The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
DUDLEY ALVIN DAUPHIN, )
Reg. No. 59816-509, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:26-CV-400-WKW
) [WO]
RAY COLEMAN, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Dudley Dauphin, an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights in connection with
sanctions he received for possessing a cell phone on three different occasions. He
challenges three BOP disciplinary actions that resulted in the forfeiture of 123 days
of good-conduct time and further alleges that he did not timely receive the
corresponding Discipline Hearing Officer reports.
At the time of filing, Petitioner was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp
in Montgomery, Alabama (“FPC-Montgomery”), where he remains in custody
today. Respondent, who is named in his official capacity as the warden of FPC-
Montgomery,1 filed an answer to the § 2241 amended petition. (Doc. # 11.) He
requests dismissal of Petitioner’s petition partially for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and, alternatively, for failure to allege a violation of his due
process rights. Petitioner was directed to file a reply (Doc. # 12) but did not do so.
For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed with prejudice
because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a due process violation. Additionally,
an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts2 [hereinafter Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases].
II. JURISDICTION
A federal prisoner may obtain habeas relief by showing that he is in custody
“in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). A § 2241 petitioner who “seeks to challenge his present physical
custody within the United States . . . should name his warden as respondent and file
the petition in the district of confinement.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447
(2004); see also Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“Section 2241 petitions may be brought only in the district court for the district in
1 Because the warden has changed since the petition was filed, the electronic docket sheet will be
updated to substitute the current acting warden, Ray Coleman, as Respondent.
2 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases apply to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b),
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (providing that the Rules apply to habeas corpus petitions filed
under provisions other than § 2254).
which the inmate is incarcerated.”). These requirements are satisfied because
Petitioner alleges he is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or
laws of the United States, names his warden as the respondent, and filed this § 2241
petition in the district where he is confined.
III. BACKGROUND
The material facts necessary to resolve this petition are undisputed. Petitioner
is serving a 120-month federal sentence (Doc. # 1 at 2), with a projected release date
of May 23, 2030 (Doc. # 11-3 at 3).3 Between April 2024 and April 2025, he
received three incident reports that collectively resulted in the forfeiture of 123 days
of good-conduct time (GCT). The incidents and resulting disciplinary outcomes are
summarized below. Petitioner’s claims are set forth following that summary.
A. Disciplinary Incidents
First Disciplinary Incident (Incident Report # 3925798). On April 19,
2024, two cell phones were found in Petitioner’s locker at the institution where he
was confined (FCC Coleman), and he was charged with the infraction, “Possession
of a Hazardous Tool, Code 108.” (Doc. # 11-2 at 3.) He received the incident report
on April 20, 2024, and a hearing occurred on April 25, 2024, before Discipline
3 References to “Doc(s).” are to the document numbers of the pleadings and other materials in the
court’s electronic record, as compiled and designated on the docket sheet by the Clerk of Court.
Pinpoint citations are to the page of the electronically filed document in the court's CM/ECF filing
system.
Hearing Officer (DHO) Wendy White. (See Doc. # 11-2 at 3, 10–13.) Petitioner
waived staff assistance and witnesses, offered no documents, and admitted “[i]t was
mine.” (Doc. # 11-2 at 3, 10–11.) The DHO relied on the staff eyewitness account,
incident report, chain-of-custody photographs, and Petitioner’s admission to find
him guilty. (Doc. # 11-2 at 3–4, 10–12.) Sanctions included forfeiture of 41 days
GCT. (Doc. # 11-2 at 12.) The DHO report, dated April 25, 2024, was delivered to
Petitioner on May 2, 2024. (Doc. # 11-2 at 13; Doc. # 1 at 2.)
Second Disciplinary Incident (Incident Report # 4060221). On January 27,
2025, at FPC Montgomery, staff observed Petitioner holding a cell phone, and he
was again charged with “Possession of a Hazardous Tool, Code 108.” (Doc. # 11-3
at 3.) He received the incident report the same day, and a hearing was held on
February 6, 2025, before DHO Ronald Gillard. (Doc. # 11-3 at 3, 11.) Petitioner
waived staff assistance and witnesses, offered no documents, and stated, “I have no
statement concerning a cell phone.” (Doc. # 11-3 at 3, 11–12.)
Finding Petitioner guilty, the DHO relied on the reporting officer’s eyewitness
account, chain-of-custody photographs, and the information in the incident report.
(Doc. # 11-3 at 3–4, 12–13.) Sanctions included forfeiture of 41 days GCT. (Doc.
# 11-3 at 13.) The DHO report, dated February 11, 2025, was delivered to Petitioner
on June 11, 2025. (Doc. # 11-3 at 14; Doc. # 1 at 2.)
Third Disciplinary Incident (Incident Report # 4100427). On April 14,
2025, a cell phone was found magnetized to the back of Petitioner’s locker in his
cell at FPC Montgomery. He again was charged with “Possession of a Hazardous
Tool, Code 108.” (Doc. # 11-3 at 4–5.)
Petitioner received the incident report on April 14, 2025, and a hearing
occurred on April 22, 2025, before DHO Gillard. (Doc. # 11-3 at 4, 16.) He waived
staff assistance, requested three inmate witnesses, offered no documents, and
admitted “I’m guilty of having the cell phone.” (Doc. # 11-3 at 4, 16–17.) The
witnesses provided statements that another inmate confessed to ownership of the
phone, but the DHO credited the incident report and Petitioner’s admission of guilt
during the hearing. (Doc. # 11-3 at 4–5, 17–18.) Sanctions included forfeiture of
41 days GCT. (Doc. # 11-3 at 19.) The DHO report, dated May 1, 2025, was
delivered to Petitioner on June 11, 2025. (Doc. # 11-3 at 19; Doc. # 1 at 2.)
B. Petitioner’s Claims
In light of these disciplinary outcomes, Petitioner brings three claims. In
Claim One, Petitioner alleges that the BOP exceeded its authority under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(b) by forfeiting 123 days of his GCT in a “single annual earning cycle,” an
amount he contends exceeds the maximum GCT the statute permits an inmate to
earn in a year. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) He contends that this over-forfeiture has unlawfully
extended his sentence. (Doc. # 1 at 3.)
In Claim Two, he alleges that the BOP violated its policies and regulations by
delaying delivery of the DHO reports. He asserts that Program Statement 5270.09
titled, “Inmate Discipline Program,” requires DHO reports to be provided within 15
work days, yet the second and third DHO reports were delivered approximately 125
days and 50 days after the hearings. He claims that these delays were “extreme,
unreasonable, and prejudicial,” violated Program Statement 5270.09 and 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.8(h), hindered his ability to pursue administrative remedies, and adversely
affected his eligibility for placement in a residential reentry center (RRC) and for
home confinement. (Doc. # 1 at 3–4.)
In Claim Three, Petitioner alleges a Fifth Amendment due process violation.
He contends that delays in receiving the DHO’s written findings deprived him of a
meaningful opportunity to appeal and of the procedural protections required before
the forfeiture of GCT, in violation of due process under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). (Doc. # 1 at 3–4.)
As relief, Petitioner requests the court to (1) make findings that the
“disciplinary proceedings violated federal law and constitutional due process”;
(2) restore all 123 GCT days and expunge Incident Reports 4060221 and 4100427;
and (3) order the BOP to immediately recalculate his release date, RRC eligibility,
and home confinement eligibility, and for any further just relief. (Doc. # 1 at 4.)
In response to the § 2241 petition, Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies as to the two later incidents and, in any event, that
none of the three disciplinary proceedings violated due process. (Doc. # 11.)
IV. DISCUSSION
A review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner was afforded due process
in each of the three disciplinary proceedings at issue. For this reason, only the merits
of Petitioner’s due process claims will be addressed, and the exhaustion defense will
not be reached.4 The analysis proceeds in two parts: first, it summarizes the
procedural due process protections required when a prison disciplinary hearing may
result in the loss of GCT; and second, it applies those principles to Petitioner’s
specific claims and arguments.
A. The Procedural Due Process Protections Required when a Prison
Disciplinary Hearing May Result in the Loss of GCT
Petitioner, as a federal inmate, has a liberty interest in the GCT he has earned.
See Dean-Mitchell v. Reese, 837 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that
a federal prisoner has a protected liberty interest in statutory good-time credits
already earned, in the context of a D.C. offender incarcerated in a federal prison who
faced loss of such credits following a disciplinary hearing). “Where a prisoner has
4 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015). For this reason, even
where the respondent properly raises exhaustion, the court may “skip over” that defense “if it is
easier to deny (not grant, of course, but deny) the petition on the merits without reaching the
exhaustion question.” Id. That judicial discretion is exercised here.
a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his
prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment.”
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
Therefore, “the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time
credits is not imposed arbitrarily.” Id.
Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time
credits, . . . the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the
factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action.
Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974)).
In Hill, the Supreme Court clarified that “revocation of good time does not
comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process, unless the
findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the
record.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Requiring a modicum
of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent
arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue
administrative burdens.” Id. at 455. The Court further expounded on its some-
evidence holding as follows:
We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some
evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to
revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some
evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal
could be deduced. . . .” Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied
does not require examination of the entire record, independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.
Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the
record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board. We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a
constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take place
in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often
act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less
exigent circumstances. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of
prison administrators that have some basis in fact.
Id. at 455–56 (citations omitted). In a § 2241 habeas proceeding, whether “some
evidence” supports a prison disciplinary decision revoking a prisoner’s good-time
credits presents a question of law. Kapordelis v. Myers, 16 F.4th 1195, 1199 (5th
Cir. 2021).
B. Application of the Procedural Due Process Principles to Petitioner’s
Specific Claims and Arguments
1. Advance Written Notice of the Disciplinary Charges
Petitioner received advance written notice of each charge when he was served
with the incident report: on April 20, 2024 (first infraction); on January 27, 2025
(second infraction); and on April 14, 2025 (third infraction). (Doc. # 11-2 at 3, 10;
Doc. # 11-3 at 3, 11; Doc. # 11-3 at 4, 16.) His DHO hearings were held on April
25, 2024, February 6, 2025, and April 22, 2025, respectively. (Doc. # 11-2 at 3, 10;
Doc. # 11-3 at 3, 11; Doc. # 11-3 at 4, 16.) On these undisputed facts, Petitioner’s
due process right to advance written notice was satisfied, and he does not allege
otherwise.
2. Opportunity to Call Witnesses and Present Documentary Evidence
Petitioner received the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in each of the three disciplinary proceedings. He waived the right to call
witnesses at the DHO hearings for the first two infractions but requested and
presented witnesses at the DHO hearing for the third infraction. He did not request
or submit documentary evidence at any hearing. (Doc. # 11-2 at 3; Doc. # 11-3 at
3, 4.) Accordingly, Petitioner received the process due with respect to the
opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and he does not allege
otherwise.
3. The Hill Requirement that Disciplinary Findings Must Be Supported
by “Some Evidence”
Following each hearing, the DHO found that Petitioner committed the charged
misconduct. (Doc. # 11-2 at 3, 11; Doc. # 11-3 at 3, 11; Doc. # 11-3 at 4, 16.)
Reaching those determinations, the DHOs relied on the reporting staff’s eyewitness
accounts. According to those accounts, during routine searches, a cellular phone
was discovered in Petitioner’s cell on two occasions, and on the third occasion,
Petitioner was observed holding a cellular phone and surrendered it upon demand.
The DHOs also relied on the incident reports and supporting materials, including
chain-of-custody photographs, as well as Petitioner’s admissions of guilt as to the
first and third infractions. (Doc. # 11-2 at 3–4; Doc. # 11-3 at 3–4, 12–13; Doc.
# 11-3 at 4–5, 18.)
Because revocation of GCT need only be supported by “some evidence,” Hill,
472 U.S. at 454, the record here more than suffices. The DHOs’ findings will not
be disturbed.
4. Written Statement of the Evidence and Reasons for the Disciplinary
Action; Timeliness of Petitioner’s Receipt of the DHOs’ Written
Findings
Petitioner admits he received written DHO reports explaining the evidence
relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. However, he complains that
he did not receive the DHO report for the second disciplinary incident until
approximately 125 days after the hearing and that he did not receive the DHO report
for the third incident until approximately 50 days after the hearing. (Doc. # 1 at 3–
4.) He asserts that these delays hindered his ability to pursue administrative
remedies (Doc. # 1 at 3–4), but Respondent argues that Petitioner has not shown
resulting prejudice (Doc. # 11 at 13–14). Respondent has the better argument.
District courts considering habeas claims relating to the late receipt of DHO
reports have concluded that “a delayed delivery of a disciplinary report to an inmate,
without more, does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief.” Nicholson v.
Carter, 2024 WL 895120, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 29, 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (collecting cases). This finding across district courts rests, in part, on the
principle that “[i]t is not the mere fact of the government’s delay that violates due
process, but rather the prejudice resulting from such delay.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Griffin v. Ebbert, 640 F. App’x 181, 184 (3d Cir.
2016) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation where the petitioner did not
receive a disciplinary report for 18 months because the petitioner did not
demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the delay and had received the process he
was due under Wolff).
Here, Petitioner ultimately received the DHO reports for each infraction and
has not shown prejudice from any delay. Although Petitioner contends that the
delays in receipt of two of the DHO reports impeded his ability to pursue
administrative remedies, the undisputed record shows otherwise. After receiving
these DHO reports, Petitioner filed administrative remedies, and none was rejected
as untimely. Rather, administrative remedy no. 1277250-R1 was rejected because
Petitioner used the incorrect form and attempted to submit it as “sensitive.” (Doc.
# 11-1 ¶ 11.) He was advised of these deficiencies and instructed how to correct and
resubmit the form, but he did not do so. (Doc. # 11-1 ¶ 11.) Also, administrative
remedy no. 1201954-F1 was rejected because Petitioner improperly filed at the BP-
9 level, and he did not attempt to resubmit this administrative remedy again at any
level. (Doc. # 11-1 ¶ 10.)
On this record, Petitioner has not shown that the delay in receiving two of the
DHO reports prejudiced his ability to seek administrative recourse. He received all
the process due under Wolff v. McDonnell, see 418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974), and
any delay in receiving the DHO reports did not rise to the level of a due process
violation.
5. BOP’s Alleged Noncompliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) and its Own
Policy and Regulation
Petitioner alleges that the BOP violated 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) and failed to
comply with its own policy and regulation. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Respondent argues that
these allegations do not provide a basis for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Doc. # 11 at 14–17.) These allegations are addressed in turn.
First, Petitioner contends that the BOP exceeded its authority by forfeiting
more GCT for his disciplinary infractions than he believes 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)
permits. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Resolving that contention requires interpreting both
§ 3624(b) and Program Statement 5270.09. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), a federal
prisoner serving a term of more than one year may earn up to 54 days of GCT for
each year of the sentence imposed based on “exemplary compliance with
institutional disciplinary regulations.” Program Statement 5270.09 governs the
forfeiture of GCT for Greatest Severity Level prohibited acts (Level 100 offenses).
(See Doc. # 11-4.) It authorizes forfeiture and/or withholding of earned GCT or non-
vested GCT “up to 100%.” (Doc. # 11-4 at 47.) Petitioner was found to have
committed three Level 100 offenses, for which forfeiture of up to 100% of vested or
non-vested GCT is authorized. (See Doc. # 11-4 at 47.) The sanction imposed for
each of his infractions (i.e., 41 days per infraction) fell within those limits.
Petitioner argues that any forfeiture of GCT is capped at the amount he could
earn in a single year under § 3624(b). (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Neither Program Statement
5270.09 nor § 3624(b) imposes that limitation. Program Statement 5270.09 does not
tether the permissible forfeiture of GCT to a one-year accrual cap. And § 3624(b)
addresses how GCT may be earned and does not contain any provision restricting
the BOP’s ability to forfeit previously accrued GCT based on disciplinary
misconduct. As the district court in Garcia v. Warden, FCI Danbury explained,
GCT accrues over the course of a federal prisoner’s sentence, so the pool of GCT
credits available to forfeit grows as GCT credits are earned. See 2025 WL 1927909,
at *6 (D. Conn. July 14, 2025). Thus, a prisoner “who has accumulated two or more
years of GCT credits” could “lose more than 54 days’ GCT credits after committing
multiple prohibited acts.” Id. Petitioner, therefore, cannot show that the BOP
exceeded its statutory authority in imposing the GCT forfeitures.
Second, Petitioner alleges that the BOP violated its own policy and regulation,
and thereby his due process rights, by delaying delivery of the statutorily required
written disciplinary decisions beyond the timeframe contemplated by Program
Statement 5270.09. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Program Statement 5270.09 provides that the
DHO will “give[] the inmate a written copy of the decisions and disposition,
ordinarily within 15 workdays of the decision.” (Doc. # 11-4 at 36.) While it is
undisputed that the BOP failed to provide two of the DHO reports within the 15-
workday timeframe contemplated by Program Statement 5270.09, Petitioner
identifies no authority indicating that such a timing lapse, standing alone, amounts
to a due process violation. Persuasive authority is to the contrary. See Brand v.
Warden, FCI Florence, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40914, at *23 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 2026)
(rejecting a due process claim premised on the alleged noncompliance with BOP
timing policy for setting a disciplinary hearing because “even if prison staff had
violated BOP policy, a violation of BOP policies and procedures does not support a
due process violation” (collecting cases)), R&R adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39733 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2026). Additionally, while the Code of Federal Regulations
specifies the information the DHO’s written report must contain, it does not set forth
any provision that prescribes a deadline for providing it. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h).
V. CONCLUSION
Petitioner has not alleged any due process violation arising from the
disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the forfeiture of his good-conduct time.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall update the electronic
docket sheet to substitute Ray Coleman as the Respondent.
Final judgment will be entered separately.
DONE this 3rd day of September, 2026.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE