Slick

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MARY JO SHANNON SLICK, )

) CASE NO. 5:26-CV-00029

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

)

GOVERNING BOARD of the STARK )

STARK COUNTY EDUCATIONAL ) MEMORANDUM OF

SERVICE CENTER, et al., ) OPINION AND ORDER

) [Resolving ECF No. 11]

Defendants. )

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Mary Jo Shannon Slick was general counsel at an Ohio public education agency

from 1997 until she was fired in 2025. Believing that her termination was unlawful and

pretextual, she sued her ex-employer and two of its officers for a violation of procedural due

process and breach of contract. Defendants argue that Plaintiff had no constitutional or

contractual right to public employment and move to dismiss both claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. To survive

dismissal, Plaintiff must plausibly allege the state deprivation of a protected property interest

without due process of law, and Defendants must plausibly allege the existence of a contract,

performance, breach, and damages. On review, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11)

is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. HISTORY 1

The Ohio General Assembly created “county boards of education” in 1914 to reorganize

disconnected rural school districts across the state. See Ohio Auditor of State, Ohio’s

Educational Service Centers: Operational Study (May 28, 2020). In 1995, it rebranded the

boards as “educational service centers” (“ESCs”), public organizations that provide

administrative, technological, and professional support to local school districts. See Ohio Rev.

Code § 3311.05. By law, any school district with fewer than 16,000 enrolled students must

partner with an ESC. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.843. ESCs are considered “school districts”

under state law, see Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.055, and “local education agencies” under federal

law, see 20 U.S.C. § 7801.

By statutory default, legal counsel for each ESC is “the prosecuting attorney of the

county in which the largest number of pupils supervised by the governing board of the

educational service center reside.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.35. But statute also authorizes

ESC boards to hire their own legal counsel. See Ohio Rev. Code § 309.10. Many ESCs

exercise that option to “avoid potential conflicts of interest” and “receive more specialized

services than statutory counsel can provide.” Kyle A. Knapp, One Cannot Serve Two Masters:

Solving the Inherent Conflicts of Interest in Statutory Legal Counsel for Ohio School Boards,

26 Cap. U.L. Rev. 141, 141–42 (1997)

1 As it must, the Court construes the following in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

accepts her well-pleaded allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor.

See Bruce v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 168 F.4th 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2026).

One ESC, the Stark County Educational Service Center (“Stark ESC”), serves 22 school

districts across four counties in Northeast Ohio. Stark ESC is led by a five-member

“Governing Board,” managed by a superintendent, and administrated by treasurer. The

Governing Board is a “school board” under state law. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.055. It

hired Plaintiff as its general counsel in 1997 under Ohio Rev. Code § 309.10. See ECF No. 1

at PageID ##: 3–5, ¶¶ 12, 24. Her decades-long employment was regulated by a series of

multi-year contracts called “Employment Agreements.” See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 3, ¶ 15.

The latest Employment Agreement was approved in January 2024 and bound the Parties to a

new, five-year work term from July 1, 2025 to June 30, 2030. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #:

219. The contract contains an explicit provision that “General Counsel may terminate this

contract with sixty (60) days’ notice.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 9, ¶ 1.

In 2024, “friction” flared between Plaintiff and Joe Chaddock, Stark ESC’s

superintendent. ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 4, ¶ 22. Chaddock also serves on the board of the

Stark County Schools Council of Governments (“Stark CoG”), a consortium of school districts

that manages, inter alia, a $500,000,000.00 health insurance fund. See ECF No. 1 at PageID

#: 4, ¶ 22. At the time, he simultaneously served on the board of a private health benefits

company that allegedly contracted with Stark CoG. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 214. In

Plaintiff’s view, Chaddock was upset that she raised conflict concerns regarding his dual board

roles. See ECF No. 1at PageID #: 4, ¶ 23. Chaddock says that he accepted Plaintiff’s advice

and resigned from the private board in 2024. See ECF No. 20 at PageID #: 195.

On October 13, 2025, Plaintiff received a letter titled “Notice of Loudermill Hearing”

from James Carman, Jr., Stark ESC’s treasurer. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 4, ¶ 24. The

letter said:

I am writing to notify you that the Stark County Educational Service

Center Governing Board (“Board”) will consider terminating your

General Counsel Contract with the Board after it considers and acts

to eliminate the General Counsel position. I am enclosing a draft

resolution for your review.

The Board will conduct a Loudermill hearing on October 16, 2025

at 3: 15 p.m. We will meet at 6057 Strip Ave, N.W., North Canton,

Ohio. You have the right to representation at this hearing.

ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 12. On October 16, 2025, the Governing Board convened and passed a

resolution declaring, in relevant part, that:

WHEREAS, the Board believes it is in the best interest to and

eliminates the General Counsel position effective at 11:59 p.m. on

October 16, 2025; and

WHEREAS, the Treasurer has provided [Plaintiff] with grounds for

the termination of her General Counsel Contract and has provided

her with a draft copy of this resolution and provided her with a full

opportunity for her to provide any information she wanted the Board

to consider before making this decision; and

WHEREAS, after providing [Plaintiff] with this opportunity and

having considered any information she provided during that

meeting, the Board determined to terminate Slick’s General Counsel

Contract because the position no longer exists[.]

ECF No. 1 at PageID ##: 13--14. Plaintiff was terminated that day. See ECF No. 1 at PageID

#: 14.

B. PROCEEDINGS

On October 30, 2025, the Governing Board sued Plaintiff in the Stark County (Ohio)

Court of Common Pleas for conversion, replevin, and breach of contract. See Governing Bd.

of the Stark Cty. Educ. Serv. Ctr. v. Slick, No. 2025-CV-02371 (Stark Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct.

30, 2025). The complaint claims the Governing Board discovered on July, 30 2025 that

Plaintiff was shredding documents and deleting of electronic records in violation of Ohio law.

See ECF No. 11–2 at PageID #: 100, ¶ 3. It also claims she “surreptitiously absconded” with

records after learning she would be fired, and that the Governing Board “terminated the

general counsel position on October 16, 2025” as a result. ECF No. 11–2 at PageID #: 100, ¶

4.

On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff sued the Governing Board, Chaddock, and Carman in

federal court on two causes of action. See ECF No. 1. Claim I is a procedural due process

claim against all three Defendants. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 5–6, ¶¶ 33–39. Claim II is a

breach of contract claim against the Governing Board alone See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 5–7,

¶¶ –45. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, consequential, incidental, and punitive damages, fringe

benefits, interest, fees, costs, and expenses. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 7. Defendants

answered and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See ECF Nos. 11, 12. Their motion is

fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 17, 20.

C. THRESHOLD DISMISSAL

Plaintiff concedes to dismissing (a) Claim I against Chaddock in his official capacity,

(b) Claim I against Carman in his official capacity, and (c) Claim I against Carman in his

individual capacity. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 158. She opposes dismissing (a) Claim I

against Chaddock in his individual capacity, (b) Claim I against the Governing Board, and (c)

Claim II against the Governing Board. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 158. She contests

whether Chaddock and Carman should be dismissed with or without prejudice. See ECF Nos.

11 at PageID #: 79, 17 at PageID #:160.

On the contested dismissal for Claim I in Chaddock’s individual capacity, Defendants

prevail. A “damage[s] claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of

constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each

defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673,

684 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Official capacity constitutional claims “cannot be

founded upon conclusory, vague or general allegations[.]” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l

Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002). The Complaint makes many

conclusory allegations against Chaddock, but fails to explain how those allegations establish

liability in his individual capacity. See ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #: 86. The contested claim

bears all the marks of a proscribed and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On the prejudice question, however, Plaintiff prevails.

Dismissal with prejudice is serious because it “operates as a rejection of the plaintiff's claims

on the merits” and precludes relitigation under res judicata. Michigan Surgery Inv., LLC v.

Arman, 627 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2010). Defendants offer no justification for such a

significant sanction. The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is granted in part: Claim I is

dismissed without prejudice as to Chaddock and Carman in both their individual and official

capacities. Only the Governing Board remains.

III. LAW

Civil cases start with complaints. A complaint must clearly and concisely explain why

the plaintiff deserves relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The standard is plausibility, which is

more than possibility but less than probability. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility requires

specific facts linking the defendant to the unlawful conduct. See id. Conclusions,

speculations, and “naked assertions” are not specific facts. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555.

In response to an anemic pleading, a defendant can move to dismiss for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Once the motion is briefed, courts use a two-step process to

resolve it. See Dyda v. Michigan Sec'y of State, No. 26-1228, 2026 WL 2085527, at *3 (6th

Cir. July 20, 2026). First, they pretend the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and draw all

reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. Second, they use those presumptions and inferences

to decide whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Hodges v. City of

Grand Rapids, 139 F.4th 495, 504 (6th Cir. 2025).

There are a few caveats. First, only “well-pleaded” allegations are presumed true.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Second, courts ignore legal conclusions disguised as factual

allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, courts are

generally limited to the “four corners” of the complaint. Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th

479, 486 (6th Cir. 2024). Courts can consider some exhibits, public records, and attachments.

See Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids, 139 F.4th 495, 510 (6th Cir. 2025). And fourth, because

it is more art than science, rightly resolving a motion to dismiss requires equal parts common

sense and legal experience. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. STEP I

To begin step one, the Court accepts the following well-pleaded facts as true. See

Dyda, 2026 WL 2085527, at *3.

1. Plaintiff is an American citizen and lives in Summit County, Ohio.

2. Carman is Stark ESC’s treasurer.

3. Chaddock is Stark ESC’s superintendent.

4. The Governing Board hired Plaintiff as Stark ESC’s general counsel

in 1997.

5. Plaintiff’s employment was controlled by multi-year contracts

approved by the Governing Board.

6. Plaintiff’s most recent Employment Agreement was approved by the

Governing Board in January 2024, executed on June 20, 2024, and

effective July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2030.

7. Section 1 of the contract states that Plaintiff “may terminate this

contract with sixty (60) days' notice.”

8. After the Employment Agreement was adopted, Plaintiff

“experienced friction” with Chaddock.

9. Carman sent Plaintiff a letter on October 13, 2025 regarding a draft

resolution to terminate her position and scheduling a hearing for

October 16, 2025.

10. No other justification for the termination was communicated to

Plaintiff.

11. At the October 16, 2025 hearing, no justification beyond elimination

of the general counsel position was cited by the Governing Board.

12. On October 30, 2025, the Governing Board filed a separate lawsuit

against Plaintiff asserting a new reason for her termination.

13. That lawsuit alleges Plaintiff was shredding documents and

requesting deletion of electronic records before she was terminated.

See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 212–15, ¶¶ 1–30.

Next, the Court does not presume the following allegations are true because they are

legal conclusions or not well-pleaded. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (“We [continue] our analysis

by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth”).

1. Supplemental jurisdiction exists.

2. Plaintiff was an exemplary employee with no record of any

performance issues.

3. The repeated contract renewals and pay raises reflected Plaintiff’s

strong work performance.

4. The Employment Agreement did not provide any mechanism for the

Governing Board to terminate Plaintiff's employment.

5. Only Plaintiff could terminate the Employment Agreement.

6. Chaddock's was angry over the conflict issue raised by Plaintiff.

7. The motivation for Plaintiff’s termination was Chaddock’s anger.

8. There was no real justification for eliminating the general counsel

position or terminating the Employment Agreement.

9. Plaintiff was not provided with a Loudermill hearing.

10. Plaintiff would have provided “ample evidence” disproving the

shredding allegations and proving the asserted reason for

termination was pretextual had she been informed.

11. Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in

continued employment.

12. Defendants “conspired” to deny Plaintiff procedural protection.

13. Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a property interest without due

process of law.

14. Defendants acted “malicious[ly], intentional[ly], and/or recklessly

or callously indifferent.”

15. Defendants' conduct caused financial, reputational, and other

compensable harm.

16. Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required

by the Employment Agreement.

17. The Governing Boar breached the Employment Agreement because

it “had no contractual basis” to terminate Plaintiff.

18. Stark ESC breached the Employment Agreement.

19. Stark ESC caused Plaintiff pecuniary harm.

See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 212–17, ¶¶ 9–45.

Next, the Court accepts the following allegations as true because Defendants admit to

them. See Borror Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Oro Karric N., LLC, 979 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2020)

(“Under federal law, stipulations and admissions in the pleadings are generally binding on the

parties and the Court”).

1. Stark ESC acted under color of state law.

2. Carman and Chaddock acted under color of state law in their official

capacities.

3. Jurisdiction is proper.

4. Venue is proper.

5. Plaintiff was Stark ESC’s general counsel for over 28 .

6. Due process confers a constitutionally protected property interest in

employment to certain public employees.

See ECF Nos. 1 at PageID ##: 212–16, ¶¶ 3–34; 12 at PageID ##: 125–28, ¶¶ 3–34.

Finally, the Court draws the following reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See

Dyda, 2026 WL 2085527, at *3.

1. The “friction” with Chaddock contributed in part to the Governing

Board's decision to terminate Plaintiff.

2. The document shredding rationale first raised in the Governing

Board’s state complaint contributed in part to the Governing Board's

decision to terminate Plaintiff

3. Because the Governing Board continually renewed Plaintiff’s

contract for 28 years without any noted issues, the termination was

not the product of a legitimate misconduct concern other than the

alleged shredding and friction.

4. Plaintiff was fired without pre-termination notice as to the shredding

and friction claims and was not given an opportunity to respond to

the allegations against her.

B. STEP II

In step two, the Court applies the preceding presumptions and inferences and

determines whether the Complaint is plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“[O]nly a

complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss”).

1. Claim I

Claim I asserts a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against the Governing Board

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6, ¶ 37. A prima facie 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim requires the plaintiff to identify a constitutional right and show the government

deprived that right. See Susselman, 109 F.4th at 870. Here, Plaintiff identifies the right to

due process. The Due Process Clause says the states cannot deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It has

procedural and substantive facets. See Lifestyle Communities, Ltd. v. City of Worthington,

Ohio, 165 F.4th 1013, 1026 (6th Cir. 2026). Claim I is a procedural due process claim. See

ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6, ¶ 37. A prima facie procedural due process claim requires the

plaintiff to show the deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property by the state

without adequate process. See Lifestyle Communities, 165 F.4th at 1026. At the pleading

stage, plausibility is the minimum standard. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

a. Property Interest

The Constitution protects more than just “real estate, chattels, [and] money.” The Bd.

of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972). Its aegis extends over

“property interests” to some intangible benefits, like contract rights. See Property Interest,

Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). But the Constitution does not create property

interests. See Hasanaj v. Detroit Pub. Schools Cmty. Dist., 35 F.4th 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2022)

(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 548 (1985)). They come from the

states through “independent sources of entitlement” like statutes and contracts. Id. (citing

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)). States can use these independent sources to

create property interests in, inter alia, public employment. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 533.

But unlike property interests, the right to due process comes “not by [state] legislative grace,

but by constitutional guarantee.” Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974). So only

“federal constitutional law” determines when a property interest gets due process protection.

Hasanaj, 35 F.4th at 447 (citing Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,

757 (2005)). And once protected, it “cannot be deprived [without following] constitutionally

adequate procedures.” Kelley v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 751 Fed. Appx. 650, 656 (6th Cir.

2018) (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 533).

Not all public employees have a protected property interest in their jobs. See

Cunningham v. Blackwell, 41 F.4th 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2022). Due process is unbothered

when, for example, a state can hire or fire its workers at will. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at

756. A protected property interest requires a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued

public employment. Kaplan v. U. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2021). A claim of

entitlement is legitimate when it is supported by “rules or mutually explicit understandings.”

Id. That includes public employees who have tenure, are removable only for cause, or have

similar status. See Hasanaj, 35 F.4th at 448. A public employer’s customs and practices may

also support a legitimate claim of entitlement. See Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 467

(6th Cir. 2009).

The Governing Board argues that Ohio Rev. Code § 309.10 does not give Plaintiff a

protected property interest in continued employment. See ECF No. 11-1 at PageID #: 91

(citing Simiele v. Bd. of Educ. of Cleveland City Sch. Bd., 57 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1995)).2 In

Simiele, an attorney-plaintiff brought a procedural due process claim against the Cleveland

Board of Education after he had been terminated as general counsel. See id. The panel

concluded the attorney-plaintiff had no property interest because his employment relied solely

on state law. Id. The Governing Board paints Simiele as “binding 6th Circuit precedent” and

“nearly identical to the current action[.]” ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #: 9. The Governing

Board also argues that “both Federal and Ohio law clearly establish that a client has the

absolute right to discharge [an] attorney and terminate the relationship at any time, with or

without cause, however arbitrary.” ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #: 89. It cites authority3

purportedly confirming that the “absolute right of discharge exists regardless of whether a

contract of employment exists.” ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #: 90.

On the first front, Plaintiff counters that whether the Governing Board had statutory

authority to hire her “says nothing about whether the parties' written contract created an

entitlement to its full term.” ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 153. She says the Employment

Agreement gave her a protected property interest in her job regardless of what Ohio Rev.

Code § 309.10 does or does not bestow. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 151. She also decries

2 In its reply, the Governing Board also argues (for the first time) that Plaintiff was not a

“public employee,” but merely outside counsel employed on a retainer agreement. See ECF No.

20 at PageID #: 198. Setting aside that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived,

see Stanalajczo v. Perry, 174 F.4th 968, 977 (6th Cir. 2026), the Court rejects this argument on

substance. At the pleading stage, Plaintiff plausibly falls under the statutory definition of a

school board “public employee” established in Ohio Rev. Code § 145.01(A).

3 See The Flush, 277 F. 25 (2d Cir. 1921); Schwartz v. Broad. Music, 130 F. Supp. 956

(S.D.N.Y. 1955); De Korwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 155 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1957);

Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio 1994);

Moraine v. Lewis, 784 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 2003).

Simiele as an “unpublished disposition” and “materially distinguishable” from this case. ECF

No. 17 at PageID ##: 143–54. On the second front, Plaintiff argues the absolute discharge

rule conflates two distinct questions: whether the Governing Board could fire her (on the one

hand) versus whether she qualified for due process protection before it did fire her (on the

other). See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 152. Where Claim I is concerned, she claims the first

question irrelevant and the second question is dispositive. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 152–

53.

On review, Claim I plausibly alleges that Plaintiff possessed a protected property

interest. Under Ohio law, the Governing Board is “a body politic and corporate . . . capable of

suing and being sued, contracting and being contracted with.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.17. A

written contract with an “explicit tenure provision” like the Employment Agreement is

sufficient to support a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. Perry, 408

U.S. at 601. When resolving a procedural due process claim, “[a] contract . . . may create a

property interest.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other

grounds by EOG Res., Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868 (6th Cir. 2025).

Although an attorney employed solely under statute has no protected property interest, an

attorney employed under statute and contract plausibly does. See 82 Ohio Jur. 3d Schools,

Universities, and Colleges § 160.

The Governing Board’s absolute-discharge rule is equally unpersuasive. Although “a

client may always discharge a lawyer, regardless of cause and regardless of any agreement

between them,” termination is “not always without adverse consequence.” Restatement

(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 32 (2000). The Governing Board’s proposed rule

would likely bar all procedural due process claims from ex-publicly employed attorneys.

Moreover, the Governing Board’s proposed authority addresses the common law right to

terminate counsel in private contract and payment disputes, not publicly employed attorneys

claiming statutory, contractual, or constitutional protections. See ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #:

90. The Governing Board was mistaken to refer to these cases as “exact authority.” 4 ECF

No. 20 at PageID #: 196.

In its more relevant citations, the Governing Board still misreads the caselaw. It errs

on Simiele’s facts, which are not “nearly identical to the current action[.]” ECF No. 11–1 at

PageID #: 92. Although both Simiele and this case concern procedural due process claims

from Ohio attorney-plaintiffs against the school boards that fired them, the Governing Board

ignores the key distinction. Here, the attorney-plaintiff had a contract; there, the attorney-

plaintiff did not. It also errs on Simiele’s law, claiming it “established . . . the Governing

Board’s exercise of its power of termination fails to give rise to a [§ 1983] claim as a matter

of law[.]” ECF No. 11-1 at PageID #: 92. But Simiele says no such thing. The question in

that case was whether the attorney-plaintiff’s employment fell under Ohio Rev. Code

