Yu

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

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8 WEN YU,

9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-5203-JNW-MLP

10 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

11 MEESHA SIDHU,

12 Defendant.

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14 Plaintiff Wen Yu (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Yu”), who is currently detained at Western State

15 Hospital (“WSH”), filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on

16 Defendant Meesha Sidhu’s (“Defendant” or “Dr. Sidhu”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot.

17 (dkt. # 66).) Through counsel, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion (Resp. (dkt. # 73)), and

18 Defendant filed a reply (Reply (dkt. # 75)). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the

19 balance of the record, and the governing law, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion (dkt.

20 # 66) be GRANTED.

21 I. BACKGROUND

22 There is no dispute that on December 12, 2024, Mr. Yu was involuntarily medicated

23 pursuant to a state trial court order. (See Mot. at 3, Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff, in an unsigned and

1 unverified response to interrogatories, asserts that during the medication injection “multiple staff

2 members physically restrained” him, he was “struck and bruised during this process,” and he

3 experienced “rib pain” after.1 (First Pavela Decl. (dkt. # 67), ¶ 5, Ex. C at 3.) Plaintiff does not

4 provide any evidence of his own behavior before, during, or after the involuntary medication.

5 Plaintiff’s counsel states in a sworn declaration that Mr. Yu is “5 feet 2 inches tall and weighs

6 less than 120 pounds.” (Rossi Decl. (dkt. # 74), ¶ 2.)

7 Dr. Sidhu stated in his sworn declaration that he has reviewed records and has a “limited”

8 recollection of the December 2024 incident. (Sidhu Decl. (dkt. # 70), ¶¶ 4-5.) Dr. Sidhu

9 explained that his usual practice when operating under a court involuntary medication order,

10 after a patient refuses oral medication, is for WSH staff to “engag[e] in a hold of the patient, to

11 restrain the patient, so that a nurse could administer an injection, in a safe manner.”2 (Id., ¶ 6.)

12 “[R]estraints would be utilized if a patient is displaying threatening behavior.” (Id.) Dr. Sidhu

13 avers he “did not strike or hit or seek to harm Mr. Yu” and, to the best of his recollection, he

14 “held one of his limbs, in conjunction with security personnel, so that a nurse could administer”

15 the injection. (Id., ¶ 8.) Dr. Sidhu stated that he “would remember” if he witnessed anyone

16 striking or harming a patient and would have reported it. (Id., ¶ 9.) Dr. Sidhu also “do[es] not

17 recall Mr. Yu complaining of any physical pain after he was medicated.” (Id, ¶ 12.) If Mr. Yu

18 had, Dr. Sidhu “would have ensured he had access to medical care[.]” (Id.)

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1 Plaintiff’s signed amended complaint similarly alleges that he was struck and sustained rib injuries.

(Am. Compl. (dkt. # 6) at 7-8.)

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2 The parties agree that evidence of routine practice is admissible. (Mot. at 9; Resp. at 7; see also Fed. R.

23 Evid. 406 (“Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice may be admitted to prove

that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine

practice.”).)

1 Michelle Roder, a Registered Nurse, stated in a sworn declaration that she does not recall

2 the December 2024 incident in detail but she reviewed records indicating she and another RN

3 participated. (Roder Decl. (dkt. # 69), ¶ 2.) She reports that, after a patient refuses compulsory

4 medication, “[p]rotocol dictates that if a patient remains resistant or exhibits signs of agitation,

5 security personnel are notified for assistance.” (Id., ¶ 4.) She has “never seen anyone get hurt

6 during a manual hold” and has “never seen security strike a patient during any involuntary

7 medication procedure.” (Id., ¶ 7.) If she had “ever witnessed abuse, excessive force, or improper

8 conduct toward a patient, [she] would be required to report it.” (Id., ¶ 8.)

9 Ms. Roder attached to her declaration medical records relating to the incident. (Roder

10 Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A.) According to a report she signed on December 12, 2024, after Mr. Yu

11 refused oral medication, he “became angry and agitated, posturing aggressively toward staff”

12 whereupon a “manual hold was initiated due to immediate danger, and an IM [intramuscular]

13 injection was administered.” (Id., Ex. A at 15; see also id. at 6 (Mr. Yu “appeared agitated

14 yelling cursing the staff and fighting the staff.”).) Mr. Yu continued to display “hostility,

15 resistance to redirection, and escalating anger and irritability” and was “increasingly aggressive

16 and agitated, shouting, resulting in placement in a five-point restraint” for 32 minutes. (Id., Ex. A

17 at 15.) “No injuries were reported.” (Id.) Mr. Yu denied pain after the incident. (Id., Ex. A at 4,

18 9.)

19 WSH Security Guard Rollin Mixon stated in a sworn declaration that records show he

20 was one of the staff members present for the “physical hold during [Mr. Yu’s] involuntary

21 medication” although Mr. Mixon does not remember the event. (Mixon Decl. (dkt. # 68), ¶¶ 2,

22 4.) Mr. Mixon described his general practice to “follow the directions of clinical staff and use the

23 least amount of force necessary to assist[.]” (Id., ¶ 5.) If he were to see a staff member “strike or

1 hit a patient—beyond the controlled physical hold required for an involuntary injection—[he]

2 would immediately . . . have them leave the room” and later notify a supervisor and file a report.

3 (Id., ¶ 6.)

4 Mr. Mixon attached to his declaration a Security Incident Report for the December 12,

5 2024 incident, signed that day. (Mixon Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Security was dispatched and Ms.

6 Roder “asked security for assistance with IM BACKUP.” (Id., Ex. A at 2.) Security asked Ms.

7 Roder “if they had a hands on order and she said yes. Security then went hands on with the

8 patient and assisted him to the room with a therapeutic manual hold.” (Id., Ex. A at 2-3.) Mr. Yu

9 was noncompliant and “started fighting with security” who then “secured the patient in 5 point

10 restraints to his bed.” (Id., Ex. A at 3.) “No patient or staff was harmed.” (Id.)

11 II. DISCUSSION

12 A. Plaintiff’s Request for Deferral

13 Plaintiff requests that, if summary judgment is not denied, the Court defer ruling on the

14 Motion to permit him to take Dr. Sidhu’s deposition. (Resp. at 10-11.) He further asserts he

15 intends to file a second amended complaint to add claims. (Id. at 11.)

16 A court may defer consideration of a summary judgment motion if the “nonmovant

17 shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to

18 justify its opposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “A party requesting a continuance pursuant to

19 Rule 56[d] must identify by affidavit the specific facts that further discovery would reveal, and

20 explain why those facts would preclude summary judgment.” Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San

21 Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).

22 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Sidhu’s deposition is “the single most critical piece of missing

23 discovery” and cites Dr. Sidhu’s declaration stating that his recollection of the incident is

1 “limited.” (Resp. at 15 (quoting Sidhu Decl., ¶ 5).) Given that Dr. Sidhu has already reviewed the

2 available records, Plaintiff fails to establish that a deposition would revive his memory or result

3 in any new information. (See id., ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff has not met his burden to identify what facts

4 further discovery would reveal or why they would preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, his

5 request for deferral is denied.

6 B. Summary Judgment

7 1. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

8 Summary judgment is appropriate when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

9 as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

10 56(a). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party

11 fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he

12 has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving

13 party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there is an absence of evidence to

14 support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. The moving party can carry its initial burden by

15 producing affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-movant’s case, or by

16 establishing that the non-movant lacks the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy its burden of

17 persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102

18 (9th Cir. 2000). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine issue of

19 material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The

20 Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 585-87.

21 In supporting a factual position, a party must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the

22 record . . . ; or show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

23 genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the

1 fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there

2 is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at

3 586. “[T]he requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. . . . Only disputes over

4 facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the

5 entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986)

6 (emphasis in original). The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

7 disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

8 prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

9 The opposing party must present significant and probative evidence to support its claim

10 or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

11 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is

12 not sufficient” to defeat summary judgment. Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

13 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor can the non-moving party “defeat summary judgment with allegations

14 in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements.” Hernandez v.

15 Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003).

16 2. Section 1983 Standards

17 To sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he

18 suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2)

19 the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton

20 v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied

21 only if a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another’s

22 affirmative act, or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the

23 deprivation complained of. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.

1 1981) (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

2 “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

3 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

4 a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). If a defendant

5 does not directly cause the alleged injury, they may still be held liable for “setting in motion a

6 series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to

7 inflict the constitutional injury.” Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoted

8 source omitted). Vicarious liability may not be imposed on a supervisory employee for the acts

9 of their subordinates in an action brought under § 1983. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corrs. &

10 Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). A supervisor may, however, be held liable under

11 § 1983 “if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient

12 causal connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional

13 violation.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001).

14 3. Excessive Force Standards

15 Because Mr. Yu was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged excessive force, his

16 claim is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. To succeed on an excessive force claim

17 under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show that “the force purposely or knowingly used against

18 him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015).

19 “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case,’”

20 without regard to the officers’ underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397 (quoting Graham v.

21 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Relevant considerations include “the relationship between

22 the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any

23 effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security

1 problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was

2 actively resisting.” Id.

3 C. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

4 Considering the Kingsley factors, Defendant provides evidence that force was needed

5 because medical staff assessed Mr. Yu as aggressive and an immediate threat, staff used the

6 minimal force needed, Plaintiff was not injured,3 and Plaintiff was actively resisting compulsory

7 medication. (See Mot. at 8-11; Sidhu Decl.; Roder Decl.; Mixon Decl.) Defendant has met his

8 initial burden to show that the force used was objectively reasonable and, thus, did not violate

9 Mr. Yu’s constitutional rights.

10 The burden, accordingly, shifts to Plaintiff to establish a genuine issue of material fact in

11 order to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue exists over whether the

12 force used was objectively unreasonable because “the decision to apply physical force was made

13 before security personnel had any direct contact with Mr. Yu.” (Resp. at 6.) As evidence,

14 Plaintiff offers his counsel’s declaration stating that, based on his review of the record, he

15 “understand[s] a ‘hands on order’ to mean a pre-authorization to apply physical force to a

16 patient, made before direct individualized contact.” (Rossi Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff argues that this is

17 “not responsive force” but “predetermined force.” (Resp. at 6.) When the force was authorized,

18 however, is not evidence that the force itself was unreasonable.

19 Defendant presents unrebutted evidence that medical staff determined that Mr. Yu was

20 aggressive and an immediate danger and then called security staff for assistance. (Roder Decl.,

21 Ex. A at 6, 15.) Even accepting Plaintiff’s proffered evidence, he identifies no reason why

22 security staff would have to see Mr. Yu and conduct their own assessment that force was

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3 Plaintiff argues that the medication caused side effects, due to which it was discontinued. (Resp. at 8.)

This is not an injury caused by the allegedly excessive force, however.

1 required before applying force to assist medical staff as requested. Having “pre-authorization” to

2 apply force does not create a genuine issue of material fact over whether the force used was

3 objectively unreasonable.

4 Plaintiff next argues that the reports Defendant has submitted were prepared by interested

5 parties, no body camera recordings exist, and no independent review was conducted. (Resp. at

6 11.) He does not, however, present any evidence to rebut the records and declarations Defendant

7 submitted. Even if Plaintiff’s unverified interrogatory responses are considered, Mr. Yu states

8 only that he was struck and bruised and experienced rib pain. He has not rebutted Defendant’s

9 evidence that Mr. Yu resisted compulsory medication aggressively and was an immediate threat,

10 making the use of force necessary, nor has Plaintiff offered any evidence that the amount of

11 force was unreasonable in response to the situation.

12 Plaintiff argues that the lack of staff injuries creates “a significant evidentiary gap.”

13 (Resp. at 8.) Plaintiff emphasizes his slight stature, yet argues that it is “highly improbable” if he

14 was indeed aggressive that “six trained security personnel sustained zero injuries.” (Id. at 6.) The

15 lack of injuries to staff does not create a genuine issue of material fact over whether the force

16 used against Mr. Yu was objectively reasonable.

17 Finally, Plaintiff argues that whether he understood the offer of oral medication prior to

18 the involuntary injection “is a genuine factual question.” (Resp. at 13.) He does not, however,

19 offer any evidence that he did not understand the offer of oral medication or explain how this

20 impacted whether the force used to comply with a state court involuntary medication order was

21 reasonable. Claims related to the state order are not before this Court. (See dkt. ## 59 at 4-6, 60.)

22 Plaintiff has not submitted significant, probative evidence supporting his claim sufficient

23 to defeat summary judgment. See Intel Corp., 952 F.2d at 1558. The Court concludes that

1 summary judgment should be granted, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the Court need

2 not reach Defendant’s alternative argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

3 III. CONCLUSION

4 The Court recommends GRANTING Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt.

5 # 66) and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. A proposed order accompanies this Report

6 and Recommendation.

7 Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk and

8 served upon all parties to this suit not later than fourteen (14) days from the date on which this

9 Report and Recommendation is signed. Failure to file objections within the specified time may

10 affect your right to appeal. Objections should be noted for consideration on the District Judge’s

11 motions calendar fourteen (14) days from the date they are filed. Responses to objections may

12 be filed by the day before the noting date. If no timely objections are filed, the matter will be

13 ready for consideration by the District Judge on August 25, 2026.

14 The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Report and Recommendation to the parties

15 and to the Honorable Jamal N. Whitehead.

16 Dated this 4th day of August, 2026.

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18 MICHELLE L. PETERSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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