The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ALTAGRACIA SALCEDO,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-01141-KCD-NPM
v.
THE DISTRICT BOARD OF
TRUSTEES SOUTHWESTERN
STATE COLLEGE, FLORIDA,
THE DISTRICT BOARD OF
TRUSTEES FOR FLORIDA
SOUTHWESTERN STATE
COLLEGE,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Plaintiff Altagarcia Salcedo sues her former employer, Defendant
Florida Southwestern State College (“FSW”), for discrimination and
retaliation. (See Doc. 6.) FSW moved for summary judgment (Doc. 28), and
Salcedo has responded (Doc. 36), making this matter ripe. For the reasons
below, the motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
The parties largely agree on the basic plot of this dispute, even if they
fiercely contest the underlying motives. Where the record reveals a genuine
dispute over the facts, the Court notes it below. Salcedo, a 49-year-old Hispanic
woman with brown skin, was an associate director in the student affairs
department at FSW. She worked there for a tumultuous year before she was
fired.
During that year, her relationship with other employees was strained.
Especially in the IT department. She claims that two IT employees, Kaci Brito
and Carmen Allen, often ignored her when visiting the building but greeted
white colleagues. (Doc. 36 at 10.) They also required Salcedo to “submit HTML
code with IT tickets,” a requirement they did not impose on her younger, white
colleagues. (Id.)
Worse, Brito allegedly refused to train Salcedo. On one occasion, Brito
held back assignments until the eleventh hour, forcing Salcedo to miss an
afternoon of training just to get the work done. (Id. at 11.) And during a
separate virtual training session, Brito unceremoniously invited Salcedo to
drop off the call right as the presentation turned to topics relevant to her job.
According to the transcript, their conversation went like this:
Brito: “…and also you can jump off at any point
because we just needed communication stuff.”
Salcedo: “I don’t mind staying, because I know it
affects admissions, so I’d like to be able to give them a
recap…”
Brito: “Cool.”
(Doc. 36-1 at 204.)
Then came the system audit. FSW says it reviewed its network to comply
with federal cybersecurity standards, identifying employees who held more
system access than their roles strictly required. As a result of that audit,
Salcedo and two of her coworkers lost their prior access. (Doc. 27-3 at 6.) But
Salcedo views the lock-out as a targeted attack. She points out that the vice
president of IT never bothered to ask her—or her supervisor—what level of
access her duties actually required. In her mind, the real goal was simply to
make her job impossible. (Doc. 36 at 10.)
The aftermath only fueled her suspicions. According to Salcedo, FSW
revised her job description to reflect the fact that she would not be able to
access the software system. Yet it did not remove the clause requiring her to
continue training other employees on its use. (Doc. 36-1 at 496.)
At that point, Salcedo formally complained of discrimination to HR. (Doc.
36-3 at 1.) But the ensuing investigation brought her no relief. The inquiry
concluded that no discrimination had occurred. (Doc. 36-4 at 12.) Five months
later, a flurry of emails culminated in Salcedo’s termination. The messages are
reproduced below. The back-and-forth is undeniably long, but it provides
necessary context to understanding how and why FSW showed her the door.
Salcedo first emailed her direct supervisor, Kailee Mateika:
From: Altagracia Salcedo
Sent: Wednesday, September 6, 2023 9:02 AM
To: Kailee Mateika
Subject: Tomorrow’s Meeting
Good morning, Kailee. I hope this message finds you well.
I would like to discuss some concerns I have regarding
recent events, and I have outlined them below for our
meeting tomorrow:
1. Survey Assignment: I was responsible for distributing
surveys to the team, following your approval of my
recommended approach, which was to assign two surveys
to each team member to prevent them from feeling
overwhelmed with eight surveys.
2. Tiffany’s Request: Tiffany repeatedly asked to have alt
eight surveys on each iPad, contrary to the approved plan.
Despite my explanation and insistence that we stick to the
agreed-upon approach on three separate occasions, she
continued to request this change, and it was eventually
granted by you during Tuesday’s meeting. She refused to
accept the direction I gave her, which is insubordination.
Could you please provide an explanation for why Tiffany’s
actions consistently undermine my work that has been
previously approved by you?
3. Consistent Behavior: This incident is not an isolated
case. Tiffany has also displayed disrespectful behavior
towards me in front of the team and during meetings.
Could you please provide insights into why Tiffany’ s
actions and behavior have been allowed to persist without
intervention as they are impacting our work environment
negatively?
4. Disparaging Remarks: Tiffany has been allowed to make
disparaging remarks about former colleagues, Susel,
Raquel and Yuri, during team meetings, falsely accusing
them of subpar work and maliciously deleting files. Such
behavior is detrimental to our work environment.
5. Negative Comments about Naples School District:
Tiffany’s negative comments about people coming with
“pitchforks” for the Naples school board members for not
canceling school during the first day of the hurricane are
unprofessional and alarming. Negative comments like that
about people we should be building relationships and
partnerships with are inappropriate and
counterproductive. It’s essential that we maintain a
positive and professional relationship with the community.
Could you please provide insights into why Tiffany’s
actions and behavior have been allowed to persist without
intervention? As you are in charge of the team, it is your
responsibility to manage and coach her in the moment to
prevent these issues from continuing. If she displays
insubordination again and undermines the work that I
have completed and you have approved, I may have no
choice but to bring these concerns to Jason’s attention.
Given the recent instance where Tiffany made last-minute
changes to my approved work, and has a tendency to
undermine not only my work but those of her own
colleagues, I would like to request the following procedures
moving forward: I will need assigned tasks to come with
either a soft or hard deadline in writing, and approvals for
such tasks should also be documented in writing.
Thank you for your attention to these concerns.
* * * *
From: Kailee Mateika
Sent: Wednesday, September 6, 2023 4:01 PM
To: Altagracia Salcedo
Subject: Re: Tomorrow’s Meeting
Altagracia,
Our team is a collaborative, creative, and flexible group.
Plans can change as situations evolve and change or as we
move through a project. As the leader of this team, it is my
prerogative to make adjustments to move things forward.
Tiffany does not report to you. She reports to me.
Therefore, the only way she could be deemed insubordinate
is if she refused a reasonable request from me as her
supervisor. It is not helpful or productive for you to view
anyone as “undermining your work” when I make a
decision. I have been in these meetings and have not
viewed any team members treating you or anyone else in a
disrespectful manner. I have not received any complaints
regarding Tiffany’s work. Regarding the discussion of
Collier County Public Schools, the conversation was not
disparaging, it reflected the observations of the team
regarding the reaction of parents.
Regarding your request, “I will need assigned tasks to come
with either a soft or hard deadline in writing, and
approvals for such tasks should also be documented in
writing.” I am not going to accommodate that request and
instead would strongly urge you to Learn to be more
flexible and less rigid as you participate within this team
environment going forward.
(Doc. 36-9.) Apparently unhappy with Kailee’s response, Salcedo emailed
FSW’s President:
From: Altagracia Salcedo
Sent: Wednesday, September 6, 2023 5:47 PM
To: Jeffery S. Allbritten
Cc: Ian Neuhard
Subject: Fw: Tomorrow’s Meeting
Dear President Allbritten,
I hope this message finds well. I came to FSW to help the
organization and serve the students. For the most part I
love it here and like you I believe in integrity. I don’t
believe employees should be allowed to speak ill of others
in meetings, especially when it comes to our community
partners. I addressed these concerns and others to Kailee
and received the following email. I have been treated
unfairly at FSW simply for asking for clarity and respect
and this is not first time.
Although it was not my job, I reached out to the CEO of the
Marriott and Publix for donations after hurricane Ian,
which we received. I did that because I care. I also,
communicated with John Sykes, the CEO of iHeart Radio
and Chairman of the Rock n Roll Hall of Fame about
possibly providing music for one of our student events.
Again, that’s not my job but I did it because I genuinely
care and I want to the students to enjoy their academic
journey and help FSW succeed. I’m disappointed but how
I’ve been treated.
Everyone should be treated equally and respectfully.
(Id.) Salcedo then followed up with another email to Kailee in the morning:
From: Altagracia Salcedo
Sent: Thursday, September 7, 2023 5:42 AM
To: Kailee Mateika
Cc: Jason Dudley; Ian Neuhard
Subject: Re: Tomorrow’s Meeting
Kailee,
I’m disappointed that you chose to make accusations that
have no merit, and insult me instead of asking questions
and having a conversation with me. I feel uncomfortable
with the alarming direction that you took my concerns and
inquiries in. Maintaining respectful and constructive
communication is crucial in business, and I believe it’s
essential to address this matter.
In your previous message below, you used terms like “not
flexible” and “rigid” to describe me, which I find to be
untrue, insulting, and unprofessional. It’s important to
engage in discussions with a focus on the issues at hand
rather than resorting to personal attacks and derogatory
statements. I have gladly done everything you asked me
to do since the transition. I’ve also reached out to donors
and organizations to help students, which is not part of my
job. I offered to help FSW Collegiate and IT redesign the
websites, which is also not part of my job. Adam and I were
the ones who previously reached out to you and asked if we
can hold a quarterly meeting with all the FSW marketing
people so that we can collaborate. I can provide proof of all
of this.
I worked hard and tirelessly to help colleagues in
Enrollment Services before the change. I’ve never asked a
team member in Marketing to undo a job that you
instructed them to complete because that would undermine
their work and your direction. Tiffany Quinn is a
coordinator. She is not my supervisor, so it was
inappropriate for her to insist that I undo my job that you
directed me to complete in front of my colleagues last week.
When you asked me to change the direction so that Tiffany
can do what she wants on Tuesday, I complied
immediately.
I gave everyone on the Marketing Team access to the
survey questions weeks ago (screenshots below) and
encouraged them to create their own QR codes if they
wanted to. Everyone has access to Qualtrics. I have always
offered to help the team any way that I can and collaborate
well with colleagues.
I would like you to provide proof, not just statements, of
when/where I have been inflexible or rigid because I have
proof that there’s no truth to that disturbing claim.
Tiffany has spoken negatively about people’s jobs and has
spoken down to me and over me on more than one occasion.
Talking badly about people openly in meetings creates a
toxic work environment. She lacks experience when it
comes to soft skills and active listening. If you had actually
taken the time to speak with me instead of insulting me, I
would have told you that you should help her develop those
skills so she can be successful. I believe in helping people
get up instead of kicking them down.
Attached are screenshots of the comments that were made
about the Naples School Board and Dr. Bernstein. I don’t
believe either party would appreciate these comments
made about them.
You assigned a $40,000+ Campus Tour project for me to
manage, which I enjoy managing but can only do so much
on my end. The vendor provided a timeline and costs in the
contract so it is essential to move forward. I don’t believe
in doing things last minute if we can methodically plan
ahead. I asked for test shots for one building in July and
have not seen any and it’s September. I created a tentative
shot list which Eric lashed out at me for, even though it
was a tentative shot list. It’s clear that I’m not allowed to
ask team members for these deliverables so I asked you to
approve a soft deadline so everyone is on the same page.
This is an expensive project that tax payers probably paid
for so I like to be mindful of how I’m spending someone
else’s money.
It’s sad that you are refusing to provide timelines/deadlines
to me but have no problem providing them to the other
team members. I need those to be successful, efficient, and
manage my time. I don’t believe it’s unreasonable to ask for
clarity in writing so that there is no misunderstanding,
since you’re the only person who knows what everyone is
working on and things change on a whim in Marketing.
Since you refuse to provide those deadlines in an email, I
cc’d Jason and Dr. Neuhard for help in getting those
deadlines and approvals in an email, especially for Campus
Tour (see attached.) It is clear to me that people of color are
not treated fairly at FSW because if we were, you would not
feel empowered to insult me the way you did.
(Id.) Perhaps unsurprisingly, Salcedo’s decision to escalate her grievances
directly to the college president caught the administration’s attention. FSW’s
General Counsel and head of human resources stepped in:
From: Susan C. Bronstein
Sent: Thursday, September 7, 2023 9:29 AM
To: Altagracia Salcedo
Subject: Meeting
Good morning, would you be available to meet with me and
the college’s General Counsel, Joe Coleman via Zoom this
afternoon at 1 p to discuss your recent email to the
President’s Office?
* * * *
From: Altagracia Salcedo
Sent: Thu. Sep 7, 2023 at 10:34 AM
To: Susan C. Bronstein
Subject: Re: Meeting
Good morning, Susan.
I hope you are well. Is there any issue with my email? If
there are any concerns, please specify them in an email
response. I kindly decline the proposed Zoom meeting. I am
not comfortable participating in a meeting with you or
General Counsel without legal representation. Should I
consider retaining an attorney? While it is not my
preference, I am willing to do so if necessary. You have a
copy of the email that I sent President Allbritten. It is
important that individuals in leadership roles within a
public institution remain informed about what is
happening on the ground level.
The primary responsibility of HR and the General Counsel
at FSW is to safeguard the college’s interests, not mine,
which was evident in the equity report. Unfortunately,
there appears to be a clear pattern of discrimination at
FSW, which is unfortunate because there are a lot of good
people there.
* * * *
From: Susan C. Bronstein
Sent: Thursday, September 7, 2023 12:25 PM
To: Altagracia Salcedo
Cc: Joe Coleman
Subject: Re: Meeting
It is regrettable that you have declined the invitation to
discuss your employment concerns with the College’s Chief
Human Resources officer and General Counsel. However,
this response is consistent with your pattern of telling
fellow employees how to conduct themselves and do their
jobs and thereafter claiming you are just looking out for the
College’s and taxpayer’s best interests. It is not lost on the
College that you have been fabricating meritless
discrimination and retaliation claims for some time. Your
specious assertion that you have been the target of
discrimination will be met with a vigorous and truthful
defense should you choose to bring same. Your passive
aggressive communications with and about colleagues and
overt insubordination compels the College to terminate
your employment effective immediately.
(Doc. 36-11 at 1.)
This lawsuit followed. Salcedo alleges age and race discrimination, and
that her firing was retaliation for reporting it. (Doc. 6.)
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial. It “is appropriate when
a movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
[he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gonzalez v. Indep. Ord. of
Foresters, No. 24-10758, 2025 WL 337898, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025).1
“When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a judge is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Las Brisas Condo. Homes Condo.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-41-KCD, 2023 WL 8978168,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2023). “An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Do v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 1:17-
CV-23041-JLK, 2019 WL 331295, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2019). “And a fact is
material if it may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable
substantive law.” Toca v. Debonair Props. LLC, No. 2:23-CV-303-KCD, 2025
WL 2106674 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2025). Where there are factual disputes, we
must resolve them in the non-moving party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
The mechanics are straightforward. “The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history,
and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.
to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined
at trial.” Andrews v. Ciccone, No. 3:23-CV-88-MMH-SJH, 2025 WL 2508878,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2025). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its
own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995).
III. Discussion
Salcedo’s claims are addressed below. But first some background on the
framework applicable to this dispute. Salcedo seeks relief under both Title VII
and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). Because the FCRA is modeled on
Title VII, the same standards apply to both. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs.,
Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff can prove discrimination
using either direct or circumstantial evidence. Because direct evidence is
notoriously scarce, courts rely on a familiar framework to evaluate claims built
on circumstantial proof. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). Here is how the Eleventh Circuit breaks it all down:
As we have explained, the McDonnell Douglas framework
and the convincing mosaic approach are two paths to the
same destination—the ordinary summary judgment
standard. One approach is not more forgiving than the
other on the final question, which is whether a reasonable
jury could infer illegal discrimination. But given the
continuing confusion on this issue, we add a little more
explanation here.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set out a burden
shifting framework designed to draw out the necessary
evidence in employment discrimination cases. A plaintiff
proceeding under that framework bears an initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once
that initial burden is met, the employer must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse
employment action, and then, finally, the plaintiff must
show that the employer’s reason is pretext for unlawful
discrimination. This final question of pretext merges with
the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
In other words, the pretext prong of McDonnell Douglas is
just the ordinary summary judgment standard.
The convincing mosaic approach is—in its entirety—the
summary judgment standard. That phrase is a metaphor,
not a legal test and not a framework. It is also a helpful
reminder that McDonnell Douglas is not the only game in
town—a particularly useful point for employees with
significant evidence of illegal discrimination who lack the
comparator evidence often required to set out a case under
McDonnell Douglas.
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024).
1. Race Discrimination
Salcedo’s first and second claims are race discrimination. Because, as
mentioned, “[f]ederal case law interpreting Title VII . . . applies to cases arising
under the FCRA[,]” the Court considers them jointly. City of Hollywood v.
Hogan, 986 So. 2d 634, 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Both outlaw an
employer’s discrimination “against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s [race].” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 346
(2024); Fla. Stat. §760.10. To discriminate means to treat worse. Muldrow, 601
U.S. 346.
Salcedo urges the Court to view her evidence as a “convincing mosaic”
that, taken as a whole, allows a jury to infer discrimination. (Doc. 36 at 16); see
Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 946 (11th Cir. 2023). To survive
FSW’s summary judgment motion under this theory, she “must present a story,
supported by evidence, that would allow a reasonable jury to find that [FSW]
engaged in unlawful discrimination.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972,
995 (11th Cir. 2025). She can piece that mosaic together with “evidence that
demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements, or other information from which discriminatory intent may be
inferred, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees,
and (3) pretext.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022).
Salcedo recounts a story in which she was asked to leave a virtual
training session, was the only employee required to submit “HTML code with
IT tickets,” lost access to a software system, and was fired just 48 hours after
complaining about discrimination. (Doc. 36 at 16-17.) She tries to color in this
narrative with a handful of more explosive claims. For instance, she alleges
that a coworker told her Brito was treated better when she previously held the
same position. And a former supervisor warned Salcedo of “sabotage.” (Id. at
9-10.) She also floats an entirely uncited theory that HR was conspiring to
document her every move. (Id. at 18.)
But here is the problem: summary judgment runs on admissible
evidence, not workplace hearsay. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1325
(11th Cir. 1999). Salcedo offers no path to admissibility for her ancillary facts.
For instance, she does not claim that her co-worker’s statements fall under a
hearsay exception. And her sweeping claim about HR’s documentation plot is
unmoored from the evidentiary record. (See Doc. 36 at 18.) Stripped of the
hearsay and hyperbole, we are left only with the admissible core of her story.
Salcedo insists that these remaining facts prove the college’s stated
reasons for her treatment are just a pretext for discrimination. But to show
pretext, she must expose “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in” FSW’s story so glaring “that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of
Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2023). She falls well short
of that mark. Take the software access. FSW restricted Salcedo’s privileges—
along with the privileges of her white coworkers—to comply with federal
cybersecurity standards. (Doc. 36-4 at 145-146; Doc. 27-3 at 8.) Salcedo gives
us no reason to view that routine security audit as an elaborate, racially
motivated lie. Or consider the HTML code issue. FSW explains that it only
asked Salcedo for HTML code because IT had to build her a customized
tracking system after she repeatedly complained about their standard ticket-
renaming procedure. (Doc. 36-1 at 432; Doc. 27-3 at 3-4.) Nothing in the record
suggests that explanation is a cover-up. And, for reasons discussed below, the
record does not cast skepticism on FSW’s proffered reason for firing her—her
“passive aggressi[on]” and “overt insubordination”—because Salcedo’s
complaints of discrimination in her final emails were sprinkles of objectively
unreasonable beliefs among complaints that had nothing to do with her race.
Compare Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018), with
Decoste v. City of Boynton Beach, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2026)
(“[A]n employee’s decision to engage in protected activity cannot immunize
that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take
place at work and that all employees experience.”).
Salcedo has no direct evidence or similarly situated comparators from
which the Court can infer a meaningful connection between her race and the
alleged discriminatory treatment. And federal courts have rejected claims on
records far more troubling than this one. For example, even where a plaintiff
was referred to by racial epithet, her employer verbally proclaimed “hiring too
many black employees,” and four of those Black employees were fired, that still
“[fell] short of the evidence needed for a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination
by a decisionmaker.” Decoste, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 1373-74. Other examples
include:
See, e.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295
F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (no direct evidence of
discrimination, even where supervisor said “[w]e’ll
burn [the plaintiff’s] black ass,” because that
statement was “too remote” and did “not directly
relate[ ] to the subject of [the plaintiff’s] termination”);
Morgan, 750 F. App’x at 788 (no direct evidence of
discrimination, even where the named partner of the
plaintiff’s firm said he did not like “Black people” and
“that’s why they’re in the back of the office,” because
“these remarks and others like them were unrelated to
the decisionmaking process”); Walker v. St.
Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 506 F. App’x 886,
888 (11th Cir. 2013) (no direct evidence of
discrimination, even where the decisionmaker told the
plaintiff she “should go back to the night shift” to “be
with her own kind,” because “the ‘your own kind’
statement does not prove race or gender
discrimination without inference”); Carter v. Three
Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642
(11th Cir. 1998) (no direct evidence of discrimination,
even where the decisionmaker admitted that she had
“a bias against blacks” and that “she found that they
were difficult for her to trust or get along with,”
because those statements “could have been expressing
a desire to get past such prejudices” and “the
statement does not relate directly to the [challenged
employment] decision”).
Wills v. Walmart Assocs., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1250 (S.D. Fla. 2022). At
bottom, none of the facts Salcedo presents create a genuine dispute over
whether FSW’s legitimate reasons were a pretext for discrimination. So her
claims fail.
2. Retaliation
Salcedo’s third and fourth claims are for retaliation under Title VII and
the FCRA. Like above, the Eleventh Circuit applies the same standards for
both. Patterson v. City of Melbourne, 669 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1219 (M.D. Fla.
2023). “To establish a claim of retaliation, [Salcedo] must prove that she
engaged in statutorily protected activity, that she suffered an adverse action,
and that the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity.”
Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018). If she can
establish that, the burden shifts to FSW to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the retaliation. Salcedo must then show that the
reason is merely a pretext and that the real reason was retaliation. Patterson
v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2022)
Title VII and the FCRA make it an unlawful employment practice to
retaliate against an employee for reporting discrimination—triggering the
opposition clause—or for taking part in an investigation—triggering the
participation clause. See Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103
F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997). Salcedo maintains she was terminated for
reporting the discrimination she encountered. As for such allegations:
[a]n employee can establish a statutorily protected
expression for a retaliation claim under the opposition
clause if she demonstrates a good faith, reasonable belief
that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment
practices; this standard has both a subjective and an
objective component, which means that a plaintiff must
show that he subjectively, in good faith, believed that his
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices
and that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and record presented.
Schmidt v. Disney Parks, Experiences & Prods., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 3d 1314
(M.D. Fla. 2024).
The threshold for proving that an employee engaged in a protected
activity by reporting discrimination is undeniably low. But a plaintiff’s purely
subjective belief that discrimination occurred, without more, is not enough.
“The objective reasonableness of her belief is measured by reference to
controlling substantive law.” Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295
(11th Cir. 2016). “The employer’s practice, which a plaintiff opposes does not
in fact have to be unlawful ... rather, the employee need only have a reasonable
belief that the employer’s practices are discriminatory.” Danner v. Sumter
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 7:12-CV-02391-RDP, 2013 WL 754956, at *4 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 26, 2013).
Salcedo notes that her belief of discrimination, which she reported, was
not merely based on a single stray remark or general disagreements at work.
Instead, according to Salcedo, her “discrimination complaint is . . . a detailed,
multi-incident document that names specific actors, specific dates, specific
witnesses, and specific conduct that [she] expressly attributed to race and age.”
(Doc. 36 at 21.) However, to determine whether her belief was objectively
reasonable, the Court looks to the incidents she believes were discriminatory,
not the level of detail in her complaint.
Salcedo says she complained of the following:
being ignored from professional greetings while white
colleagues received them; being required to submit HTML
code that white colleagues were not required to; being
asked to leave a vendor training session at the exact
moment essential job functions were about to be
demonstrated; having system access revoked to zero while
a younger, white Admissions Coordinator was given access;
being forced to spend six hours working through conference
sessions she had traveled to attend, while Brito and Allen
attended those same sessions; and receiving humiliating,
demeaning emails copied to supervisors and colleagues in
response to inquiries.
(Doc. 36 at 21.) While that is her account of events, satisfying the subjective
part of the test, the evidence provides an objective picture that a reasonable
person would not interpret as discrimination.
Start with the morning pleasantries. Allen and Brito worked in a
separate department, and Salcedo faults them for walking into her office suite
without saying hello. (Doc. 36-2 at 2.) That is a textbook example of the
ordinary workplace friction that falls safely outside the bounds of an
employment discrimination claim. As for the IT tickets, Salcedo provides no
evidence of who was required to submit HTML code—only testimony about the
difficulty she faced with the procedure. (Doc. 36-1 at 166-173.) Whatever the
technical mechanics at play here, a separate department’s procedural process
for managing its workflow is far to disconnected from Salcedo’s race to support
an objectively reasonable belief of discrimination.
The same reasonable person would not infer intentional discrimination
from a coworker’s remark that she “can jump off at any point” from a Zoom
meeting. Nor would they infer discrimination because their employer suddenly
becomes stricter about who has access to a federally regulated software system
and adjusts their job descriptions accordingly. (Doc. 36-1 at 496.) The same
goes for having to log 6 extra hours of work during a conference, or engaging
in petty email squabbles with colleagues. These are the ordinary, minor
annoyances of office life—not actionable civil rights violations.
Although Salcedo claims that her white coworkers did not share her
same experience, she provides no admissible evidence to prove it. The Court
cannot find anything in the record to fairly compare her side of the story with
that of her colleagues. See Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 996 (“A similarly situated
comparator typically will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or
misconduct); be subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule; have
the same supervisor(s); or share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary
history.”) Certainly, Salcedo’s belief that she faced discrimination only needs
to be reasonable, not necessarily correct. But we still apply legal standards
when evaluating how a reasonable person would perceive it. See Tipton v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Com., 872 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Eleventh Circuit has illustrated what constitutes an objectively
reasonable belief of discrimination, and Salcedo’s workplace grievances fall on
the wrong side of the line. See Butler v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d
1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008) (“a racially derogatory remark by a co-worker,
without more, does not constitute an unlawful employment practice . . ., and
opposition to such a remark, consequently, is not statutorily protected
conduct.”); Laincy v. Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 520 F. App’x 780 (11th
Cir. 2013) (“his belief that coworker’s allegedly harassing comments
constituted unlawful employment practice was not objectively reasonable as
coworker’s three innocuous comments asking if he was dating anyone were not
threatening, humiliating, or offensive and did not interfere with employee’s job
performance”); see also Bailey v. DAS N. Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (M.D.
Ala. 2020) (“while an employer’s intent may be difficult to discern, it is not
objectively reasonable to presume that, simply because an employee has been
subjected to seemingly inexplicable negative treatment, the true reason for the
treatment must be unlawful discrimination”); Stafford v. Duval Cnty. Pub.
Schs., 720 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (black employee’s complaints
about problems with his manager, describing manager withholding
information, using a harsh tone or aggressive body language, engaging in
unwarranted criticism of employee, and other communication problems with
manager that were allegedly related to employee’s race, were not “protected
activity” for purposes of Title VII retaliation claim).
Salcedo also has a causation problem. In her view, the 48-hour window
between her final emails and her firing provides the temporal proximity a jury
needs to infer retaliation. But that timeline works only if her September emails
count as protected activity. The Court agrees with FSW on this point—
”[m]erely phrase-dropping people of color into a dialogue that makes no
connection to race or any unlawful conduct, does not constitute protected
activity.” (Doc. 39 at 6.) As the record shows, Salcedo’s email messages lack
any substantive detail about unlawful conduct. Rather than raising new claims
of discrimination, they merely rehash prior gripes and refer back to the results
of her original April complaint. Because the emails do not constitute new,
independent protected activity, Salcedo cannot use them to reset the clock.
Setting aside the September emails, the temporal link disappears
completely. A five-month gap between her protected complaint and her
termination cannot establish causation on its own. See Davis v. Collins, 781 F.
Supp. 3d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (finding that more than two months was not
sufficient temporal proximity to show that the protected activity and the
adverse action are not wholly unrelated).
In the end, the reason for Salcedo’s termination jumps right off the page.
When she did not like her supervisor’s response, she bypassed the chain of
command and complained directly to the college president. And when FSW
tried to schedule a meeting to discuss the issue, she refused to participate. No
reasonable jury could look at this record and conclude that FSW fired her in
retaliation for an old complaint, rather than for this disruptive and
insubordinate behavior.
3. Age Discrimination
Salcedo’s final claim is age discrimination under the FCRA. Yet she
mounts no substantive defense of this count. She simply lumps age and race
together, casually appending the word “younger” whenever she mentions her
white colleagues. But age and race discrimination are two distinct theories
with distinct evidence. “In our adversarial system, a claimant must present
her case. It is not a court’s job to conduct research to provide the proper support
for [conclusory] arguments.” Herman v. Mr. Cooper Grp. Inc., No. 2:23-CV-948-
JES-KCD, 2024 WL 3277021, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2024). This Court has
“neither the duty nor the time to investigate the record in search of an
unidentified genuine issue of material fact to support [Salcedo’s age
discrimination] claim.” Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028,
1032 (8th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th
Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). In
any event, because Salcedo ties her race and age claims together, the latter
necessarily fails for the same reasons already explained. See Chavez v. Sec’y
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court
cannot be expected to do a petitioner’s work for him.”).
IV. Conclusion
The record does not contain sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find in Salcedo’s favor. Her claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and age
discrimination thus fail. Accordingly, FSW’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doe. 28) is GRANTED and Salcedo’s complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment in FSW’s favor, terminate all deadlines, and close
the case.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on September 4, 2026.
KyleC.Dudek =—>
United States District Judge
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