3319.02—a separate statute that gives due process protection to certain “administrative

employees”—or under Ohio Rev. Code § 309.10 alone—which does not. See Simiele, 57

F.3d at 1070. Again, Plaintiff’s protected property interest arises from statute and contract,

not statute alone. In fact, Simiele undermines the Governing Board’s argument. The panel

4 Even if these cases were on point (they are not), they have little persuasive value. The

Flush was decided in 1921, Schwartz in 1955, and De Korwin in 1957, each predating the

landmark due process decisions in Roth and Loudermill by several decades. And none of them

are binding; Schwartz comes from the Southern District of New York and De Korwin from the

Northern District of Illinois, respected districts that are, nonetheless, out-of-circuit and non-

binding. Furthermore, The Flush is from the Second Circuit, not the Sixth, and both Lansberry

and Moraine are state court decisions which are non-binding on federal constitutional issues.

deciding that case noted in dicta that when “[a] public employee has a property interest in

continued employment if the state created such an interest by . . . providing the employee with

a contract.” Id. at 1070 (citation modified) (emphasis added).

Finally, the Governing Board errs on Simiele’s authority, describing it as “valid Sixth

Circuit precedent” because “[a]n unpublished opinion does have precedential effect as

persuasive authority.” ECF No. 20 at PageID #: 197 (emphasis in original).5 The Governing

Board is wrong.6 Unpublished opinions in the Sixth Circuit are never binding on subsequent

appellate panels or district courts. E.g., Ohio v. Becerra, 87 F.4th 759, 782 (6th Cir. 2023)

(“[an] unpublished opinion is not binding”); Meadows v. City of Walker, 46 F.4th 416, 424

n.15 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[an] unpublished opinion . . . is not binding upon us”); Graiser v.

Visionworks of Am., Inc., 819 F.3d 277, 283 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[the case] is unpublished, and is

accordingly not binding precedent”).

b. Deprivation

A deprivation is the taking away or confiscation of a constitutional right without due

process of law. See Deprivation, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Some takings,

5 The Governing Board says Plaintiff’s contention that unpublished decisions are not

precedent is “entirely fabricated.” ECF No. 20 at PageID #: 197. Accusing opposing counsel of

“fabricating” an axiomatic proposition of civil procedure is not zealous advocacy; it is the mark

of failed adherence to the professional obligations to know the law and act with civility. See

Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, r. 11 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2024)

6 This argument conflates disparate concepts. To have “precedential effect” means a case

has binding authority (i.e., inferior courts must follow its holding). See Freeman v. Wainwright,

959 F.3d 226, 232 (6th Cir. 2020) (“we need not look elsewhere when binding precedent from

our own Circuit answers the question”) (cleaned up). But “persuasive authority”—though

sometimes instructive—means a case “has no independent binding force.” Chad Flanders,

Toward A Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 55, 61 (2009); see also Timothy

Schwarz, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore Controlling Precedent, 56

Emory L.J. 1475, 1479 (2007) (“[t]he touchstone of persuasive authority is that the deciding

court is not required to follow result or reasoning of the referenced authority”) (emphasis added).

however, are “categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Kerchen v.

U. of Michigan, 100 F.4th 751 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 849 (1998)) (cleaned up). Thus, a deprivation requires “more than a negligent act[.]”

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). The taking must be “grossly negligent,

deliberately indifferent, or intentional.” Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir.

1996). And when the threatened property interest is in continued public employment, it must

cause “a substantial, tangible harm and . . . material change” to employment status. Peterson

v. Johnson, 87 F.4th 833, 837 (6th Cir. 2023).

On review, the Complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff

experienced a “material change” in her employment status when she was fired. Peterson, 87

F.4th at 837. The Government Board’s termination decision was not accidental, negligent, or

reckless; it was the intentional outcome of a formal board resolution that ended Plaintiff’s

employment at a precise time, on a precise date, and for an (allegedly) precise reason. See

Bozzo v. Nanasy, 159 F.4th 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 2025).

c. Process

After finding a deprivation, “the next step is to determine what process is due.”

Bohler v. City of Fairview, 830 F. App'x 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2020). But “different

circumstances call for different processes,” so courts must balance the government's interest,

the individual's stake in the matter, and the suitability of the procedures used. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976); Kaplan, 10 F.4th at 578 (“the Mathews three-part

balancing test is the proper standard for analyzing a procedural due process claim of a

government employee who has a property interest in his or her job”) (quoting Sonnleitner v.

York, 304 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2002)). The “root requirement” is “an opportunity for a

hearing before an individual is deprived of any significant property interest.” Hieber v.

Oakland Cty., Michigan, 136 F.4th 308, 321 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at

542). Here, that means a pretermination hearing. See Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901

F.2d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 1990). The formality of the hearing can vary “depending upon the

importance of the interests involved[.]” Hieber, 136 F.4th at 321. At minimum, however, it

must give the employee notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and a chance to

respond in self-defense. See Hieber, 136 F.4th at 321–22.

The Governing Board does not address adequate process in its briefs. Plaintiff argues

that “a mismatch between announced grounds and actual grounds [for termination] states a

constitutional violation.” ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 148. She claims the letter from Carman

identified only the elimination of the general counsel position, not termination for alleged

document shredding or friction with Chaddock. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 148. And

Plaintiff says the board hearing was pretextual because it was “framed . . . exclusively around

that announced ground.” ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 148.

Plaintiff’s argument relies heavily on Hieber, 136 F.4th at 317. In Hieber, a Michigan

county fired a longtime department head following hostile work environment accusations.

See id. The district court concluded the pretermination procedures were satisfactory under

Loudermill and granted summary judgment against the plaintiff. See id. The Sixth Circuit

reversed after finding the pretermination process did not give the plaintiff notice of the

specific charges and evidence against him. See id. at 322–23. Plaintiff reads Hieber to hold

that a mismatch between pre-termination and post-termination justification constitutes a per

se due process violation.7 See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 156. She argues that “[h]ad the

actual basis [for her termination] been disclosed during the pre-termination process, [she]

would have presented evidence that her handling of client files comported with the law and

that the proffered basis [for her termination] was pretextual.” ECF No. 17 at PageID ##: 156–

57.

On review, the Complaint plausibly pleads inadequate process. The Governing Board

unquestionably has a “legitimate interest in preserving [its] fiscal and administrative

resources.” Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 902 (6th Cir. 2019)). That includes

the practical and efficient management of its employees. See Kaplan, 10 F.4th at 582. At the

same time, however, Plaintiff had a significant and countervailing interest in maintaining her

livelihood because the loss of income is “a serious blow to any citizen.” Roth, 408 U.S. at

589 (Marshall, J. dissenting). She also had a legitimate interest in maintaining her personal

and professional reputations and relationships. See Kaplan, 10 F.4th at 580 (citing

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543). Finding new employment takes substantial time and effort,

especially when an applicant is “burdened by the questionable circumstances under which

[s]he left h[er] previous job.” Id. The balance favors Plaintiff.

In their state complaint, the Governing Board admits it fired Plaintiff because she

“surreptitiously absconded with [Stark [Stark ESC]’s records” on October 15, 2025. ECF No.

7 Plaintiff overstates Hieber’s effect. The constitutional violation in that case derived

from a mismatch between charges addressed in an investigatory interview and the charges

addressed in the formal notice of termination. See id. at 322–24. That is, Hieber’s due process

mismatch came between pretermination and termination, not between termination and post hoc

justification. See id. at 324. It identified a narrow problem with pretermination procedure, not a

broad rule that post-termination justification on new grounds makes the pre-termination process

unconstitutional per se. See id.

11–2 at PageID #: 100, ¶ 4. The Governing Board also admits it learned Plaintiff was

“shredding documents and requesting the deletion of electronic records” three months before

Carman’s October 13, 2025. letter. ECF No. 11–2 at PageID #: 100, ¶ 3. The federal

Complaint creates a reasonable inference that neither the letter nor the hearing gave Plaintiff

notice and the opportunity to respond to the specific allegations against her. It also creates the

reasonable inference the Governing Board fired Plaintiff for separate, undisclosed misconduct

discovered before the notice and the hearing, thereby denying Plaintiff any meaningful chance

to respond to the allegations and present her side of the story. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 14.

In summary, Claim I plausibly alleges the Governing Board deprived Plaintiff of a

protected property interest in continued public employment without due process of law.

“[W]hether or not the discovery process w[ill] confirm or refute those allegations later in the

litigation” is a question for another day. Abbey v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,

Tennessee, No. 25-5736, 2026 WL 2070292, at *1 (6th Cir. July 17, 2026). The Motion to

Dismiss is denied on Claim I as to the Governing Board.

2. Claim II

Claim II is a breach of contract claim against the Governing Board under state

common law. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6–7. In Ohio, a breach of contract is the

“[v]iolation of a contractual obligation by failing to perform one's own promise, by

repudiating it, or by interfering with another party's performance.” Breach of Contract,

Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A prima facie breach of contract claim requires a

plaintiff to plausibly allege the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance, the

defendant's breach, and damages. See Mentor Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Lake

Cty. Educ. Serv. Ctr. Governing Bd., 74 N.E.3d 706, 719 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. 2016).

Plaintiff claims the Governing Board “breached the Employment Agreement” when it

terminated her employment with “no contractual basis[.]” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 7. The

Governing Board counters “termination of [the] contract does not constitute a breach because,

as an attorney practicing law in the State of Ohio, [Plaintiff] was terminable at any time and

for any reason.” ECF No. 11–1 at PageID #: 82. It also claims that, because it raised its own

breach of contract claim against Plaintiff in state court on the same Employment Agreement,

Claim II “is a compulsory counterclaim . . . required to be brought in the state court action, if

at all[.]” ECF No. 20 at PageID #: 202.

The Governing Board’s compulsory counterclaim argument is unpersuasive. There

are no “statute[s] or equitable doctrine[s] authorizing a federal court to enforce state

compulsory-counterclaim law or otherwise manage duplicative state-federal litigation.”

Quality Assocs., Inc. v. The Procter & Gamble Distrib. LLC, 949 F.3d 283, 285 (6th Cir.

2020) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1418 (3d ed.)). And Sixth Circuit courts “cannot enforce a state compulsory-

counterclaim rule against a federal litigant while the relevant state litigation is still pending.”

Id. Because the Stark County Court of Common Pleas has not entered final judgment on

Defendants’ breach of contract claim, the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply. See

Slick, No. 2025-CV-02371.

The Governing Board’s second argument fares better. That body insists that the Court

should dismiss Claim II for “convenience, fairness, and comity” to avoid “undermin[ing]

judicial economy given the existence of parallel, ongoing litigation” in state court. ECF No.

11–1 at PageID #: 82. Because Claim II is a state-law claim, the Court’s authority comes via

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. And while the issues often intersect, the

Sixth Circuit has not resolved whether supplemental jurisdiction and compulsory

counterclaims are separate inquiries. See Pritchard v. FTM, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-01001-JGC,

2024 WL 3012836, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2024). But the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction is “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.” Michigan Department Of

Environment v. Gerald R. Ford Int’l Airport Authority, No. 24-1734, 2026 WL 1881045, at

*4 (6th Cir. June 30, 2026) (quoting Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 535 (6th Cir.

2003)). A district court can decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for “compelling

reasons[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

On review, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Claim II. To

maximize litigative efficiency and judicial economy, competing breach of contract claims

over the same Employment Agreement should be tried in a single proceeding in a single court

applying a single, unified contractual interpretation. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437

U.S. 655, 663 (1978) (“it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to

proceed in a . . . [law]suit where another [law]suit is pending in a state court presenting the

same issues, not governed by federal law”). This declination mitigates the risk of piecemeal

and disparate adjudication, respects the significant efforts well underway in state court, and

acknowledges that the state action began before the federal one. It also “serves [Ohio’s]

desirable goal of bringing all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence before

the court in a single action.” Cent. W. Virginia Energy Co. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel

Corp., 245 F. App'x 415, 425 (6th Cir. 2007). Because the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Governing Board’s Motion to

Dismiss is granted on Claim II as to the Governing Board.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is granted in part and denied in part.

Claim I is dismissed without prejudice as to Joe Chaddock and James Carman, Jr. in their

official and individual capacities. Claim I remains active against the Governing Board.

Claim II against the Governing Board is dismissed because the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim alleged therein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 4, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge