HOOTEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHAEL HOOTEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00379-JPH-DML

)

R. VANVLEET et al., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Michael Hooten, an Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC")

inmate, alleges that Defendants Randall Vanvleet and Matt Leohr failed to

protect him from being attacked by his cellmate in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Dkt. 19. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the

reasons explained below, the motion, dkt. [92], is granted.

I.

Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely

disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts

of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's

factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,

and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),

the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Hooten

and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.

A. Parties

At all times relevant to Mr. Hooten's allegations, he was an IDOC inmate

housed at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Dkt. 11 at 1 (Amended

Complaint). Mr. Hooten suffers from a very progressive form of multiple sclerosis

("MS"). Id. at 4.

Defendant Matt Leohr is the Supervisor of Classification at Wabash Valley,

Dkt. 93-4 at 1 (Leohr Affidavit). Defendant Randall Vanvleet is identified as the

Office of Investigations and Intelligence ("OII") Supervisor and is not a

classification staff member. Dkt. 11 at 1; dkt. 93-3 at 2–4 (Vanvleet affidavit).

B. Mr. Hooten's Relevant Location History

Mr. Hooten was housed in Lincoln House ("L-House") at Wabash Valley.

Dkt. 93-3 at 1. In L-House, Mr. Hooten engaged in manipulative and disruptive

behavior, including harassing medical staff, and manipulating an officer into

giving him a Little Debbie snack. Id. As a result, on January 5, 2024, Mr.

Vanvleet transferred Mr. Hooten to George House ("G-House"). Id. at 1-2. Mr.

Vanvleet testified that he approved the move because the environment in G-

House is more controlled and would reduce Mr. Hooten's opportunities to cause

problems and help maintain order. Id. at 1-2. G-House was not a restricted

housing unit. Id. at 2. Inmates in G-House came out in smaller groups for

recreation and meals but otherwise retained full privileges of general population.

Id.

Mr. Hooten was transferred from G-House to Frank House ("F-House") on

March 21, 2024. Dkt. 93-4 at 2. Neither Mr. Vanvleet nor Mr. Leohr authorized,

directed, or were otherwise involved with Mr. Hooten's transfer to F-House. Dkt.

93-4 at 2; dkt. 93-3 at 3. This transfer appeared on a movement sheet with

approximately twenty other bed moves submitted by a Correctional Sergeant

responsible for coordinating daily institutional movement. Dkt. 93-4 at 2. In F-

House, Mr. Hooten was assigned a cellmate through the routine cell-assignment

process. Id. Neither Mr. Vanvleet nor Mr. Leohr approved or selected Mr. Hooten's

cellmate assignment. Dkt. 93-3 at 2-3; dkt. 93-4 at 2.

C. April 5, 2024 Altercation

Mr. Hooten alleges he was attacked by his cellmate on April 5, 2024. Dkt.

11 at 5; dkt. 93-1 at 15. Mr. Hooten reports he had teeth injuries, a concussion,

and a black eye after the incident. Dkt. 93-1 at 20-21. He filed a grievance on

April 8 stating that he had been attacked by his cellmate over the weekend. Dkt.

93-2 at 38 (Grievances). This grievance was returned by the grievance specialist

on the grounds that classification actions like bed moves, change in security

level, and facility transfers should be raised in a classification appeal. Id. at 37.

There is no evidence that Mr. Hooten gave Mr. Vanvleet or Mr. Leohr copies of

the grievance or that they were otherwise aware of this grievance before the April

11 altercation between Mr. Hooten and Mr. Majors. See id.

D. April 11, 2024 Altercation

On April 11, 2024, Mr. Hooten was involved in a physical altercation with

his cellmate, Mr. Majors. Dkt. 93-4 at 2-3. The official incident and disciplinary

reports prepared by facility staff document that Mr. Majors sustained multiple

puncture-type stab wounds and needed to go to the hospital for emergency

medical treatment. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Hooten was then moved to restrictive housing

("the SHU"), consistent with IDOC policy requiring separation of offenders

involved in a violent incident. Dkt. 93-3 at 3. Mr. Vanvleet did not determine

which inmate remained in the original cell and which was moved. Id.

Before the attack, neither Mr. Vanvleet nor Mr. Leohr had knowledge of

any safety concern about Mr. Hooten sharing a cell with Mr. Majors. Dkt. 93-3

at 2-3; dkt. 93-4 at 2-3. Defendants first became aware of a problem between

Mr. Hooten and Mr. Majors after the April 11 incident, when they reviewed the

disciplinary and incident reports describing the physical altercation. Dkt. 93-3

at 2-3; dkt. 93-4 at 2-3.

A disciplinary process was initiated against Mr. Hooten for battery on

another offender. Dkt. 93-3 at 3; dkt. 93-4 at 2-3; dkt. 110-1 at 3. He was found

guilty of stabbing his cellmate and issued 90 days of disciplinary status

restricted housing time. Dkt. 93-4 at 3. After his disciplinary segregation term,

Mr. Hooten remained in Administrative Segregation until August 11, 2025, when

he was transferred to a different correctional facility. Dkt. 93-4 at 3-4.

III.

Discussion

Mr. Hooten brings an Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendants,

alleging that they failed to protect him from being attacked by Mr. Majors. Dkt.

19.

Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violent assaults by

other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). They incur liability

for the breach of that duty if they were "aware of a substantial risk of serious

injury to [an inmate] but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect

him from a known danger." Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir.

2007)); see also Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2010). To

succeed on a claim for failure to protect, Mr. Hooten must show that (1)

Defendants were aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to him, and (2) they

acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834,

837; Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). An official will only be

liable when he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it. Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006).

A defendant had actual knowledge of impending harm if the plaintiff

complained to him about "a specific threat to his safety." Gevas v. McLaughlin,

798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015). But "[c]omplaints that convey only a

generalized, vague, or stale concern about one's safety typically will not support

an inference that a prison official had actual knowledge that the prisoner was in

danger." Id. at 480–81; see Dale, 548 F.3d at 569 ("[A]s the vagueness of a threat

increases, the likelihood of actual knowledge of impending harm decreases."). By

contrast, "a complaint that identifies a specific, credible, and imminent risk of

serious harm and identifies the prospective assailant typically will support an

inference that the official to whom the complaint was communicated had actual

knowledge of the risk." Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481 (officers had notice that plaintiff

was in danger of being attacked when plaintiff told them about an individual who

repeatedly threatened to stab him and had remarked that he had snitched on a

prior cellmate). A defendant cannot be held liable for knowing general risks of

violence in prisons. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005).

Mr. Hooten has not designated evidence showing that either Mr. Vanvleet

or Mr. Leohr were aware of any substantial risk of serious harm to him, from Mr.

Majors or anyone else, in April 2024. Mr. Hooten argues that Defendants should

have been aware of general risks to his safety because of his housing location,

MS condition, and/or his cellmate's conduct history. Knowledge of such general

risks, however, are insufficient to hold a prison official responsible for an inmate

being attacked by another inmate. See Borello, 446 F.3d at 747. In a prison,

there is almost always a heightened risk of violence. See Shields v. Dart,

664 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[A] general risk of violence in a maximum

security unit does not by itself establish knowledge of a substantial risk of

harm.").

Mr. Hooten also argues that Defendants should have been aware of the

April 5 attack before the April 11 attack when he was "forced to defend himself,"

and Mr. Majors ended up with multiple stab wounds. Dkt. 93-4 at 2-3; dkt. 110

at 5, 6-7. But Mr. Hooten does not designate evidence or argue that he informed

Mr. Vanvleet or Mr. Leohr of the April 5 attack, or that he informed them of a

specific risk to his safety from Mr. Majors.

The designated evidence therefore does not allow a reasonable jury to find

that Defendants failed to protect Mr. Hooten from an attack by Mr. Majors.

In Haley v. Gross, for example, the defendants knew that the plaintiff's cellmate

had threatened him multiple times and knew that the plaintiff was "deadlocked"

in his cell with him overnight. 86 F.3d 630, 642–43 (7th Cir. 1996). And in Gevas,

the plaintiff "identified the individual threatening him (Adkins), the nature of the

threat (that Adkins would stab him), and supplied context that rendered the

threats plausible (including Adkins's remark that Gevas had 'snitched' on a prior

cellmate)." 798 F.3d at 481. Mr. Hooten, by contrast, has not designated evidence

from which a reasonable jury could conclude that either Defendant knew of a

specific or credible threat to his safety. See Dale, 548 F.3d at 569 ("[A] prison

official does not violate the Eighth Amendment every time an inmate gets

attacked by another inmate. Prisons, after all, are dangerous places often full of

people who have demonstrated aggression. And so, an inmate has no claim

unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk."). Mr. Vanvleet and

Mr. Leohr are therefore entitled to summary judgment!.

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment GRANTED. Dkt. [92]. Final

judgment will issue in a separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/4/2026 Pat tanbor—

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

MICHAEL HOOTEN

988796

MIAMI - CF

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

All Electronically Registered Counsel

1 Because the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find in Mr. Hooten's favor as

to the merits of his claims, it need not address the qualified immunity defense.