Thornton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES E. THORNTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-886-NJR

LATOYA HUGHES and JANE DOE

NURSE PRACTITIONER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Charles E. Thornton, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint,

Thornton alleges that Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner acted with deliberate indifference

when she discontinued his pain medication.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Under Section1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).

TheComplaint

Thornton suffers from a pre-existing injury resulting from a gunshotwound to the

mouth that left bullet fragments an inch or two from Thornton’s spinal cord (Doc. 1, pp.

6, 10). As a result of the injury, Thornton suffers from extreme nerve pain making it

difficult to squat, bend over, kneel, walk, or get out of bed without medication (Id. at pp.

7, 11). The pain was previously controlled by a prescription for Neurontin, 1200 mg (Id.

at pp. 7, 10). The medication was initiallyprescribed by doctors directly after he received

his injuries in 2009,and he continued to receive the medication while in jail and in prison

(Id. at p. 10).

On September 5, 2025, Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner at Menard discontinued

Thornton’s prescription for Neurontin, both his morning and evening doses (Doc. 1, pp.

7-8). She failed to provide a replacement medication for his pain (Id. at p. 11). As a result,

Thornton alleges that he suffers with pain in his neck 24 hours a day and he has difficulty

walking and getting out of bed (Id. at pp. 7-8). He can barely write due to pain that travels

from his neck down his right arm (Id.). He suffers from weakness and numbness in his

right arm and fingers (Id.). He also has trouble performing daily functions such as

cleaning his cell and washing his body (id. at p. 8).

Thornton alleges the nurse practitioner discontinued the medication in retaliation

for Thornton filing grievances about the previous discontinuation of his medication (Doc.

1, pp. 7, 12).

Preliminary Dismissal

Although Thornton identifies IDOC Director Latoya Hughes as a defendant in the

case caption, he fails to include any allegations against her in his statement of the claim.

He merely notes that she is the director and sued in her official capacity. But Hughes

cannot be liable simply in her position as director because there is no respondeat superior

(or supervisory) liability under Section 1983. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th

Cir. 2001); Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d

861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Public officials are accountable for their own conduct, but they

are not vicariously liable for the acts of their subordinates.”).To the extent Thornton sues

Hughes in her official capacity and seeks monetary damages from her (Doc. 1, p. 9),

“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under

[Section] 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, any claim

against Latoya Hughes is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical

needs claim against Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner for

discontinuing Thornton’s prescription for Neurontin.

Count 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Jane Doe Nurse

Practitioner for discontinuing Thornton’s prescription in

retaliation to Thornton filing grievances.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.1

At this stage, Thornton alleges a viable deliberate indifference claim against the

Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner. He alleges that she discontinued his pain medication

without a basis for stopping the medication and without offering an alternative for his

pain. Thus, Count 1 shall proceed against Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner.

But Thornton fails to allege a viable retaliation claim against Jane Doe Nurse

Practitioner. In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged

in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First

Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the

deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). “The ‘motivating

factor’ amounts to a causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Manuel

v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). Thornton merely alleges in conclusory fashion

that Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner sought to retaliate against him when she discontinued

his medication. Although Thornton alleges that he previously wrote grievances about

prior instances where his medication was denied, he fails to allege that those grievances

were the motivating factor for the discontinuation of his medication or even that the nurse

practitioner was aware of the grievances. There are no allegations to suggest when he

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

wrote the early grievances, whether the grievances were about the nurse practitionerand,

if they were, whether she was aware of the grievances, and whether she acted in response

to the grievances. His conclusory statements are not enough to state a retaliation claim.

Thus, Count 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

To aid Thornton in identifying the Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner, the Court ADDS

the current warden of Menard, Matthew Plummer, in his official capacity to respond to

discovery aimed at identifying the unknown nurse practitioner.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Thornton recently filed a motion for expediting a preliminary injunction hearing

(Doc. 5). He alleges that he continues to suffer from non-stop nerve pain due to his lack

of access to Neurontin (Id. at p. 2). He describes the pain as bolts of electricity running up

and down his spine (Id.). He also suffers from mobility issues and numbness in his right

arm (Id.). He alleges that his pain is chronic and he needs proper medication to control

his pain (Id. at p. 3). Thornton has been without his Neurontin since September 2025 and

his condition continues to deteriorate without access to his medication (Id. at p. 6).

Thornton seeks an examination and medical plan from a qualified specialist (Id. at p. 8).

He also seeks a single-man cell because his cellmates bully him (Id. at p. 7). He believes

that Defendants placed him in double-man cells in an act of retaliation for his complaints

against medical care and in an attempt to bully and scare him (Id. at pp. 6-7).

To the extent Thornton seeks a single-man cell, his request for injunctive relief is

DENIED. Thornton argues that he was placed in a double-man cell in retaliation for his

grievances, but he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to this

claim. His retaliation claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and his Complaint

lacks any allegations regarding his placement in a double-man cell or threats to his safety.

As to Thornton’s request for injunctive relief regarding his access to Neurontin,

the Court ADDSWarden Matthew Plummer (in his official capacity only),to respond to

the request and implement any injunctive relief that may be awarded. Although

Thornton asks for expedited review, the Court notes that Thornton has been without his

prescription for almost 11 months and it is not entirely clear how his condition has

changed in that time. Thornton merely states that his condition is deteriorating every day.

At this time, the Court DEFERS ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction and

DIRECTS Plummer to file a response within 14 days of service of the pleadings in this

case. After Plummer has filed his response, the Court will determine whether an

expedited hearing is warranted.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Jane Doe Nurse

Practitioner. Warden Matthew Plummer is ADDED to the case, in his official capacity

only, for purposes of responding to discovery regarding the identity of the Jane Doe and

responding to Thornton’s motion for preliminary injunction.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Matthew Plummer (official capacity only): (1)

Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form

6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of

employment as identified by Thornton. If defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the defendant, and

the Court will require the defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Thornton,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

Because Thornton’s claims involve his medical care, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.

If judgment is rendered against Thornton, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Thornton is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep

the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the

Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing

and not later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to

comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and

may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 4, 2026

C

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the

defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all

the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically

directed to do so.

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