The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ARTHUR MILLER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1438-PRW
)
CREEK COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT )
OFFICE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Memorandum in Support
Thereof (Dkt. 7), filed by Defendants Creek County Child Support Office, Oklahoma
County Child Support Office, and Josh Holloway, and pro se Plaintiff Arthur Miller’s
Jurisdictional Rebuttal to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 9). Upon review, the Court
GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7) and DISMISSES the Complaint (Dkt. 1)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Background1
Miller appears to contest the validity of a child-support order enforced against him
by Creek County Child Support Office, Oklahoma County Child Support Office, and Josh
1 Miller filed what could be two complaints as a single document. For purposes of this
Order, however, the Court views the Complaint as a whole.
Holloway in his individual capacity. The Complaint’s first recitation of facts states only as
follows:
Plaintiff was subjected to multiple National Medical Support Notices and
Electronic Income Withholding Orders (eIWOs) that were materially
incomplete, missing federally required information, missing the child’s first
name, and not on valid OMB-approved forms. Defendants used these invalid
documents to seize Plaintiff’s wages in violation of federal law, including 42
U.S.C. § 666, 45 C.F.R. § 303.32, and 45 C.F.R. § 303.100. Defendant Josh
Holloway personally participated by preparing or enforcing defective orders.
Plaintiff requested correction, but Defendants refused to issue valid
documents or verify the accuracy of the information used to seize income.2
The second recitation of facts includes even less information:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants transmitted or relied upon invalid or
incomplete digital support services documentation, failed to comply with
required signature, match, and federal documentation standards, and relied
upon materials alleged to be nonmailable under federal postal regulations.
Plaintiff also alleges instances of improper processing of USPS missing mail
forms and incomplete or inaccurate federal records.3
The Complaint then includes ten claims for relief, including (1) “Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” (2) “Fourth Amendment
Unreasonable Seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” (3) “Use of false or materially incomplete
documents under color of state law,” (4) “Supervisory liability against Creek and
Oklahoma County Child Support Offices,” (5) “Mail Fraud,” (6) “Wire Fraud,” (7) “False
Statements,” (8) “Nonmailable Matter,” (9) “Privacy Act,” and (10) “Alleged Deprivation
of Information Relating to Motion to Quash.”4 Miller provides no explanation of how the
2 Compl. (Dkt. 1), at 1–2.
3 Id. at 4–5.
4 Id. at 3, 5.
factual allegations support granting relief on any of these claims. Miller then requests
$450,000 in damages and “seeks declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the defective
orders and prohibiting further enforcement actions based on incomplete or noncompliant
documents.”5 On December 26, 2025, all three Defendants moved to dismiss this case
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
Legal Standard
In reviewing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
must satisfy itself that the pleaded facts state a claim that is plausible.6 All well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed “in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”7 Additionally, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.”8 While factual allegations are taken as true, a court need
not accept mere legal conclusions.9 “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action” are not enough to state a claim.10 Rule 12(b)(1) motions,
on the other hand, generally take one of two forms, either “a facial attack on the sufficiency
of the complaint’s allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction,” or “a challenge to the actual
5 Id.
6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
7 Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
8 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
9 Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2012).
10 Id. at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based.”11 The legal standard depends on
which type of challenge the movant asserts. Defendants raise a facial attack. The Court
therefore confines its review to the Complaint and accepts all allegations as true—much
like Rule 12(b)(6) review.12
“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”13 Courts should not, however, “assume
the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.”14 And the broad construction of a pro se
plaintiff’s complaint “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts
on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”15 Because a pro se plaintiff “requires
no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury,” his pro se
status does not overcome the rule that “conclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”16
Miller need not plead a formulaic recitation of every element. He must, however,
plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
11 Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
12 See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001).
13 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. (citations omitted).
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”17 The elements of the claims he invokes
remain a useful guide in deciding whether that inference is available.18
Discussion
I. The Child Support Offices are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
“The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits
in federal court against a state and arms of the state.”19 An assertion of that immunity
“concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court” and is properly taken up
under Rule 12(b)(1).20 Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to states and state entities
but not to counties, municipalities, or other local government entities.”21 The Supreme
Court has “repeatedly refused to extend sovereign immunity to counties.”22 The question
is thus whether the Creek County Child Support Office and the Oklahoma County Child
Support Office are county agencies at all, or are instead local offices of a state agency.
17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
18 Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192.
19 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
20 Washington v. Okla. State Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F. App’x 419, 420 (10th Cir.
2020) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299
F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002)). The Court cites unpublished decisions of the Tenth
Circuit for their persuasive value, consistent with Tenth Cir. R. 32.1 and Fed. R. App. P.
32.1
21 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
22 N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006).
Oklahoma law answers that question. The Department of Human Services is “the
single state agency designated to administer a statewide plan for child support” under Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act.23 The Child Support Enforcement Division of DHS is “the
state agency designated to administer the child support enforcement program for the State
of Oklahoma and its District Offices.”24 The Division may initiate enforcement
proceedings, obtain judgments for arrearages, and effectuate income assignments.25 The
Tenth Circuit has held that DHS is an arm of the State,26 and that Oklahoma Child Support
Services is a “state entity” against which the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suit in federal
court.27 The offices named in the caption, though geographically identified by county, are
district offices of that statewide division rather than political subdivisions of Creek County
or Oklahoma County.
The Tenth Circuit’s arm-of-the-state factors confirm as much. The Court considers
(1) “the character ascribed to the entity under state law”; (2) “the autonomy accorded the
entity under state law”; (3) “the entity’s finances”; and (4) “whether the entity in question
23 56 O.S. § 237(A).
24 Id. at § 237.7(1).
25 Id. at § 240.1.
26 See, e.g., McKinney v. State of Okla., Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Shawnee OK, 925 F.2d 363,
365 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he eleventh amendment bars [the] plaintiff from seeking money
damages against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services.”); Washington, 802 F.
App’x at 420; Miller v. Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. CIV-22-507-D, 2022 WL
16541217, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2022) (collecting cases).
27 Madden v. Madden, 683 F. App’x 685, 686 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished).
is concerned primarily with local or state affairs.”28 State law ascribes the child support
function to DHS as a single statewide agency and to its District Offices; those offices
operate under the Division’s statutory charge, not as independent county departments; the
program is financed with federal and state funds that DHS is authorized to accept and
expend, and fees are deposited in the Department’s Administration Fund;29 and the offices
administer a statewide IV-D plan, not a municipal program.
The party asserting arm-of-the-state status ordinarily bears the burden of
establishing it.30 Defendants have carried that burden. Unlike the novel hospital authority
at issue in Hennessey, these offices perform a function that Oklahoma statutes assign to
DHS and that the Tenth Circuit has already treated as an arm of the State. On this facial
Rule 12(b)(1) challenge, the Court may resolve that legal question from the governing
statutes and controlling precedent.
Oklahoma has not consented to suit in federal court,31 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not abrogate the State’s immunity.32 Miller also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. Ex
parte Young permits a plaintiff to pursue prospective equitable relief against a state officer,
but it “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred
28 Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253; accord Hennessey v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 53 F.4th
516, 528 (10th Cir. 2022).
29 See 56 O.S. §§ 237, 237.7(1).
30 Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 531–32.
31 51 O.S. § 152.1(B) (“[I]t is not the intent of the state to waive any rights under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
32 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–66 (1989).
regardless of the relief sought.”33 Miller’s claims against the Child Support Offices—
damages and equitable relief alike—are therefore dismissed without prejudice.34
Holloway is differently situated because he is named in his individual capacity. The
Eleventh Amendment “does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and
personal liability on state officials under § 1983.”35 Injunctive or declaratory relief that
would run against Holloway in office is effectively an official-capacity claim.36 Ex parte
Young then supplies the relevant exception to immunity, provided the complaint “alleges
an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.”37 Holloway’s individual-capacity damages claims are thus not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, but, as explained below, Younger abstention independently requires
the Court to deny equitable relief.
II. Younger abstention bars Miller’s requests to halt or invalidate ongoing child-
support enforcement.
Younger is a doctrine of abstention, not a defect of Article III jurisdiction. Once its
conditions are met, however, “there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief.”38 Abstention
33 P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see
also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34 Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt., Dist. No. 1, Logan Cnty., Okla. v. City of
Guthrie, 654 F.3d 1058, 1069 n.9 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal on sovereign immunity
grounds…must be without prejudice.”).
35 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).
37 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citation
omitted).
38 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976).
is confined to three “exceptional” categories of state proceedings: (1) “state criminal
prosecutions,” (2) “civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceedings involving
certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.”39 If the state proceeding falls within one of those categories, the Court
then applies the Middlesex factors to determine whether there is: (1) an ongoing state
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding; (2) an adequate state forum; and (3) an
important state interest.40
The state proceedings here fall within Sprint’s second category. Civil enforcement
actions warrant abstention when they are “akin to a criminal prosecution” in important
respects—characteristically initiated by the State in its sovereign capacity to sanction the
federal plaintiff for a wrongful act.41 Oklahoma’s IV-D agency may initiate enforcement
proceedings, obtain arrearage judgments, and issue income-withholding orders.42 Miller
alleges that Defendants used National Medical Support Notices and Electronic Income
Withholding Orders to seize his wages, and he asks this Court to invalidate those
instruments and “prohibit[] further enforcement actions.”43 That is a challenge to coercive,
39 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (quoting New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989)); Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023); Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky
Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 669–70 (10th Cir. 2020).
40 Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
41 Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
42 See 56 O.S. §§ 237, 237.7, 240.1, 240.2.
43 Compl. (Dkt. 1), at 3, 5.
state-initiated collection of a support obligation, which is the very sort of civil enforcement
to which Younger extends.44
The same request also fits Sprint’s third category. Younger reaches civil actions that
would interfere with “orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions,” including the processes by which a State compels
compliance with its courts’ judgments.45 Income withholding is the statutory means by
which Oklahoma gives effect to child-support orders.46 A federal decree invalidating those
instruments and prohibiting further enforcement would interfere with that compliance
process.47
The Middlesex factors are met. First, there is an ongoing state proceeding. Miller
does not dispute that child-support enforcement related to his claims remains afoot. The
harms alleged stem from “multiple National Medical Support Notices and Electronic
Income Withholding Orders,”48 and he seeks “an order halting and prohibiting all ongoing
. . . actions, orders, or determinations by Defendants related to the matters alleged in this
Complaint.”49 Ongoing wage withholding under those instruments is thus continuing
44 See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (Younger applied to a state civil-
enforcement action to recover fraudulently obtained welfare benefits).
45 Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72–73 (citation omitted).
46 See 56 O.S. § 237.7(14); 43 O.S. § 115.
47 See Stephens v. Child Support Servs. of Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 24-cv-216-JDR-
CDL, 2025 WL 1194950, at *4–5 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2025) (abstaining on those
grounds), aff’d, 2026 WL 125755 (10th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (unpublished).
48 Compl. (Dkt. 1), at 2.
49 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
enforcement of a live support obligation. And the State may pursue enforcement in district
court or via administrative law judges who conduct hearings that are judicial in nature.50
Second, Miller has not shown that the state forum is inadequate. “Minimal respect
for the state processes . . . precludes any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard
federal constitutional rights.”51 Oklahoma law affords notice and a hearing on enforcement
and income assignment: within fifteen days of being served, an obligor may request a
hearing, and the administrative court then hears identity and arrearage disputes.52
Constitutional claims can be raised there and on review.53 Unless state law clearly bars the
federal claims, the state forum is adequate,54 and Miller identifies no such bar. Third,
“[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern.”55 Enforcement of child-support
obligations is among those interests.
When the Younger conditions are met, abstention is mandatory unless an exception
applies: a proceeding commenced in bad faith or to harass, a flagrantly and patently
unconstitutional statute, or other extraordinary circumstances creating a threat of great and
50 See 56 O.S. §§ 237.7(3), 240.1, 240.2; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432–34; Ohio Civ. Rts.
Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986).
51 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431 (emphasis in original).
52 See 56 O.S. § 240.2.
53 See id. at § 240.3.
54 See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258.
55 Moore, 442 U.S. at 435; accord Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir.
1996).
immediate irreparable injury.56 Miller’s allegations that the withholding notices were
incomplete or not on OMB-approved forms, taken as true, do not meet that heavy burden.57
The Court therefore abstains.
The proper disposition of these claims depends on the relief sought. Claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with the state proceedings must be
dismissed without prejudice. Younger also extends to damages claims when a federal
judgment would have preclusive effects on the pending state proceeding, but the Supreme
Court has “permitted federal courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to
enter a stay, but [has] not permitted them to dismiss the action altogether.”58 The Court
therefore dismisses Miller’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. It does not stay
any damages claim against Holloway, because those claims independently fail to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, as explained in Part III. The damages claims against
the Child Support Offices have already been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
To the extent the Complaint is instead read as an attack on a final state-court support
judgment (asking this Court to invalidate the underlying order itself rather than to halt
ongoing administrative enforcement) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would independently
bar that request. Rooker-Feldman precludes “state-court losers complaining of injuries
56 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Amanatullah v.
Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999).
57 See Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1066–68 (the plaintiff bears a “heavy burden” to show an
exception).
58 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996).
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”59
III. The remaining claims fail to state a claim, and leave to amend would be futile.
“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it
is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile
to give him an opportunity to amend.”60 That is the case with each of Miller’s remaining
theories.
Several counts cannot be cured by repleading. Mail fraud, wire fraud, false
statements, and “nonmailable matter” are criminal prohibitions. Criminal statutes that “do
not provide for a private right of action” are “not enforceable through a civil action.”61 The
Privacy Act governs federal agencies.62 It does not supply a cause of action against a state
child-support office or a state official.63 And supervisory-liability claims against the offices
fail for the additional reason that those offices, as arms of the State, are not “persons” under
§ 1983.64 The count styled “Alleged Deprivation of Information Relating to Motion to
59 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
60 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d
1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001)).
61 Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007).
62 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (defining “agency” by reference to 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)).
63 See Oliver v. Garfield Cnty. Det. Facility, No. CIV-10-1281-HE, 2012 WL 668802, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 8, 2012).
64 Will, 491 U.S. at 64–66, 71.
Quash,” meanwhile, identifies no recognized federal cause of action and is unsupported by
well-pleaded facts.
The Complaint’s theory of liability rests on alleged noncompliance with Title IV-D
documentation requirements, including 42 U.S.C. § 666 and 45 C.F.R. §§ 303.32 and
303.100. But Title IV-D “does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to
substantially comply with Title IV-D.”65 Those provisions are directives to the States as
conditions of federal funding rather than privately enforceable individual rights. And
Spending Clause statutes create rights enforceable under § 1983 only when Congress
unambiguously says so.66 Miller identifies no such right.
What remains are conclusory constitutional labels tied to a single sentence that
Holloway “personally participated by preparing or enforcing defective orders.”67 In a §
1983 case, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom”68 because individual liability must rest on personal
involvement in the alleged violation.69 In other words: conclusory allegations without
supporting factual averments are insufficient.70 And even construed liberally, the
Complaint does not identify the process Miller was due and denied, or facts making a
65 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
66 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
67 Compl. (Dkt. 1), at 3.
68 Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
69 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.
70 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Fourth Amendment claim plausible, as opposed to disagreement with the completeness of
IV-D forms. And incomplete paperwork, without more, is not a constitutional violation.
Amendment would not cure these defects. Claims against the Child Support Offices
cannot proceed in this Court are barred by sovereign immunity regardless of additional
facts. Criminal statutes and the Privacy Act do not authorize private claims. And Title IV-
D doesn’t confer the rights Miller seeks to enforce. And any reformulated request that this
Court invalidate, halt, or declare unlawful the ongoing withholding of support would
remain barred by Younger. Leave to amend is therefore denied as futile.
Conclusion
The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. 7) and DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Complaint (Dkt. 1). Miller’s claims against Creek County
Child Support Office and Oklahoma County Child Support Office are dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. His requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are
dismissed without prejudice under Younger. His remaining claims against Holloway are
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Although a purely merits dismissal
may be entered with prejudice where amendment would be futile, the Court enters a
uniform without-prejudice judgment because the Eleventh Amendment and Younger bars
cannot be dismissed with prejudice. Leave to amend in this action is denied as futile.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions in this case are DENIED
AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of September 2026.
PATRICK R. WYRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16