MOORE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-3303

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J. September 3, 2026

Plaintiff John Moore filed the instant action against Defendants the City of Philadelphia

(“the City”) and Detectives Joe Walsh, William Coogan, William Gross, Raleigh Witcher, and

Rossiter in their individual capacities, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Moore

claims that he was wrongfully incarcerated for nearly 27 years following his prosecution by

Defendants. He raises claims under § 1983 of malicious prosecution (Count I), deprivation of

liberty without due process and denial of a fair trial (Count II), civil rights conspiracy (Count

III), failure to intervene (Count IV), municipal liability (Count V), and malicious prosecution

under Pennsylvania state law (Count VI). Now, Defendant Walsh moves to dismiss the claims

against him for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the Motions to Dismiss, the Court takes all of Plaintiff’s allegations

in the Complaint as true.1

In December 1997, Mr. Moore was arrested for the July 7, 1996 robbery and murder of

Sammy Cedano, based on the statements of fifteen-year-old James Lamb, who admitted to

1 Compl. [Doc. No. 1].

participating in the murder and agreed to plead guilty to third-degree murder for the July 7, 1996

crimes.2 In May 2000, Mr. Moore was tried and convicted in a bench trial of second-degree

murder and other felonies for the July 7, 1996 murder of Sammy Cedano, and he was sentenced

to life without parole.3 Lamb, who testified against him, at times inconsistent with his previous

statements, was sentenced to five to twenty years of incarceration based on his participation in

the shooting and robberies.4 Lamb served seven years before being granted parole.5

Mr. Moore advocated for his innocence of the crime, and after serving over twenty years,

in April 2021, Mr. Moore obtained access to his “H” file, or police homicide file, and the District

Attorney’s Office (“DAO”) file.6 Through the files, Mr. Moore’s counsel discovered that

substantial evidence pointed to a man named Robert Turner, not Mr. Moore, as the perpetrator

and Lamb’s co-conspirator.7 Police identified Turner months before Lamb named Mr. Moore in

a statement.8

Among the evidence identifying Turner was a Narcotics Arrest Blotter, which listed

people arrested for narcotics offenses in the area surrounding where the murder took place and

noted each person’s age, race, gender, address, and criminal identification number.9 Only two

individuals on the list fit the physical descriptions provided by three eyewitnesses to the crime,

one of whom was Turner.10 Turner had been arrested one month before the murder for the

2 Compl. ¶¶ 40-45 [Doc. No. 1].

3 Id. ¶¶ 46-52.

4 Id. ¶¶ 46-53.

5 Id. ¶ 53.

6 Id. ¶ 54.

7 Id. ¶ 55.

8 Id.

9 Id. ¶ 56.

10 Id.

knowing and intentional possession of heroin.11 This document was not provided to Mr. Moore,

his defense counsel, or even the prosecution.12

Using the narcotics blotter, police identified an arrest photo of Turner from the date of his

June 1996 narcotics arrest.13 The photo is accompanied by a physical description of Turner,

which matches the descriptions provided by eyewitnesses.14 Mr. Moore claims that a photo of

Turner was not shown to the witnesses, nor provided to the defense.15 Neither Turner’s name or

address were provided to defense counsel, which prohibited Mr. Moore from identifying

additional evidence pointing to Turner, including that Turner died in 1996 so Lamb could not

have obtained a beneficial plea deal to testify against his actual co-perpetrator.16

In 2004, Lamb signed an affidavit in which he recanted his testimony against Mr. Moore

and claimed that Defendants Witcher and Gross encouraged him to identify Mr. Moore as being

involved in the crime.17 In this affidavit, Lamb claimed that Mr. Moore was not present for or

involved in the crime.18

Mr. Moore claims that the police, upon identifying Turner’s potential involvement in the

crime and his subsequent death, wanted to implicate a living co-conspirator with Lamb.19

Despite three eyewitnesses being shown photos of Mr. Moore, including an eleven-year old

interviewed by Defendant Walsh, not one identified him as being involved in the crime.20 Mr.

Moore alleges that police coerced Lamb to implicate him and that they were aware of Lamb’s

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id. ¶ 57.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. ¶ 58.

17 Id. ¶ 59.

18 Id.

19 Id. ¶¶ 60-61.

20 Id. ¶ 62.

susceptibility to coercive interrogation tactics.21 Lamb’s false testimony against Mr. Moore is

corroborated by several individuals both before and after his recantation.22

Additional exculpatory evidence was withheld from Mr. Moore and his defense at trial,

including ballistics evidence, a police search of Mr. Moore’s home, and eyewitnesses’ failure to

identify Mr. Moore in a photo array.23

On April 20, 2022, Mr. Moore filed an amended Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)

petition in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas based on the evidence obtained from the H-

file and DAO file.24 On June 27, 2023, Judge Scott DiClaudio granted Mr. Moore’s PCRA

petition, vacated his conviction for second-degree murder and other felonies, vacated his

sentence to life without parole, and ordered a new trial.25

Mr. Moore maintains his innocence, yet he accepted a plea deal to a lesser charge of

third-degree murder with a sentence of 13 to 26 years of incarceration, plus five years’ probation,

which amounted to time served at the time of his plea.26 Mr. Moore was released from prison on

July 11, 2023.27

In addition to the specific facts of Mr. Moore’s arrest, conviction, vacated first

conviction, and eventual plea deal, he alleges a pattern and practice of unconstitutional

misconduct by the Philadelphia Police Department in homicide investigations.28 These

allegations are specific to Count V against the Philadelphia Police Department, so the Court does

not recount them for purposes of ruling on Defendant Walsh’s Motion to Dismiss.

21 Id. ¶¶ 63-64.

22 Id. ¶¶ 66-70.

23 Id. ¶ 71.

24 Id. ¶ 72.

25 Id. ¶ 74.

26 Id. ¶¶ 75-77.

27 Id. ¶ 77.

28 Id. ¶¶ 78-94.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.”29 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.30 The plausibility standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.31 Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent

with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’ ”32 The reviewing court must “construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,

the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”33 The court must draw all inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.34 Yet, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and

conclusory statements” must be disregarded.35

III. DISCUSSION

A. Favorable Termination

Defendant Walsh first argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because he argues

that Mr. Moore has not received a favorable termination of his conviction.

The Supreme Court ruled in Heck v. Humphrey that a claim for “damages for [an]

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

29 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

30 Id. at 678

31 Id.

32 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

33 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

224, 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).

34 Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2021).

35 City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878-79 (quoting James v. City of

Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)).

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid . . . is not cognizable under §

1983” unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”36 Defendant Walsh

argues that Mr. Moore’s entire Complaint is barred by the Heck Doctrine.

1. Malicious Prosecution Counts

Mr. Moore’s first § 1983 claim is malicious prosecution, which is squarely subject to

Heck. In order to recover on a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in

plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the

defendant acted maliciously or for purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the

plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of

the legal proceeding.37 The Pennsylvania state law tort of malicious prosecution requires the first

four elements of a constitutional malicious prosecution claim.38

One necessary element for both federal and state malicious prosecution claims is

termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.39 This requirement “avoids

parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt ... and it precludes the possibility of

the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal

prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting

resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.”40

36 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

37 Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017).

38 Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, 853 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2012).

39 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.

40 Id.

Here, Mr. Moore pled guilty to third-degree murder following the Pennsylvania Court of

Common Pleas vacating his conviction for second-degree murder. While the second-degree

conviction was terminated by post-conviction relief, Mr. Moore’s guilty plea to third-degree

murder resulted in a subsequent valid conviction, which precludes a finding of favorable

termination. Without favorable termination, Plaintiff cannot plead factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for malicious prosecution.

Moreover, the fact that the charge he pled guilty to was not part of the original accusations

brought by the Commonwealth is irrelevant because the criminal proceeding, as a whole, did not

terminate in Mr. Moore’s favor. Accordingly, his claims for malicious prosecution in Counts I

and VI will be dismissed.

2. Remaining Claims

Defendant Walsh also argues that the Heck doctrine bars Mr. Moore’s entire Complaint,

including his claims of deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denial of a fair trial,

civil conspiracy, and failure to intervene. Under Heck, these claims are not cognizable under

§1983 if they challenge the validity of Mr. Moore’s remaining third-degree conviction.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have considered a so-called “two

conviction” case, as presented here.41 In absence of controlling precedent, several courts within

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have followed Poventud v. City of New York,42 when

analyzing “two-conviction” cases.43

41 Gaskins v. City of Philadelphia, 806 F. Supp. 3d 507, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (noting cases currently pending where

the Third Circuit may “engage this issue directly in the near term”).

42 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).

43 Wagner v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 25-CV-1450, 2026 WL 789450, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2026); Dennis

v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2019); Gladden v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 21-

4986, 2022 WL 605445, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2022); Maldonado v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-3474, 2023

WL 4685967 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2023).

Poventud is instructive. There, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a due

process violation based on a Brady v. Maryland44 violation does not depend on “factual

innocence, but rather what would have been proven absent the violation.”45 The presence of a

constitutional Brady violation “need not be at odds with his guilt,” because the remedy for a

Brady violation is a new trial in which the withheld material is disclosed and provided to the

defendant.46 This reasoning falls in line with Heck’s explicit language that “[a] district court

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”47 While favorable

termination is a required element of malicious prosecution, it is not a required element for every

§ 1983 claim arising out of a criminal case. Thus, the Court must look to the specific claims to

determine whether the Counts necessarily imply the invalidity of Mr. Moore’s plea.

First, Mr. Moore claims that Defendants deprived him of liberty without due process and

denied him a fair trial by fabricating evidence, withholding material exculpatory and

impeachment evidence, and deliberately failing to conduct a constitutionally adequate

investigation. As in Poventud, this count alleges a violation of Brady for withholding

evidence. “Because [Mr. Moore] was aware of the undisclosed exculpatory material prior to his

guilty plea, his plea could not have implicated the constitutional violations at issue in his trial.

Following vacatur of his conviction, a favorable judgment in this § 1983 action would not render

invalid any subsequent, plea-based judgment against [Mr. Moore].”48 The remedy for a Brady

44 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

45 Poventud, 750 F.3d at 134.

46 Id. at 133.

47 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

48 Poventud, 750 F.3d at 136.

violation does not involve invalidation of Mr. Moore’s eventual conviction, so he may proceed

on a due process claim for withholding material exculpatory and impeachment evidence.

Several courts in this Circuit have extended the reasoning of Poventud beyond Brady

claims to other due process claims in “two conviction” cases, including to fabrication of

evidence charges.49 As with a due process claim for withholding evidence at Mr. Moore’s trial, a

due process claim for fabricating evidence does not invalidate Mr. Moore’s subsequent

conviction. Further, any claim regarding the lack of an adequate investigation would also not

invalidate the second conviction.

Heck does not bar Mr. Moore’s due process claims, and it does not bar the Complaint in

its entirety. While neither party discussed Heck’s application to Counts III and IV in the Motion

to Dismiss, the Court notes that neither the civil conspiracy count nor failure to intervene counts

are barred by Heck. In order to state a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983, Mr. Moore must

plead “(1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a deprivation of civil

49 See e.g., Wagner v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 25-CV-1450, 2026 WL 789450, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20,

2026); Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (denying motion to dismiss

deliberate deception and fabrication of evidence claims arising from prosecution resulting in first conviction that

was vacated, despite subsequent plea of no contest to third degree murder), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 19

F.4th 279 (3d Cir. 2021) (declining to rule on Heck issue); Gladden v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-4986, 2022 WL

605445, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss arguing that fabrication of evidence and

deliberate deception claims were barred by Heck when plaintiff pleaded no contest to third-degree murder

after vacated conviction); Carson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 23-2661, 2024 WL 3792223, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13,

2024) (denying motion to dismiss fabrication of evidence and withholding of impeachment/exculpatory evidence

claims because they did not imply invalidity of second conviction); Natividad v. Raley, No. 22-5061, 2025 WL

1550740, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2025) (rejecting argument that claims of fabricating evidence and deliberate

deception were Heck-barred where plaintiff pleaded to third-degree murder, an offense “with essentially the same

elements and supported by the same facts offered at his first-degree trial”); White v. City of Philadelphia, No. 23-

4538, 2025 WL 3706949, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (holding that coercion, fabricated evidence, and

withholding of Brady material claims were not Heck-barred); Maldonado v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-3474, 2023

WL 4685967, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 21, 2023) (declining to dismiss fabrication of evidence claim on Heck ground

because compliant raised plausible inference that faulty evidence was not “foundational to his second

conviction”); Bey v. Hediger, No. 24-702, 2025 WL 2636424, at *5-7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2025) (rejecting argument

that destruction of evidence, fabrication of evidence, Brady, and coercion claims were Heck-barred after subsequent

plea to third-degree murder which was “based upon the same underlying conduct” as the preceding invalidated

conviction).

rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.”50 If challenging the

underlying alleged civil rights violation does not violate Heck, then challenging a conspiracy to

violate the civil rights will not invalidate Mr. Moore’s second conviction. The civil conspiracy

count is not barred by Heck.

The Third Circuit has held that “[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or

refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation . . . takes place in his presence, the officer is

directly liable under Section 1983.”51 Here, Mr. Moore’s failure to intervene claim includes

arguments that the individual officers failed to intervene in the alleged due process violations

involved in Mr. Moore’s initial conviction. As the alleged due process claims do not imply the

invalidity of Mr. Moore’s current conviction, a failure to intervene to prevent the due process

violations similarly do not imply the invalidity of Mr. Moore’s current conviction. Accordingly,

the failure to intervene claim is not barred by Heck.

B. Qualified Immunity

Next, Defendant Walsh moves to dismiss the inadequate investigation and failure to

intervene claims against him, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity on these counts.

“A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless the plaintiff shows

that the officer violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’”52 To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified

immunity, courts apply a two-prong test.53 The Court evaluates “(1) whether the plaintiff

50 Oliver v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 25-197, 2025 WL 1902298, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (citation

omitted).

51 Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.

1986)).

52 Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).

53 Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021).

sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly

established at the time of the official’s conduct.”54

First, Defendant Walsh argues that Mr. Moore’s claim for inadequate investigation must

be dismissed because he argues there is no constitutional right to a police investigation. The

Court need not decide whether there is such a constitutional right, because the second prong

resolves the inquiry. “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”55 Thus, at

the time of the alleged conduct, the existing caselaw must give the official “fair warning” of the

unconstitutionality of his actions.56

At the time of Mr. Moore’s trial and initial conviction, it was not clearly established

whether an individual had a right to an adequate criminal investigation against them.57 While

certain cases recognize there was a clearly established right to a criminal investigation absent

constitutional violations, these cases do not clearly establish an independent right to a certain

adequacy of investigation.58 Because the right to an adequate investigation was not clearly

established at the time of Defendant Walsh’s alleged actions, the Motion to Dismiss will be

granted as to this claim. However, Mr. Moore correctly notes that he alleges alternative bases for

the constitutional violation in Count II for which Defendant Walsh is not entitled to qualified

54 Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

55 Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015).

56 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

57 See Johnson v. Logan, 721 F. App’x 205, 208 n.9 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We note, without deciding, that we have

significant doubts about whether there is an independent substantive due process right to be free from a reckless

investigation.”); Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“whether the officers

conducted the investigation negligently is not a material fact” in determining whether a constitutional violation

occurred); Wallace v. City of Philadelphia, 2025 WL 2935248, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025) (“Courts in this

district have consistently held that there is no constitutional right to a police investigation.” (collecting cases));

Ogrod v. City of Philadelphia, 598 F. Supp. 3d 252, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to a

police investigation and the Third Circuit has not recognized a cause of action arising out of an allegedly deficient

investigation.”).

58 See Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484 (“The obligation of local law enforcement is to conduct criminal investigations in a

manner that does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of the person under investigation.”).

immunity. Thus, Count II’s claim for failure to conduct a constitutionally adequate investigation

will be dismissed and the remaining claims in Count II (fabrication of evidence and withholding

material exculpatory and impeachment evidence) will not be dismissed.

Finally, Defendant Walsh argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Moore’s

failure to intervene claim. While, as discussed, the Third Circuit recognizes a cause of action

against a police officer who “fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation . . .

takes place in his presence,”59 there is no clearly established standalone right to intervention by

officers “to prevent false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and deprivation

without due process of law.”60 Accordingly, such a right was not clearly established at the time

of Mr. Moore’s arrest, Defendant Walsh is entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to

intervene claim. His Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to Count IV.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part as to the

malicious prosecution and failure to intervene counts, granted as to the failure to conduct a

constitutionally adequate investigation claim, and denied in all other respects. Accordingly,

Counts I, IV, and VI will be dismissed against Defendant Walsh. An order will be entered.

59 Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 650 (quoting Byrd, 783 F.2d at 1007).

60 Compl. ¶ 116 [Doc. No. 1]; Handy v. City of Philadelphia, 2025 WL 2618956, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2025);

Onyiah v. City of Philadelphia, 660 F. Supp. 3d 407, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2023); Ogrod, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 273; Outlaw v.

City of Philadelphia, No. 21-1290, 2021 WL 3471168, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2021).