The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JENNIFER S. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 1:25-CV-461-HAB-ALT
PARKVIEW HEALTH SYSTEM INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Jennifer S. Jones (“Plaintiff”) is suing Parkview Health System Inc.,
Parkview Hospital Inc. (both collectively “Parkview”), and Parkview Police Officer Colten Jones
(“Officer Jones”) (collectively “Defendants”). (ECF 14). The claims in Plaintiff’s ten-count
Amended Complaint relate to her employment as a nurse at Parkview, her treatment as a patient
in their care, and actions Parkview allegedly took in response to actions Plaintiff took in both
settings. (Id.).
She asserts claims against Parkview for False Claims Act (“FCA”) retaliation; disability
discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
interference and retaliation; violations of her constitutional rights through claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”); false imprisonment; malicious prosecution; defamation; and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Id.). Plaintiff lodges the Section 1983, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and IIED claims against Officer Jones as well, and further
asserts an assault claim.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF 20). That motion is fully
briefed and ripe for ruling. (ECF 21, 22, 24). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion will
be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The well-pleaded facts alleged in Plaintiff’s first Amended Complaint are detailed below.1
A. Plaintiff’s Employment
Plaintiff is a registered nurse who previously worked for Parkview in Allen County,
Indiana. (ECF 14, ¶ 3). Parkview is a hospital system that receives federal financial assistance
through Medicare and Medicaid funding. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5–10). Plaintiff has PTSD and Major
Depressive Disorder, which she alleges in her Complaint make her a qualified individual with a
disability that substantially limits major life activities. (Id. ¶ 4).
In 2021 and 2022, Plaintiff alleges that she reported specific instances of suspected
Medicare fraud, Medicaid fraud, and patient safety issues both through Parkview’s internal
systems and directly to Parkview leadership. (Id. ¶ 13).2 Other than these internal reports to
1 Plaintiff cites several attached exhibits throughout her complaint. The Court recognizes Defendants’ concern that
none of these exhibits (ECF 23-2) appear to be original, which raises legitimate questions about their authenticity. But
for purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must and does accept all facts and allegations
presented therein as true.
Defendants further note that these exhibits, though attached to Plaintiff’s original complaint (ECF 1, 1-3), were not
attached to the filing of her first amended complaint. (ECF 14, ¶ 29). She merely incorporated the exhibits by reference,
which the local rules do not allow. N.D. Ind. L-R 15-1(b)(2). Plaintiff later re-filed the exhibits with her response to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF 22, 23, 23-1, 23-2). Although this does not comply with the local rules, the Court
will consider these exhibits as if they were properly attached and part of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A
copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). Further, to the
extent that “an exhibit attached to or referenced by the complaint contradicts the complaint's allegations, the exhibit
takes precedence.” Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013).
2 She supports her allegations by citing public media reports of fraud allegations and qui tam actions brought against
Parkview, as well as a settlement Parkview reached with the Indiana Attorney General for such fraud. (ECF 14, ¶ 13;
ECF 23-2, at 12–15). She also cites emails in an exhibit that purport to verify her allegations that reports were made.
(ECF 14, ¶ 13). But most of the six email quotes in that exhibit—all from the same email chain with the subject line
Parkview, Plaintiff makes no allegation that she reported any false claims to the federal
government. She alleges retaliation began immediately after making these internal reports,
including “isolation, schedule manipulation, and bans on email reporting.” (ECF 14, ¶ 15). She
says this retaliation caused her health deterioration. (Id.).
Years later, between 2023 and 2024, Plaintiff alleges Parkview engaged in acts that
amounted to interference and retaliation under the FMLA. (ECF 14, ¶ 17). These actions included
interfering with her leave requests and retaliating against her for making them. She also alleges
Parkview manipulated her schedule; disciplined her; screened her patient safety reports; denied
her job training; and constructively discharged her. (Id.).
B. Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment
In September 2022, eight months after Plaintiff reported her fraud and patient safety
concerns, she went to Parkview as a patient seeking emergency room (“ER”) care for severe
stomach pain. (Id. ¶ 16). During that visit, Plaintiff asserts that staff improperly labeled her as
“drug-seeking” and that clinical notes contradicted this conclusion. (Id.). She includes as an
attachment to her complaint an email she sent to Parkview complaining about her treatment, stating
she was treated like a “med seeker.” (Id., ECF 23-2, at 25).
More than a year later, on October 26, 2023, Plaintiff went to the ER again. (ECF 14, ¶
18). She presented with hypertensive blood pressure but received no treatment. (Id.). Plaintiff
asserts she tried to leave, but Parkview officers chased her down in the parking lot and attempted
to detain her. (Id.). During that chase, Officer Jones brandished a firearm. (Id.). In the end, Plaintiff
“Internal Transfer,” with five excerpted from the same message—do not contain what she suggests. (ECF 23-2, at 16–
18). Three reference concerns for patient safety or protocol, and one references a report about a specific patient. (Id.,
at 16). None directly mention Medicaid or Medicare fraud. (Id., at 16–18).
managed to leave. (Id.). Plaintiff reported to the Parkview Patient Advocate the next day and
messaged her therapist shortly thereafter on October 29, 2023. (ECF 14, ¶ 20).
On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff attended a scheduled therapy session at Parkview. (Id. ¶ 21).
Once there, a Parkview officer was waiting to execute a pre-planned detention3 before any clinical
evaluation. (Id.). The visit was documented, with clinical notes showing that the criteria for an
involuntary hold were not met. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff was discharged the next day. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 34).
Plaintiff’s exhibits suggest that this October 30 evaluation completed a wellness check initiated on
October 26. (ECF 23-2, at 37). The Parkview Patient Advocate confirmed that Plaintiff’s departure
on October 26 occurred before that wellness check, which had to be performed by the Fort Wayne
Police Department, was complete. (Id.).
C. Prosecution
One month later, Officer Jones initiated criminal charges by filing an affidavit which
Plaintiff asserts omitted exculpatory facts and contradicted his previous statements to the Fort
Wayne Police Department. (ECF 14, ¶ 24). Plaintiff’s exhibits include the following alleged
excerpts from Officer Jones’s affidavit regarding what happened during her second ER visit:
On or about the 26th, day of October 2023 […] did knowingly commit the crimes)
of: resisting law enforcement with a vehicle 35-44.1-3-1, criminal recklessness (35-
42-2-2) and reckless driving 9-21-8-52.)
. . .
We were pursuing Jennifer because we were told that she was on a 48-hour hold
that was later determined not to be accurate.
. . .
3 It is unclear whether Plaintiff “pre-planned” her own stay at the hospital for treatment or whether she is alleging that
Parkview decided to put her on an involuntary hold before she arrived for her appointment.
In fear that she was going to run over officer Miller I drew my firearm and told her
to stop. […] Jennifer then sped off in her vehicle through a crowded parking lot
with several bystanders.
(ECF 23-2, at 38).
It is not the standard practice of Parkview to press charges on patients. (ECF 14, ¶ 25). But
Plaintiff says charges were nonetheless formally filed in January 2024 and remained pending for
eighteen months. (Id. ¶ 26). This caused harm to Plaintiff’s reputation, livelihood, and emotional
well-being. (Id.). Parkview also filed a medication theft complaint that Plaintiff claims is
fabricated. (Id. ¶ 27). She alleges Parkview changed their story to pin the theft on her, shifting their
timeframe for the alleged theft from a three-day window to having occurred on the only day
Plaintiff worked that week. (Id.). This complaint was rejected by the Attorney General and “an
inside witness confirmed targeting and lack of evidence.” (Id.).
LEGAL STANDARD
When the Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), it “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1 (2002). The facts must also be viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 279
(7th Cir. 1996).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must state a claim for which the
Court could grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The factual allegations in the complaint must
also “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). They also need to be facially plausible.
Id. To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow the Court “to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. But because the plaintiff in this case
is representing herself, the Court must liberally construe her complaint and hold it to a “less
stringent standard[] than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed
so as to do justice.”).
DISCUSSION
I. The Facts the Court Can Consider
Before starting this analysis, the Court needs to address how the parties have presented
their arguments throughout their briefs.
Defendants’ briefs in support of their motion to dismiss consistently include factual
allegations found only in Plaintiff’s original complaint. (ECF 21, 24). Defendants do so both to
fill in gaps in the Amended Complaint’s factual history and to highlight contradictions between
the two complaints. (ECF 21, at 4 n. 3). They invite the Court to consider these aspects of the
original complaint and cite another case from the Northern District of Indiana to support that this
would be appropriate. Vukadinovich v. Posner, No. 2:22-CV-118-TLS-JPK, 2023 WL 4931648
(N.D. Ind. June 21, 2023). But Defendants are wrong, and Vukadinovich does not stand for what
they say it does.4
“An amended pleading supersedes the original.” Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202,
207 (7th Cir. 2008). “[F]acts or admissions from an earlier complaint that are not included in a
4 Vukadinovich contains language about courts being permitted “to consider direct contradictions between earlier
pleadings and a proposed amended pleading.” Vukadinovich v. Posner, No. 2:22-CV-118-TLS-JPK, 2023 WL
4931648, at *27 (N.D. Ind. June 21, 2023). But this rule is discussed in the context of courts considering motions for
leave to amend complaints. Id. It says nothing of motions to dismiss already amended complaints.
later complaint cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C.,
725 F.3d 772, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2013). And “where the original complaint and an amended
complaint contain contradictory or mutually exclusive claims, only the claims in the amended
complaint are considered; the contradicted claims in the original complaint are knocked out.” Id.
at 783. These longstanding Seventh Circuit rules preclude the Court from considering the contents
of Plaintiff’s original complaint in ruling on this motion to dismiss.5
For her part, Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss relies in part on facts
that she did not include in the Amended Complaint. While a “complaint may not be amended by
the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss,” Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d
328, 348 (7th Cir. 2012), the Court may “consider additional facts set forth in” a brief opposing
dismissal “so long as those facts ‘are consistent with the pleadings.’” Phillips, 714 F.3d at 1019–
20 (quoting Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)). Thus, to the
extent Plaintiff’s additional facts are consistent with the Amended Complaint, the Court has
considered them.
II. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims
A. FCA Retaliation
The FCA “imposes a civil penalty and treble damages upon any person who presents to the
United States Government ‘a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.’” Fanslow v.
Chicago Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); Id. §§
3729–3732 (2004)). “To enhance enforcement, the Act permits private persons known as relators
5 The Court is only aware of one exception to this rule: verified complaints, which are “the equivalent of an affidavit
for purposes of summary judgment.” Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
is not a verified complaint, so this exception does not apply.
to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the government.” Id. To establish a claim, a relator must show
that the defendants knowingly caused false claims to be submitted to the federal government and
that the falsity was material to the government’s decision to pay the claim. United States v. Molina
Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., 17 F.4th 732, 740 (7th Cir. 2021).
The FCA also protects whistleblowers from retaliation, “providing that ‘[a]ny employee ...
shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee ... whole, if that employee ... is
discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or ... discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee ... or associated others’ in
furtherance of [an FCA] action.” Heath v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 889 F.3d 872, 874 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging an FCA retaliation claim must contain
factual allegations that, if proven, would establish that (1) the plaintiff was acting in furtherance
of an FCA enforcement action or other efforts to stop violations of the FCA, (2) the employer
knew the plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct, and (3) the employer was motivated to take
an adverse employment action against the plaintiff because of the protected conduct. Brandon v.
Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 2002); Singer v. Progressive
Care, SC, 202 F. Supp. 3d 815, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Parkview argues that Plaintiff’s FCA retaliation claim must be dismissed for several
reasons. It asserts Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under the FCA and she was not
subjected to any adverse employment action because of that protected activity. More specifically,
Parkview argues that Plaintiff’s internal reports did not report FCA violations or internally report
suspected fraud as her Amended Complaint suggests and, even if they did, there are no plausible
facts showing that Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action.
Under § 3730(h), protected activity can be (1) acts done in furtherance of an FCA action
or (2) efforts to stop an FCA violation. “Reporting suspected misconduct to internal supervisors”
may constitute protected activity. Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir.
2012); see also Klee v. McHenry County College, 2017 WL 3168973, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 26,
2017) (“Reports to supervisors are a natural first step to stopping fraudulent activity and,
depending on the employee’s position and the employer’s response, may be the only activity they
can engage in before filing their lawsuit.”).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that she engaged in protected activity by making
internal reports to Parkview of suspected Medicaid or Medicare fraud in an effort to stop violations
by Parkview. This is contradicted, Parkview argues, by documents attached to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint of reports Plaintiff submitted to Parkview that do not allege any kind of false or
fraudulent Medicaid or Medicare claim being reported by Plaintiff. Thus, Parkview asserts that
Plaintiff has pled herself out of court by failing to plead that she engaged in protected conduct.
To assess whether Plaintiff’s conduct was protected under the statute, courts examine
“whether (1) the employee in good faith believes, and (2) a reasonable employee in the same or
similar circumstances might believe, that the employer is committing fraud against the
government.” United States ex rel. Uhlig v. Fluor Corp., 839 F.3d 628, 635 (7th Cir.
2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “An employee need not have actual
knowledge of the FCA for his actions to be considered ‘protected activity,’” as long as “the
employee in good faith believes, and a reasonable employee in the same or similar circumstances
might believe, that the employer is committing fraud against the government.” Fanslow v. Chicago
Mfg. Center, Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2004). In this context, reasonableness requires
the Court to examine “the facts known to the employee at the time of the alleged protected
activity.” Id.
As it stands, the Amended Complaint’s allegations and the supporting documentation for
those allegations establish only complaints about internal processes and patient care, not
allegations that Parkview was engaged in fraud against the government. See United States ex rel.
Sibley v. Univ. of Chicago Med. Ctr., 44 F.4th 646, 665 (7th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal
because “[e]ven crediting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
[Plaintiff’s] favor… her report of illegal activity lacked the required “reasonable objective basis”);
United States v. Pfizer Inc., 2019 WL 1200753, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2019) (dismissing FCA
claim because a reasonable employee in similar circumstances might believe company had quality
control problems and violated regulations, but that does not mean a reasonable employee might
believe those things “constitute fraudulent claim activity—particularly when Relator fails to allege
he made any complaints relating to government claims or payment”).
While a retaliation plaintiff “need not be able to prove fraud on the merits[,]” Abner v.
Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 3853361, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 2008) (citing
Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864–65 (7th Cir. 1994)), she must provide some factual basis
for her belief that she is engaging in protected activity under the FCA. Indeed, “Congress intended
to protect employees from retaliation while they are collecting information about a possible fraud,
before they have put all the pieces of the puzzle together.” United States ex rel. Kietzman v.
Bethany Circle of King’s Daughters of Madison, Ind., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 964, 982 (S.D. Ind.
2018). But the FCA does not protect “an employee who just imagines fraud without proof.” Id.
The employee cannot “play[ ] the part of Chicken Little[,] ... imagin[ing] fraud but lack[ing] any
objective basis for that belief[.]” Lang v. Nw. Univ., 472 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2006).
It may be that Plaintiff has facts, known to her at the time that she made reports to Parkview
that would demonstrate her good faith belief that she was reporting conduct prohibited by the FCA
in an effort to stop violations of the FCA. Those same facts may also be enough to plausibly allege
that a reasonable employee might believe that those facts constitute fraudulent claim activity. But
as it stands now, the Amended Complaint is void of such facts. For this reason, the Court grants
Parkview’s Motion to Dismiss, but also grants Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend her
complaint if she believes she has facts with which to plausibly allege a claim for FCA retaliation
under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
Parkview also asserts that Plaintiff has not pleaded enough facts to support a plausible
inference that she suffered an adverse employment action or that the actions taken against her were
temporally connected to her internal complaints. For sure, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seems
internally inconsistent. She states, for instance, at ¶ 15 that after submitting her internal complaints
in 2021-2022, “[r]etaliation began immediately…including isolation, schedule manipulation, and
bans on email reporting.” In ¶ 30, Plaintiff says that in 2023-2024 “Parkview took adverse actions
– schedule/FTW manipulation, discipline, MIDAS interception, denial of PRN role training,
constructive discharge.” As with her allegations of engaging in protected activity, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is short on facts.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Parkview took adverse actions against her for filing the
internal complaints, she must plead facts that support the inference that Parkview took particular
actions because she engaged in protected activity. When determining whether an employer took
adverse action against an employee because of his or her protected activity, courts may consider
the timeline of events. See United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc., 912 F.3d 190, 201
(4th Cir. 2018). Thus, if Plaintiff amends her complaint, she should also include facts, including a
timeline, of when she is asserting the various adverse actions occurred. See Nifong v. SOC, LLC,
190 F.Supp.3d 549, 559 (E.D. Va. 2016) (allegations that plaintiff’s employer implemented a
schedule adverse to plaintiff nearly twelve weeks after plaintiff reported defendant’s fraudulent
billing practices were sufficient to support a causal nexus between the protected activity and
adverse action at the motion to dismiss stage). In the absence of amendment by Plaintiff as set out
above, her FCA retaliation claim will be dismissed.
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are available to plaintiffs who were
“subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To state a prima facie Rehabilitation Act claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
that they are a disabled individual under the act; (2) that they are “otherwise qualified” for any
benefit sought; (3) that they were discriminated against solely because of their disability; and (4)
that the program that discriminated against them receives federal financial assistance. Id.; see also
Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim against Parkview must be
dismissed because her complaint does not satisfy either the second or third elements. No doubt,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and exhibits contain very little about her Rehabilitation Act claim.
In fact, the following paragraph identifying this count of her complaint is the only explicit
reference to it:
Count II– Rehabilitation Act § 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794): Disability
Discrimination/Failure to Accommodate/Retaliation (Parkview Health; Parkview
Hospital; Park Center)
31. Parkview entities receive federal financial assistance. Plaintiff is a qualified
individual with a disability. Parkview failed to provide reasonable
accommodations, failed to engage in the interactive process, and retaliated for
protected requests in 2023-2024, causing harm. (Ex. 12; Ex. 20-24; Ex.26).
(ECF 14, at 7).
Even reading the facts in the Amended Complaint and exhibits favorably to the Plaintiff,
the Amended Complaint fails to identify the basic facts surrounding a request for accommodation
that she sought related to her disability. While Plaintiff alleges she was a qualified individual with
a disability, several necessary facts are missing.
First, Plaintiff asserts that Parkview interfered with her staffing schedule, employee
classification, and her ability to attend training for a different job. But she has failed to tie these
issues to any request she made for an accommodation for her disability. Second, other than her
basic assertion that Parkview retaliated against her by interfering with her staffing schedule,
classification, and training, she has not asserted any adverse action Parkview took against her.
Thus, any claims for disability discrimination or retaliation fall short of stating a claim.
That said, the Court will permit Plaintiff one final attempt to amend her Rehabilitation Act
complaint to allege discrimination and/or retaliation. Plaintiff should plead facts showing that she
is an individual with a disability, that she sought reasonable accommodation for her disability and
the nature of the requested accommodation, that Parkview denied her request, and that she was
otherwise qualified with the accommodation to perform her job. If Plaintiff alleges that Parkview
retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation, she should plead those facts and the
alleged actions taken against her by Parkview with some specificity. She should identify what
accommodation she sought for her disability and what actions Parkview took to retaliate against
her for requesting that accommodation. For now, however, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Rehabilitation Act claim is granted.
C. FMLA Claims
To state a claim for FMLA interference, Plaintiff must show (1) she was eligible for FMLA
protection, (2) she worked for a covered FMLA employer, (3) she was entitled to FMLA leave,
(4) she gave enough notice of her intent to take leave, and (5) her employer denied her FMLA
benefits she was entitled to. Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006). For a
retaliation claim, she would need to show that “(1) [s]he engaged in a protected activity; (2) h[er]
employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there is a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Pagel v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d
622, 631 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has pleaded enough to plausibly satisfy the elements of both
claims.
Plaintiff specifically alleges that she made protected leave requests and that Parkview
interfered with her efforts. She details several actions—including schedule manipulation,
employee status manipulation, and constructive discharge—which she asserts were retaliatory.
Parkview does not contest that Plaintiff has satisfied the elements of an interference claim
in her pleading. They only contend that her claim is barred by the statute of limitations. But this
argument is dependent on facts from the original complaint which the Court can no longer
consider. (ECF 21, at 14–15). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that the retaliation occurred
in 2023 and 2024. (ECF 14, ¶ 17). Because Plaintiff filed her complaint in 2025, at least some of
her allegations fall within the two-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1).
For Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, Parkview argues that the two-year gap between Plaintiff’s
leave and the alleged FMLA retaliation makes her claim for a causal connection too attenuated.
But this time gap is reflected only in Plaintiff’s original complaint. No time gap is specified in the
Amended Complaint. To the extent any time gap does exist between Plaintiff’s FMLA leave and
the alleged retaliation, the Amended Complaint does not clearly reveal it. So even though time
gaps could defeat allegations of a causal connection, there is not enough present to justify
dismissing the case at this early stage. Parkview also contends that because the FMLA requires
“but for” causation, her other claims in this complaint necessarily contradict her pleading and
defeat her claim. But like with her Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff is allowed to plead in the
alternative at this stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). Thus, this is not a basis for dismissing her
FMLA claims.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA claims is denied.
D. Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff asserts different constitutional claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer
Jones and Parkview. She alleges Officer Jones violated her Fourth Amendment rights through an
unlawful seizure and violated her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff also makes claims against Parkview under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging the existence unconstitutional policies as well as a failure to
train. The Court addresses each of these claims in turn.
1. Officer Jones
a. Fourth Amendment
A plaintiff can assert claims for violations of her constitutional rights through Section 1983
if she alleges (1) that she was deprived of a right under the Constitution or laws of the United
States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Here, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Jones violated her Fourth Amendment rights on two
separate dates.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. To state a claim under Section 1983 for unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege conduct that constitutes a seizure and that the seizure was
unreasonable. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (“‘Seizure’ alone is not
enough for § 1983 liability; the seizure must be ‘unreasonable.’”). Plaintiff’s complaint bases her
unlawful seizure claim on Officer Jones’s efforts to detain her following her October 26 ER visit
and her “pre-planned” detention for the wellness check on October 30. In response, Defendants
argue that Officer Jones was not involved with the October 30 incident and that the Defendant was
not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment on October 26.
The Court can easily dispense with both Plaintiffs’ contentions. First, as to the October 30
incident, Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes, that her complaint does not allege Officer Jones
was present when she was seized on October 30. (ECF 22, at 12). She argues instead that “[t]o the
extent Defendants argue Officer Jones was not physically present on 10/30, the § 1983 claim
against him arises from his role in the chain (10/26 assault/attempted detention; 11/28 affidavit).”
(Id.). The Court disagrees. While the events of October 26 may have informed Plaintiff’s detention
on October 30 during the wellness check, Officer Jones did not seize or detain Plaintiff on that
date. Because the events of October 30 do not implicate Officer Jones, Plaintiff cannot state a
claim against him for the October 30 detention on that basis.6 See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d
824, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2010) (“individual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in
the alleged constitutional violation”).
This leaves the October 26 incident. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that she was discharged
from the hospital and as she was leaving, Officer Jones chased her through Parkview’s parking lot
6 Plaintiff further requests, in the alternative, that she be allowed to amend her complaint to add the specific officers
involved in the October 30 detention. (ECF 22, at 12). Although the Court will grant Plaintiff permission to amend
her complaint to cure some of her other claims, see infra, the Court will deny this request. Curing claims against
existing Defendants is much less onerous than adding new ones roughly a year after this lawsuit was filed and nearly
three years after the events took place. Because of the passage of time, the claims against these yet-to-be-named
officers may also be barred by the statute of limitations, and amendments to include the officers may not relate back.
See Terry v. Calhoun, No. 1:17-CV-440-TLS, 2018 WL 6308998, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 2018) (statute of limitations
for § 1983 claims in Indiana is two years); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
and brandished a firearm to prevent her from leaving. She asserts that despite being chased, she
got into her car and drove away. She believes these acts violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
A person is “seized” whenever an official “restrains his freedom of movement” such that
he is “not free to leave.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254–55 (2007). Likewise, a show
of authority by an official can result in a seizure, even absent physical restraint, if the person yields
to it. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (holding that a seizure by a show of
authority does not occur unless the subject yields); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
n.10. (1989) (“A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when
government actors have, by means of physical force or show of authority ... in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “While an officer’s
application of physical force always constitutes a seizure, a ‘show of authority’ alone is
insufficient; an officer’s show of authority becomes a seizure only if the person at whom it is
directed actually submits to that authority.” United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir.
2011) see also Brendlin 551 U.S. at 254 (“A police officer may make a seizure by a show of
authority ... but there is no seizure without actual submission[.]”); United States v. Collins, 714
F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that no seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment
“until force is applied or the suspect submits to the officer”).
The problem with Plaintiff’s assertions here is that she does not allege that her freedom of
movement was restrained and she admits she did not yield in response to Officer Jones’ show of
authority. Without the physical restraint of the Plaintiff or her actual submission to a show of
authority, “there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.”
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254.
Plaintiff does plead that Officer Jones drew his weapon and asserts that she was not free to
leave, but this is not enough to show that she was “seized” as contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, under Seventh Circuit precedent, no seizure occurs under the Fourth
Amendment even when officers fire gunshots at a fleeing suspect and miss because that does not
amount to physical force. Green v. Chvala, 567 F. App’x 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that
plaintiff was not seized under the Fourth Amendment where officer’s shots did not hit him); Cabell
v. Rousseau, 130 F. App’x 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff was not seized by
physical force because, while officers fired at him numerous times, he was not struck by any of
the bullets); see also Valle v. City of Chicago, 333 F. Supp. 3d 800, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“The
shots fired by [the officers] do not qualify as ‘physical force,’ for purposes of a Fourth Amendment
seizure, because Plaintiff has not alleged that the bullets struck him or his vehicle.”).
Valle is instructive. There, the Plaintiff’s vehicle became lodged in a snow bank on a street
outside a home he was visiting. While he (and others who had come outside to assist him)
dislodged the vehicle, officers were responding to a shots-fired call in the area. The Plaintiff there
alleged that as he dislodged his vehicle and was leaving the area, he drove by officers who, in
turn, indiscriminately fired at his vehicle. He alleged he was terrified of being killed and fled the
scene. So the Plaintiff sued, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when
they fired at his vehicle.
The court in Valle held that the Plaintiff did not state a Fourth Amendment claim. In doing
so, the court acknowledged that, “[t]he officers’ shots might well qualify as a ‘show of authority’
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment” Valle, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 806 (citing Carlson v. Bukovic,
621 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 2010) (identifying “the display of a weapon” as a factor relevant to
whether a seizure has occurred). But ultimately, “because [the Plaintiff] did not submit to the
officers’ putative show of authority, and he does not allege that his freedom of movement was
otherwise restrained, Plaintiff was not ‘seized.’” Id.
Here, like in Valle, Plaintiff makes no assertion that Officer Jones physically detained her.
She acknowledges that despite Officer Jones brandishing a firearm, she drove away. Given the
absence of any physical detention or submission by Plaintiff to the officer’s authority, she cannot
state a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Jones for the October 26 incident.
b. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff utilizes the same series of events above to assert that Officer Jones violated her
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. But the Seventh Circuit has made clear that
Section 1983 claims for unlawful seizures “rest[] exclusively on the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.
City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019). “In other words, the Fourth Amendment, not
the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a [Section] 1983 claim” for Plaintiff’s claim.
Other than the allegations related to Officer Jones pursuing her in the parking lot, Plaintiff has not
stated a claim for any violation of her Fourteenth Amendment protections.7
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against
Officer Jones is granted.
2. Parkview
Plaintiff also makes a claim against Parkview under Monell alleging the existence of
unconstitutional policies as well as a failure to train. Claims under § 1983 can generally only be
brought against municipalities or those acting under color of state law. Here, however, Parkview
7 The Fourteenth Amendment is relevant insofar as it incorporates Fourth Amendment protections to the states. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). But Plaintiff has no Section 1983 claim through the Fourteenth Amendment.
is a private entity, and nothing in the complaint suggests that it was acting under the color of state
law. Thus, she cannot state a viable claim against it under §1983.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claim is granted.
III. Plaintiff’s State Claims
In addition to her federal claims, Plaintiff also asserts several claims under Indiana state
law: assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, IIED, and defamation. The Court
addresses each in turn.
A. Assault, False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Claims against
Officer Jones
The Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) imposes requirements on plaintiffs who pursue
certain kinds of claims. The ITCA governs lawsuits against municipalities and government
employees who commit torts within the scope of their employment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3. But
the ITCA also covers hospital police officers, who have “[t]he same common law and statutory
powers, privileges, and immunities as sheriffs and constable.” Ind. Code § 16-18-4-6(a)(2). For
many kinds of torts, the ITCA provides immunity to those covered, barring any plaintiffs from
suing. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3. Plaintiffs cannot sue individual employees personally if they allege
that the employees “acted within the scope of [their] employment.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b); see
also Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014). An employee’s actions may
fall within the scope of their employment “if his purpose was, to an appreciable extent, to further
his employer’s business.” Stropes by Taylor v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc.,
547 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ind. 1989). For an employee’s act to fall outside the scope of their
employment, it must occur “within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee
to serve any purpose of the employer.’” Knighten v. E. Chicago Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 792
(Ind. 2015).
Plaintiff’s complaint pursues assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims
against Officer Jones based on his pursuit of her as she left Parkview’s ER on October 26, 2023.8
She alleges that Officer Jones pursued her because he believed Parkview placed her on an
involuntary hold. Her malicious prosecution claim is based on Officer Jones’ affidavit that led to
the initiation of criminal charges against Plaintiff. But Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Jones
acted outside the scope of his employment with Parkview when he took the actions that he did.
Rather, the reasonable inference from the facts she pleads is that Officer Jones, as part of his duties
with Parkview, chased her because he believed the hospital had placed a hold on her. She has not
alleged any action that would fall outside the scope of his employment with Parkview, and thus,
she fails to state a claim against Officer Jones for assault, false imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution. Howlett v. Hack, 794 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing the ITCA and dismissing
a state-law malicious prosecution claim against a police officer).
B. False Imprisonment against Parkview
Plaintiff also asserts a false imprisonment claim against Parkview premised on Parkview
improperly holding her—or attempting to—during an ER visit and a therapy appointment.
Defendants move to dismiss the claim, arguing that this Court is precluded from hearing it under
Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”).
The MMA imposes requirements on Plaintiffs before they can sue qualified medical
providers like hospitals for claims that sound in medical malpractice. Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4.
Plaintiffs must first present their proposed complaint to a medical review panel through the Indiana
8 Plaintiff concedes Officer Jones was not present for the events on October 30, so he cannot be held liable for any
assault or false imprisonment on that date.
Department of Insurance and that panel must issue an opinion. Id.; see also H.D. v. BHC Meadows
Hosp., Inc., 884 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Although Plaintiff has framed her claim as one for false imprisonment against Parkview,
the MMA defines “malpractice” to include “a tort or breach of contract based on health care or
professional services that were provided, or that should have been provided, by a health care
provider, to a patient.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-18. This definition “neither specifically includes nor
excludes intentional torts from the definition of malpractice.” Van Sice v. Sentany, 595 N.E.2d
264, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). But at least one court has found that the definition can include false
imprisonment where the claim arises from the Plaintiff’s treatment by a health care provider.
Semones v. Scott Cnty. EMS, No. 4:22-CV-00089-KMB-JMS, 2023 WL 2895548, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 11, 2023).
Here, as alleged, Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment arises from the medical and
professional services Parkview provided to her. This seemingly places her claim within the reach
of the MMA’s provisions. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that she complied with the MMA
prior to bringing suit and under Indiana law, a Court may not adjudicate a medical malpractice
claim against a qualified medical provider before the plaintiff has filed a proposed complaint with
the Indiana Department of Insurance (the “IDOI”) and a medical review panel has issued an
opinion on the claim. Thus, this Court is precluded under Indiana law from adjudicating her false
imprisonment claim against Parkview.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claim is, therefore, granted.
C. Malicious Prosecution against Parkview
A plaintiff pursuing a malicious prosecution claim must prove four elements: “(1) the
defendant [] instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff []; (2) the defendant
acted with malice in doing so; (3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and
(4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” City of New Haven v. Reichhart,
748 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2001). “Malice may be shown ‘by evidence of personal animosity or
inferred from a complete lack of probable cause or a failure to conduct an adequate investigation
under the circumstances.’” Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Golden
Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland, 557 F,3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 2009).
Parkview argues that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim centers on actions taken by
Officer Jones. Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest Parkview itself took steps to initiate or pursue
Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. Still, Officer Jones is a Parkview employee. And even though he
is immune, that does not mean Parkview is. See Est. of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 238, 254–
55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that immunities for an agent do not generally transfer to the
principal in respondeat superior cases). An employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s
wrongful acts if those acts were “committed within the scope of the agency relationship.” Yost v.
Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 519 (Ind. 2014). Parkview employed Officer Jones as a hospital
police officer. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges facts against Officer Jones related to the
initiation of her criminal charges that appear to have occurred within the scope of his employment.
Thus, Plaintiff could still proceed against Parkview for malicious prosecution if her pleadings
plausibly state a claim.
While Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint satisfies the initiation and favorable termination
elements, it does not sufficiently allege Parkview lacked probable cause or acted with malice.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges Parkview “initiated or caused a prosecution without
probable cause and with malice” and that “the case terminated in Plaintiff’s favor.” (ECF 14, ¶
39). This lists all the necessary elements. But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Any legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. So, to survive Parkview’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff needs
to have pleaded facts to demonstrate the requisite malice and lack of probable cause. She has not.
The charges brought against Plaintiff were purportedly for criminal recklessness and
reckless driving stemming from her flight from Officer Jones on October 26. (ECF 23-2, at 38).
There is no dispute that this is true or that the case eventually terminated in her favor. But
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not include any facts supporting the probable cause or malice
elements. She cites several exhibits in support of her assertions that these elements are met, but
does not explain how they demonstrate the absence of probable cause. Even if some inference of
lacking probable cause could be drawn from the exhibits or elsewhere in her Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff has also not alleged facts that would show the requisite malice. She makes no allegations
of targeted animosity toward her from Parkview, a failure to investigate, or a lack of cause so
severe that malice can be inferred. Compare Welton, 770 F.3d at 674 (holding conclusory legal
assertions and an allegation that an officer intentionally presented false facts do not satisfy the
malice requirement), with Owens v. Downey, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (holding
Plaintiff satisfied the malice requirement by noting Defendant’s history of personal animosity
toward him and repeated false allegations of trespass against him).
Plaintiff argues that inconsistencies between different exhibits, along with Officer Jones
chasing her on the mistaken belief that she was under a hold, demonstrate the necessary malice.
But the discrepancies she highlights are tedious, such as whether the supposed hold was supposed
to be 48 or 72 hours. This does not support an inference of malice or lacking probable cause when
pursuing criminal charges. Further, whether Officer Jones had authority to place her on a hold
when he chased her has no bearing on whether probable cause existed to charge her with criminal
recklessness and reckless driving, or whether Parkview acted with malice in pursuing said charges.
In sum, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacks the necessary facts to support her allegations
that Parkview lacked probable cause or acted with malice in initiating criminal charges against
her. That said, she may have facts she has not yet offered that would support those elements. If she
can amend her complaint to provide a factual basis for the probable cause and malice elements,
she could proceed against Parkview on a malicious prosecution claim. Thus, the Court will grant
Plaintiff one more opportunity to amend this claim to add the necessary facts described above.
Absent such an amendment, the motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim against
Parkview is granted.
D. IIED
Plaintiff alleges “[a]ll applicable Defendants” are liable for IIED. (ECF 14, ¶ 41). She bases
this claim on Officer Jones’s brandishing of a firearm, her pre-planned detention at her October 30
therapy appointment, and the initiation of the later-dismissed criminal charges. To state an IIED
claim, Plaintiff must allege “that a defendant (1) engaged in ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct that
(2) intentionally or recklessly (3) caused (4) severe emotional distress.” Doe v. Methodist Hosp.,
690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997), abrogated on separate grounds Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v.
McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022).
Defendants argue that the ITCA and MMA prevent Plaintiff from pursuing this claim. They
are correct. The allegations against Officer Jones for this claim overlap with Plaintiff’s allegations
against him for her assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Only the pre-planned
detention allegation implicates Parkview, and this allegation overlaps with Plaintiff’s MMA-
barred false imprisonment claim. As the Court has explained, all actions Officer Jones allegedly
took occurred within the scope of his employment. And Parkview’s pre-planned detention was a
health care decision covered by the MMA which, even if improper, required Plaintiff to obtain an
opinion from a medical review panel before filing suit.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the IIED claim is granted.
E. Defamation
Plaintiff’s final claim asserts defamation against Parkview. Specifically, she alleges that
Parkview accused her of stealing drugs in a complaint directed to the Attorney General. She further
asserts that Parkview intentionally manipulated dates on a criminal referral to the Attorney
General’s office to accuse her of the theft.
“In Indiana, defamation is actionable when communication exists with four elements:
‘defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages.’” Martino v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., 715
F.3d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130,
136 (Ind. 2006)). Communications with a defamatory imputation must, by necessity, be false. Id.
Defamation per se occurs when those communications impute “(1) criminal conduct; (2) a
loathsome disease; (3) misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation; or (4)
sexual misconduct.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. 2007).
Defendants agree that Plaintiff has stated a claim for defamation under Indiana law. They
instead argue that Plaintiff cannot pursue this claim because Parkview’s referral to the Attorney
General is covered by qualified privilege.
The qualified privilege defense under Indiana law “applies to ‘communications made in
good faith on any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or
in reference to which he has a duty, either public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if made
to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.’” Partin v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 135
F.4th 549, 564 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992)).
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the existence of privilege “by proof of a recognized
public or private interest which would justify the utterance of those words.” Id. Once this burden
is met, a plaintiff may overcome that privilege by showing that it was abused. Id. This can be done
by showing that “(1) the communicator was primarily motivated by ill will in making the
statement; (2) there was excessive publication of the defamatory statements; or (3) the statement
was made without belief or grounds for belief in its truth.” Id. “[C]ommunications made to law
enforcement to report criminal activity are qualifiedly privileged.” Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at 600. But
“[u]nless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, the question of whether the
privilege has been abused is for the jury.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind.2007).
Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded defamation. She has also plausibly plead facts that could
overcome the privilege asserted by Parkview. Plaintiff alleges, in essence, that Parkview supplied
false dates on a criminal referral to the Attorney General’s office to accuse her of theft. Whether
that bears out as true in discovery or whether the contention survives summary judgment is another
matter. But for now, Plaintiff has pled some facts that could possibly show actual malice or ill-will
by Parkview and overcome the qualified privilege. Cf. Mance v. Autozone, 2026 WL 2388795, at
*2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 2026).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the defamation claim against Parkview is denied.
CONCLUSION
As set out above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 20) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s FMLA and defamation claims against
Parkview. It is GRANTED as to all other claims. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended
complaint solely to add factual allegations, if they exist, to her FCA retaliation, Rehabilitation Act
discrimination and/or retaliation, and malicious prosecution claims against Parkview. Any
amended complaint must be filed no later than October 2, 2026.
SO ORDERED on September 3, 2026.
s/ Holly A. Brady
CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT