Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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:

MIGLAB TRAVAUX ET SERVICES, :

:

Plaintiffs, :

: 25-CV-06318 (JAV)

-v- :

: OPINION AND ORDER

UNITED STTAES OF AMERICA, and :

INTERNATIONAL ARMORING :

CORPORATION, :

:

Defendants. :

:

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JEANNETTE A. VARGAS, United States District Judge:

On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff Miglab Travaux et Services (“Plaintiff” or

“Miglab”) initiated this action against Defendants International Armoring

Corporation (“IAC”) and the United States of America (the “Government”). See ECF

No. 1. In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a vehicle—which Plaintiff

had purchased from IAC and arranged to be shipped from Texas, United States to

Togo—was seized and forfeited by United States Customs and Border Protection

(“CBP”). ECF No. 27 (“Am. Compl.”), ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff brings a breach of

contract claim against IAC. Id., ¶¶ 18-20. Plaintiff also seeks to set aside the

forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(e).

IAC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 28. The Government filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, a motion for summary

judgement pursuant to Rule 56. ECF No. 36. For the reasons that follow, both IAC

and the Government’s motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following allegations are derived from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.

In or about April 2020, Plaintiff contracted with Defendant IAC, purchasing a

2020 Mercedes Benz Sprinter van (the “vehicle”) from IAC for approximately

$250,000. Am. Compl., ¶ 12. IAC agreed to ship the vehicle from Freeport, Texas to

Lome, Togo, with an estimated departure in April 2021. Id., ¶ 14. CBP agents

seized the vehicle before it left the United States. Id., ¶ 15. Although CBP claims

that on or about April 15, 2021, it sent a Notice of Seizure to Savadogo Loukouman,

who brokered the transaction, Plaintiff never received the notice. Id. CBP

completed the forfeiture process in January 2022, and Plaintiff received notice of

the forfeiture through its former counsel on April 18, 2022. Id., ¶ 16. After Plaintiff

filed a protest with CBP, CBP informed Plaintiff that it was not a party entitled to

the Notice of Seizure. Id., ¶ 17.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] plaintiff asserting

subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that it exists.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.

2000). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under

Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate it.” Id.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “may challenge

either the legal or factual sufficiency of the plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction, or

both.” Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). Where the

defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, the court

must treat all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the complaining party. Id. “But where evidence relevant to

the jurisdictional question is before the court, the district court may refer to that

evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).

B. Rule 12(b)(2)

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), a

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the Court’s personal jurisdiction over

the defendants. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34-35 (2d

Cir. 2010). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,

a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Thomas v.

Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2006). As such, a plaintiff must show “legally

sufficient allegations of jurisdiction,” including “an averment of facts that, if

credited, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” In re Magnetic

Audiotape, 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

To resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, a court has “considerable procedural

leeway and may decide it on the basis of affidavits alone, permit discovery in aid of

the motion, or conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Struna v. Leonardi, 626 F. Supp.

3d 657, 665-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (cleaned up). The court should “construe[] any

pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” but “not draw

argumentative inferences in the plaintiff's favor” nor “accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the

court may consider matters outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); see also

Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d

25 (2d Cir. 1997).

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 999 F.3d 842, 854

(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, . . . [the standard] requires more than labels[,] conclusions, and

a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

To resolve a 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded

allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Romanova

v. Amilus Inc, 138 F.4th 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2025). “A district court may consider the

facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” Revitalizing Auto

Communities Env’t Response Tr. v. Nat’l Grid USA, 92 F.4th 415, 436 (2d Cir.

2024). “Moreover, even if a document is not expressly incorporated by reference, the

court may still consider it if the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect,

rendering the document integral to the complaint.” Id. (cleaned up).

DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over IAC

Defendant IAC contends that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over IAC,

a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Ogden, Utah, ECF No. 30

(“Burton Decl.”), ¶ 5. The Court agrees.

Personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary is determined by “whether the

state’s long-arm statute provides a statutory basis for jurisdiction and, if so,

whether exercising personal jurisdiction would comport with due process.”

Edwardo v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Providence, 66 F.4th 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2023) (per

curium); see also Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The breadth

of a federal court’s personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in

which the district court is located.”). Here, Plaintiff relies upon the specific

jurisdiction provision of New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), as

providing the statutory basis for the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. ECF

No. 31 (“Pl. Mem. in Opp’n to IAC Mot.”) at 5-11.

Under Section 302(a)(1), personal jurisdiction is properly asserted over an

out-of-state defendant who, in person or through an agent, “transacts any business

within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” so

long as the cause of action “aris[es] from” such transactions. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §

302(a)(1). Accordingly, to determine if personal jurisdiction exists under this

provision, “a court must decide (1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business'

in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a

business transaction.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d

50, 60 (2d Cir. 2012). Although “proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient

to invoke [personal] jurisdiction” under the State’s long-arm statute, the defendant’s

activities must be “purposeful.” Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467

(1988).

Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an out-

of-state defendant transacts business in New York, including whether the

defendant has an on-going contractual relationship with a New York corporation,

whether the contract was negotiated or executed in New York, whether the

defendant has visited New York for the purpose of meeting with parties to the

contract, what the choice-of-law clause is in any such contract, whether the contract

requires notices and payments to be sent into the forum state, and whether the

contract subjects them to supervision by the corporation in the forum state. Agency

Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1996).

“Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant, through volitional acts,

avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d

375, 380 (2007) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to create an inference that IAC engaged in any

volitional act to conduct business in New York. The contract was not negotiated in

New York nor did it require either party to send payments to New York. Burton

Decl., ¶ 7.1 The invoice lists a Burkina Faso address and Canadian area code2 for

Plaintiff. See ECF No. 27-2 (“Ex. B”).. “Critically, every aspect of the business

performed by [IAC] was performed outside of New York: the merchandise at issue

never passed through New York; no one in New York supervised the shipments; and

no payment flowed into New York.” Suntree Int’l Corp. v. Rossi, 19-CV-3845 (NG)

(RLM), 2021 WL 5701407, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021). By entering into a

contract with a foreign company based in Burkina Faso, Am. Compl., ¶ 7, to ship a

car from Texas to Togo, id., ¶ 15, IAC was by no means “projecti[ing] itself onto New

York.” Berkshire Cap. Grp., LLC v. Palmet Ventures, LLC, 307 F. App'x 479, 481

(2d Cir. 2008) (summary order).

Although Plaintiff alleges that “IAC purposefully did business with Miglab’s

New York office,” Pl. Mem. in Opp’n to IAC Mot. at 2, Plaintiff “cannot establish

jurisdiction through conclusory assertions alone” and must make allegations with

“some factual specificity.” Cont’l Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Equate Petrochemical Co., 586

F. App'x 768, 769 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (citation omitted). The only

allegations Plaintiff has advanced with any “factual specificity” concern two emails

1 Although these facts are from IAC’s affidavit, the Amended Complaint contains no

allegations to the contrary.

2 The Court takes judicial notice, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201, that

226 is a Canadian area code. See AllAreaCodes.com,

https://www.allareacodes.com/226 (last accessed July 6, 2026).

sent from IAC to one of Plaintiff’s employees based in its New York office concerning

the transaction. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 5-7, ECF No. 27-3 (“Ex. C”) and 27-4 (“Ex. D”).

These emails—one attaching an export license, Ex. C, and the other attaching

videos and photos of the vehicle, Ex. D—do not suggest that Defendant purposefully

transacted business in New York. This kind of “temporary, random, or tenuous

[contact] with the forum” is inadequate to establish jurisdiction. Agency Rent A Car

Sys., 98 F.3d at 30 (citing cases). In particular, courts have found even more

sustained contacts, including frequent phone calls and emails sent into New York

by a non-domiciliary defendant during the course of a contract negotiation, does not

permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) where the

contract itself was to be performed outside of New York. See, e.g., Suntree, 2021 WL

5701407, at *5 (citing cases); Arouh v. Budget Leasing, Inc., 883 N.Y.S. 2d 4, 5 (1st

Dep’t 2009); Executive Life Ltd. v. Silverman, 890 N.Y.S. 2d 106, 108 (2009).

These emails also do not plausibly suggest that IAC had knowledge of

Plaintiff’s New York office before this lawsuit commenced. The emails, which were

sent to a Gmail account, contain no indication that Plaintiff’s agent was located in

New York at the time of the communications. See Ex. C and Ex. D. As IAC did not

purposefully “transact any business” in New York state, Section 302(a)(1) does not

confer personal jurisdiction over IAC.

Plaintiff argues that by advertising “Shipping Worldwide” and worldwide

delivery on its website, IAC’s contacts with New York are purposeful and it would

be foreseeable for IAC to be haled into a New York court. Pl. Mem. in Opp’n to IAC

Mot. at 11. However, courts have held that advertisements on “passive” web sites

are not acts “purposefully directed toward the forum state,” unless accompanied by

additional contacts like selling to or collecting information from forum residents.

K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, No. 98-CV-3773 (LMM), 1998 WL 823657, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 24, 1998) (collecting cases); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952

F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“A passive Web site that does little more than

make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the

exercise of personal jurisdiction.”). As a company that “does not have an office in

New York, own real estate in New York, have any current customers in New York,

[nor] otherwise do business in New York,” Burton Decl., ¶ 6, IAC’s website is

immaterial to establishing purposeful business activity in the state.

As personal jurisdiction does not lie under New York’s long-arm statute, the

Court need not reach the question of whether personal jurisdiction comports with

due process. See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161,

168 (2d Cir. 2013).

B. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff requests that it be permitted to take limited discovery related to

personal jurisdiction, including: “(1) IAC’s communications with Miglab and

[Miglab’s New York agent]; (2) IAC’s knowledge of Miglab’s New York office; (3)

IAC’s New York customers and shipments; and (4) IAC’s use of U.S. ports and

facilities[.]” Pl. Mem. in Opp’n to IAC Mot. at 14-15. Because Plaintiff offers

nothing more than sheer speculation that any evidence will be uncovered that

would establish personal jurisdiction, the Court denies this request.

“Whether to allow jurisdictional discovery is a decision as to which a district

court enjoys substantial discretion.” Reed Int'l, Inc. v. Afghanistan Int'l Bank, 657

F. Supp. 3d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).

Where “the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case for personal

jurisdiction, jurisdictional discovery is generally not granted.” RSM Prod. Corp. v.

Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 387 F. App’x 72 (2d Cir.

2010) (summary order). Discovery may be granted, however, if the plaintiff but has

“made a sufficient start toward establishing jurisdiction and have shown that their

position is not frivolous.” PST Servs., Inc. v. Larson, 221 F.R.D. 33, 37 (N.D.N.Y.

2004); see also Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. A.J. Stratton Syndicate (No. 782), 731 F.

Supp. 587, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (collecting cases). “Discovery need not be granted to

allow plaintiff to engage in an unfounded fishing expedition for jurisdictional facts.”

RSM Prod. Corp., 643 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations have not established a prima facie case of

personal jurisdiction nor made a “sufficient start” toward it. Even if they had,

however, the specific categories of discovery sought by Plaintiff are unlikely to yield

information relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Any discoverable information

related to IAC’s communications with Plaintiff’s New York office would presumably

already be in Plaintiff’s possession. Plaintiff provides no non-speculative reason to

suggest that IAC would have knowledge that the Miglab employee with whom it

communicated was based in New York. More fundamentally, even if Plaintiff could

establish such knowledge on the part of IAC, and could point to evidence of

additional communications between IAC and its New York office during the course

of negotiating the sale contract, this would not change the jurisdictional calculus.

As discussed supra, such communications, even if they occurred more frequently

than the two emails cited in the Amended Complaint, would not suffice to establish

personal jurisdiction. See Suntree, 2021 WL 5701407, at *5.

With respect to discovery regarding IAC’s general business dealings in New

York, such evidence likewise would not establish personal jurisdiction under Section

302(a)(1), as the cause of action here would not arise from business dealings IAC

conducts with third parties. While such discovery might be relevant to the general

jurisdiction provision of New York’s long arm statute, IAC has made no attempt to

argue that personal jurisdiction is appropriate under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. See Reich

v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Under Section 301, “[a] defendant

is doing business and is therefore present in New York and subject to personal

jurisdiction with respect to any cause of action, related or unrelated to the New

York contacts, if it does business in New York not occasionally or casually, but with

a fair measure of permanence and continuity.” (cleaned up)), aff’d, 858 F.3d 55 (2d

Cir. 2017). Plaintiff has not presented a single allegation, other than the use of

“Worldwide” in its advertising, that suggests that IAC conducts any business in

New York, let alone with the requisite level of continuity required under Section

301. Moreover, IAC has denied any business dealings and customers in New York.

Burton Decl., ¶ 6.

In any event, permitting discovery to establish jurisdiction under Section 301

would be futile. It well-established that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a

corporate defendant that is not incorporated in New York or that does not have its

principal place of business in New York will only comport with due process in “truly

‘exceptional’ circumstances.” See, e.g., United States v. Wolin, No. 17-CV-2927

(KAM) (CLP), 2024 WL 779056, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2024); see also Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (for court to exercise general jurisdiction over

corporation, its contacts with a state must be so “continuous and systematic as to

render it essentially at home in the forum State” (cleaned up)). Thus, even were

Plaintiff to obtain evidence that IAC had other New York customers, or shipped

items through New York ports, that would not suffice to subject IAC to suit in a

New York court on Plaintiff’s claims.

C. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff sues the United States to set aside a civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(e). “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its

consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). The civil forfeiture claims against the

United States must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed

to allege an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity.

Firstly, Plaintiff relies upon the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2680(c), as amended by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”),

as providing the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity. Am. Compl., ¶ 10.

Plaintiff’s invocation of the FTCA to sustain subject matter jurisdiction is

inapposite for several reasons. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity with respect

to “claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for. loss of property . . .

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b)(1). “This waiver, however, is made subject to the detention exception, §

2680(c) of the FTCA, which bars claims ‘arising in respect of . . . the detention of any

goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any

other law enforcement officer.’” Diaz v. United States, 517 F.3d 608, 613 (2d Cir.

2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).

CAFRA amended Section 2680(c) to create “an exception to the exception,

that is, to permit claims against the United States for injury or loss of goods or

property in law enforcement custody if the claimant can satisfy four conditions.” Id.

The four conditions are:

(1) the property was seized for the purpose

of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing

for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence

imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;

(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;

(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or

mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture); and

(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the

interest of the claimant in the property was subject

to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)-(c)(4)). Failure to fulfill any one of those four criteria

means that Plaintiff “cannot benefit from § 2680(c)’s re-waiver of sovereign immunity,

and there is no federal jurisdiction under the FTCA to hear [Plaintiff’s] claim.” Id.

The Amended Complaint concedes that the vehicle was in fact successfully

forfeited. Am. Compl., ¶ 16. Accordingly, Section 2680(c) does not operate to waive

the Government’s sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Acosta v. United States, 12-MC-

793 (ARR), 2013 WL 2444172, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2013); Akeem v. United

States, 854 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

The FTCA also does not provide the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity

for the additional reason that Plaintiff has not plead that it timely filed an

administrative claim with the agency prior to initiating this suit. “The FTCA

requires that a claimant exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a

complaint in federal district court,” and a failure to do so warrants dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health

Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden “to

both plead and prove compliance with the [FTCA’s] statutory requirements.” In re

Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1987) (collecting cases).

Alternatively, CAFRA itself provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity

for claimants “entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding

under a civil forfeiture statute who [do] not receive such notice.” 18 U.S.C. §

983(e)(1); see also Clark v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 14-CV-7195 (JFB) (AYS), 2017 WL

1067800, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No.

14-CV-7195 (JFB) (AYS), 2017 WL 1078566 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2017) (“CAFRA sets

forth the government’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity authorizing suits

concerning assets that are administratively forfeited.”). Yet Plaintiff’s claims3 do

not fall within the ambit of Section 983(e)’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 983 permits a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a

“civil forfeiture statute.” That term has a defined meaning, and is limited to “any

provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a

sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(i). The

definition expressly excludes “the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law

codified in title 19.” Id.

The statutes underlying the forfeiture at issue in this action—19 U.S.C. §

1594(a) and 13 U.S.C. § 305(c)(4), ECF No. 38-8—are therefore not “civil forfeiture

statute[s]” within the meaning of Section 983. As a title 19 provision, 19 U.S.C. §

1594(a) is expressly carved out of the statutory definition of “civil forfeiture

statute.” See United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming that

the “customs carve-out” excludes any provision in title 19).

Plaintiff argues that 13 U.S.C. § 305(c)(4) independently qualifies as a “civil

forfeiture statute.” ECF No. 47 at 4. But Section 305(c)(4) provides for the

assessment of civil penalties, not civil forfeiture. Therefore, Section § 305(c)(4) also

fails to qualify as a “civil forfeiture statute” under CAFRA.

Plaintiff also urges the Court to “construe [CAFRA’s] provisions broadly,” to

3 Plaintiff also cites 18 U.S.C. § 981, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 18-20, but Section 981

offers no statutory cause of action—it merely defines the types of property subject to

civil forfeiture in the United States.

achieve its remedial objectives. Jd. However, “[a]ny waiver of the government’s

sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed in favor of the government.” S.E.C. v.

Credit Bancorp., Lid., 297 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); see also United

States v. Ross, 161 F.4th 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2025) “[CAFRA] is properly recognized

as a waiver of sovereign immunity and, as such, must be construed strictly so as not

to enlarge the waiver beyond what the language of the statute requires.”)

Given that Plaintiffs claims against the Government do not fall within the

narrow waiver of sovereign immunity granted by 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), the claims

against the United States are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED. The

Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions and to close the case.

SO ORDERED. .

Dated: July 28, 2026 Lak wll VGiodeD

New York, New York JEANNETTE A. VARGAS

Wnited States District Judge

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