Wilson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

DALE WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 1:25-cv-01030-TLP-tmp

v. )

)

H. JACK HOLMES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se Plaintiff Dale Wilson sued many Defendants asserting claims under federal and

state law. (See ECF Nos. 2, 78.) The Court referred this case to Chief Magistrate Judge Tu M.

Pham to manage all pretrial matters. See Admin. Order No. 2013-05. All Defendants now move

to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 75, 85, 86, 88, 90.) Judge Pham issued a Report and Recommendation

(R&R”) recommending that the Court grant the Motions. (ECF No. 96.) For the reasons below,

the Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

claims.

BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge Pham described this case’s background and the allegations in the

Third Amended Complaint.1 The Court briefly recounts those details here.

This case arises out of state probate proceedings. After Plaintiff’s son, Adam Wilson

(“Adam”), passed away, it appeared that he had died without leaving a will. (See ECF No. 44 at

1 In his R&R, Judge Pham proposed findings of fact. (See ECF No. 96 at PageID 951–57.)

Plaintiff did not object to his findings.

PageID 473.) So Judge Christi Little appointed Plaintiff as Administrator of Adam’s estate.

(Id.) But Defendants H. Jack Holmes and Nancy McHaney later brought to probate court what

they claimed, and the Tennessee Circuit Court later found, to be Adam’s Will. (Id. at PageID

473–74.) Judge Little then revoked Plaintiff’s Letters of Administration and appointed Holmes

and McHaney as Administrators of the estate. (Id. at PageID 474.) Plaintiff challenged the Will,

and Circuit Judge Kyle Atkins found that the Will was valid. (Id.)

Plaintiff sued here on January 30, 2025. (ECF No. 2.) His Complaint named Defendants

Holmes, McHaney, Charles Exum, Christina McConnell, Lili Griffin, Judge Little, Marci Willis,

Michelle Mysinger, Anna Jordan, and Judge Atkins (“Individual Defendants”). (ECF No. 2.)

Plaintiff then moved to amend his Complaint several times. (ECF Nos. 44, 53, 54, 58.) Judge

Pham granted the requests (see ECF No. 63), and Plaintiff’s operative pleading is now the Third

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 78.) The Third Amended Complaint removes Judges Little and

Atkins as Defendants and adds Madison County, Tennessee (“Madison County”). (Id. at PageID

663.)

Plaintiff asserts five claims seeking monetary damages plus claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID 669–72.)

Count One alleges that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Individual Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s inheritance rights, his role as personal representative, his right to contest Adam’s will,

and his right to protect the estate. (Id. at PageID 669.) Plaintiff further alleges that all the

Individual Defendants acted under color of state law and “deprived [him] of these interests

without due process.” (Id.)

Count Two is a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim also asserted against the Individual Defendants.

(Id. at PageID 669–70.) Plaintiff claims that “Defendants entered into a conspiracy and

understanding to obstruct Plaintiff’s access to fair court proceedings, to hide the forgery and

asset diversion, and to prevent accurate judicial review.” (Id. at PageID 670.)

Count Three alleges state-law fraud and extrinsic fraud against Defendants Holmes,

McHaney, Exum, McConnell, Griffin, Willis, Mysinger, and Jordan. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that

these Defendants, among other things, “engaged in a scheme to defraud Plaintiff and the courts

by promoting a forged will, using forged or coerced signatures, executing and relying on

unattached Attestation Statements, filing misleading or incomplete documents, manipulating

scheduling, and hiding critical evidence and motions.” (Id.)

Count Four is a denial-of-access-to-courts claim under § 1983 alleging that the Individual

Defendants “deprived Plaintiff of meaningful access to courts by obstructing subpoenas,

blocking access to files, hiding motions and affidavits, manipulating the docket, relying on a will

that the court itself found did not meet statutory requirements, participating in a system where

courts of record kept no record, and benefiting from a court clerk and sheriff’s department

practice that barred pro se litigants from bringing phones or recording devices into the

courthouse.” (Id. at PageID 670–71.)

Finally, Count Five asserts a § 1983 Monell claim against Madison County. (Id. at

PageID 671.) Plaintiff alleges failure to train, “tolerance and enforcement of a sheriff’s and

clerk’s practice that barred pro se litigants from entering the courthouse with phones or recording

devices, while not equally applied to attorneys and insiders,” failure to ensure court proceedings

“were actually recorded and transcribed,” and failure to investigate misconduct. (Id.)

Defendants all moved to dismiss.2 (ECF Nos. 75, 85, 86, 88, 90.) And Plaintiff

responded in opposition. (ECF Nos. 87, 92, 93.) After review, Judge Pham recommended

granting Defendants’ Motions. (ECF No. 96.)

The thirty-page R&R methodically analyzes the parties’ arguments. In sum, Judge

Pham’s Proposed Conclusions of Law are: (1) Judges Little and Atkins should be dismissed

because Plaintiff removed them from his Third Amended Complaint (id. at PageID 956–57); (2)

Griffin and Jordan should be dismissed because, as a court clerk and judicial assistant, they are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity (id. at PageID 958); (3) Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims

are time barred and equitable tolling does not apply (id. at PageID 958–66); (4) even if the

statute of limitations did not bar the § 1985 claim, Plaintiff fails to assert a valid claim for civil

conspiracy (id. at PageID 966–68); (5) even if the statute of limitations did not bar the § 1983

claim, Plaintiff cannot sue private actors under the statute (id. at PageID 968–70); (6) Madison

County should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against it (id. at

PageID 970–77); and (7) Plaintiff’s fraud and extrinsic claims fail because Plaintiff has not

alleged them with particularity (id. at PageID 977–80).

Plaintiff timely objected. (ECF No. 97.) Defendants Griffin, Madison County, and

Jordan replied. (ECF Nos. 98, 99.)

LEGAL STANDARD AND OBJECTIONS

A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and a

recommended ruling on certain dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to dismiss. See 28

2 Defendants moved to dismiss the original Complaint as well. (ECF Nos. 30, 34, 38, 40.) But

Judge Pham issued an R&R recommending that the Court deny the Motions as moot because

Plaintiff had amended his Complaint. (ECF No. 64.) The Court adopted that R&R in October

2025. (ECF No. 70.)

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). The parties may object to those proposed findings and

recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). And if neither party

objects, then the district court reviews the R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory

committee’s note. But if there is an objection, the district court reviews the “properly” objected-

to portions of the R&R de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Objections come with limits. Typically a party cannot raise new arguments or issues in

objections that it did not first present to the magistrate court. Dabrowski v. Tubular Metal

Systems, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (quoting Murr v. United States, 200 4

F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)). Parties must object “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with

a copy of the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). And objections must be “specific.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); see also Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his Court has held

that an objection preserves an issue when it ‘explains and cites specific portions of the report

which counsel deems problematic.” (citation omitted)).

“Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v.

Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.

1995)), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Solomon v.

Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 478 F. App’x 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2012). So when a plaintiff submits

only vague, general, or conclusory objections, the district court may review the R&R for clear

error, rather than de novo. See Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002); see also

Carter v. Mitchell, 829 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In general, ‘the failure to file specific

objections to a magistrate[] [judge’s] report constitutes a waiver of those objections.’” (citation

omitted)).

These limits support judicial economy. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)

(“The Sixth Circuit’s decision to require the filing of objections is supported by sound

considerations of judicial economy.”). Raising specific objections enables district courts to

“focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”

Id.; see Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining

that a “general objection to the entirety of a magistrate’s report has the same effects as a failure

to object” because it does not focus the district court’s “attention . . . on any specific issues for

review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless”). The purpose is to avoid

“the magistrate and the district court [from] perform[ing] identical tasks.” Howard, 932 F.2d at

509; see Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147–48 (“The Sixth Circuit's rule, by precluding appellate review

of any issue not contained in objections, prevents a litigant from “sandbagging” the district judge

by failing to object and then appealing.”).

I. Objections

Plaintiff objects to Judge’s Pham’s recommendations that this Court (1) dismiss the §§

1983 and 1985 claims as time barred; (2) reject Plaintiff’s “ghost” routing argument; (3) grant

quasi-judicial immunity to Defendants Griffin and Jordan; (4) find no state action within the §

1983 claims; (5) dismiss Madison County because Plaintiff failed to plead Monell liability; and

(6) dismiss the state-law fraud claims. (ECF No. 97.) These objections only warrant clear error

review because they are either conclusory, vague, or present issues that Plaintiff did not raise

before Judge Pham. And as explained below, each objection lacks merit.

A. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff’s first two objections go hand in hand. They both relate to Judge Pham’s

recommendation that Plaintiff’s federal claims are time barred. (See id. at PageID 981–82.)

Remember, Judge Pham found that the federal claims accrued “at the latest” on January 29,

2024—the day the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision—and

Plaintiff waited over a year form that date to sue here on January 30, 2025. (See ECF No. 96 at

PageID 961.) Plaintiff does not argue that Judge Pham’s math is incorrect. Rather, Plaintiff

states that he has “now confirmed” that the Tennessee Clerk’s Office served him a copy of the

appellate decision by physical mail rather than email. (ECF No. 97 at PageID 981.) He also

argues that he has “now confirmed” that the Jackson Clerk’s Office received and docketed his

Complaint on January 30, 2025, and that the Complaint “arrived via bankruptcy routing rather

than with the original mailing envelope.” (Id. at PageID 982.)

Plaintiff did not present this “new evidence” to Judge Pham despite having over fifteen

months to do so. So these arguments fall short because Plaintiff failed to present this evidence to

Judge Pham in the first instance so he waived this argument. See Dabrowski, 722 F. Supp. 3d at

771 (quoting Murr, 200 4 F.3d at 902 n.1); Tulis v. Gerragano, No. 24-1226, 2025 WL 1805166,

at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 30, 2025) (“[T]he purpose of objections to a report and recommendation

is to focus the attention of the district court on possible errors of fact or law contained in the

report, not to present new evidence and arguments that were not presented to the magistrate

judge in the first instance.”) (citation omitted)).

What is more, Plaintiff’s arguments contradict his earlier position. In response to

Madison County, Griffin, and Jordan’s Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff accepted that the statute of

limitations ran on January 24th. (See ECF No. 87 at PageID 734–35.) He argued that

“[e]quitable tolling, continuing-violation principles, and federal accrual rules all weight heavily

against a mechanical ‘one-day-late’ dismissal.” (Id. at PageID 735.) Judge Pham’s R&R

correctly disposes of these arguments in detail. (ECF No. 96 at PageID 962–66.) And Plaintiff

has pointed to no error in Judge Pham’s analysis. The Court thus overrules Plaintiff’s first two

objections.

B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff next objects to applying quasi-judicial immunity “at the pleading stage.” (ECF

No. 97 at PageID 983.) This argument similarly comes up short. Although Plaintiff states that

the Court “should require an act-by-act functional analysis” (ECF No. 97 at PageID 983), he

does not explain what that analysis would look like or otherwise articulate where Judge Pham

might have erred. Nor does he explain why Judicial Assistant Jordan or Assistant Clerk Griffin

acted outside of “duties [] functionally comparable to those of a judge.” Hughes v. Duncan, 93

F.4th 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

An “objection” that does little more than disagree with a magistrate judge’s

recommendation “without explaining the source of the error” is not considered proper or

“specific.” Howard, 932 F.2d at 509. At any rate, Judge Pham did not err under any standard of

review. He analyzed Plaintiff’s allegations and correctly concluded that Jordan and Griffin are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. So the Court overrules this objection as well.

C. State Action

Judge Pham found that the Third Amended Complaint failed in part because the § 1983

claims were “brought against private actors.” (ECF No. 96 at PageID 968–70.) Plaintiff

“objects to the categorical dismissal on this ground at the pleading stage.” (ECF No. 97 at

PageID 983.) This is another general objection with no legal or factual support. See Howard,

932 F.2d at 509. Judge Pham acknowledged that while it is possible for a private actor to be

liable under § 1983, “[t]here is no factual basis presented in the pleadings to support that any

state actor compelled, significantly encouraged, or coerced the private actor Defendants to take

the allegedly unconstitutional action.” (ECF No. 96 at PageID 969–70.) This is the correct

conclusion based on the pleadings. Finding no error in Judge Pham’s analysis and

recommendation, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection.

D. Monell Claim and State-Law Claims

Plaintiff’s final two objections are not really objections at all. He requests leave to

amend his Monell and state-law fraud claims. (ECF No. 97 at PageID 983.) And if the Court

declines to allow Plaintiff to amend his fraud claims, he asks the Court to “decline supplemental

jurisdiction . . . and dismiss any remaining state-law claims without prejudice.” (Id.)

Start with the first request. Rule 15 provides that a court should freely grant leave to

amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “If it is at all possible

that the party against whom the dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or

state a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415

F. App’x 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). But granting leave to amend “is not merely

a formality, especially in the event of . . . ‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed.’” United States ex rel. Angelo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 F.4th 441, 454 (6th

Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 550 (2024) (citation omitted).

Judge Pham gave Plaintiff many chances to plead his case and he amended his

complaints three times. And he responded to motions to dismiss and lodged objections to the

R&R. “‘[E]nough is enough . . . [a] [f]ederal court is not a sounding board for litigants to test

various theories until they find one allowing the litigation to continue.’” Id. (citation omitted).

The Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint a fourth time to try to cure yet

another round of pleading defects. See id. (“Our pleading rules—and the district court’s

discretion to administer them—exist to keep litigants from sandbagging their opponents until

they are on notice of what their allegations lack.”).

That leaves supplemental jurisdiction. “In determining whether to retain jurisdiction over

state-law claims, a district court should consider and weigh several factors, including the ‘values

of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d

949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). A federal court’s general practice is to decline

supplemental jurisdiction when, as here, no federal claims remain. See id. at 952; Lyndon’s LLC

v. City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 23-1895, 2024 WL 3427176, at *3 (6th Cir. July 16, 2024)

(“Both federal statutory provisions and our precedent not only permit but encourage district

courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are left without

an anchor when their associated federal claims are dismissed.” (citations omitted)).

Despite this general practice, the Court hesitates before dismissing Plaintiff’s state claims

without prejudice just so that he can keep litigating them in state court. But Defendants’

responses to Plaintiff’s objections did not argue against dismissal without prejudice. And the

Motions to Dismiss filed by those Defendants implicated in the state claims—McHaney,

Holmes, Willis, Mysinger, Exum, and McConnell—expressly ask the Court not to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. (ECF No. 88 at PageID 757; ECF No. 90-5 at PageID 903 (requesting

in the alternative).) The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law claims without

prejudice.

DISPOSITION

Because Plaintiff’s objections do not warrant de novo review or otherwise fail on the

merits, the Court reviews the R&R for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous only when,

after reviewing the record, the Court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” United States v. Reed, 72 F.4th 174, 190 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United

States v. Sands, 4 F.4th 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2021)). Having reviewed the R&R, the parties’

filings, and the record, the Court finds no such error. The Court will therefore adopt Judge

Pham’s recommendation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the Judge Pham’s R&R and GRANTS

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. The Court thus DISMISSES Plaintiff’s federal claims WITH

PREJUDICE and dismisses Plaintiff’s state-law claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of September, 2026.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE