
5 team—can give rise to a retaliation claim under Title IX.
6 But Plaintiff still must establish that she was suspended and terminated for speaking out
7 against discrimination on the basis of sex, even if not her own. And as above, Plaintiff’s
8 allegations do not suggest that she was suspended or terminated because of her advocacy for the
9 rights of female athletes on SJSU’s volleyball team. Rather, she was suspended and terminated
10 because she disclosed a student’s information to the media (incidentally, by sharing her Title IX
11 complaint), in open defiance of SJSU administrators’ instruction. See supra Section III.A.2; SAC
12 ¶ 44. There is no allegation that SJSU’s instruction to keep a student’s transgender identity
13 confidential was discriminatory – indeed, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
14 (“FERPA”) prohibits SJSU and its employees from publicly disclosing personally identifiable
15 information about any student, regardless of their sex or other characteristics (and regardless of
16 whether a student’s information has already been made public by others). 20 U.S.C.
17 § 1232g(b)(1); ECF No. 83 at 19. Plaintiff’s complaint supports that she was disciplined for
18 violating a confidentiality law, not for opposing discrimination on the basis of sex.
19 Besides sharing her Title IX complaint with the media, Plaintiff does not allege that she
20 took any specific actions in furtherance of her advocacy that might have caused SJSU to suspend
21 and terminate her. See generally SAC; id. ¶ 44. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation
22 under Title IX. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim with leave to amend.
23 IV. CONCLUSION
24 Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with leave to amend. Given that Plaintiff has only
25 once amended, and voluntarily so, the Court permits Plaintiff to amend her complaint to cure the
26 deficiencies discussed in this Order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)
27 (pursuant to Rule 15(a), leave to amend “should be freely granted when justice so requires,”
] than on the pleadings or technicalities.”) (en banc) (internal quotes and ellipses omitted). Plaintiff
2 || shall file an amended complaint within 21 days from this Order.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 || Dated: September 4, 2026
Noél Wise
6 United States District Judge
7
8
9
10
1]
a 12
13
14
15
16
17
Z 18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28