The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
JAMES LAUGHRIDGE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:25-cv-2126-CEM-LHP
BRANDON STAHL, JOSEPH
LUNDY, SHANE OVERFIELD,
Defendants
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case Pending Ruling on
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity. Doc. No. 52.
Plaintiff partially opposes. Doc. No. 58. Upon consideration, the motion (Doc.
No. 52) will be denied.
Plaintiff James Laughridge, proceeding pro se, filed his first complaint in this
case against Defendant Stahl and others on November 6, 2025, alleging claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Doc.
No. 1. The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed on
May 22, 2026, which asserts three (3) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First
Amendment retaliation against Defendant Brandon Stahl (Count I), Defendant
Joseph Lundy (Count II), and Defendant Shane Overfield (Count III) in their
individual capacities. Doc. No. 42. In sum, Plaintiff’s claims center around an
incident that occurred on November 9, 2024, when Plaintiff complained about the
parking of Defendant Stahl’s personal Jeep in a gated community. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21,
26. Plaintiff complained to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”), and to
Defendant Stahl directly, and recorded Defendant Stahl and OCSO with his
cellphone. Id. ¶¶ 21, 26, 34, 36. Two (2) days later, Defendants contacted
Plaintiff’s employer via email and telephone and falsely claimed Plaintiff had
engaged in aggressive behavior and had to be confronted by deputies during the
November 9, 2024 incident. Id. ¶¶ 42-48. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
communications with his employer were in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected First
Amendment conduct, resulting in a formal investigation and temporary suspension
of Plaintiff’s job duties/privileges, and causing Plaintiff emotional distress and
harm to his professional reputation, as well as a chilling effect on his future
protected speech. Id. ¶¶ 49-56.
Defendants have moved to dismiss based on the doctrine of qualified
immunity, and because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege claims of First
Amendment retaliation. Doc. Nos. 45, 51. Plaintiff has responded in opposition,
and the motions remain pending before the Presiding District Judge. Doc. Nos. 50,
59. Pursuant to the Case Management and Scheduling Order, discovery closes on
April 19, 2027, the dispositive motions deadline is May 19, 2027, and jury trial is
scheduled for the October 2027 trial term. Doc. No. 26.
Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay all remaining case
management deadlines pending resolution of their qualified immunity defense
raised in their motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 52. In response, Plaintiff does not
oppose a stay of all future deadlines, but asks that any discovery already in
progress, to include a subpoena served on the City of Orlando and Plaintiff’s
Renewed Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 56), be allowed to proceed. Doc. No. 58.
The Court has broad discretion to stay discovery as part of its inherent
authority to control its docket. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); see also
Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[A]
magistrate has broad discretion to stay discovery pending decision on a dispositive
motion.”). However, motions to stay discovery pending a ruling on a dispositive
motion are generally disfavored in this District. See Middle District Discovery
(2021) § (I)(E)(4); see also Gen. Dynamics Elec. Boat Corp. v. Skobic, No. 3:24-cv-387-
WWB-MCR, 2024 WL 4188363, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2024) (“A stay of discovery
should be the exception rather than the rule. There is no general rule that
discovery be stayed while a pending motion to dismiss is resolved.” (citations
omitted)). Indeed, “when discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case
management problems which impede the Court’s responsibility to expedite
discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and problems.” Feldman v.
Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting Simpson v. Specialty Retail
Concepts, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 (M.D.N.C. 1988)). See also Tech Traders, LLC v.
Insuladd Env't, Ltd., No. 6:18-cv-754-Orl-40GJK, 2018 WL 8369219, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 5, 2018) (noting that requests to stay discovery “are generally disfavored
because they unreasonably delay the progress of the case and impede the Court’s
ability to manage discovery.”).
The moving party bears the burden of showing good cause to stay discovery.
Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652; see also Middle District Discovery (2021) § (I)(E)(4)
(“[U]nusual circumstances may justify a stay of discovery in a particular case upon
a specific showing of prejudice or undue burden.”). In determining whether a stay
of discovery is warranted, the Court must balance the harm produced by delay
against the possibility that the dispositive motion will be granted and entirely
eliminate the need for discovery. Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652. In making this
determination, “it is necessary for the Court to take a preliminary peek at the merits
of the motion to dismiss to see if it appears to be clearly meritorious and truly case
dispositive.” Id. at 652–53 (quotations omitted).
In addition, the Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has stated
discovery generally should not proceed until the threshold issue of qualified
immunity is addressed. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (noting
qualified immunity provides “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal
question”). However, the Supreme Court has qualified this general guidance,
noting discovery may be appropriate even when the defense of qualified immunity
is raised. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588, 597–98 (1998) (stating a trial court
must exercise discretion when deciding whether to allow discovery after the
defense of qualified immunity is raised and noting qualified immunity is intended
to protect officials from “broad-reaching discovery” but some discovery may still
be proper). Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized discovery is not
uniformly prohibited before a qualified immunity defense is decided. Harbert Int'l,
Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting some discovery may be
permitted but the trial court “must exercise its discretion so that officials are not
subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery” (quoting Crawford–El, 523
U.S. at 597–98)).
With these standards in mind, the Court finds that Defendants have not
shown good cause for a stay of the case. The undersigned recently entered a
Report and Recommendation recommending that the Presiding District Judge deny
both motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 60. As it specifically pertains to qualified
immunity, the undersigned found that Defendants failed to satisfy their burden that
they were acting within their discretionary authority – indeed they made only a
passing reference in a footnote to this burden – and that the law regarding First
Amendment retaliation as it relates to the facts of this case was clearly established
as of the time of the events in question. Id. The undersigned further noted that
Defendants could reassert their qualified immunity defense at summary judgment,
following development of a factual record. Id. As for Defendants’ other
arguments, the undersigned applied the standards for a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and found that Plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged plausible claims for First Amendment retaliation. Id.
Thus, while the undersigned does not speak to the ultimate resolution of
Defendants’ motions, it is not a foregone conclusion that Defendants will prevail on
their motions to dismiss such that a stay of the case is warranted. Cf. United States
Ex Rel. Deligdish v. N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 6:22-cv-696-JSS-DCI, 2025 WL
1580804, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2025), aff’d sub nom. Deligdish v. N. Brevard Cnty.
Hosp. Dist., No. 6:22-cv-696-JSS-DCI, 2025 WL 2217710 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2025)
(denying motion to stay where magistrate judge issued a report recommending
dismissal of some, but not all, claims; “[t]hus, though the undersigned has found
that the motions to dismiss have some clear merit . . ., the undersigned has implicitly
found that the motions to dismiss are not ‘truly case dispositive,’ in that they do not
dispose of this case as a whole or eliminate entirely the need for discovery. . . . As
such, staying discovery . . . does not serve the interests of justice or judicial
economy.” (citations omitted)); Aldridge v. Beaumier, et al., No. 5:21-cv-15, 2021 WL
12440246, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. May 20, 2021) (denying motion to stay pending resolution
of motion to dismiss raising qualified immunity where it did not appear that
resolution of the motion to dismiss would resolve the entire case).1
Other than relying on their qualified immunity defense, Defendants make no
argument that litigating this case will cause any specific burden or prejudice, or that
discovery is disproportionate or otherwise inappropriate. See Ray v. Spirit Airlines,
Inc., No. 12-61528-CIV, 2012 WL 5471793, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2012) (“[T]he
multitude of tools provided by the discovery rules remain at [defendant’s]
disposal,” and “particularized discovery issues [may] be addressed and resolved
on a case-by-case basis, which is a more prudent approach than an indiscriminate
blanket stay of discovery.”). Indeed, at this point it appears that discovery has
been minimal, with the lone pending dispute related to a subpoena directed to a
non-party. See Doc. Nos. 56, 58. Thus, the Court finds no other special
circumstances exist warranting a stay of this case at this time.
1 In addition to citing to general legal principles, Defendants reference two (2)
district court decisions where motions to stay were granted. Both are distinguishable. In
James v. Conley, No. 1:23-cv-24467-KMM, 2024 WL 4377612, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2024),
the motion to dismiss was filed by a recently added defendant, and there was no report
and recommendation or other ruling on the motion. And Elliott v. Wilcox, No. 3:13-cv-
580-J-39JRK, 2015 WL 13389881, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2015) involved an unopposed
motion to stay case management deadlines pending resolution of motions for summary
judgment, not, as Defendants misquote, motions to dismiss.
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to stay (Doc. No. 52) is DENIED. See
also Clampet v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 23-60799-CIV-SINGHAL, 2023 WL 4763127,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2023) (denying motion to stay pending resolution of motion
to dismiss because “dismissal [wa]s not a foregone conclusion”).
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 4, 2026.
ay □□□
LESLIE AN PRICE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
QQ.