The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CFSP 2024-AHP1 147-03 NORTHERN
BOULEVARD LLC,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against-
25-CV-2768 (TAM)
FLUSHING REALTY NY LLC et al.,
Defendants.
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TARYN A. MERKL, United States Magistrate Judge:
On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff CFSP 2024-AHP1 147-03 Northern Boulevard LLC
(“CFSP”) initiated this action against Defendants Flushing Realty NY LLC (“Flushing
Realty” or the “Borrower”), Joel Wiener (“Wiener” or the “Guarantor”) (together,
“Defendants”), the New York City Environmental Control Board (“ECB”), and John
Doe No. 1 through John Doe No. 100.1 Compl., ECF 1, ¶¶ 1, 6–11. Plaintiff seeks to
foreclose a mortgage lien encumbering a property located at 147-03 Northern Boulevard
a/k/a 35-33 147th Street, Flushing, New York 11354 (the “Property”),2 pursuant to the
governing loan documents.3 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to foreclose and sell
1 Defendants John Doe No. 1 through John Doe No. 100 are unknown persons or entities
joined as party defendants because they may have some interest in or lien upon the property
Plaintiff seeks to foreclose. Compl., ECF 1, ¶ 11. However, Plaintiff requests the Court amend
the caption to strike the “John Doe” defendants. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Mem.”), ECF 30-34, at 1. The request is granted.
2 The Property Description attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s complaint contains a more
detailed description of the Property. See Property Description, ECF 1-1.
3 See Consolidation, Modification, and Extension Agreement (“CMEA”), arts. 12–13, ECF
30-5, at ECF pp. 54–65 (describing the parties’ obligations and remedies in the event of a
default).
the Property to satisfy Plaintiff’s damages, consisting of $4,253,901.95 in principal plus
accrued fees and interest. Id. ¶¶ 3, 63.
Currently pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
against the Borrower and the Guarantor and for default judgment against Defendant
ECB. See Mot. for Summ. J. & Default J. (“Mot.”), ECF 30; Mem., ECF 30-34. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Factual Background
A. The Loan Documents
This case arises out of a loan, secured by a note and mortgage, that Defendant
Flushing Realty took out on a residential property located at 147-03 Northern
Boulevard, Flushing, New York 11354.4 Compl., ECF 1, ¶¶ 1–2.
On June 12, 2015, the Borrower executed an Amended and Restated Mortgage
Note (the “Note”) to repay New York Community Bank (the “Original Lender”)
$4,630,000.00 plus interest. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 4–6; see Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4.
Also on June 12, 2015, to secure its indebtedness under the Note, the Borrower executed
a Consolidation, Modification, and Extension Agreement (the “CMEA”) which
contained a mortgage (the “Mortgage”), an assignment of leases and rents (“ALR”) and
a security agreement (the “Loan Agreement”), under which the Borrower assigned to
the Original Lender all existing and future leases and rents, and which conferred upon
the Borrower a revocable license to collect and retain the rents as they become due and
4 The Property Plaintiff seeks to foreclose is residential. CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 26
(“The property is used exclusively as residential apartments.” (emphasis omitted)); see ALR,
ECF 30-8, at ECF p. 2 (categorizing the Property as an apartment building).
payable. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 7–9; see CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF pp. 14–15. The CMEA
was recorded on June 26, 2015. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 8; see CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 2.
Also on June 12, 2015, the Guarantor executed a Guaranty of Recourse Obligations (the
“Guaranty”) to and for the benefit of the Original Lender. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 14; see
Guaranty, ECF 30-9.
On December 18, 2020, the Borrower and the Original Lender entered into a
Mortgage Modification Agreement (the “Modification”), which modified the Note,
CMEA, Mortgage, ALR, and Guaranty (together with the Modification, the “Loan
Documents”) to amend the principal balance of the loan to $4,287,773.62. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF
30-1, ¶ 15; see Modification, ECF 30-10. The Modification was recorded on November 8,
2021. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 15; see Modification, ECF 30-10, at ECF p. 2.
Effective December 1, 2022, the Original Lender merged with Flagstar Bank, N.A.
(“Flagstar”). Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 16. On December 30, 2024, Flagstar, as successor in
interest to the Original Lender, executed and delivered an assignment of mortgage (the
“First Assignment”), an allonge to the Note (the “First Allonge”), and an assignment of
leases and rents (the “First ALR”) in favor of CF SPG Depositor LLC (“CF”). Pl.’s 56.1,
ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 17–19; see First Assign., ECF 30-11; Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4, at ECF p.
20; First ALR, ECF 30-12. The First Assignment and First ALR were recorded on January
23, 2025. First Assign., ECF 30-11, at ECF p. 2; First ALR, ECF 30-12, at ECF p. 2.
Also on December 30, 2024, CF executed and delivered an assignment of
mortgage (the “Second Assignment”), allonge to the Note (the “Second Allonge”), and
assignment of leases and rents (the “Second ALR”) in favor of Computershare Trust
Company, N.A. (“Computershare Trust” or the “Interim Holder”). Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1,
¶¶ 20–22; see Second Assign., ECF 30-13; Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4, at ECF p. 21;
Second ALR, ECF 30-14. The Second Assignment and Second ALR were also recorded
on January 23, 2025. See Second Assign., ECF 30-13, at ECF p. 2; Second ALR, ECF 30-14,
at ECF p. 2.
On April 15, 2025, the Interim Holder executed and delivered an assignment of
mortgage (the “Third Assignment”), allonge to the Note (the “Third Allonge”), and
assignment of leases and rents (the “Third ALR”) in favor of Plaintiff. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-
1, ¶¶ 23–26; see Third Assign., ECF 30-15; Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4, at ECF p. 23;
Third ALR, ECF 30-16. The Third Assignment and Third ALR were recorded on May 8,
2025. See Third Assign., ECF 30-15, at ECF p. 2; Third ALR, ECF 30-16, at ECF p. 2.
B. Loan Document Terms and Event of Default
Under the CMEA, the Borrower was obligated to repay the Mortgage “in the
amount required to amortize the unpaid principal balance of [the] Note in equal
monthly installments” on the first day of every month. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 31
(quotation marks omitted); see Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4, ¶ 3(c). As the Guarantor,
Defendant Wiener agreed to be held liable for the “prompt and complete payment” of
any debts not delivered in accordance with the Loan Documents, as well as all fees and
costs related to the enforcement of the Guaranty. Guaranty, ECF 30-9, at ECF pp. 4–5.
Under Section 12.2(1)(a) of the CMEA, any failure by the Borrower to “pay or
deposit when due . . . any amount required by the Note, this Mortgage or any other
Loan Document” is deemed an “Event of Default.” CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 55; see
also Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 29–30. The CMEA also provides that following a default,
Plaintiff “may declare the unpaid portion of the [Mortgage, interest, and other costs] to
be immediately due and payable.” CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 57.
Plaintiff contends, and Defendants dispute, that Borrower failed to make the
required monthly payments for the months beginning January 1, 2025, through May 1,
2025; the last payment made towards the Loan was made on January 14, 2025, which
was the required monthly payment due on December 1, 2024. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1,
¶¶ 32–33; see Transaction History, ECF 30-18; see also Defs.’ Counter-56.1, ECF 32-1,
¶¶ 32–33; Wiener Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 16–17 (stating that “Borrower made payments
and/or engaged in payment activity after January 2025 that is not fully or accurately
reflected in Plaintiff’s submissions” and that “[t]o the extent payments were not
credited, such failure is attributable to Plaintiff’s accounting or application of
payments”).
The Mortgage provides the Borrower a 10-day period to cure any monetary
default following written notice to the Borrower. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 34; see CMEA
§ 15.1, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 66. On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff notified the Borrower and
Guarantor of the events of default described above and demanded that the Borrower
cure the default within ten days, via a letter sent to the address Plaintiff had on file for
Defendants. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 39; see Notice of Default, ECF 30-19. The following
day, April 18, 2025, Plaintiff was notified that the Notice of Default was not delivered
because Defendants had moved; that same day, Plaintiff’s counsel located a new
address for the Borrower and re-sent the Notice, of which mailing the Guarantor
acknowledged receipt via email on April 22, 2025. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 40–41; see
Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 3–5.
On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff notified the Borrower and Guarantor via letter that,
due to the Borrower’s failure to cure the default within the ten-day cure period, Plaintiff
had elected to accelerate the loan, and that all amounts due under the Mortgage
(including the unpaid principal balance, all accrued interest, and the pre-payment
premium) were immediately payable. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 46–48; see Notice of
Acceleration, ECF 30-20, at 2 (declaring “the Secured Obligations to be immediately due
and payable” (emphasis omitted)).
Plaintiff avers that as of March 20, 2026, there was $5,152,513.09 due to Plaintiff
under the Loan documents, consisting of (1) $4,253,901.95 in unpaid principal;
(2) $121,959.96 in unpaid interest on the Loan’s unpaid principal from December 1,
2024, to April 28, 2025, accruing at 7.125% (December 2024) and 6.875% (January 1, 2025
through April 28, 2025); (3) $770,428.91 in unpaid interest accruing at the 20% default
rate on the Loan’s unpaid principal for the 326 days from April 29, 2025, to March 20,
2026; and (4) $6,223.85 in late charges, minus a $1.58 Debt Service Reserve fee. See Mem.,
ECF 30-34, at 14; Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 50–59.
II. Procedural History
As noted above, Plaintiff commenced this action on May 16, 2025. See generally
Compl., ECF 1.5 On June 24 and 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed certificates of service indicating
that (1) Wiener was served on June 18, 2025, rendering his answer due July 9, 2025;
(2) Flushing Realty was served on June 4, 2025, rendering its answer due June 25, 2025;
and (3) ECB was served on June 3, 2025, rendering its answer due June 24, 2025. See
Certificates of Service, ECF 6, ECF 7, ECF 8. Defendants Flushing Realty and Wiener
5 Plaintiff is a limited liability company of which its sole member, Computershare Trust,
is a citizen of Massachusetts. Compl., ECF 1, ¶¶ 4–5; Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 1. Defendant
Flushing Realty is a limited liability company whose sole members, Joel Wiener and Sherry
Wiener, are citizens of New York. Rule 7.1 Disclosure, ECF 37; see also Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 2;
Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶ 2. Defendant Wiener is an individual domiciled in New York.
Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶ 3. Defendant ECB is a New York judiciary tribunal and is
therefore a citizen there. Compl., ECF 1, ¶ 10. The amount in controversy is well over $75,000.
See Compl., ECF 1, ¶ 63 (stating that, as of the date of the filing of the complaint, Plaintiffs were
owed $4,253,901.95 in principal); see Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 59 (stating that as of March 20, 2026,
there was $5,152,513.09 plus interest accruing due to Plaintiff under the Loan Documents).
Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
filed an answer on July 10, 2025. Answer, ECF 9. To date, Defendant ECB has not filed
an answer. See generally Docket.
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for emergency relief to appoint a
receiver. See Mot. to Appoint Receiver, ECF 10. On November 13, 2025, Plaintiff’s
motion was granted, and on December 4, 2025, the Court appointed Chris Neilson as
receiver. Mem. & Order, ECF 20; Order Appointing Receiver, ECF 22.
On February 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request for a certificate of default as to
Defendant ECB, which was granted on February 13, 2026. Req. for Certificate of Default,
ECF 25; Entry of Default, ECF 28. Also on February 9, 2026, Plaintiff and Defendants
submitted a joint status report, advising that Plaintiff intended to file a motion for
summary judgment; the following day, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting a pre-motion
conference on the anticipated motion, which was denied as unnecessary. Letter, ECF 26;
Req. for Pre-Mot. Conference, ECF 27; Feb. 18, 2026 ECF Order. On February 26, 2026,
the Court entered the parties’ proposed briefing schedule on the anticipated motion.
Feb. 26, 2026 ECF Order.
On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Defendants
Flushing Realty and Wiener and for default judgment against Defendant ECB. Mot.,
ECF 30. On April 15, 2026, Defendants Flushing Realty and Wiener filed their
opposition. Opp’n, ECF 32. On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed a reply in support. Reply,
ECF 33.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Darnell v.
Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2017). “A fact is ‘material’ for these purposes if it ‘might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677,
682 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Further, a factual dispute is “genuine” if “‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The
Court “must view all facts in this case in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
resolving all ambiguities in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th
75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021). “Put another way, summary judgment is appropriate only where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
movant.” Id. (alterations and quotation marks omitted).
“The movant bears the burden of ‘demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.’” Nick’s Garage, Inc., 875 F.3d at 114 (alteration in original) (quoting
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has satisfied their burden, “‘the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Brizzi v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 529 F. Supp. 3d 44, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252
(“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position
will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-movant].”).
Summary judgment must be denied “if there is any evidence in the record that
could reasonably support a jury’s verdict for the non-moving party.” Marvel Characters,
Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002). Further, Rule 56(c) provides that:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made
for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Lener v. Hempstead Pub. Schs., 55 F. Supp. 3d 267, 274
(E.D.N.Y. 2014).
When determining whether a movant is entitled to summary judgment, courts
do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations to decide the truth of the
matter, but instead determine “‘whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Green v.
Town of E. Haven, 952 F.3d 394, 406 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
District courts are “required to ‘resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences
that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.’”
Kessler v. Westchester County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Cifra v. G.E. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234,
236 (2d Cir. 2012). In addition, courts “may not properly consider the record in
piecemeal fashion, trusting innocent explanations for individual strands of evidence;
rather, it must review all of the evidence in the record.” Rasmy v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952
F.3d 379, 386 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
B. New York Mortgage Foreclosure
“In a foreclosure action under New York law, a plaintiff can establish its prima
facie entitlement to summary judgment by producing evidence of the mortgage, the
unpaid note, and the defendant’s default.” Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 366 Realty
LLC, No. 17-CV-3570 (SJ) (RER), 2021 WL 9494173, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021). “Once
a mortgagee’s prima facie case is established, the mortgagor must make an affirmative
showing that a defense to the action exists.” Gustavia Home, LLC v. Hoyer, 362 F. Supp.
3d 71, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quotation marks omitted), remanded, No. 19-0471-cv, 2025 WL
2233400 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (summary order), vacated on reconsideration on other
grounds, 802 F. Supp. 3d 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-2980-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 24,
2025). If the defendant-mortgagor contests the plaintiff-mortgagee’s standing to
foreclose, “the plaintiff must prove its standing as part of its prima facie showing.” CIT
Bank N.A. v. Donovan, 856 F. App’x 335, 336 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). “A
plaintiff establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by demonstrating that
it is either the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is
commenced.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Gordon, 97 N.Y.S.3d 286, 292 (App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
In addition to the common law elements of its prima facie case discussed above,
the party moving for summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action must
demonstrate statutory compliance with the New York Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”). See CIT Bank, N.A. v. Anderson, No. 16-CV-1712 (ERK)
(PK), 2019 WL 3842922, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019); Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd. v. Tawil,
No. 24-CV-1082 (MKB) (TAM), 2025 WL 2482306, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2025). Under
RPAPL § 1303, a foreclosing party in an action involving residential real property must
provide notice to “(a) any mortgagor if the action relates to an owner-occupied one-to-
four family dwelling; and (b) any tenant of a dwelling unit,” with specific formatting
and content requirements for such notices. RPAPL § 1303(1)–(4); see also id. § 1305(3)
(“[A] successor in interest of residential real property shall provide written notice to all
tenants in the same manner as required by [§ 1303(4)] . . . .”); see also N.Y. Real Prop. L.
§ 265-a (Home Equity Theft Prevention Act).
The required § 1303 notice for tenants of a multi-unit building must contain
specific language, starting with “Notice to Tenants of Buildings in Foreclosure[.] New
York State Law requires that we provide you this notice about the foreclosure process.
Please read it carefully,” and include a paragraph, in all capitalized and underlined
letters, regarding tenant rights and protections. RPAPL § 1303(5); see also id. § 1303(4).
Additionally, the notice must be in bold, 14-point type, printed on colored paper (other
than the color of the summons and complaint), and the title of the notice must be in
bold, 20-point type. Id. § 1303(4). Section 1303 notices must “be delivered with the
summons and complaint,” and for buildings with five or more dwelling units, posted
on the outside of each entrance and exit of the building. Id. § 1303(2), (4).
C. Default Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a “two-step process” for obtaining a
default judgment. Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). The
plaintiff must first obtain an entry of default when a defendant “has failed to plead or
otherwise defend” in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after the certificate of
default is entered and on the plaintiff’s application, the district court may enter a
default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(b). A “plaintiff
is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right simply because a party is in
default.” Finkel v. Universal Elec. Corp., 970 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Rather,
the decision to grant a motion for default judgment is “left to the sound discretion of
[the] district court because it is in the best position to assess the individual
circumstances of a given case and to evaluate the credibility and good faith of the
parties.”6 Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993).
The district court must also determine whether the plaintiff’s “allegations
establish [the defendant’s] liability as a matter of law.” Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79,
84 (2d Cir. 2009). In making this determination, the “court is required to accept all of the
. . . factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s]
favor.” Id. It is “the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that those uncontroverted
allegations, without more, establish the defendant’s liability on each asserted cause of
action.” Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Section 1311 of the RPAPL identifies the necessary defendants in a mortgage
foreclosure action, providing that persons “whose interest is claimed to be subject and
subordinate to the plaintiff’s lien, shall be made a party defendant to the action,”
including “[e]very person having any lien or incumbrance upon the real property which
is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the lien of the plaintiff.” RPAPL § 1311.
“This rule ‘derives from the underlying objective of foreclosure actions — to extinguish
the rights of redemption of all those who have a subordinate interest in the property
and to vest complete title in the purchaser at the judicial sale.’” NDF1, LLC v.
Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 3d 273, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. 3301
6 A plaintiff must also establish compliance with the procedural requirements of
E.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rules 7.1, 55.1, and 55.2. Having carefully reviewed the filings in this case,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion papers substantially comport with these rules. First,
Plaintiff requested a certificate of default in accordance with Local Rule 55.1(a)(1), which was
served on Defendant ECB via first class mail. See Req. for Certificate of Default, ECF 25. Second,
Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendant ECB has failed to defend the action and that the
pleadings were properly served. See Aff. of Service, ECF 8. Third, Plaintiff demonstrated that
Defendant ECB, as an entity, is not a minor, incompetent, or subject to the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50 U.S.C. § 3931. See Req. for Certificate of Default, ECF 25. Finally,
Plaintiff has certified the mailing of all of the default motion papers to Defendant ECB. See
Certificate of Service, ECF 35.
Atl., LLC, No. 10-CV-5204 (FB) (SMG), 2012 WL 2529196, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the case of a non-mortgagor defendant, entry of default judgment may be
appropriate where “the complaint alleges nominal liability, i.e., that any judgments or
liens a defendant may have against the property are subject and subordinate to
plaintiff’s lien.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for RMAC Tr., Series 2016-CTT v. Harilal, No.
19-CV-7034 (CBA) (JRC), 2022 WL 16754569, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) (quotation
marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4596734 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2022). After entry of a default judgment against a joined defendant with a nominal
interest, “any such interest in the relevant property is terminated.” Windward Bora LLC
v. Baez, No. 19-CV-5698 (PKC) (SMG), 2020 WL 4261130, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020)
(quotation marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, 2026 WL 873093 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2026).
Courts apply a heightened pleading standard for municipal defendants, like the
ECB, to determine whether Plaintiff has established nominal liability. See id. This
standard requires the complaint to allege “[d]etailed facts showing the particular nature
of the interest in or lien on the real property and the reason for making such city a
party-defendant.”7 RPAPL § 202-a(1). If the non-mortgagor defendant is a city entity,
7 Documentary proof of the city’s interest or lien is usually necessary and sufficient to
satisfy the heightened standard for pleading nominal liability against city defendants. See Fed.
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. 2120 Tiebout LLC, No. 23-CV-9445 (DEH), 2025 WL 1503957, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2025) (collecting cases in the Second Circuit requiring documentation identifying the
existence and nature of the ECB violation to satisfy RPAPL § 202-a(1)’s pleading requirements);
and the lien exists due to a judgment, the complaint must include “the name of the
court, date recorded, clerk’s office in which filed, the names of the parties against whom
and in whose favor such judgment was recovered and a brief description of the grounds
for or the nature of such judgment.” Id. § 202-a(2).
II. Analysis
A. Note, Mortgage, and Proof of Default
“A plaintiff is entitled to foreclose on a property if it demonstrates the existence
of an obligation secured by a mortgage, and a default on that obligation.” OneWest Bank,
N.A. v. Denham, No. 14-CV-5529 (DRH) (AKT), 2015 WL 5562980, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2015) (quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5562981
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015). Here, Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the existence of the Note and Mortgage. See Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 4–26;
Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4; CMEA, ECF 30-5; see also First Assign., ECF 30-11; First
ALR, ECF 30-12; Second Assign., ECF 30-13; Second ALR, ECF 30-14; Third Assign.,
ECF 30-15; Third ALR, ECF 30-16. Although Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ standing
to commence this action as the assignee and/or holder of the Note, as discussed infra,
they do not meaningfully dispute the existence of the underlying documents. See
generally Opp’n, ECF 32.
Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for Holders of COMM 2014-UBS6 Mortg. Tr. Com. Mortg. Pass-
Through Certificates v. 366 Realty LLC, No. 17-CV-3570 (KAM) (JAM), 2024 WL 4891739, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2024) (A “plaintiff must substantiate their allegations with documentation,
such as a title report.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
366 Realty LLC, 2025 WL 556036 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2025); see also CIT Bank v. Dambra, No. 14-CV-
3951 (SLT) (VMS), 2015 WL 7422348, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015) (finding title search
documents showing monies the defendants owed to the ECB sufficient to support the plaintiff’s
allegations of liens), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. CIT Bank, N.A., v. Dambra, 2015
WL 7430006 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2015).
Having produced the Note and the Mortgage, Plaintiff must next show that
Defendants have defaulted in paying the loan to establish a prima facie case. Baez, 2020
WL 4261130, at *3. Plaintiff has submitted evidence that Defendant Flushing Realty
“failed to make the Required Monthly Payments that were due on the first day of each
month from January 1, 2025, through and including May 1, 2025 . . . [and] has made no
payments of any kind toward the Loan since January 14, 2025.” Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1,
¶¶ 32–33; see Transaction History, ECF 30-18. The Court also notes that under § 12.2 of
the CMEA, any failure by Defendants to remit the monthly payments constitutes an
event of default. CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF pp. 55–57. The CMEA also states that, upon
default, the lender “may declare the unpaid portion of the Secured Obligations to be
immediately due and payable, without any presentment, demand, protest, notice or
action of any kind.” Id. at ECF p. 57. Accordingly, Plaintiff has advanced sufficient
evidence to establish Defendants’ default.
Defendants object to Plaintiff’s proof of default on two grounds. First,
Defendants claim that the notice of default — which triggered a ten-day period
allowing Defendants to cure the default — was improperly delivered.8 Defs.’ Counter
56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶¶ 37, 39–42, 48–49; see Wiener Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 3–14. Specifically,
Defendants assert that the “alleged Notice of Default was not delivered in accordance
with the notice provisions of the Mortgage and therefore was ineffective to trigger any
8 As set forth above, Plaintiff first sent Defendants a notice of default on April 17, 2025,
and the next day, received a notification that the notice was not delivered because Defendants
had moved without apprising Plaintiff of their change in address. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 39–40;
see Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶ 3; Notice of Default, ECF 30-19 (addressed to Defendants at 1 Penn
Plaza, Suite 4000, New York, New York 10119). That same day, April 18, 2025, counsel located a
new address for the Borrower and re-sent the Notice, and on April 22, 2025, the Guarantor
acknowledged receipt via email. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 40–41; see Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 4–
5; see also Notice of Acceleration, ECF 30-20 (addressed to Defendants at 2 Grand Central Tower,
140 E. 45th Street, 12th Floor, New York, New York 10017).
rights or obligations thereunder.” Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶ 39 (citing Wiener
Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 3–10; CMEA, ECF 1-3; Notice of Default, ECF 1-16).
The relevant provisions of the Mortgage read as follows:
Section 13.1 Remedies. If an Event of Default occurs, Lender may, at its
option, but without obligation, exercise one or more or all of the following
remedies: . . .
(2) Acceleration. Lender may declare the unpaid portion of the
Secured Obligations to be immediately due and payable, without
any presentment, demand, protest, notice or action of any kind
(each of which hereby is expressly waived by Borrower),
whereupon the Secured Obligations shall become immediately due
and payable.
. . . .
(5) Foreclosure Proceedings. Lender may institute proceedings,
judicial or otherwise, for the complete or partial foreclosure of this
Mortgage and sale of all or any portion of the Property at public
auction[.]
Section 15.1 Notice Period(s). Notwithstanding any of the provisions
contained herein to the contrary, the Lender shall provide the Borrower
written notice of any default herein. If the Borrower is in default in the
payment to the Lender of any sum or amount of money which may fall
due or be payable from time to time under the term of the Agreement
hereunder (“a Monetary Default”), the Borrower shall have a period of ten
(10) days after the Lender's giving of such notice within which time such
default must be cured.
Section 16.5 Notices. All notices and other communications provided for
under this Mortgage shall be in writing [and mailed], if to Borrower, to its
address set forth in the preamble of this Mortgage . . . [or] at such other
address as shall be designated by [the Borrower] in a written notice to the
other party complying as to delivery with the terms of this Section.
CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF pp. 57, 59, 66, 69.
Here, Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a technical defect in
the provision of notice of default is a defense to foreclosure, particularly where, as here,
the Mortgage does not require expressly notice as a condition precedent to foreclosure.
See generally Opp’n, ECF 32; cf. 1 Bergman on N.Y. Mortg. Foreclosures §§ 4.04A
(observing that the “general rule is that demand for payment is not a prerequisite to
commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action”), 4.05 (noting that mortgages can be
drafted to “mandate notice of a claimed default as a precondition to exercise an
acceleration”). Even assuming Defendants have not waived this argument by not
briefing it, the record indicates that Defendants had ample notice of Plaintiff’s intent to
accelerate the debt and foreclose the Mortgage. Here, Plaintiff sent a notice of default to
the address it had on file for Defendants, as per Section 16.5 of the Mortgage; when that
was returned as undeliverable the next day, counsel re-sent the notice to a new address
it located for the Borrower, and the Guarantor later acknowledged receipt of the notice.
See Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶¶ 39–41; see Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 3–5; Notice of Default,
ECF 30-19; Notice of Acceleration, ECF 30-20. As far as the Court is able to discern,
notice was properly effectuated where, as here, the Borrower did not give the Lender
notice of its change in address and the Lender promptly re-sent the notice to an address
at which receipt was later confirmed.9 See supra note 8; cf. CMEA, ECF 30-5, at ECF p. 24
(“Borrower agrees not to change its principal place of business without giving Lender at
least thirty (30) days’ prior notice so long as obligations are outstanding.”).
Analogous facts allowed the court to reach the same conclusion in FDIC v.
Carbomin Group, Inc. See 575 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1991). There, the
court held that “it was clear that Carbomin was given adequate notice of the FDIC’s
intention to foreclose” because (1) the agreement provided that the FDIC, “upon notice,
9 Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, Defendants’ position would seem to imply that
if Plaintiff cannot notify Defendants of their default at the address Defendants initially provided
to Plaintiff — because Defendants changed their address without notifying Plaintiff — Plaintiff
would be divested of its right to foreclose the Mortgage. This is a nonsensical reading of the
CMEA.
at its option, could commence a foreclosure proceeding,” (2) the FDIC “sent two letters
to Carbomin indicating that it would commence foreclosure proceedings,” and
(3) thereafter, the parties agreed on a timeline for the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings. Id.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ objection to Plaintiff’s proof of
default on grounds that notice was not given as provided for in the Mortgage does not
create a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendants defaulted on the Mortgage.
See id.
Second, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s “characterization of the payment history”
and state that, rather than defaulting, “Borrower made payments and/or Plaintiff
misapplied or failed to properly credit payments.” Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32–1,
¶¶ 32–33; see Wiener Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 15–18. Defendants do not state when they
made payments towards the outstanding balance, or what amount was purportedly
remitted and/or should have been credited towards the same, nor do they cite to any
evidence in the summary judgment record beyond the Guarantor’s declaration, which
suffers from the same deficiencies. See Weiner Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 15–18 (asserting, with
no specifics, that, inter alia, “Borrower made payments and/or engaged in payment
activity after January 2025”). It is axiomatic that, in opposing a motion for summary
judgment, “[t]he non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or
unsubstantiated speculation” to create a genuine dispute of material fact; rather, “the
non-movant must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue exists.”
Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). But even if
the Court were to credit Defendants’ unsubstantiated averments, “[a]llegations of
partial payments remitted after default do not constitute a defense to a foreclosure
action” because “[p]artial payment does not cure a default.” Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n v.
Commack Props., LLC, No. 09-CV-5296 (DRH), 2010 WL 5139219, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2010). Defendants’ attempts to poke holes in Plaintiff’s case do not identify a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants ceased making payments on the loan.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently
established evidence of the Note, Mortgage, and of Defendants’ default.
B. Plaintiff’s Standing to Foreclose
Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s standing as either a holder or an assignee of the
Note and Mortgage. See generally Opp’n, ECF 32. As discussed above, if the mortgagor
contests the mortgagee’s standing to foreclose, “the plaintiff must prove its standing as
part of its prima facie showing,” Donovan, 856 F. App’x at 336 (quotation marks
omitted), which it may do “by demonstrating that it is either the holder or assignee of
the underlying note at the time the action is commenced,” Gordon, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 292
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see Gustavia Home, LLC v. Rutty, 720 F.
App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (noting that the plaintiff may “demonstrate
that it was the holder or assignee of the mortgage and note when the action was
commenced”).
1. Standing as the Holder of the Note
The summary judgment record amply establishes that Plaintiff was the holder of
the Mortgage and Note when this action was commenced, and therefore has standing to
seek foreclosure of the Property.
Under New York law, proof of physical possession of a note prior to the
commencement of the foreclosure is “sufficient on its own to prove a plaintiff’s standing
to foreclose on the mortgage associated with the note.” OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina,
827 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Taylor, 25
N.Y.3d 355, 361 (2015). Where there are allonges attached to the note, the plaintiff is
“required to establish both that it physically possessed the note with an allonge at the
time that [the] action was commenced and that the allonge was firmly affixed to the
note.” LNV Corp. v. Allison, 170 N.Y.S.3d 162, 165 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2022); see
Courchevel 1850 LLC v. Alam, 464 F. Supp. 3d 475, 480–81 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d sub nom.
Courchevel 1850 LLC v. Koznitz I LLC, No. 23-7263-cv, 2025 WL 1512953 (2d Cir. May 28,
2025) (summary order). The affidavits of a plaintiff’s corporate representative or
counsel in the case can suffice as proof of physical possession of the note and allonges.
See Melina, 827 F.3d at 223. For example, in Aurora, even though the plaintiff there
produced an affidavit in lieu of the original mortgage note, and “the affidavit was
lacking details regarding Aurora’s possession of the note,” the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court’s reliance on the affidavit alone to grant summary judgment to the
plaintiff was not error, though it noted that “the better practice would have been for
Aurora to state how it came into possession of the note.” 25 N.Y.3d at 362.
Here, Plaintiff has produced the Note and allonges, and has averred that the
three allonges “were all firmly affixed to the Note by a staple and in the possession of
Plaintiff’s counsel on the date Plaintiff commenced this action.” Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1,
¶ 25; see Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 6–11 (noting that Plaintiff’s counsel removed the
staple from the top left corner of the Note, First Allonge, and Second Allonge in order to
scan the allonges into a single file and attach them to the complaint, and then re-stapled
the Note, First Allonge, Second Allonge, and Third Allonge together).10
Defendants do not meaningfully dispute Plaintiff’s proffered evidence with
citations to the summary judgment record. Rather, they take issue with the fact that all
three allonges were not firmly affixed to the Note at the time of delivery of the allonges
to Plaintiff’s counsel. See Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶ 25; see also Defs. 56.1, ECF 32-
2, ¶¶ 14–30. Specifically, Defendants contend that “a plaintiff relying on an allonge” to
establish its status as a holder “must demonstrate both possession of the note and that
the allonge was firmly affixed at the time of transfer.” Opp’n, ECF 32, at 6. But whether
“the plaintiff originally took possession of a note with loose allonges and then stapled
them to the note after the fact” is “immaterial to its holder status,” as long as the note
and allonges are firmly affixed by the commencement of the foreclosure action.
Courchevel 1850 LLC, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 481. Indeed, as the cases Defendants cite make
clear, Plaintiff is “‘required to establish both that it physically possessed the note with
an allonge at the time that this action was commenced and that the allonge was firmly
affixed to the note.’” Opp’n, ECF 32, at 6 (quoting LNV Corp., 170 N.Y.S.3d at 165
(emphasis added)).
10 Plaintiff’s counsel states that on May 2, 2025, he “reviewed the original Loan file and
confirmed the presence of the original Note with First Allonge and Second Allonge affixed to it
by a staple in the top left corner of the documents,” and “received a package from Edward
Barrett of Newmark containing the Third Allonge signed by him.” Galati Decl., ECF 30-23,
¶¶ 7–8. Although Plaintiff does not otherwise explain why the First and Second Allonges were
delivered to Plaintiff separately from the Third Allonge, Defendants cite no authority to suggest
that delivery of the allonges separately from the note is fatal to Plaintiff’s standing where, as
here, the Note and Allonges were in Plaintiff’s physical possession and firmly affixed prior to
the commencement of this action. See Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 355, 361 (2015)
(“In the current case, the note was transferred to Aurora before the commencement of the
foreclosure action — that is what matters.”).
Here, the three allonges were firmly affixed by the time the action was
commenced. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 25; see Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 6–11. The Court
finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established that Plaintiff physically possesses the
relevant Note and Mortgage, and that the same was true upon the filing of this action.
See Melina, 827 F.3d at 222. On the basis of the summary judgment record, Plaintiff has
standing to foreclose as the holder of the Note.
2. Standing as an Assignee of the Note
Defendants also challenge Plaintiff’s standing as an assignee. Specifically,
Defendants contest the validity of the chain of assignments of the Mortgage, which they
characterize as “internally inconsistent, altered, and unsupported by competent
evidence establishing when the purported transfers occurred.” Opp’n, ECF 32, at 4. The
purported deficiencies include the fact that (1) the First Assignment is dated as of
December 30, 2024, but the “notarial acknowledgments are dated December 18, 2024,”
indicating that “the notary purportedly acknowledged execution before the documents
were signed,” and (2) the Second Assignment was originally dated December 18, 2024,
but this date was manually crossed out with a pen, replaced with December 30, 2024,
and initialed “AG,” and Plaintiffs do not indicate who made these alterations or when.
Id. at 5; see First Assign., ECF 30-11, at ECF p. 6; Second Assign., ECF 30-13, at ECF p. 6.
Defendants argue that courts “have rejected similar chains of assignments where the
documents contain[ed] internal inconsistencies” or “contained chronological
impossibilities.” Opp’n, ECF 32, at 5 (citing Hoyer, 802 F. Supp. 3d 445).
However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has demonstrated its standing as the
holder of the Note, and therefore need not additionally demonstrate its standing as an
assignee. See Rutty, 720 F. App’x at 29 (explaining that under New York law, the plaintiff
may demonstrate standing as either a holder or an assignee); cf. Windward Bora, LLC v.
Regalado, 751 F. Supp. 3d 122, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (finding, in summary judgment
posture, that the plaintiff could proceed to trial on the question of whether it had
standing as an assignee, even though it could not establish its standing as a holder),
appeal filed, No. 26-1143-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2026). “‘[B]ecause an assignment may be
made under New York law by physical delivery and not only by written indorsement,’
an ‘alleged defect concerning the allonge [would be] immaterial’ if there is adequate
evidence that physical delivery effected valid assignment.” Hoyer, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 469
(quoting Robinson v. H&R Block Bank, FSB, No. 12-CV-4196 (SMG), 2013 WL 2356106, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013)).
Defendants cite Rutty for the proposition that “[e]ven where allonges are offered,
defects in the assignment chain independently defeat standing.” Opp’n, ECF 32, at 4.
However, in Rutty, the allonges themselves were defective because they were “undated,
and no other evidence establishe[d] that the original lender assigned the note” to the
plaintiff in that action. 720 F. App’x at 29. By contrast, here, although the third allonge is
also undated, see Note & Allonges, ECF 30-4, at ECF p. 23, Plaintiff submitted the sworn
declaration of its attorney and special servicer, Richard J. Galati, Jr., stating that he
received the Note and allonges prior to commencing this foreclosure action, see Galati
Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 6–11. As discussed above, “proof of physical possession” is
“sufficient on its own” to prove Plaintiff’s standing as a holder, and has no impact on
the legal effect of the assignments. Melina, 827 F.3d at 223.
Defendants’ citation to Hoyer is distinguishable for similar reasons. In that case,
the court vacated its earlier summary judgment order on reconsideration, finding that
the affidavits that originally formed the plaintiff’s evidentiary basis for summary
judgment were entitled to “almost no weight” in light of “myriad discrepancies”
between the evidence in the summary judgment record and publicly available
documents. Hoyer, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 456, 469. There, however, the plaintiff’s evidence
stated that the first assignment took place more than seven months after the date of the
second assignment, and “public documents reflect an almost entirely different chain of
assignments of the mortgage and note than that proffered by Plaintiff.” Id. at 454, 457.
Here, the discrepancies Defendants highlight evince, at worst, imprecise drafting that
was caught and corrected prior to the commencement of this action. Defendants cite no
case, and the Court can find none, holding that manually crossing out the date of
execution of an allonge and initialing the changes is fatal to Plaintiff’s status as an
assignee, let alone as a holder. Cf. Koznitz I, 2025 WL 1512953, at *3 (finding that the
allonges must “trace an unbroken chain of transfer to the last prior possessor,” and the
defendant-appellant “raised no genuine issue as to any fraud or gap in the chain of
transfer”).
Here, because Plaintiff has established its standing as a holder, it need not also
demonstrate its standing as an assignee. See Gordon, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 292. In light of
Plaintiff’s standing, the Court finds that there is no dispute of material fact on Plaintiff’s
prima facie entitlement to foreclosure on the basis of the summary judgment record.
C. Compliance with RPAPL § 1303
As discussed above, RPAPL § 1303 requires a mortgagee seeking to foreclose on
a residential property to comply with certain notice procedures. It is not meaningfully
disputed that Plaintiff posted the § 1303 notice, as required by New York law, when it
first initiated this action. Pl.’s 56.1, ECF 30-1, ¶ 60; Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 15–16; cf.
Defs.’ Counter 56.1, ECF 32-1, ¶ 60 (citing Wiener Decl., ECF 32-3, ¶¶ 3–10 (disputing
the adequacy of the Notice of Default)). Specifically, on June 11, 2025, Plaintiff’s process
server posted two copies of the Notice to Tenants of Building in Foreclosure to the only
exit and entrance door of the Property. Affirmation of Service, ECF 30-28, at ECF p. 2
(stating that one copy was firmly affixed “conspicuously on the front main door of the
building” and one copy was affixed “conspicuously on the window to the right of the
main entrance door” and providing a photograph of same). The notice was printed on
yellow colored paper, that is, a color other than the color of the Summons and
Complaint, the title of the notice appeared in bold, 20-point type, and the text appeared
in bold, 14-point font. Id.; Galati Decl., ECF 30-23, ¶¶ 15–16; see RPAPL § 1303 Notice,
ECF 30-27. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has complied with the statutory
notice requirements. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Injawe Inc., No. 24-CV-3051 (TAM),
2025 WL 3707090, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2025).
Given that Plaintiff has demonstrated compliance with both the common law
and statutory requirements for its prima facie case with facts that are not subject to
genuine dispute, and in the absence of further defenses from Defendants,11 the Court
finds that Plaintiff has shown its entitlement to summary judgment. Accordingly,
11 The Court notes that on July 10, 2025, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint
containing five affirmative defenses. Answer, ECF 9. However, Defendants’ affirmative
defenses, which are essentially boilerplate, do not adhere to the Second Circuit’s pleading
standards, set forth in GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., which require a defendant
raising affirmative defenses “to support these defenses with some factual allegations to make
them plausible.” 918 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Fossil Grp., Inc. v. Angel Seller LLC, 627 F.
Supp. 3d 180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (noting that counterclaims must meet the plausibility
standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal).
Additionally, although Defendants have advanced arguments consistent with two of
their affirmative defenses (that “Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action” and “[t]here has
been no default herein”) on summary judgment — which the Court has rejected for the reasons
discussed supra — Defendants have not advanced arguments or evidence in support of their
other three affirmative defenses. Answer, ECF 9, ¶¶ 102–105; compare id. ¶¶ 94–101 (stating that
(1) “Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth a cognizable cause of action upon which relief may be
granted”; (2) “subject matter jurisdiction is lacking” because “there is no complete diversity in
this action”; and (3) “the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant” because “service of
process was not properly effected” (capitalization modified)), with Opp’n, ECF 32. Accordingly,
the Court deems these affirmative defenses “to be abandoned and ineffective to defeat
summary judgment.” E. Sav. Bank v. Robinson, No. 13-CV-7308 (ADS) (SIL), 2016 WL 482024, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016).
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against Defendants Flushing Realty and
Wiener is granted.
III. Default Judgment
Plaintiff has also moved for a default judgment against Defendant ECB. See Mot.,
ECF 30. Here, Plaintiff named ECB as a defendant because ECB’s liens against Flushing
Realty made it a necessary party to this foreclosure action. Compl., ECF 1, ¶ 10; see
Schedule A, ECF 1, at ECF p. 27; see also RPAPL § 1311(3); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Watts, No. 16-CV-6919 (ENV) (RER), 2019 WL 3716190, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019),
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3714582 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2019). Plaintiff
now seeks a default judgment solely against Defendant ECB, which has failed to
respond to this action. Mem., ECF 30-34, at 12–13.
Plaintiff represents that the ECB holds various open judgments against the
Property. Compl., ECF 1, ¶ 10. Plaintiff also alleges that the ECB’s interest in the
Property accrued subsequent to, and is therefore subject and subordinate to, Plaintiff’s
Mortgage lien. Id. Plaintiff also avers that the ECB has filed various liens and/or
judgments against the Property over the years, as set forth in Schedule A of the
complaint. Schedule A, ECF 1, at ECF p. 27. Plaintiff has pled the violation number,
judgment dates, and the original amounts. Id. Although Plaintiff did not include a
detailed description of the violations, the Court finds that this information is sufficient
to meet the RPAPL’s heightened pleading standards with respect to ECB.12 See
Cunningham, 754 F. Supp. 3d at 286–87 (finding that a complaint referencing all
violation dates, penalty amounts, and statuses to be sufficient); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v.
366 Realty LLC, 806 F. Supp. 3d 356, 369–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding that Plaintiff’s
submission of violation numbers, order dates, notice dates, docket dates, and balances
due met the heightened pleading standards); see also Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. 204 Ellery
St., LLC, No. 23-CV-5343 (ENV) (RML), 2025 WL 1309875, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2025).
ECB has not submitted any opposition to Plaintiff’s assertions or motion. See
generally Docket. Consequently, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true and
grants Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant ECB. See Onewest Bank
v. Serbones, No. 14-CV-7281 (RJD) (MDG), 2016 WL 1295197, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2016) (recommending default judgment be entered against the ECB after the plaintiff
served the ECB with process and with copies of its motion for default judgment), report
and recommendation adopted as modified sub nom. OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Serbones, 2016 WL
1306545, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).
IV. Requested Relief
Plaintiff seeks a judgment ordering the foreclosure and sale of the Property, and
identifies the following outstanding debts owed to CFSP: (1) $4,253,901.95 in
12 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, as of the date this opinion was issued,
the Property had eight unpaid violations listed on the OATH website, all of which are dated
after the 2015 mortgage. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d
156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that courts may take judicial notice of “documents retrieved
from official government websites” or other government records from such sites) (collecting
cases). The Property’s violations are viewable on the OATH Ticket Finder website, at
https://a820-ecbticketfinder.nyc.gov/searchHome.action? (last accessed September 3, 2026),
and at https://a836-citypay.nyc.gov/citypay/ecb (last accessed September 3, 2026). The
amount due to ECB, which includes a recently issued violation, totaled approximately $2,500.00
as of the date this opinion was issued.
outstanding principal; (2) $26,099.46 in unpaid interest incurred between December 1,
2024, through December 31, 2024, based on a 7.125% interest rate; (3) $95,860.50 in
unpaid interest incurred between January 1, 2025 through April 28, 2025, based on a
6.875% interest rate; (4) $770,428.91 in default interest incurred between April 29, 2025,
and March 20, 2026, based on a 20% interest rate; and (5) $6,223.85 in late charges
incurred between January 2025 and April 2025, minus a $1.58 Debt Service Reserve fee,
totaling $5,152,513.09. Mem., ECF 30-34, at 14; Cato Decl., ECF 30-2, at ECF p. 18.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has demonstrated its entitlement to the
various categories of damages it seeks. However, given the length of time between
when Plaintiff’s motion was filed and the date of this opinion, Defendants’ total
indebtedness has likely changed. Mem., ECF 30-34, at 14 (noting that the full amount
owed as of March 21, 2026, includes $5,152,513.09, plus interest accruing, until the entry
of the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale); see Letter, ECF 34.
Given the Court’s grant of summary judgment, the Court directs Plaintiff to
submit an updated proposed order of foreclosure and sale as to Defendants Flushing
Realty and Wiener. The Court further directs Plaintiff to make an application for a
referee to supervise the sale. Following the selection of the referee and sale of the
property, Plaintiff shall file a proposed judgment, along with an affidavit from the
appointed referee, concerning any amounts due to Plaintiff following the sale.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment against Defendants Flushing Realty and Wiener and for default judgment
against Defendant ECB, and finds that an order of foreclosure and sale shall issue. By
September 17, 2026, Plaintiff is directed to submit an updated proposed order as to
Defendants Flushing Realty and Wiener. Plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this
memorandum and order on the defaulting Defendant ECB and to file proof of service
with the Court by September 10, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 3, 2026 __
aagt 4. Wlurke,
TARYN A. MERKL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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