Conway

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

*

JACQUELINE CONWAY, *

*

Plaintiff, *

* Civ. No. MJM-25-1826

v. *

*

JASMINE JEFFRY, et al., *

*

Defendants. *

*

* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On April 10, 2026, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Amended Order

granting in part and denying in part defendants Jasmine Jeffry and Bryan McDowell’s

(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 5), entering summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on plaintiff Jacqueline Conway’s (“Plaintiff”) claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 in Counts I through III of the Complaint. ECF Nos. 21 & 22. The Court also

remanded Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims in Counts IV through IX of the Complaint to the

Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County. Id. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). ECF No. 24. The

motion is fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary to resolve it, see Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).

For the reasons stated below, the Court shall deny Plaintiff’s motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e). The court “has considerable discretion in deciding whether to modify or amend

a judgment.” Gagliano v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 230, 241 n.8 (4th Cir. 2008).

Modifying a judgment “is an extraordinary remedy that should be applied sparingly.” Mayfield v.

Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing EEOC v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1997)). Although Rule 59(e) does not provide

a standard under which a district court may grant a motion to alter or amend a judgment, see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(e), the Fourth Circuit has recognized “three grounds for amending an earlier

judgment: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new

evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice[,]”

Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s prior judgment was based on clear errors of fact and law,

resulting in manifest injustice. See ECF Nos. 24 & 24-1. “To successfully demonstrate that a

Court’s prior decision was a ‘clear error or manifest injustice,’ a party must show that the Court

was ‘dead wrong.’” Hartnett v. Hardenbergh, No. 3:23-CV-17-HEH, 2026 WL 510726, at *5

(E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2026) (quoting TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009)); see

also TFWS, 572 F.3d at 194 (citation modified) (“[T]o meet the high burden of showing that our

[prior] holding . . . was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice[,] [the] prior

decision . . . must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead

fish.”). In other words, “for a court to reconsider a decision due to manifest injustice, the record

presented must be so patently unfair and tainted that the error is manifestly clear to all who view

it.” In re D.C. Diamond Corp., No. 1:19-CV-463, 2020 WL 13605457, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16,

2020), aff’d, 816 F. App’x 873 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 232 F.

Supp. 3d 785, 799 (D.S.C. 2007)). “A court’s decision is free from ‘clear error’ when it is ‘factually

supported and legally justified.’” Nicholson v. Durant, 162 F.4th 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081–82 (4th Cir. 1993)). “Mere disagreement does not

support a Rule 59(e) motion.” Id. (quoting Hutchinson, 994 F.2d at 1082).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court incorporates by reference the factual background summarized in Part I of its

prior Memorandum Opinion. ECF No. 21 at 2–6.

Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the record in this case, the Court does not find

any clear error of law or fact in its judgment or that modifying the judgment is necessary to prevent

manifest injustice. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion is denied.

A. Probable Cause

1. Maryland Law Supports the Court’s Finding of Probable Cause to Arrest

Plaintiff for First-Degree Assault

Plaintiff argues that the Court committed clear legal and factual errors in concluding that

Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for first-degree assault. Although Plaintiff

advances several arguments as to why the Court’s probable cause finding was erroneous, her most

primary contention is that the Court’s finding is contrary to the definition of first-degree assault

under Maryland law. ECF No. 24-1 at 5–6.

“Probable cause is ‘defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a

prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’” ECF

No. 21 at 14 (quoting United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004)). “Probable

cause [to arrest] is not a high bar[,]” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation

modified); “[i]t requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual

showing of such activity[,]” id. (citation modified). “Whether probable cause exists in a particular

situation . . . always turns on two factors in combination: the suspect’s conduct as known to the

officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” ECF No. 21 at

19 (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Under Maryland law, “[s]econd-degree assault ‘encompasses three modalities: (1) intent

to frighten, (2) attempted battery, and (3) battery.’” Hammond v. State, 289 A.3d 776, 791 (Md.

App. Ct. 2023). “Second-degree assault is elevated to first-degree assault when there is an

aggravating factor,” id., such as “commit[ting] an assault with a firearm,” Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Law § 3-202(b)(2), (c). As the Court noted in its prior Memorandum Opinion, “an assault ‘of the

intent to frighten variety’ is ‘defined as the doing of an act that places the victim in apprehension

of immediate bodily harm with the intent to cause such apprehension.’” ECF No. 21 at 16 (quoting

Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 184 (Md. 1999)). For such an assault, “[a]ll that is required in terms

of perception is an apparent present ability [by the assaulter to consummate a battery] from the

viewpoint of the threatened victim.” Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)

(citation omitted); see also Harrod v. State, 499 A.2d 959, 964 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (“[T]he

victim must be aware of the impending contact.”). “If . . . the would-be victim of the threat is

unaware of the threatening conduct, there can be no assault of this variety.” Lamb, 613 A.2d at

412 (citing Harrod, 499 A.2d at 964). While a would-be victim need not “be actually frightened

or placed in fear of an imminent battery[,]” they must at the very least “be placed ‘in reasonable

apprehension of an impending battery.’” Hammond, 289 A.3d at 791–92 (quoting Lamb, 613 A.2d

at 409). In Maryland, a battery is “inten[tional] . . . harmful or offensive contact with another

without that person’s consent[,]” and may occur through “direct or indirect contact.” Nelson v.

Carroll, 735 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Md. 1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 & cmt. d

(1965)); see also Hendrix v. Burns, 43 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“[A] battery can

be committed by the use of . . . a gun or other instrumentality.”).

The Court did not err in finding that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

first-degree assault. Here, Defendant Jeffry learned from her investigation “that Plaintiff possessed

a firearm and held it” while telling Agnew that she would “put some bullets in [him,]” which

prompted Agnew to “back[] away from her vehicle while putting his hands up.” ECF No. 21 at

18–19 (quoting ECF No. 5-2 at 02:26–02:43). “Although Agnew reported that Plaintiff held what

appeared to be a taser in her left hand that she pointed in his direction, and that he did not see a

gun, . . . Plaintiff admitted to Defendant Jeffry that she at least tried to ‘ma[ke] sure’ Agnew saw

the firearm in her right hand[.]” Id. at 18 (first citing ECF No. 5-3 at 01:10–01:13, and then quoting

id. at 02:48–02:51). Based on these accounts, the Court again concludes that Defendant Jeffry

collected sufficient information to establish probable cause that Plaintiff committed an act placing

Agnew in apprehension of immediate bodily harm and that she intended to cause such

apprehension. Because Plaintiff admitted to committing this act with a firearm, Defendant Jeffry

had probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed first-degree assault.

In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred because “it is black-

letter Maryland law that first-degree assault of the intent-to-frighten variety by use of a firearm

requires, as an indispensable element, that the alleged victim actually perceive the firearm.” ECF

No. 24-1 at 5 (citing Lamb, 613 A.2d at 413). The Court finds that Plaintiff misreads the applicable

Maryland caselaw. The cases to which Plaintiff cites do not state that a would-be victim must

accurately perceive the instrumentality with which an assailant committed assault; rather, they

state that the victim must be placed “in reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.” Lamb,

613 A.2d at 413; see also Harrod, 499 A.2d at 964–65; Perry v. State, 2017 WL 2709801, at *5

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 23, 2017). Defendant Jeffry’s investigation made clear that Agnew was

aware that Plaintiff intended to make “harmful or offensive contact with [him] without [his]

consent[]” through “indirect contact.” Nelson, 735 A.2d at 1099 (citation omitted). His

apprehension was evident from his backing away from Plaintiff with his hands raised after seeing

an object in her hand and hearing her make a threat to shoot him. Put plainly, a reasonable officer

in Defendant Jeffry’s position could gather that Agnew was aware of an impending battery, even

if he perceived a taser in Plaintiff’s hand instead of a firearm. Plaintiff does not cite any caselaw

suggesting that a mistaken belief about the instrumentality of an assault negates awareness of an

impending battery, nor has the Court identified any.

The cases to which Plaintiff cites do not compel the conclusion Plaintiff advances. For

instance, in Perry v. State,1 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (now, the Appellate Court of

Maryland) considered whether the appellant could commit first-degree assault by pointing a gun

directly at an infant. 2017 WL 2709801, at *1. The court explained that “[i]n order for an infant to

be aware of [an impending battery],” where “the only threatened battery came from the threatened

use of a firearm[,] . . . the infant would have to be aware of what a firearm is, and what it can do.”

Id. at *5. Adapting a hypothetical from Lamb, the court found that “[i]f the would-be victim

perceives the threatening conduct but [does not know, for instance, what a firearm is, or what it

can do], there is no apprehension of an imminent battery and, therefore, no assault of the

threatening variety.” Id. Perry was not about an adult who mistakenly perceived one weapon as

another; it was about an eleven-month-old infant who, while able to perceive visually that a firearm

1 In her memorandum supporting her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff appears to misquote

Lamb. ECF No. 24-1 at 5 (“[I]f a would-be victim perceives the threatening conduct but [does not know]

what a firearm is or what it can do, there is no apprehension of an imminent battery and, therefore, no

assault of the threatening variety.”). The quoted material comes from Perry. See Perry, 2017 WL 2709801,

at *5.

was pointed in her direction, lacked the ability to identify the firearm as a tool capable of causing

bodily harm. The key in Perry was not whether the infant could recognize the firearm, but whether

the infant could recognize the appellant’s conduct as threatening immediate harm at all. Unlike the

infant in Perry, Agnew could understand Plaintiff’s verbal threat of immediate bodily harm and

could associate the object he perceived in Plaintiff’s hand with bodily harm. He apparently knew

what a taser was and that it could physically harm him. Id. Although, based on Plaintiff’s admission

that she held an actual firearm and not a taser, Agnew misperceived the type of weapon involved,

he nevertheless experienced the requisite apprehension that the infant in Perry could not.

Next, in Harrod v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered whether the

appellant committed assault of the intent-to-frighten variety when he “thr[ew] [a] hammer over

top of [a child’s] port-a-crib” even though “there was no evidence that [the child] was . . . even

aware that a hammer was thrown.” 499 A.2d at 960–61. Because “[t]here [was] no evidence in the

record . . . that [the child] was in fact aware of the occurrences in his home,” the court held that

“there was insufficient evidence to find appellant guilty of the putting victim in fear-type assault.”

Id. at 964. Again, Harrod makes clear that the relevant inquiry was not whether the child accurately

identified the instrumentality used in the assault, but whether the child was aware of any impending

battery at all. This case is distinguishable because Agnew was unquestionably aware of Plaintiff’s

threatening conduct and exhibited apprehension of an impending battery when he backed away

from her vehicle with his hands raised.

Plaintiff’s argument is further undermined by Maryland’s statutory scheme governing

assault. Section 3-203 of Maryland’s Criminal Law Article prohibits the commission of an assault.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203(a), (b). Section 3-202 separately identifies the use of a firearm

in the commission of an assault as an aggravating factor. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-202(b)(2),

(c). The firearm aggravator thus concerns the weapon actually used by the assaulter, rather than

the victim’s perception of the weapon. This reading of the statutory provisions is supported by

Maryland’s Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, which provide, in relevant part, the following

instructions for the intent-to-frighten theory of second-degree assault:

Assault is intentionally frightening another person with the threat of

immediate offensive physical contact [or] physical harm. In order to

convict the defendant of assault, the State must prove:

(1) that the defendant committed an act with the intent to place [the

victim] in fear of immediate offensive physical contact [or]

physical harm;

(2) that the defendant had the apparent ability, at that time, to bring

about offensive physical contact [or] physical harm; and

(3) that [the victim] reasonably feared immediate offensive physical

contact [or] physical harm[.]

Md. State Bar Ass’n, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions § 4:01 (3d ed. 2025) (citation

modified). The jury instruction for the use-of-firearm theory of aggravation to first-degree assault

is provided separately as follows:

In order to convict the defendant of first degree assault, the State

must prove all of the elements of second degree assault and also

must prove that . . . the defendant used a firearm to commit assault[.]

Id. § 4:01.1A (citation modified). Here, a reasonable officer in Defendants’ position had probable

cause to believe that the underlying assault was sufficiently established and that Plaintiff used the

firearm in committing the assault. Accordingly, the Court’s determination that Defendants had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for first-degree assault was not “dead wrong.” Hartnett, 2026 WL

510726, at *5 (citation omitted).

Because the Court did not err in finding Plaintiff’s arrest to be supported by probable cause,

it likewise did not err in any of its other findings that depended on that determination.

2. Plaintiff’s Remaining Probable Cause Arguments Are Unpersuasive

Plaintiff also argues that the Court should grant her motion because the Court erred when

it: (1) resolved factual disputes in Defendants’ favor on the probable cause inquiry, ECF No. 24-1

at 7–10; (2) failed to grapple with the fact that, on the same day Plaintiff was arrested, the

Baltimore County Court Commissioner reviewed the charges and expressly found no probable

cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, and the State’s Attorney’s Office independently concluded Plaintiff’s

arrest was premature, id. at 10–11; (3) failed to consider Defendant Jeffry’s hesitation or

ambivalence about whether probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest, id. at 12; (4) denied

Plaintiff’s discovery request regarding body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage in which Defendant

Jeffry spoke with her immediate supervisor about whether probable cause existed to arrest

Plaintiff, id. at 12–13, 17–19; and (5) misrelied on McCoy v. Housing Authority of New Orleans,

id. at 14–17. The Court addresses in turn each of these arguments.

First, “[w]hen making a probable cause determination in th[e] context [of a motion for

summary judgment], the court must ‘[v]iew[] the record and draw[] all reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to [the non-moving party], while simultaneously viewing the facts from

the perspective of a reasonable officer.’” Bost v. Bradds, Civ. No. SAG-12-2544, 2013 WL

5308275, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2013) (fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh alterations in Bost)

(quoting Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 2012)). In granting summary judgment in

favor of Defendants here, the Court’s probable cause determination was consistent with this

standard.

Second, the Court was not required to give substantive weight to the probable cause

determinations made by the Baltimore County Court Commissioner and the State’s Attorney’s

Office after Plaintiff’s arrest. See Johnson v. Prince George’s Cnty., Civ. No. DKC 10-0582, 2011

WL 806448, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2011) (“There is no authority supporting [d]efendants’ notion

that the [Maryland state district court] commissioner’s determination is entitled to some weight in

a case such as this one.”); United States v. Fontanez, Crim. No. 20-00689 (SRC), 2021 WL

5105783, at *7 n.8 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2021) (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 55 n.2) (“[T]he Court is not

bound to the probable cause determinations made by prosecutors. Rather, the Court must evaluate

probable cause on its own.”). Nor do the Commissioner’s and State’s Attorney’s Office’s contrary

legal conclusions create a genuine dispute of material fact. The only relevant question, for purposes

of determining probable cause in this case, is whether the facts known to Defendants at the time

of Plaintiff’s arrest established probable cause when viewed from the perspective of an objectively

reasonable officer. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citation omitted); Rogers,

249 F.3d at 290. This is a question of law, as noted in the prior Memorandum Opinion. See ECF

No. 21 at 15–16 (collecting cases); Middleton v. Koushall, Civ. No. ELH-20-3536, 2024 WL

1967816, at *34 (D. Md. May 3, 2024) (citing United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir.

2011)). “The question should only proceed to the jury where there is a genuine dispute of material

fact about what the officer knew before effecting the arrest.” ECF No. 21 at 16 (citations omitted).

Any legal conclusions reached by the Commissioner or the State’s Attorney’s Office do not give

rise to any genuine factual dispute about what Defendants knew when Plaintiff was arrested. There

is no genuine dispute as to the facts known to Defendants at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest; the entire

investigation is captured in BWC footage presented to the Court. As established supra, the Court

did not err in determining that those facts established probable cause.

Third, because “probable cause is an objective standard,” ECF No. 21 at 19 (quoting

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 54 n.2), Defendant Jeffry’s “contemporaneous doubt” has no bearing whether

an objectively reasonable officer in her position would have found probable cause to arrest Plaintiff

for first-degree assault. Plaintiff’s “[m]ere disagreement” with this aspect of the Court’s

determination does not warrant reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Nicholson, 162 F.4th at 422

(citation omitted).

Fourth, for the same reason explained above, Plaintiff’s request for discovery of the BWC

footage of Defendant Jeffry’s full conversation with her supervisor does not preclude summary

judgment. “Probable cause is determined through a standard of objective reasonableness based on

the information known to the officer—not the officer’s own subjective assessment of probable

cause.” ECF No. 21 at 17 (citing Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 185 (4th Cir. 2016)).

Accordingly, the requested “footage [is] immaterial” to the Court’s probable cause determination

“and far from ‘essential to [Plaintiff’s] opposition.’” Id. (quoting Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927,

931 (4th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s conclusion likewise does not

provide cause for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Nicholson, 162 F.4th at 422 (citation omitted).

Fifth, the Court properly cited McCoy v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, Civ. No. 15-

398, 2016 WL 2992528 (E.D. La. May 24, 2016), aff’d, 714 F. App’x 322 (5th Cir. 2017), for the

well-established proposition that an officer confronted with conflicting facts and an assertion of

self-defense is not precluded from finding probable cause to make an arrest. See, e.g., Schimandle

v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 114 F.4th 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he existence and validity of

an affirmative defense does not necessarily negate probable cause to arrest.”) (citation omitted);

Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[A]rresting officers, in deciding whether

probable cause exists, are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of

credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a sufficient basis for believing that

an offense has been committed.”) (citation omitted); Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 539 F. Supp. 3d

617, 626 (S.D. Miss. 2021), aff’d, 33 F.4th 774 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A] mere assertion of an

affirmative defense does not negate probable cause.”) (citation omitted); Thomas v. City of

Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (quoting Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v.

Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2004)) (“A police officer may not ignore conclusively

established evidence of the existence of an affirmative defense, but the officer has no duty to

investigate the validity of any defense.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s defense was not

“conclusively established” by the facts known to Defendants at the time of arrest. Hodgkins, 355

F.3d at 1061. For example, Plaintiff and Agnew provided conflicting accounts as to whether

Agnew had behaved in a threatening manner toward Plaintiff. Because Defendant Jeffry’s

investigation revealed conflicting accounts of the events relevant to the merits of any self-defense

defense Plaintiff might assert, Defendants were not precluded from finding probable cause to arrest

her. Because probable cause is an objective standard, Defendant Jeffry’s subjective assessment of

the “reasonableness of Plaintiff’s fear[]” cannot negate Defendants’ probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff. ECF No. 24-1 at 16.

Plaintiff separately argues that “[t]he evidence negating probable cause was conclusively

established . . . [by] Agnew’s repeated insistence that he never saw a firearm and was never placed

in apprehension by one.” ECF No. 24-1 at 17. But, as discussed in Part II.A.1 supra, all that was

required to support an arrest for the first-degree assault was a reasonable probability that Plaintiff

placed Agnew in reasonable apprehension of an impending battery, that Plaintiff used a firearm in

doing so, and that it appeared to Agnew that Plaintiff had the ability to cause him offensive physical

contact or harm. See Harris, 728 A.2d at 184; Hammond, 289 A.3d at 791–92; Lamb, 613 A.2d at

412; Md. State Bar Ass’n, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions §§ 4:01, 4:01.1A. It was

not required that Agnew specifically perceive the firearm instead of a taser, as long as it was

apparent to him that Plaintiff had the then-present ability to consummate a battery, see Lamb, 613

A.2d at 412, which both his and Plaintiff’s statements to Defendant Jeffry establish was the case.

Agnew’s mistaken perception of the weapon used by Plaintiff does not negate the probable cause

supporting Plaintiff’s arrest.

B. Excessive Force

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in its excessive force analysis because it relied on an

unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion in determining that, at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, “there was

neither binding precedent in this Circuit nor a ‘robust consensus’ among other circuits establishing

that a police officer violates clearly established law by ‘injuring an individual during handcuffing,

even when the officer was aware of the individual’s preexisting injury or complaints of pain or

discomfort.’”2, 3 ECF No. 21 at 26 (quoting Schoonover v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 20-

1680, 2023 WL 4026091, at *6 (4th Cir. June 15, 2023)); see also ECF No. 24-1 at 19. Plaintiff

cites Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), and Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2017),

to support her proposition that an unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion “cannot . . . negate a ‘robust

consensus’ of authority for purposes of the clearly-established-law inquiry.” ECF No. 26 at 10;

see also ECF No. 24-1 at 19. However, those cases simply establish that, when determining

whether a right was clearly established, if no case is directly on point, courts must consider whether

2 Plaintiff also argues that the Court’s excessive-force analysis was legally erroneous because the

Court treated Plaintiff’s pain in an internally contradictory manner. ECF No. 24-1 at 20. The Court made

clear in its prior Memorandum Opinion that it would “‘adopt[] . . . [P]laintiff’s version of the[] facts[,]’ to

the extent her version of events is not refuted or contradicted by the video evidence.” ECF No. 21 at 24

(second and fourth alterations in ECF No. 21) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). The

Court’s acknowledgment that Plaintiff was in pain, coupled with its observation that she did not outwardly

or verbally indicate that she was experiencing pain while being handcuffed or after exiting Defendant

Jeffry’s vehicle at the Towson precinct, is not internally contradictory. ECF No. 21 at 25–26. Rather, those

findings are consistent with the Court’s stated approach to evaluating Plaintiff’s version of the events.

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive.

3 Plaintiff further contends that the Court’s reliance on Schoonover is inappropriate because of the

procedural and factual distinctions between that case and the instant matter. See ECF No. 24-1 at 21–26.

The Court finds those distinctions immaterial to its reliance on Schoonover in analyzing Plaintiff’s

excessive-force claim.

“existing precedent” or a “consensus of persuasive authority” has clearly established the right. See

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11–12; Thompson, 878 F.3d at 98. The Schoonover court did precisely that:

it considered the relevant persuasive authorities4 and concluded that there was no robust consensus

establishing a right to have officers consider known injuries when deciding whether to handcuff a

non-threatening individual.5 See Schoonover, 2023 WL 4026091, at *6. In reaching that

conclusion, it observed that the relevant persuasive authorities actually indicated “that police

officers are entitled to qualified immunity after injuring an individual during handcuffing, even

when the officer was aware of the individual’s preexisting injury or complaints of pain or

discomfort.” Id. Schoonover’s status as “an unpublished Fourth Circuit[] opinion” and therefore

“not binding[,]” United States v. McGrann, 927 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (E.D. Va. 2013), did not

preclude this Court from relying upon its persuasive reasoning as a “useful analytical tool[,]” Bank

4 As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Schoonover, district court decisions are not usually considered

as persuasive authorities for purposes of demonstrating that a right is clearly established because they lack

precedential value. 2023 WL 4026091, at *5 (citing Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 545 (4th

Cir. 2017)); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“Many Courts of Appeals . . .

decline to consider district court precedent when determining if constitutional rights are clearly established

for purposes of qualified immunity.”); Booker, 855 F.3d at 545 (“Given that published district court

opinions, like unpublished opinions from our Court, have no precedential value, it follows that we should

not consider them [as persuasive authorities in a qualified immunity analysis].”). Therefore, the Court did

not err in holding that it could not “rely upon a finite set of district court decisions alone in determining

whether there is a ‘clear’ or ‘robust’ consensus among courts for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis.”

ECF No. 21 at 23 (citations omitted).

5 Plaintiff highlights the fact that the Fourth Circuit in Schoonover was analyzing a much narrower

right—the right not to be handcuffed wrist-to-ankle—to argue that the Court’s reliance on the unreported

opinion was a clear legal error. ECF No. 24-1 at 22; ECF No. 26 at 10. In doing so, Plaintiff overlooks the

portion of Schoonover on which the Court actually relied. Specifically, the Court relied on Schoonover’s

discussion of the right Schoonover himself asserted—the right to have known injuries considered by police

officers during handcuffing. See Schoonover, 2023 WL 4026091, at *4. There, the Fourth Circuit

acknowledged that “other circuits have reached the conclusion opposite Schoonover’s position: that police

officers are entitled to qualified immunity after injuring an individual during handcuffing, even when the

officer was aware of the individual’s preexisting injury or complaints of pain or discomfort.” Id. at *6

(emphasis added). Given the similarity—if not identicalness—between the right asserted in Schoonover

and the right Plaintiff asserts in the instant matter, this Court found it appropriate to consider the Schoonover

court’s discussion and analysis of those circuit court decisions in determining whether Plaintiff’s right was

“clearly established.”

of Southside Va. v. Host & Cook, LLC, 239 F.R.D. 441, 450 (E.D. Va. 2007). This Court properly

treated Schoonover as a persuasive authority and appropriately considered its assessment of the

relevant legal landscape, together with the other persuasive authorities, in reaching its excessive-

force determination.

C. The Second Amendment

Plaintiff argues that the Court made a legal error in its evaluation of her asserted right under

the Second Amendment because it did not conduct a constitutional merits analysis under New York

State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ECF No. 24-1 at 27–28 (“[T]he Court

bypassed the threshold constitutional question entirely and failed to apply the framework mandated

by [Bruen].”). But Plaintiff’s desired approach is not required in a qualified immunity inquiry. As

explained in the Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion,

[f]ollowing the identification of the precise rights at issue, the Court

must determine whether there was “a violation of a constitutional

right” and whether “that right [was] ‘clearly established’ at the time

of the alleged violation.” . . . Only one of these questions must be

resolved in favor of Defendants for qualified immunity to

apply. . . . The Court has discretion in deciding which question

should be addressed first.

ECF No. 21 at 13 (first quoting Campbell v. Florian, 972 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2020), as

amended (Aug. 28, 2020), and then citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 242).

Accordingly, the Court did not err by ending its qualified immunity inquiry after concluding that

Plaintiff’s asserted right under the Second Amendment was not clearly established.

D. Bystander Liability

Plaintiff argues that the Court must reconsider its dismissal of her bystander liability claim

against Defendant McDowell because that dismissal was predicated on findings that Plaintiff

contends were erroneous. ECF No. 24-1 at 29. For the reasons explained in Parts II.A–C supra,

however, the Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendant

Jeffry on qualified immunity grounds based on the lack of evidence that she violated a clearly

established constitutional right. See ECF No. 21 at 14–28.

Plaintiff also argues that “the record independently supports [Defendant] McDowell’s

liability[]” and, thus, her bystander liability claim is “independently viable” notwithstanding

Defendant Jeffry’s liability. ECF No. 26 at 13; see also ECF No. 24-1 at 29. Plaintiff’s

“independent viability” argument fails, however, because bystander liability under § 1983 requires

the officer’s knowledge that another officer was violating an individual’s constitutional rights. See

Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Without

any violation of a clearly established constitutional right by Defendant Jeffry, the Court finds no

basis to reconsider its finding that Defendant McDowell did not violate any clearly established

constitutional right as a bystander and, therefore, is entitled to qualified immunity.

III. ORDER

For the reasons stated above, it is this 3rd day of September, 2026, by the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.

DATE: 9/3/26

/S/

Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge