Officer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DAMION ORLANDO )

OFFICER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1272-R

)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT )

COURT, et al., )

)

Respondents.1 )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Damion Orlando Officer, a noncitizen proceeding pro se,2

seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.3 United States

District Judge David L. Russell referred the case to the undersigned

1 Respondents entered an appearance on behalf of United States Attorney

General Todd Blanche and Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

Markwayne Mullin. Doc. 7. Chris Gantt is Warden of the Cimarron

Correctional Facility, where the Government is housing Petitioner.

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro

se, the Court liberally construes his arguments. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But it is not “the proper function of the district

court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Id.

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The Government

responded, Doc. 8, and Petitioner filed a reply, Doc. 9. So, the matter is at issue.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant

Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order Respondents to provide

Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within ten days or else release

Petitioner.

I. Factual background and procedural history.

Petitioner is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States on June

9, 2024, on a B-2 visa, with authorization to remain until December 8, 2024.

Doc. 8, Ex. 1. On February 5, 2026, officials with the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) arrested Petitioner for overstaying his visa and “placed [him]

in immigration custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1).” Doc. 8, at 3. DHS

issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (NTA) alleging he was subject to removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).4

Id. (citing Ex. 1, at 1).

4 An NTA acts as “a charging document” informing the noncitizen of “the

specific charges against him and outlin[ing] their legal and factual basis.”

Dragomirescu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 44 F.4th 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing 8

U.S.C. § 1229a).

2

On March 20, 2026, Petitioner filed an application for asylum. Id. On

July 23, 2026, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal; Petitioner has

appealed that ruling and that appeal remains pending.5

II. Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner argues that Respondents violated: (1) his Fifth Amendment

procedural due process rights; (2) the INA when they mandatorily detained

him under § 1225; (3) the INA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by

failing to provide a bond hearing and for arresting him without a warrant; and

(4) the APA. Doc. 1, at 7-8. He seeks his immediate release, or, alternatively, a

bond hearing. Id. at 8.

III. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

5 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Sep. 3,

2026).

3

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

IV. Discussion.

A. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention and entitles

him to a bond hearing.

Respondents state DHS placed Petitioner in immigration custody under

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). Doc. 8, at 3. They argue that, because Petitioner has not

requested a custody redetermination hearing, an IJ has not denied him one

and his claims are “not ripe for resolution.” Id. at 4.6 The undersigned

disagrees.

Federal regulations permit a noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a), to request a bond hearing before an IJ at any time prior to the entry

of a final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (“After an initial custody

determination . . . the respondent may, at any time before an order under 8

6 Any request by Petitioner would have been futile. On September 5, 2025,

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a precedent decision, binding

on all immigration judges, holding that an immigration judge has no authority

to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States

without admission. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA

2025). The BIA determined that such individuals are subject to detention

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are therefore ineligible to be released on

bond. Id.

4

CFR part 240 becomes final, request amelioration of the conditions under

which he or she may be released.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing framework

for requesting a bond determination). However, they are not required to

request a bond hearing before pursuing § 2241 habeas corpus relief. See, e.g.,

Salvador F.-G. v. Noem, 2025 WL 1669356, at *6 (N.D. Okla. June 12, 2025)

(“[Section] 1226 contains no clear rule that requires exhaustion of

administrative remedies.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226). And while “exhaustion of

available administrative remedies is a prerequisite for § 2241 habeas relief” in

general, neither the statutory language of § 1226 nor the habeas statute

“expressly contain such a requirement.” Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203

(10th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, the Court should reject Respondents’

argument.

The Court should grant the petition in part and order Respondents to

provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days, or else

release Petitioner. See Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1251 n.13

(10th Cir. 2026) (directing district court to order the government to provide the

petitioner a bond hearing within seven days “[b]ecause [the petitioner] can

properly be subject to detention under § 1226(a).”); see also Colin v. Holt, No.

CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025)

(“Petitioner has not received a bond hearing and Respondents raise no

5

objection challenging their obligations to provide bond hearings for noncitizens

that are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”).

B. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining

claims.

Given the undersigned’s recommendation to grant Petitioner a bond

hearing, the Court should decline to address the merits of Petitioner’s

remaining claims for relief. The Court can grant him relief under § 1226(a).

See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 n.3 (“Because the Court grants the relief

the Petitioner requests based on the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the

Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim.”); see also

Ramos Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-721-D, 2026 WL 2033144, at *2 n.2 (W.D.

Okla. July 14, 2026) (declining to address the petitioner’s remaining claims

after ordering a bond hearing).

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition in part and order

Respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing in

front of a neutral IJ within ten days or otherwise release Petitioner.

The undersigned also recommends that the Court order Respondents to certify

compliance with the Court’s order by filing a status report within ten business

6

days of the Court’s order, and to promptly provide a copy of this order to counsel

for the Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Facility.

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by September

11, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72.7 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to

make timely objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right

to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore

v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and

Recommendation disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge in the captioned matter.

7 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that

rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus

petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x

227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be

applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they

need not be in every instance–particularly where strict application would

undermine the habeas review process”).

7

ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2026.

ga Ler

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE